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ABSTRACT: In the last fifteen years, conflict resolution, a collaborative, 
problem-solving approach to social conflicts, was introduced to new 
democracies in an attempt to develop civil society’s capacity for conflict 
management (Mayer, 2000). Conflict resolution provides people with an 
opportunity to advocate effectively for their own interests in a non-violent, 
constructive manner through systematic educational efforts, skills trainings, 
dialogue initiatives, and mediation practices (Mayer, 2000). It empowers people 
to address, manage, and transform difficulties and antagonism into a source of 
positive social change and, thus, change people’s negative psychological 
responses to conflicts (Bush & Folger, 1994). In this view, conflict resolution in 
new democracies’ civil society provides citizens as well NGO practitioners with 
the skills and opportunities to practice how to express and resolve differences in 
a safe and constructive environment (Shonholtz, 1997). In an effort to provide 
additional information about civil society’s conflict resolution practices and their 
affect in new democracies, this dissertation examines the existing efforts of 
South Korean civil society organisations to promote conflict resolution 
methodologies. Specifically, three organisations are examined to understand 
better South Korean civil society’s response to PCR issues. Furthermore, by 
closely examining these three civil society organisations, this dissertation aims 
to explore what affect increased awareness and engagement in conflict 
resolution methodologies have on the democratic quality of civil society.
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the last fifteen years, various social conflicts have rapidly 
emerged at all levels of society. A major problem with these conflicts 
is linked to the citizens’ inability to constructively deal with them. 
Instead of responding to various conflictual social issues through the 
process of negotiation and bargaining, citizens often manage the 
conflict with hostility1. (The Special Advisory Committee on 
Sustainable Development, 2004, p. 8)  
 
The above quote from the 2004 Report on the Institutionalization of the 
Conflict Resolution System in the Republic of Korea, the first government-
sponsored publication on such a topic, highlights that social conflicts are 
increasingly affecting the country. At the centre of the social conflict debates in 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea hereafter) lies the country’s civil society, an 
institution once most trusted by South Koreans (Kim, 2009). The country 
officially embarked on democratic transition in 1987, after Chun Do-Hwan, a 
military dictator agreed to accept the oppositional civil society’s demands for 
democracy, including the restoration of regular, free, and democratic 
presidential elections. Since then, civil society in South Korea has been largely 
revered for its influential role in monitoring the state’s democratic reforms and 
offering a space to mobilise citizen action.  
In the early 2000s, civil society in South Korean was criticised for its 
inability to resolve growing social conflicts (Park, 2004). Conservative political 
parties and media have particularly exploited South Korean civil society’s 
apparent failure in its role in the country’s growing social and public policy 
conflicts, also claiming that South Korean civil society has a limited impact on 
fostering democratic citizenship and values (Lee, 2009). Such criticism 
portrayed civil society as a party to social conflict by instigating conflictual social 
                                                
1Translated by the author.  
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dynamics, as well as escalating a public policy debate into a fierce protracted 
social conflict (Han & Seol, 2006). In response, a number of South Korean civil 
society organisations published essays that showcased the peace and conflict 
resolution efforts they had undertaken (Park, 2002; Park, 2007). They also 
argued against the conservatives’ claim that South Korean civil society was ill-
equipped to operate in a democratic environment in which disagreements and 
difference were tolerated and appreciated.  
Coming from a generation that benefits from the fruits of bloody 
democratisation battles endured by the oppositional civil society, the author 
grew up romanticising people power and civil society’s role in mobilising citizen 
action. Inspired by progressive intellectuals and civil society activists in South 
Korea, the author had the view that the expansion of civil society and its 
heightened capacity to generate progressive political discourses were beneficial 
to the country’s democratic development. However, the rise of social conflicts 
and civil society’s interplay with them in the last ten years offered an opportunity 
to reflect upon the author’s assumptions about the positive relationship between 
civil society, citizen participation in the public sphere, and democracy. This 
dissertation is a summary of the journey that the author has undertaken in the 
last six years to assess her assumptions about civil society and democracy 
critically, and to investigate civil society’s constructive engagement in South 
Korea’s social conflicts.  
This thesis grew out of a collision between the ideas and values shared 
by South Korean civil society activists who pioneered the Peace and Conflict 
Resolution (PCR hereafter) movement, whom the author met during her early 
 3 
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20s2, her intellectual training in peace studies, and an escalating interest in 
participatory democracy theory fuelled by reading Benjamin Barber’s Strong 
Democracy (1984). A growing body of scholarly work analysing the PCR 
movement’s effort to strengthen civil society further guided the development of 
the thesis (Gidron, Katz & Hasenfeld, 2003; Shonholtz, 1997; Van Tongerene, 
2005).  
This dissertation will make a contribution by exploring South Korean civil 
society’s responses to growing social and public policy conflicts and the impact 
such activities have in strengthening civil society’s role in deepening democracy 
in the country. The author will argue that civil society organisations in South 
Korea, which integrate peace and conflict resolution methodologies, play a vital 
role in enhancing civil society’s ability to nurture democratic values, norms, 
processes, and skills. Their use of peace and conflict resolution practices, 
emphasizing problem solving and tolerance, enables democratic participation 
and the constructive management of contentious social issues. To understand 
this core argument better, this thesis uses a case study methodology, 
investigating three civil society groups in South Korea that have integrated PCR 
methodologies.  
This introductory chapter reflects on the rationale for the research project, 
and describes the relevance of the core premise of the dissertation to South 
Korea’s continuing process of democratic development. To begin, this 
introduction chapter contextualises how the emerging social conflicts became a 
challenge for democratic consolidation and deepening processes by briefly 
                                                
2The author met two PCR activists while she studied abroad from 2000 to 2005 in the United States. She 
was exposed to the emergent PCR movement in South Korea through her interaction with these 
individuals. They played an influential informant role for this dissertation, and are introduced as 
interviewees in Chapter Three.  
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reviewing existing literature. Then, it reflects on how effectively the research 
questions examine South Korea’s civil society and its changing role in post-
democratic contexts. To conclude, the chapter introduces the structure of this 
dissertation, and how each chapter supports examination of the core premise.  
The Emergence of Social Conflict in the Democratic Transition Period 
Since the 1980s, efforts to move from authoritarianism to democracy 
have been initiated throughout the world (Huntingdon, 1991). This process 
generally begins with the restoration of an institutional infrastructure that allows 
open competition for the right to control the government (Grugel, 2002). At the 
top level, the political elites in new democracies have introduced a wide range 
of measures aimed at institutional reform in order to create a political 
environment favouring pluralistic democracy. With the opening of democratic 
space, civil societies in new democracies—which had previously functioned to 
mobilise democratic forces to challenge authoritarian states—have begun to 
undergo qualitative transformations (Howard, 2005). They have moved away 
from their previous role in strengthening oppositional movements, to taking on 
new roles that complement institutional democratisation. This process can be a 
difficult one: in new democracies, the excitement, joy, and celebration at the 
prospect of a democratic future, and the sense of civic pride that enabled the 
transformative change, have often been quickly replaced by day-to-day 
struggles to address political, economic, and social issues that the transition 
process has created3.  
                                                
3 The challenges facing new democracies vary from one country to another; they are hard to generalize, 
as each country engages in a democratic transitional process in a different way. A few commonly 
observed challenges that the new democracies were pressured to address in the late 1980s and early 
1990s include: the rise of ethnic nationalism, economic reforms (privatization and introduction of neo-
liberal economic measures), transitional justice mechanism to handle previous regimes’ corruption and 
human rights abuses, activation of civil society, and the rise of social conflicts. The aforementioned 
challenges should not be understood as general trends, but rather as the issues focused on by scholars 
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In the transitory environment of new democracies, many social issues 
intensify and often become sources of conflict. In studying social conflicts 
emerging in Eastern and Central Europe, Shonholtz (1997, p. 437) contends 
that within the process of democratic transition, three different types of social 
conflict exist in new democracies. The first type emerges because citizens have 
been “long suppressed or fostered by the previous regimes” to help the 
authoritarian and totalitarian elites maintain their control over society. The 
second type is closely linked to the transitional process that a country 
experiences “from one political and economic order” to a new system based 
upon liberal democracy and market economy. The third type of social conflict is 
“inherent to (liberal) democracy” as its underlying assumption is that democracy 
is an institutional mechanism developed to manage pluralistic interests, conflicts, 
and disputes (Shonholtz, 1997, p 437). The rise of contentious social issues or 
social conflicts was not unique to former communist countries; this has been 
witnessed in new democracies globally (Kaufman, 2005; Peters 2005; 
Rubinstein & Zeilzer, 2009; The South Korean President’s Special Advisory 
Committee on Sustainable Development, 2004). 
  The emergence of various social conflicts not only influences the daily 
lives of citizens, but also creates sizable challenges to nurturing constructive 
citizen participation in the public sphere (Shonholtz, 1997). Conflict resolution 
scholars, including Augsburger (1992), define conflict as an inevitable, natural, 
and normal part of human life, and contend that it affects society both 
negatively and positively, depending on how it is managed. These scholars 
advocate the development of social, governmental, and individual capacities for 
                                                                                                                                          
investigating the issues emerging after democratic transitions (Diamond, 1994; Huntingdon, 1991; Linz & 
Stepan, 1996, Linz & O’Donnell, 1996; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1996; Potter, 2005). 
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constructive management of conflict. Given that democracy, by definition, 
constructively regulates the social interests of diverse groups within institutional 
boundaries, scholars such as Ury (1999) and Augsburger (1992) contend that 
conflict erupting within the political and judicial boundaries of democracy can 
serve as a positive social force for the pursuit of democratic consolidation. 
However, generally, the development of effective institutional mechanisms for 
mediating conflict has not been rapid enough to cope with the growing social 
needs in new democracies, and citizens’ struggles to deal with social conflicts 
constructively have become a consistently problematic aspect of democratic 
consolidation (Shapiro, 1999). Most citizens whose lives have been long-
dictated by heavy-handed states are inadequately equipped to manage social 
conflict constructively when working with those who hold opposing points of 
view. In the absence of effective conflict-mediating institutions, people have 
resorted to coercive means of handling divisive social issues, by demonising 
those with different perspectives (Shonholtz, 1997). 
Polarisation and Discord within Civil Societies  
during the Consolidation Period 
 
As a result of the challenges in constructively managing social conflict 
within the early phases of democratisation, the role of civil society has changed. 
It has moved from working to overthrow authoritarian governments, to enabling 
civic participation within the democratic sphere. Defined as a “sociological 
counterpart of the market in the economic sphere and to (liberal) democracy in 
the political sphere”, civil society has emerged as one of the most important 
theoretical units for examining the potential for social and political change 
(White, 2004, p.6). It comprises voluntary associations, organisations, 
movements, and networks engaged in bringing about collective action 
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(Diamond, 1994; Edwards, 2004). Within the liberal democratic tradition, a 
vibrant, robust civil society is critical for democratic learning because it models 
the values and attitudes essential to deepening democracy (Diamond, 1994; 
Finkel, 2003). Similarly, proponents of participatory democracy stress civil 
society’s potential as a space for active citizen involvement in the process of 
generating critical debates on common issues (Barber, 1985). Such enthusiasm 
has produced copious resources devoted to promoting civil society in new 
democracies (Carothers & Ottawa, 2000).  
The initial euphoria over the role of civil society in constructive 
management of conflictual social issues has eventually faded as disappointing 
aspects of civil society have surfaced during the consolidation stage 
(Mendelson, 2001). First, certain sections of civil societies have practiced anti-
democratic norms and values, thus playing a counterproductive role in 
advancing democratic ideals and creating a negative conflictual dynamic. For 
example, the democratic transition in Russia and Eastern Europe brought about 
a rise in the number of grassroots organisations that mobilised around 
chauvinistic nationalism and xenophobic agendas (Francis & Ropers, 1999). As 
Chambers and Kopstein (2001) rightly point out, illiberal civil society entities in 
new democracies in post-communist countries moved political discourse away 
from democratic ideals and practise. Second, civil society activists’ unfamiliarity 
with collaborative problem-solving processes has often turned public policy 
debates into fierce social conflicts, which have some cases collapsed fragile 
emerging deliberative spaces (Im, 2000; Kim, 2004; Shin, 1999).  
In addition to impeding ordinary citizens’ abilities to handle contentious 
social issues in a constructive manner, authoritarian legacies have affected the 
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pattern of civil society activists’ engagement in public discourse. Specifically, 
authoritarian environments have not equipped civil society elites with the 
appropriate skills to foster constructive dialogue concerning highly divisive 
social issues (Shonholtz, 1997). Throughout the transitional period, dedicated 
civil society activists have mobilised the public around democratic struggles and 
led assertive non-violent direct action to restore public spaces that respect open 
discussion and dialogue (Grugel, 2002). The illegitimacy of the regimes allowed 
these activists and others to minimize and rationalise the antagonistic way in 
which civil societies engaged with states in struggles over public interests. After 
the transitions, civil society actors finally began to enjoy the freedom to 
advocate for public issues in what they perceived to be the best manner for the 
advancement of their societies. Yet, instead of facilitating multiple perspectives 
on public interest issues through dialogue and negotiation, movement-oriented 
actors have often fallen into ”political radicalism, militancy, intransigence, and 
moral purism” in their engagement with other civil society groups holding 
opposing perspectives (Im, 2000, p. 37). This, in turn, has created highly 
polarised civil societies that marginalise problem-solving approaches within civil 
society space (Shin, 1999).  
Civil Society Discourses in South Korea after the Democratic Transition 
These dynamics have not gone unnoticed by scholars in the field, as 
highlighted by the abundance of literature examining the emergence of social 
conflicts and civil society’s engagement in the context of democratization 
(Diamond, 1994; Glick & Levy, 2009; Howards, 2003; Kaufman, 2005; Peters 
2005; Rubinstein & Zeilzer, 2009; Shapiro, 1999; Shonholtz, 1997). These 
emerging challenges are particularly pertinent for the current dissertation, which 
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seeks to understand the post-transitional dynamics of South Korea’s civil 
society. In this context, this thesis reviews the emergence of social conflicts in 
South Korea during the democratic transition and consolidation processes. 
Thus far, no research examines the negotiated meaning of social conflicts in 
contemporary South Korea in relation to civil society. Most scholarly 
investigations into conflicts in the context of South Korea apply to international 
relations and security studies, which focus on South Korea’s conflictual 
dynamics with North Korea. Further, the majority of research on South Korean 
civil society focuses on civil society’s contributions to and limits in advancing 
democratic reform processes through advocacy and citizen mobilisation 
(Diamond & Kim, 2000; Kim, 2006; Kim, 2005; Kim, 2000; Kim, 2003). These 
efforts were rarely directed toward understanding the role of civil society in 
responding to conflictual social issues in the context of democratisation.  
In the early 2000s, social conflicts emerged as a public policy issue in 
South Korea due to frequent, protracted policy and social debates and the 
negative conflictual dynamics that these debates often exhibited. Under the Rho 
Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007), the Presidential Committee on 
Sustainable Development commissioned a study on social conflicts in South 
Korea and public policy options for constructive conflict management and 
resolution in the country (Chung & Kang, 2006; Kim, 2008). The study contends 
that social conflict in South Korea and its ineffective management stem from the 
legacy of the authoritarian past, as well as from a lack of adequate procedures 
and cultural infrastructures to handle challenges emerging from democratisation. 
It found that decentralisation was one main problem, that the rising 
consciousness regarding the importance of sustainability over rapid economic 
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growth was a second, and that the lack of nationwide efforts to address past 
divisions was a third (Chung & Kang, 2006). While the study looks at various 
ways to develop institutional capacity to manage social conflicts effectively, it 
neglects to examine the potential role that South Korean civil society can play in 
this democratic consolidation challenge. 
The lack of reference to civil society in the context of social conflicts and 
their management in South Korea is attributed to the fact that civil society has 
been increasingly criticised for being a party to social conflicts because their 
positions are aligned with a political stance (Kim, 2008). Park’s (2004) paper on 
civil society activism in support of constructive conflict resolution and 
reconciliation eloquently summarized such perspectives. He argued that 
progressive ideals embedded in civil society activism create contentious 
dynamics with conservative segments of South Korea (Park, 2004). When a 
political party in the centre-left spectrum used a number of advocacy campaigns 
that mainstream civil society organisations had led in the late 1990s and 2000s, 
the neutrality of civil society was questioned. Further, progressive civil society 
organisations’ partisan stance on centre-left political ideals provoked the 
emergence of conservative civil society organisations, and created highly 
dichotomised and politically contentious dynamics within the civil society. Park 
(2004, p.26) pointed out civil society’s lack of emphasis on “constructive 
dialogue and tolerance of diversity” in approaching contentious social issues. 
He analysed that the experience of oppositional civil society created values of 
conformity and solidarity for greater public goods, and relatively neglected to 
nurture the processes, values, and skills to appreciate diverse views and to 
facilitate them in a constructive way (Park, 2004).  
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Research Question and Core Arguments 
The aforementioned context begs questions. What types of civil society 
organisations can help strengthen civil society’s function as a space for 
democratic learning without restricting its ability to generate critical discourses?  
How are these groups adapting and changing over time? What types of 
activities can help enhance democratic values, norms, and skills? To search for 
answers to these questions, the author pays attention to civil society 
organisations, networks, and groups that pioneered South Korea’s PCR 
movement. At the time of writing this dissertation, there has been very little 
research conducted on the role of civil society in the advancement of citizens’ 
capacity for constructive conflict resolution in South Korea. Their efforts are 
presented in a few recently published papers written by civil society activists, 
many of whom the author interviewed during the field research (Park, 2006). 
Through capacity building activities and organising a space for engaging in 
PCR discourses, these organisations have addressed ways in which citizens 
and civil society leaders can be empowered to engage constructively in divisive 
social issues. These organisations call themselves peace organisations or 
conflict resolution groups, and contend that their activities integrate PCR 
practices (such as conflict resolution training, dialogue workshops, and 
mediation) observed in other parts of the world (Park, 2006).  
The emergence of peace and conflict resolution activism in South Korea 
triggers another sets of questions in the context of democratisation and civil 
society development. How and under what contexts have PCR methodologies 
been applied to the South Korean context? What are the primary motivations of 
these organisations in incorporating these methodologies? What changes do 
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these organisations aim to bring about in strengthening the country’s civil 
society through the emergent practices of peace and conflict resolution?  
Triggered by these questions, and inspired by conflict resolution 
literature (Augsburger, 1992; Bush & Folger, 1994; Lederach, 1995; Mayer, 
2000; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2005; Shonholtz, 1997; Tongeren, 
2005; Ury, 1999), this dissertation argues that the PCR movement, (which 
initially emerged in a post-transitional period in South Korea), strengthens civil 
society by embedding democratic skills, norms, and values. The dissertation 
further argues that this grassroots PCR movement in South Korea consists of a 
range of pragmatic responses that, at times, support citizens in addressing 
growing social conflicts and constructively engaging in contentious debates in 
civil society spaces. However, while these efforts have assisted in moving some 
civil society activist beyond purely antagonist positionality, the scope and reach 
of such efforts have thus far been limited to specific political constituencies. 
The core arguments in this dissertation have their foundation in the work 
of participatory democratic theorists who examined the types of skills, norms, 
and values beneficial to the deepening of citizens’ democratic engagement and 
participation in the public sphere (Barber, 1984; Dryzek, 2002; Galston, 1991, 
Gidron et al., 2002; Kymlicka, 2002). These scholars emphasised the 
importance of meaningful citizen participation for a sustainable and healthy 
democracy, which constructively manages competing social conflicts and 
pluralistic complexities. They outlined core participatory values, norms, and 
skills, including tolerance, non-violence, empathetic listening, collaborative 
problem solving, and willingness to engage in dialogue. These values and skills 
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are at the core of PCR practices highlighted in the literature (Shapiro, 1997; 
Shonholtz, 1999; Ury, 1999).  
The dissertation examines particular types of civil society organisations 
(PCR organisations) that attempt to achieve greater success at embedding 
democratic values. It explores the status of the PCR activism in South Korea 
and offers an examination of the existing efforts of the country’s civil society 
organisations to promote the PCR methodology. Firstly, then, the dissertation 
examines three PCR civil society organisations that emerged in the early 2000s 
in South Korea. The individual case study examples illustrate how conflict 
resolution activities were manifested in different forms of organisations and 
practitioners.  
The first case study explores a grassroots association run by local 
citizens. This organisation adopted PCR techniques in order to enrich its 
outreach programs to youth and parents. The second case study examines a 
pioneering organisation that sees PCR resolution as its core mission. The third 
case study analyses a network of peace practitioners established to prepare a 
global meeting on conflict prevention and peace building and to promote regular 
interaction among peace activists. By presenting these case studies, this 
dissertation reviews how these organisations have utilized PCR activism, and 
what has shaped the direction of these organisations’ PCR activities. To provide 
additional information on the operating contexts of these organisations, this 
dissertation maps PCR activism in South Korean civil society space, how it 
emerged, and how PCR principles are adapted to advance the organisations’ 
core functions.  
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Secondly, the dissertation explores what effect increased awareness and 
engagement in PCR methodologies can have on the democratic quality of civil 
society. Building on the participatory democracy and conflict resolution literature 
(Barber, 1984; Dryzek, 2002; Galston, 1991; Gidron et al., 2002; Kymlicka, 
2002), this dissertation analyses qualitative interviews of 54 civil society 
activists to examine the extent to which PCR activism has contributed to 
embedding the following democratic values, norms, and skills: a) tolerance; b) 
commitment to non-violent, constructive problem-solving; c) commitment to 
participation in the public sphere; and d) willingness to engage in dialogue. 
Furthermore, it examines whether, and to what extent, civil society activists in 
South Korea understand and practise the democracy nurturing aspect of PCR 
methodologies. 
While more than 20 countries transitioned to democracy during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, this dissertation investigates South Korea and its civil 
society actors working in the field of peace and conflict resolution for the 
following reasons. South Korea is a newly democratising country in which the 
majority of the citizens claim membership in voluntary associations, and civil 
society’s influence on the populace remains relatively high (Shin, Park, Hwang, 
Lee & Jang, 2003). After the initial transition, post-Communist countries’ civil 
societies moved quickly toward becoming political societies, and the elites in 
civil societies became political leaders (Bernhard, 1996). For this reason, the 
influence of civil societies in these countries has declined. In contrast, after its 
transition in 1987, South Korean civil society waited for more than 10 years to 
establish a relatively congenial relationship with the state before electing an 
oppositional candidate as president. Until 1998, relatively few civil society elites 
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were recruited to political positions, and thus, Korean civil society had time to 
develop its own capacity, such that it was strong enough not to be as easily co-
opted in challenging institutional power (Moon, 2002). 
South Korean civil society rarely receives foreign funding for its program 
implementation, and local actors initiate the PCR activities in the country. In 
post-Communist countries, a significant amount of foreign funding for 
democratisation has been transferred to civil societies. Due to strong ties with 
the international donor community, most conflict resolution programmes have 
been introduced by foreign-affiliated NGOs (Shapiro, 1999). This has often 
raised concern as to whether the conflict resolution activities that originated in 
North America and Western Europe have been imposed in an ethnocentric 
manner. With the introduction of ‘social capital’, policymakers have applied 
social capital theory to a number of third-wave democracies, and this, in turn, 
has triggered the institutionalisation of civil society (Howell & Pearce, 2001). 
Rather than widening participation and advancing democratic principles, such 
attempts have sometimes had a detrimental effect on social inclusion and 
participation. For instance, the civil society organisations funded by foreign 
organisations have become quasi-elite institutions, which are more likely to 
benefit people who have education, money, and status because they are best 
equipped to organise and make their voices heard under pluralism (Carothers, 
1999). Therefore, the existence of elite-civil organisations in transitional 
democracies has resulted in political polarisation and cynicism among those 
with fewer resources. It is important to acknowledge that the aforementioned 
phenomenon has been widely observed in many low-income transitional 
countries. The PCR field in South Korea benefits from being more locally 
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grounded than those in the countries described above are; it is far less affected 
by foreign agencies, although Western literature has, in many ways, inspired its 
activities. South Korea’s civil society interacted with external actors differently 
from the aforementioned countries which underwent democratisation during its 
transitional period.  
Finally, South Korea is a post-transitional country facing external security 
threats from its neighbour to the North. Often, the country’s full potential for 
democratisation is limited, as this external actor constantly threatens its stability. 
South Korea serves as a unique example of how domestic democratic forces 
work toward democratisation, despite constant tension due to security 
dilemmas.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation pertains to a very specific period, limited by the 
obligatory constraints placed upon any research aimed for the awarding of a 
doctoral degree. The author’s fieldwork and data collection took place in 
January 2007 and between April 2007 and June 2007. Consequently, this 
dissertation does not fully capture changes in policy environments and civil 
society’s engagement in social conflicts in South Korea that have proved to be 
of significant importance for the case study organisations since that time. The 
constraints of producing this thesis have also required the imposition of a ‘cut-
off point’ to the literature, and the author has limited her literature reviews to 
materials published before June 2010. The only cited materials published after 
June 2010 are news items of significance to the case study organisations.  
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including an introduction and 
a conclusion. The second, third, and fourth chapters (Literature Review, 
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Methodology, and Historical Analysis) allow the author to present relevant 
conceptual frameworks utilised to investigate the core premises, and to 
elaborate on the relevant contexts that have guided the development of the 
core thesis. The fifth and sixth chapters (Presentation of Case Studies and 
Comparison of Case Studies) exhibit how South Korean civil society activists 
and active, politically conscious citizens interviewed during the fieldwork in 2007 
manifest the aforementioned contexts and conceptual relevance in their 
narratives. Their views and thoughts are represented through the author’s 
interpretations and interview excerpts. Individual interviewees’ voices 
highlighted in these chapters are those the author found relevant to the core 
premises of this dissertation, and selected narratives are presented due to the 
limitation of the space. The concluding chapter summarises key issues that the 
author identified as most relevant in bringing together various components of 
the dissertation, and acknowledges the limits of this dissertation.  
The following describes specific details of each chapter. Chapter two 
examines the conceptual assumptions that supported the development of the 
dissertation’s research questions by reviewing the existing literature on civil 
society, democracy, and peace and conflict resolution. It reviews two influential 
democratic theories that have a deep impact on South Korea’s collective 
discourses on the vision of its consolidated democracy: liberal democracy and 
participatory democracy. Specifically, the chapter discusses how each 
elaborates an ideal form of consolidated democracy and engages in democratic 
citizenship discourses. In addition, Chapter two reviews three main conceptual 
frameworks of civil society—liberal democracy, emancipation, and public 
sphere—to understand how each tradition helped South Korean civil society to 
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evolve throughout its modern history. Specifically, this chapter focuses on how 
these different theories conceptualise civil society’s role in nurturing democratic 
citizenship.  
Chapter two briefly reviews the existing conceptual framework for peace 
and conflict resolution, and explains the relevancy of this conceptual framework 
to understanding the South Korean PCR movement. In particular, this 
dissertation sides with the holistic view on conflict resolution, which includes “all 
process oriented activities aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, 
cultural, and structural violence” (Reimann, p.10-11). This broader approach 
was adopted because South Korean PCR activism emerged not only to 
transform the conflictual dynamics of immediate public policy disputes, but also 
to alter the long-term patterns of problem solving among civil society activists 
because of the country’s historical legacy. Furthermore, this section presents a 
range of PCR activities in which civil society organisations engage.  
Chapter three begins with the brief overview of case study methodology, 
credited for its strength in investigating how and why questions. Concurring with 
Bennett and George (2002), Verschuren (2003), and Yin (1989; 2003), this 
dissertation argues that a case study is a holistic research methodology suitable 
for looking at a few strategically selected cases occurring in specific contexts. 
The first section of Chapter 3 explains why the case study research strategy is 
considered most appropriate in conducting this dissertation, and how this 
methodological choice has shaped, guided, and influenced the overall research 
design. After reflecting upon the research methodology, Chapter 3 introduces 
the three case study subjects that will be the focus of this dissertation: School 
Making Peace (School Peace hereafter), a grassroots civil society association, 
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which emerged to address school violence through PCR education; Women 
Making Peace–Conflict Resolution Centre (WMP—CR Centre hereafter), a 
multi-purpose hybrid organisation which utilises conflict resolution services to 
advance the country’s peace discourses and embed constructive problem-
solving culture into society; and Peace Activist Network (PAN hereafter), a set 
of two ad-hoc coalitions that emerged in response to the global call to action on 
peace-building and conflict prevention, as well as with a view to developing 
peace discourses unique to South Korean contexts. By reflecting on Fast’s 
(2003) article, the author presents the selection criteria used in choosing these 
case study organisations, and the criteria that are excluded.  
Chapter three introduces the fieldwork that the author undertook in 2007 
in order to collect the primary data, and shares the insights that the author 
gained during this period. Specifically, the author reflects upon power dynamics 
between interviewees and interviewers because of the cultural hierarchy and 
formality present in South Korean society, and contemplates the insider-
outsider dynamics that the author experienced during her engagement with 
research subjects. This reflective section presents how the author has coped 
with practical and ethical dilemmas that she encountered, and illustrates her 
efforts in pursuit of insights into South Korean civil society. Finally, Chapter 
three presents how the author utilised interviews, observation, and 
documentation in collecting data, and the challenges that she faced in obtaining 
the information through these methods.  
Chapter four is a review of South Korea’s political history since the late 
nineteenth century, focusing on democratisation in detail. Specifically, this 
chapter is an examination of the extent to which civil society plays a role in 
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various stages of democratisation in South Korea. To begin, the first part of 
Chapter four explains the emergent context of civil society in South Korea, 
illustrating to what extent civil society in the country served as a space for 
resistance and struggles. Specifically, it highlights the last 100 years of 
challenges to democratisation efforts and contingent demands for developing a 
democratic practice in South Korea. This chapter further substantiates that the 
Gramcian emancipation vision endorsed by South Korean civil society activities 
is an inevitable product of the country’s historical context, and that the 
emancipatory vision legitimized the civil society’s antagonistic and conflictual 
dynamics with state apparatus, economic and political elites in the country.  
The second part of Chapter four looks at South Korea’s democratic 
transition in 1987, and the subsequent consolidation processes from 1987 to 
2002, and examines the extent to which civil society plays a role in various 
stages of democratisation. This section highlights the rapidly changing political 
context in which South Korean civil society operates, and illustrates the evolving 
role of civil society.  
The final section of Chapter four focuses on key challenges that South 
Korea faced in furthering democratic consolidation. It highlights the context in 
which PCR organisations have developed, and their evolving role in Korean civil 
society. Specifically, this section examines how social conflicts and civil 
society’s role in this context have become problematical to policy makers, 
commentators, and civil society practitioners, and the responses that have 
resulted to resolve these conflicts. A comprehensive literature review of Korean 
political history and civil society movements, as well as interview transcripts 
from the 2007 field research, provide the foundation for Chapter four. Given the 
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impact of South Korean political history on the development of the country’s civil 
society, a number of interviewees referred to historical incidents or their 
experiences with some of the critical historical moments.  
Chapter five begins with the overview of PCR activism in South Korea, 
based upon the information collected throughout the field research and archival 
studies. This helps to provide the context in which the case study organisations 
operate, laying the groundwork for an in-depth presentation and analysis of 
individual case studies. Each case study presents the following information: two 
themes relevant to explaining the uniqueness of a particular case study 
organisation; background information and historical context; main activities 
undertaken; positive contributions of the activities or the organisation based 
upon interviewees’ input and media analysis; and specific challenges the 
participants experienced in advancing an agenda of PCR after being engaged 
with an organisation. 
Based on the findings of the case studies, Chapter six is a summary of 
the similarities and differences among the organisations. These comparisons 
are based upon four levels of analysis: organisational overview; reflection on 
conflict resolution and issue framing; interviewees’ reflections on PCR activisms; 
and reflection on the democratic nurturing qualities of these organisations, as 
revealed during the interviews. Chapter six concludes with a critical reflection 
on the research findings and identifies the opportunities and challenges facing 
South Korea’s PCR activism in pursuit of fortifying democratic consolidation. 
The dissertation concludes with a short summary of the overall research, 
and acknowledges its limitations. The concluding chapter (seven) draws 
together and affirms constituent parts of the arguments presented in previous 
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chapters. Specifically, this chapter highlights three key findings that this 
dissertation identified through multiple case studies on three civil society 
organisations.  
Potential Contribution 
This thesis aims to provide a previously neglected critical eye to the 
contributions of the PCR movement to the development of South Korean civil 
society, where only a few case studies on this issue have been documented to 
date. This thesis helps enhance understanding of the PCR movement in South 
Korea including its emergent contexts, the framing of PCR issues, and their 
similarities and differences compared to existing PCR practices in North 
America. Further, this dissertation explores to what extent the PCR movement 
contributes to embedding democratic values, processes, and skills by looking at 
three case study entities in South Korea. In so doing, this thesis has the 
potential to form the bedrock for further study into the relatively under-
investigated field of the role that civil society organisations engaged in PCR 
activism play in enhancing the democratic quality of a civil society in new 
democracies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This dissertation investigates three South Korean civil society groups 
engaging in PCR activities. The investigation explores to what extent the PCR 
movement contributes to embedding democratic norms, processes, and skills in 
Korean civil society. The PCR movement is a nascent phenomenon in South 
Korea that emerged in the country’s post-transitional civil society. The civil 
society space in South Korea surfaced initially as a space for emancipation and 
for resistance against colonialism and authoritarianism, both of which repressed 
people’s democratic desires. After the transition, the country’s civil society 
embraced a range of functions that had been previously neglected. Yet, the 
author agrees with scholars such as Kim (2009) and Joo, Lee, and Jo (2006) 
who argue that one of the functions to which South Korean civil society has paid 
less attention is its role in embedding democratic norms and processes into civil 
society space and nurturing people’s democratic habits and skills. Recently, 
nurturing civil society’s democratic capacity and fostering democratic citizenship 
have become more important as the government has put more emphasis on 
creating a participatory democratic system in the country – an emphasis 
reflected in speeches and policy directives highlighted by South Korean political 
leadership (Lee, 2008).  
 A multiple layer of theoretical and conceptual assumptions about civil 
society, democracy, and PCR have guided the development of the central 
thesis of this dissertation and have shaped the author’s interpretation of South 
Korean civil society and its interaction with peace and conflict resolution. This 
chapter reveals the conceptual assumptions that supported the development of 
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the dissertation’s research questions by reviewing the existing literature on civil 
society, democracy, and PCR. After briefly reviewing the notion of 
democratisation, the first section reviews two influential democratic theories that 
have a deep impact on South Korea’s collective discourses on the vision of its 
consolidated democracy: liberal democracy and participatory democracy. While 
theories of democratisation are less central to the core premise of this 
dissertation, they are helpful to understand the conditions affecting the process 
of democratisation. In reviewing two democratic theories, this section focuses 
on how each elaborates an ideal form of consolidated democracy and engages 
in democratic citizenship discourses. Given its prevalence in the field of 
democracy studies, liberal democratic theory has shaped the political thinking 
behind Korean political elites and influenced the country’s policies in reforming 
its institutions and rules (Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). The participatory democracy 
theory, which this dissertation sees as a complement to a liberal democratic 
vision, is especially important in defining a core set of democratic norms, 
processes, and skills; this dissertation argues that the PCR movement in South 
Korea strengthens this core set.  
The second section of this chapter begins by reviewing three main 
conceptual frameworks of civil society—liberal democracy, emancipation, and 
public sphere—to understand how each tradition helped South Korean civil 
society to evolve throughout its modern history. Furthermore, this section 
examines how these different theories conceptualise civil society’s role in 
nurturing democratic citizenship. The second section introduces how existing 
literature written by scholars and practitioners define actors in current civil 
society discourses. By paying attention to different forms of civil society entities 
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relevant to contemporary democracies, this section shows the relevancy of the 
more general categorisations to civil society actors in South Korea.  
Finally, the third section reviews the existing conceptual framework for 
PCR and explains the relevancy of this conceptual framework to understanding 
the South Korean PCR movement. Further, this section presents a range of 
PCR activities in which civil society organisations engage. These comparisons 
with ideal types highlight the differences and similarities in the PCR movement 
that emerged in South Korean civil society space.  
Democratisation 
While each country embarks on different journeys toward democracy, 
democratic scholars have theorised preconditions of democratic transition. 
Potter (2005) summarises three main theoretical approaches explaining the 
triggers of democratisation: modernisation, political actors, and structural 
analysis.  
First, contemporary academics influenced by modernisation, such as 
Diamond (1994) and Saxer (2002), emphasise the importance of socio-
economic development and contend vibrant social and economic conditions 
have greatly contributed to democratic transitions in many countries, including 
those in East Asia. They also argue strong economic development has a 
positive effect on a country’s political development as it fosters socio-political 
conditions conducive to democratisation including the growth of a middle class 
(Ahn & Jaung, 1999). According to this view, civil society is an outcome of this 
social, political, and economic modernisation. People power is a manifestation 
of a politicised middle class and an expression of the desire of newly emerging 
social actors for liberty and freedom (Diamond, 1994). While modernisation 
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theory explains certain aspects of some transitional countries with a certain 
level of economic development, such as South Korea, Taiwan, or Chile, it fails 
to explain other countries that do not necessarily experience rapid economic 
development during the time in which they begin a political transitional process, 
such as former Communist countries (Potter, 1997).  
Second, the actor-oriented theory identifies domestic and international 
political conditions affecting the behaviours of political elites, and contends 
democratisation is closely linked to their decisions and actions. This theory 
challenges the assumption of modernisation theorists, that successful economic 
development creates an environment preferable for democracy. These theorists 
contend that understanding the behaviours of political elites helps to explain 
why some countries with similar economic development successfully transition 
to democracy and others do not. Huntington (1991), for example, focuses on 
the strategies, beliefs, and interests of elites and describes how such factors 
have affected processes of democratic transition and their respective effects on 
the future type of regime. He distinguishes three different transitional processes 
based upon the elite’s actions: transformation, replacement, and trans-
placement. Transformation occurs when the existing political elite takes the lead 
in restoring democracy, such as in Spain and Brazil. Replacement takes place 
when an opposition overthrows the existing regime, as seen in Romania or in 
the past democratisation attempts in South Korea between 1945 and 1948 and 
between 1960 and 1961. Trans-placement refers to a negotiated compromise 
between the regime and the opposition to establish democracy, as in the cases 
of South Korea in 1987, Uruguay, and Poland (Huntington, 1991).  
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As the theory puts a strong emphasis on political elites, scholars in this 
school of thought minimise the importance of the contribution of people power 
to the transition of third-wave democracies. Rather, theorists such as O’Donnell 
(1996) and Linz (2000) focus on political elites’ reactions to, or strategic alliance 
with, such mass mobilisations. When these theorists highlight civil society, they 
often spotlight radical oppositional political leaders who gained their power and 
legitimacy from these democratic movements and the grassroots political action 
of mass populations (Linz, 2000; O’Donnell, 1996). Despite its influence in the 
field of democratisation, the actor-oriented view is often criticised for its lack of 
attention to other actors in society, such as underground activists, trade 
unionists, and local religious leaders who are less visible than radical 
oppositional political figures (Potter, 2005). Although they acknowledge the 
importance of the institutional basis of effective democratic development, critics 
argue democratic transition requires more than agreements on democratic rules 
and norms among the political elite and must involve all levels of society, 
including civil society (Barber, 1984). However, despite their focus on political 
elites, Linz and Stepan (1996) acknowledge a macro-perspective that values 
the importance of citizens with attitudes congruent with democratic values and 
practices.  
 Third, scholars in the school of structural analysis explain that the 
changing structure of class, government, and external power influences 
democratisation, such as the emergence of a strong and conscious middle 
class, the change of state power as a result of violent conflict, and the end of 
the Cold War (Potter, 1997). Structural scholars also criticize the actor-oriented 
approach as it underestimates the effect of structural and international changes 
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on elite behaviour (Yeo, 2006). Regarding third-wave democracy, structural 
analysis offers a compelling explanation for the democratic transitional process, 
given its insights on transnational actors such as the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, and its insights on non-traditional domestic actors, such as 
middle class intelligentsia and underground activists. 
While people power, oppositional movements, and economic 
development may play important roles, structural analysis scholars argue that 
such explanations lack a systematic approach to external influence (Yeo, 2006). 
Yeo (2006) argues that international actors played a significant role in changing 
power balance internally by shifting their political alliance or support, or affecting 
economic conditions in a country. For example, democratisation in Poland is 
closely related to the relative weakening and eventual disappearance of Soviet 
influence (Yeo, 2006). Similarly, the transition of South Korea was greatly 
affected when the US withdrew its blunt support for the military regime at the 
end of the Cold War (Yeo, 2006). 
 Mainstream democratisation theory sees institutional arrangements as 
the first step toward democratic transition. Yet, as Berhard and Karkoc (2007) 
rightly point out, a procedure-focused democratic transition neglects to address 
various issues arising in new democracies (e.g., the rise of nationalism, 
xenophobia, social exclusion, ethnic conflicts, and political apathy). While many 
new democracies have managed to prevent these negative legacies from being 
a source of violent conflict, some countries have failed to overcome these 
difficulties (Bogdanor, 1995). In response to socio-political problems that 
emerge after an initial transition4, scholars suggest various strategies for 
                                                
4 It should be noted each country undergoing democratisation experiences a different timeframe within its 
unique political context. Countries experiencing totalitarianism or authoritarianism linked to violent conflict 
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democratic consolidation with a view to overcoming fragility and enhancing the 
sustainability and quality of democracy in newly democratic countries 
(Shonholtz, 1997). Influenced by their own theoretical interpretation of ideal 
democracy, scholars offer different normative frameworks for democratic 
consolidation in new democracies. 
Theories of Democracy 
Unlike a democratic transition that can define a point of completion, 
democratic consolidation is a continuous process by which a society collectively 
searches for ideal norms and institutions suitable to its citizens. The author 
agrees with Baker (2004) who argues that arbitrarily characterising a 
consolidated democracy also implicitly imposes the idea of a particular form of 
democracy and limits the political imagination of new democracies. This section 
will present two democratic theories, namely, liberal democracy and 
participatory democracy, as they are most relevant to understanding South 
Koreans’ vision of consolidated democracy. Liberal democratic vision has 
played a prevalent role in shaping the country’s democratic reform measures, 
which required institutional and legal changes, and it was deeply influential in 
the early stage of the country’s democratic consolidation (Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). 
Participatory democratic vision, on the other hand, resonates with civil society 
activists’ visions of a consolidated democracy; this vision has gained 
momentum since the early 2000s, especially with the inauguration of President 
Roh Moo-Hyun who named his administration the ‘Participatory Government – 
Chamyeo Jeongboo (in Korean)’ (Lee, 2008). This section specifically focuses 
on the vision of democratic citizenship proposed by these two theories. 
                                                                                                                                          
require a more careful and long-term perspective in transitioning to democracy. A number of countries in 
this category are most vulnerable to returning to their authoritarian pasts during the transitional process 
(Lyons, 2002). 
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Participatory democracy literature on citizenship is particularly useful in defining 
a set of skills, norms, and processes that South Korean civil society space can 
foster.  
Liberal Perspective on Democracy 
The liberal tradition advocates pluralist democracy as the desirable end-
goal of consolidation. It defines democracy as “a system that institutionalises 
competition among intermediary groups representing different and conflicting 
social interests through free and fair elections” (Linz & Stephan, 1996, p.3). As 
expressions of diverse interests are common in a democratic polity, the liberal 
vision emphasises the importance of adhering to democratic norms to prevent 
the expression of different views from turning into violent tensions between 
interest groups (Dixon & Senese, 2002). As Dixon and Senese (2002) point out, 
when there is no mutual agreement to follow procedures and practices that 
constructively channel differences, factions and interests inevitably collide in the 
public realm. Thus, it is of critical importance to develop democratic institutions 
and procedures that will facilitate and manage the competing interests of 
diverse social groups constructively (Dixon & Senese, 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2008; Ury, 2001). This perspective of consolidated democracy, therefore, aims 
at fully embedding liberal values into all social, political, and economic 
institutions, rules, and procedures (Dahl, 2000).  
Despite its emphasis on free and fair elections, the liberal tradition 
contends democracy extends beyond integral free elections, competing parties, 
and responsible politicians (Rose & Shin, 1999). Expanding citizen participation 
in a political process is democracy’s raison d'être as pluralist democracy is 
devised to protect people from the tyranny of the powerful who often interfere 
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with people’s full exercise of citizenship (Dahl, 2000). Rose and Shin (2001, p. 
334) further articulate this view by emphasising development of institutional 
attributes and procedures to ensure different groups in society have access to 
the political system. In addition, the liberal tradition recognises the fragility of a 
democratic system in the absence of citizens and political actors who are willing 
to accept democratic procedures and rules (Dixon & Senese, 2002). Thus, the 
liberal tradition contemplates how to enhance citizens’ political competency and 
inculcate values that contribute to the functioning and sustaining of a liberal 
democratic system.  
This dissertation pays particular attention to one of the most influential 
conceptual frameworks developed in this area: civic culture. Defined as 
“attitudes toward the political system and its various parts and attitudes toward 
the self in the system” (Almond & Verba, 1963, 13), civic culture is maintained 
by democratic citizens. Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison (2001) rightly 
summarises that the core characteristics of civic culture constitute the liberal 
vision of democratic citizenship and that a set of virtues essential in democratic 
citizenship facilitate the integration of citizens into liberal democratic procedures 
and institutions. In this context, the liberal vision outlines the following set of 
democratic citizenship characteristics that would benefit the democratic 
consolidation process: citizens who would participate in civic affairs and civil 
society (civic participation); citizens who would possess civic competence in 
order to undertake roles in society to influence public policy processes; citizens 
who would have a sense of political efficacy by understanding the impacts of 
political events and activities; and citizens who would embrace a sense of civic 
duty for community affairs (Almond & Verba, 1963; Sapsford, 1999). To this end, 
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civil society is an important institution to facilitate citizens’ learning for 
democratic citizenship and to nurture civic culture as it helps to spread 
democratic norms and attitudes among citizens (Diamond, 1994; Edwards, 
2004, Markoff, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996).  
In the last fifteen years, the liberal democratic view has prevailed and 
influenced the democratic consolidation process of various third-wave countries 
including South Korea. As mentioned above, South Korea’s close relationship 
with the U.S. influenced its initial democratic transition, which followed a path to 
liberal democracy in terms of institutional reforms, strong emphasis on 
independent judiciaries, and focus on the electoral process (Carothers, 1999; 
Kim, 2000; Lee, 2008). The incorporation of the liberal democratic vision has 
strengthened South Korea’s capacity to address a range of issues that emerged 
during the democratic transitional process (Shin, 2005). However, despite its 
strengths to support institutional reforms, the liberal vision invites a number of 
criticisms (Barber, 1985; Beetham, 1997). Korean scholars, civil society 
activists, and commentators echo the main criticisms against the liberal 
democratic vision (Kim, 2000).  
First, liberal democracy assumes all social groups with conflicting interests 
have equal access to the political stage and ignores the structured privileges of 
certain groups built into the society. A number of theorists attribute the lack of 
citizen participation to its optimism toward the market economy and its 
underestimation of the existing power relationships in society (Beetham, 1997). 
Particularly, the uncritical association between market economy and liberal 
democracy has raised questions over whether liberal democracy is in fact a 
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system ruled by all of the people (Barber, 1985; Beetham, 1997). Barber (1985) 
summarises this point eloquently:  
 
(Liberal representative) democracy is deficient because it relies on the fictions 
of free market and of the putative freedom and equality of bargaining agents; 
because it cannot generate public thinking or public ends of any kind; because 
it is innocent about the real world of power and because it uses the 
representative principles. (Barber, 1985, p.132) 
 
In other words, liberal democracy raises economic liberty over political 
equality, and it is apathetic to the structural inequality affecting citizens’ 
meaningful participation in political activities. Neo-Marxist socialist thinkers such 
as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) strongly advocate this view. They assert liberal 
democracy and its alliance with the market economy creates oppressive power 
relations prohibiting a majority of individuals in certain classes from participating 
in the political process in a meaningful way (Laclau & Mouffe,1985; 
Sekhon,1999).  
Second, as participatory democracy proponents including McPherson 
(1972) and Pateman (1970) further point out, liberal democracy fails to motivate 
citizens toward participating in a political process. Liberal democrats such as 
Diamond (1994) argue that institutional foundations and fair political procedures 
are beneficial to citizens since they aim to enhance citizen participation in the 
democratic political process. In contrast to such assumptions, citizens in liberal 
democracies are, in reality, restricted in exercising their rights to participation in 
political spaces (McPherson,1972; Pateman,1970). Theorists including Scaff 
(1975) and Gordon (2001) have identified a number of factors contributing to 
such problems, such as the bureaucratic and complex nature of contemporary 
political issues, a sense of alienation, a lack of trust in political parties and 
leaders, a lack of political knowledge and competence, and powerlessness. 
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Feeling disempowered and sceptical of their ability to influence political 
decision-making and political discourse, citizens may withdraw from the political 
process in order to demonstrate their frustration and dissatisfaction (Gordon, 
2001). 
Even in many new democracies including South Korea, participation in 
elections and trust in political institutions quickly diminish (Howard, 2003; Kim, 
2009). While the introduction of liberal democracy opens up the space for free 
expression and liberalises various aspects of political society to a great degree, 
it does not provide a solution to the problem of limited mass participation in the 
democratic process. As a result, many new democracies often report the 
problem of the masses continuing to feel disempowered in the democratic 
process (Howard, 2003). In the case of South Korea, the decline of citizen 
participation in the political process became an issue in the mid 2000s, and this 
trend is reflected in the low turnout of voters in various elections (Kim, 2006; 
Kim, 2009; Song, 2007; Suh, 2006).  
Third, critics such as Barber (1984) challenge the validity of a liberal 
democratic claim on its strong ability to manage competing values and interests 
constructively. Liberal democracy’s procedural emphasis is effective in 
managing the competing interests of the political and economic elite, but this 
does not extend to addressing those of citizens. Particularly, theorists from the 
tradition of participatory democracy contend a system of conflict mitigation 
under liberal democracy is limited to competing values expressed in a politically 
organised manner, thus ignoring conflicts at the community level (Dryzek, 2002). 
For example, liberal democratic procedures and rules are helpful in addressing 
the issue of rising nationalism or xenophobia in both developed and transitional 
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democracies by establishing institutional mechanisms to prevent any racially 
motivated discrimination or crimes (Shonholtz, 1997). Yet, such institutional 
arrangements are not necessarily equipped to handle contentious behaviours 
often witnessed at the community level. People at the grassroots level rarely 
have opportunities to examine issues and identify ways to resolve them within 
their own communities (Mayer, 2004). Rather, people are often informed of 
decisions that have already been made by political leaders and asked to 
respect them.  
A source of conflict is merely suppressed within legal boundaries, but not 
effectively managed, thus leaving a strong possibility that political leaders can 
exploit such issues at a later stage (Shonholtz, 1997). This explains to some 
degree why many new democracies struggle to maintain political and social 
stability after the introduction of liberal democracy. The emergence of social 
conflicts and public policy disputes in South Korea since the late 1990s in part 
exemplifies that institutional mechanisms alone cannot effectively address 
people’s concerns (Chang, Kim, Kim, & Moon, 2005). Specifically, community 
members entrapped in social conflicts in South Korea often argue that the 
system in place privileges those with knowledge of how to utilise such 
measures to resolve conflicts (Park et al, 2006).  
Despite its shortcomings, liberal democratic theory provides one of the 
most comprehensive explanations of how democratic ideals can be realised 
through a centralised political structure. In South Korea, the incorporation of 
institutional reforms based upon the liberal vision has certainly contributed to 
developing the basic social and political infrastructure needed to maintain a 
functioning democratic society that respects individual rights and promotes 
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economic development. Without emphasising institutional reforms and 
strengthening democratic rules and regulations, citizens would not be able to 
express their views in a more organised manner and would not be able to 
develop a certain level of confidence in the country’s governing system.  
Participatory Perspective on Democracy 
The theory of participatory democracy emerged as an alternative vision to 
liberal democracy and contends that participation is at the core of democratic 
values and practices (McCowan, 2006; Pateman, 1970). Maintaining a critical 
perspective towards the liberal vision, proponents of participatory democracy, 
such as Bowman (2000), Fisher (2004), Pateman (1970), and Rosenberg 
(2003), contend that the liberal democratic political model and its strong 
emphasis on representation through political parties and elections has 
neglected to foster a system conducive to citizen participation. Pateman (1970) 
argues that there is a great need to devise a process that motivates private 
individuals to have ownership over decisions affecting their lives through active 
participation. In her view, the liberal notion of democracy simply reinforces the 
existing social order and impedes genuine democratisation of society, which 
promotes the good of the community (Pateman, 1970). From the participatory 
democratic perspective, democratic consolidation should put a greater focus on 
strengthening citizen participation.  
In order to deepen democracy and overcome the participatory deficiency 
of liberal democracy, participatory theorists, including Dryzek (1994), Roberts 
(2004), and Rosenberg (2003) call for a system that better facilitates the 
authentic participation of citizens in the political system. They emphasise the 
need for building a deliberative decision-making procedure at various levels of 
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society including at a grassroots level. Wood (2003) supports this argument, 
contending that mass participation through deliberative decision-making 
mechanisms is at the core of creating meaningful democracy. A public 
deliberative process is designed to focus on particular needs and issue-specific 
networks, rather than on general values and is often localised in order to 
overcome the practical difficulty of bringing relevant stakeholders (both 
individuals and groups) together (Dryzek, 1994; Rosenberg, 2003). Deliberative 
processes provide a space where citizens can discuss issues affecting their 
lives and can make decisions on possible solutions (Dryzek, 2000). In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, civil society activists and policy makers in South Korea 
increasingly called for a mechanism based upon strong citizen participation to 
integrate citizen perspectives in decision-making processes (Park, 2004). In this 
context, local municipalities welcome the introduction of deliberative 
frameworks as ways to sustain grassroots democracy and to address public 
policy debates in the country (Ha, 2003; Park, 2004).  
In the process of creating a participatory mode of democracy, participatory 
democrats such as Rosenberg (2003) explain that positive development takes 
place in relation to the society’s conflict resolution and problem-solving capacity 
and citizen empowerment. First, as argued by Barber (1984), citizen 
participation is a critical element of the problem-solving aspect of democratic 
polity because it “creates a political community capable of transforming 
dependent private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interest 
into public goods” (Barber, 1984, p.151). Barber continued to emphasise the 
conflict-transformative ability of participatory democracy because such a 
democracy “develops a politics that can transform conflict into cooperation 
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through citizen participation, public deliberation, and civic education” (Barber, 
1984, p.135). Especially, public deliberation processes serve to address 
conflicting social issues at the grassroots or local level because they are 
inclusive processes of dialogue designed “to facilitate mutual understanding 
and informed agreement, in which participants are free from coercion and 
manipulation and are free to express their genuine views” (Dryzek, 2002, p.43). 
To integrate fully the problem solving mechanism at the grassroots level, 
participatory democratic theorists such as Dryzek (1990), Rosenberg (2003), 
and Bowman (1998; 2000) advocate citizen virtues suitable for vibrant political 
culture. They argue citizens are required to learn to articulate their positions and 
views while taking into consideration the rights of others and respecting 
common visions (Bowman, 1998; Drysek, 1990). Participatory democracy 
requires “a political culture and corresponding structures that would enable 
citizens to retrieve information, to develop and advance positions on issues 
affecting their lives and to take part in debate” (Sekhon, 1999, p.8). 
Second, a participatory mode of democracy cannot function without 
empowered citizens who are autonomous and democratic. For example, in 
order to take part in a localised decision making process, citizens are required 
to increase their knowledge of the political process and learn the necessary 
information to judge and deliberate upon the public affairs affecting their lives 
(Drysek, 1990). A deliberative framework requires a much higher level of civic 
competence and political efficacy than does the liberal vision. Barber (1984) 
explains the empowerment of citizens through participatory democracy as 
follows:  
 
Civic activity educates individuals how to think publicly as citizens, even as 
citizenship informs civic activity with the required sense of publicness and 
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justice. Politics becomes its own university, citizenship its own training ground 
and participation its own tutor. (Barber, 1984, p.152) 
 
Given the interconnectedness of empowered citizens and their effective 
participation in democratic processes, theorists such as Bowman (2000), 
Dryzek (2000), and Rosenberg (2003) deeply value the quality of democratic 
citizenship. This dissertation pays particular attention to the specific qualities of 
democratic citizenship that participatory democracy delineates because these 
qualities are particularly relevant in facilitating citizens’ effective and 
constructive participation in the civil society space. Additionally, the 
characteristics underpinning democratic citizenship are also complementary to 
a set of citizen virtues outlined by liberal democrats such as Almond and Verba 
(1963). As mentioned above, the liberal democratic discourse emphasizes 
citizens’ procedural and institutional knowledge as core elements of democratic 
citizenship. For example, citizens are encouraged to possess civic competence, 
which includes knowledge about the political system and its leaders, civic skills, 
and democratic attitudes such as tolerance, compromise, and respect for rules 
(Sapsford, 1999). While embracing all of the aforementioned virtues valued in 
the liberal tradition, the core virtue of the participatory vision further specifies 
what it means for citizens to engage in a deliberative process.  
As Kymlicka explained (2002, p.289), citizens in participatory democracy 
are asked to be willing to “engage in a conversation and to continue the 
conversation.” In order to stay engaged in a public discourse, participatory 
democrats such as Dryzek (1994) and Galston (1991) emphasise virtues such 
as respect for difference, tolerance, and empathy as key elements for ensuring 
meaningful citizen involvement in the decision-making process. Tolerance is a 
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basic element of democratic citizenship in participatory democracy, as 
individuals with that virtue recognise others are entitled to contribute to 
decision-making processes (Scanlon, 2000). To engage in a participatory 
process (as opposed to strategic bargaining or other kinds of purely self-
interested exchanges), citizens must attempt genuinely “to understand the 
perspectives of those with whom one is deliberating and to want to reach 
agreement with them” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1997, p.32).  
Further, Dryzek (1994) contends citizens who are engaged in a 
democratic political process should listen as well as speak, seek to understand 
what others say, and respond respectfully to the views of others. Such attitudes, 
it has been proposed, will be developed when individuals are willing to accept 
the mutual reasonableness of others (Gutmann & Thompson, 1997). Similarly, 
Galston (1991, p.227) notes the virtue of citizenship in public discourse includes 
the willingness to listen seriously “to a range of views which will include ideas 
the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious”.  
Bowman (1997) describes how active participation contributes to 
fostering democratic citizenship, thus strengthening democracy’s deepening 
consolidation process in society. Kymlica (2002) argues private individuals gain 
such democratic virtues or skills through an active, authentic political 
participatory process. At the same time, this presupposes that effective political 
participation is virtually impossible without virtuous, engaged citizens who work 
toward enlightened understanding of public affairs or common political issues. 
Thus, Rosenberg (2003) highlighted the urgency to engage citizens to be 
prepared for the participatory process through a wide variety of formal and non-
formal educational activities. He summarises his argument thus:   
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It is not enough to think of citizen deliberation as a venue for inclusive, equal 
participation in what will naturally be collective decision-making. Deliberative 
arrangements must also be designed as pedagogical devices for fostering the 
capacity for personal autonomy and constructive interpersonal relations that the 
governance of the lives of real people requires. (Rosenberg, 2003, p.15) 
 
In the context of democratisation, such arguments often legitimise various 
capacity-building programmes targeting civil society groups, youths, and the 
marginalised population. In South Korea, such efforts are surfacing and this 
dissertation argues that the PCR movement in the country is one such example. 
Despite its growing importance, critics such as Posner (2003) challenge its 
applicability to new democracies, as well as existing democracies where 
democratic culture has been more firmly integrated. First, critics such as Posner 
(2003) question the practical applicability of core participatory ideals in the 
context of modern, complex societies and their challenges. While it provides a 
valuable alternative perspective on democratic theories, its practical relevance 
as a political framework at the level of the nation-state appears to be relatively 
low (Posner, 2003). Specifically, the theory of participatory democracy 
emphasises individuals must have equal access to ‘epistemological’ and 
‘substantial’ information, in order to engage fully in a participatory process. Yet 
given the complex nature and variety of knowledge modern democracies need 
to deal with, it raises the question of whether individuals will have enough time 
and resources to absorb such knowledge while pursuing their own individual 
day-to-day activities. Thus, how such an ideal could be integrated into a larger 
political system needs further elaboration. Previously, participatory democracy 
has figured in grassroots settings such as participatory budgeting in Brazil, yet 
there has not yet been a participatory democratic regime at the national level. In 
the context of South Korea, a public deliberation process was introduced to 
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respond to a particular public policy dispute, rather than being utilised as a 
proactive form of governance (Park et al., 2006).  
Second, critics such as Mouffe (1999) question whether it is practical to 
integrate the system of deliberation to newly democratised countries deeply 
divided along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines (Mouffe, 1999). Participatory 
democrats assume citizens will be willing to engage in difficult issues and will 
be committed to solving them for the benefit of common values. However, in a 
society where a strong identity affects one’s interests and political position, 
direct communicative action among citizens can escalate existing social 
tensions. Mobilisation of the civil society for particular issues can serve to 
reinforce identity politics (Berman, 1997). For this reason, critics caution that it 
is premature for new democratic states to integrate a strong element of 
deliberation until citizens are ready to embrace basic democratic values. In part, 
conservative commentators in South Korea such as Kim (2006) argue that the 
rise of conflictual dynamics, social conflicts, and public policy disputes is related 
to the rapid expansion of a deliberative space without preparing citizens. 
Instead of focusing on the public good and common interest, parties in a 
deliberative process often resort to identity politics, making it extremely difficult 
to arrive at a mutually convenient solution (Park et al, 2006). A case in point 
was illustrated in Park (2006)’s essay that outlines her experience as a co-
facilitator for a public policy dispute related to local development and dam 
construction.  
Third, while participatory democratic theorists emphasise the importance 
of citizen participation and the quality of democratic citizenship, there is a 
dearth of information regarding how citizens obtain such virtues. The theory 
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often highlights democratic citizenship as the outcome of active civic 
engagement. Often, it is assumed citizens will embrace democratic citizenship 
and its core virtues as long as there is an equitable system allowing individuals 
access to necessary information. In order for the theory to be more practical, it 
needs to provide a much more concrete theoretical vision of how these virtues 
can be developed and a more specific indication of institutions or circumstances 
that best nurture such conditions. This dissertation is an attempt to explore 
whether the PCR movement in South Korea can serve as a practical solution to 
address such challenges.  
Despite the limits, in the context of democratisation, the participatory 
theory offers a holistic approach to democratic transition and consolidation, as it 
calls for greater involvement of citizens in the political process and explores 
ways to engage citizens at all levels of society, including grassroots 
communities, regional municipalities, and national political systems. In particular, 
in the context of South Korea, participatory democracy serves as a valuable 
framework in engaging citizens, strengthening communities, and encouraging 
grassroots democracy (Ha, 2003; Kim, 2006).  
This section reviews the theories of liberal and participatory democracy, 
and examines their complementary aspects. This dissertation maintains that an 
emphasis on citizen participation in the deliberative process does not contradict 
or undermine the core elements of liberal democracy: the representative system, 
respect for the rule of law, and various institutional and procedural aspects of 
democratic practices. Understanding these two theories has been particularly 
useful in identifying a set of norms, values, and skills to be diffused into civil 
society space. The theoretical elaboration of both perspectives begins with the 
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quest to find how their systems can better facilitate citizens’ meaningful 
encounter with the political and democratic processes. Thus, citizen 
participation in a public sphere is at the centrepiece of democratic consolidation. 
These two theories argue that civil society brings citizens together in a public 
space and serves as a pedagogical utility to educate citizens to be better 
participants of a participatory process (Rosenberg, 2003).  
To facilitate citizen participation effectively and to create a safe space for 
civic engagement, both theories articulate certain virtues that citizens in a 
democratic polity should embrace. Tolerance for difference and respect for 
diverse opinions are commonly required virtues. Without the willingness of 
citizens to adhere to tolerance and diversity, both liberal rules and participatory 
mechanisms cannot effectively function. The participatory views presented 
above suggest how one’s tolerance can manifest in practice such as empathetic 
listening. Closely connected to tolerance for difference, both theories encourage 
citizens to engage in dialogue and solve differences through conversations. 
While the liberal theorists advocate this in abstract terms, the participatory 
theorists contribute to devising institutional mechanisms that further motivate 
citizens to address public issues in dialogue. For example, many procedures 
introduced in advanced democracies such as alternative dispute mechanisms 
and third-party mediation are inspired by the participatory vision that aims to 
overcome the liberal vision’s weakness in handling community problems. Both 
theories further imply that citizens’ participation must be facilitated in a non-
violent and constructive manner. Based upon the understanding of liberal and 
participatory democracy theories, this dissertation will define a set of democratic 
norms, values, and skills that a post-democratic civil society in South Korea 
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should facilitate: a) commitment to non-violent; b) constructive problem solving; 
c) commitment to engaging in a difficult conversation; and d) commitment to 
tolerance and respect for diverse opinions.  
Civil Society in Democracy and Democratisation 
Since the late 1980s, when democratisation took place in different parts of 
the world, interest in the study of civil society has increased among academics 
including those in South Korea. Broadly understood as a “sociological 
counterpart of the market in the economic sphere and to (liberal) democracy in 
the political sphere”, the term civil society has emerged as one of the most 
important prisms through which to examine social and political changes in 
transitional democracies (White, 2004, p.6). Despite the increased interest in 
the subject over the last two decades, civil society remains a highly contested 
concept without an established definition (Heinrich, 2005). The following section 
first discusses the different usages of the term ‘civil society’ to understand 
better various ideals that are attached to the term. It considers how this term is 
influenced by the different theories of democracy examined above, and 
explores how civil society is understood to contribute to fostering democratic 
citizenship. Then, the section presents four different forms of civil society actors 
frequently referenced in democratisation literature, and discusses how they are 
situated to the South Korean civil society space.  
Theories of Civil Society: Liberal and Alternative Discourse 
 Two different intellectual Western traditions elucidate the concept of civil 
society as applied to socio-political changes. The first is a liberal democratic – 
mainstream approach inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville’s writings on 
democracy. Tocqueville (1956, p. 229) defined civil society as an entity distinct 
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from the state and political parties “in which the art of association takes place 
among people of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions”. Praising it as a 
solution to prevent the tyranny of the state, he contended a robust and diverse 
civil society permits “the delimitation of government prerogatives” and creates 
“a context for constraining arbitrary or intrusive state power” (Tocqueville, 1956, 
p. 230). Furthermore, Tocqueville (1956) asserted civil society served as an 
important arena in which democratic values could be modelled, pressuring the 
state to follow suit. 
Recent liberal democratic literature on democratisation reflects 
Tocqueville’s ideas on civil society. Civil society is an autonomous realm 
bounded by a set of shared rules comprising voluntary associations, 
organisations, movements, and networks engaged in collective action (Diamond, 
1994; Edwards, 2004). In relation to democratisation, liberal democratic 
scholars such as Diamond (1994) and Grugel (2002) have highlighted the 
following two functions of civil society. First, civil society, more precisely, an 
aggregation of (voluntary) civil associations, serves as an important supporting 
structure for existing (liberal) democracy at the institutional level. As an aid to 
the state, civil society helps to improve democratic governance by reducing the 
load the state carries, addressing concrete social problems, and checking the 
abuse of state power (Diamond, 1994; Grugel, 2002). 
Second, civil society exists as a vital space for ordinary citizens to develop 
skills and habits that are beneficial to democratic development (Finkel, 2003). In 
the 1960s, based upon empirical research on four countries, Almond and Verba 
(1963) argued that civil society is a space for democratic learning, as 
participation in secondary, non-political associations positively affects the 
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development of civic competence. More recently, Putnam (1993) presented the 
positive effect of civil society on democracy through his research paradigm on 
social capital, a concept based upon the premise that social networks have 
values that benefit society’s overall development. The theory of social capital 
endorsed the idea that all institutions within civil society operate “in ways that 
reinforce positive social norms such as tolerance, non-discrimination, trust and 
cooperation”, all of which are important elements of democratic consolidation 
(Edwards, 2004, p.76).  
As previously stated, South Korea neglected the democratic educational 
function of civil society that the liberal democratic vision advocates partially due 
to South Korean civil society activists’ ambivalence towards the liberal vision, 
which trivialised the discourse generational function of civil society and 
institutionalised civil society as apolitical space to support the status quo (Kim, 
2000). Nonetheless, with the proceeding of democratic consolidation, South 
Korean civil society activists are increasingly reflective of their dilemmas as they 
outline in later chapters in this dissertation. The civil society space, which they 
operate, is constantly interacting with the political society (governments, 
parliaments, and other governing institutions), which is highly influenced by the 
liberal democratic vision (Kim, 2009). Further, as a result of the influence of the 
liberal democratic vision in the country, these activists witnessed a range of civil 
society associations including apolitical organisations, voluntary associations, 
and conservative (defined as counter-movement by the country’s civil society 
actors) groups gaining further strengths in the civil society space (Kim, 2009). 
Reflecting upon the plurality within the country’s civil society, South Korean civil 
society practitioners began to engage more in civil society’s democratic 
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educative function and contemplated how to make their activism more relevant 
to fostering democratic citizenship (Park, 2007). This is the nucleus of this 
dissertation.  
The tension between South Korean activists’ reluctance to embrace the 
liberal vision of civil society fully and their desire to nurture citizenship begs a 
question. Why do civil society activists experience such dilemmas, and what 
conceptual framework could facilitate civil society’s attempt to mediate both of 
their desires? The author argues that reviewing the emancipation framework of 
civil society provides answers to the first question and that a better 
understanding of the public sphere discourse on civil society at least partially 
answers the second question.  
The emancipation framework of civil society is influenced by the work of 
Antonio Gramsci, and it values the liberating potential of civil society. In modern 
capitalist society, dominant groups maintain their positions through the state’s 
coercive power and hegemony, the capacity of dominant classes to persuade 
subordinate ones to accept, adopt and internalise their values and norms (Cox, 
1999). Like the political society, civil society, an entity existing between the 
economy and the state, reflects the existing social order. Yet, by virtue of being 
independent of the state and separated from the market, civil society has the 
potential for the development of counter-hegemony narratives, expressed 
through the competition of ideas (Cox, 1999). The emancipation vision 
contends that civil society provides different groups with an opportunity to 
participate in forming and disseminating their messages to pursue the collective 
good. Thus, it serves as an emancipatory sphere in which the poor, the 
exploited, the voiceless, and the marginalised can engage in battles against the 
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dominant hegemonic power and attain social and political transformation 
(Ehrenberg, 1999).  
The role of democratic citizens in the Gramscian vision is to contribute to 
building up a counter hegemony that challenges the status quo creating 
oppressive social and economic dynamics. The emancipation vision maintains 
a rather ambivalent approach to the democratic citizenship that the liberal vision 
endorses, given its role in reinforcing dominant hegemony in society (Smyth, 
1989). To become an active agent of social change, the Gramscian vision 
challenges people to develop their own, what he terms “organic intellectuals,” to 
counteract conservative ideologies, and urges them to maintain the active, 
critical engagement in practical life “as constructor, organiser, permanent 
persuader, and not just simple orator” (Gramsci, 1970, p.10).  
In democratisation literature, the Gramscian notion of civil society is 
credited with providing an intellectual rationale for oppositional movements 
fighting against authoritarianism and militarism (Arato & Cohen, 1994; Kean, 
1988). The emancipation vision inspired numerous intellectuals throughout the 
late twentieth century and challenged individuals to engage in real life issues in 
a critical manner with one’s heightened awareness and consciousness of the 
oppressive social structure that perpetuate inequality and injustice. The 
Gramscian vision has been particularly influential in shaping the civil society 
discourses in South Korea. Intellectually, mainstream civil society scholars and 
prominent activists in South Korea are highly sympathetic to Gramsci’s vision 
(Chang, 2000; Kim & Kim, 2001; Kim, 1991; Lee, 1998; Moon, 1994; Moon, 
2002). This is closely linked to the historical context in which the country’s civil 
society developed.  
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Civil society in South Korea emerged in the early 20th century. It 
subsequently served as a primary space for oppositional struggles against the 
authoritarian regimes, economic elites closely tied to state apparatus, and 
colonial/neo-imperial power (Hahm, 1997). In such historical context, South 
Korean civil society’s relationship with the state or other status-quo institutions 
in society had been mostly characterised as antagonistic and confrontational, 
and civil society activists focused to increase individuals’ political and class 
consciousness around the oppression perpetuated by a series of authoritarian 
rules in the country (Kim, 2000). The oppositional civil society in South Korea 
and its persistent struggles are credited for triggering the democratic transition 
in 1987 and for making the early transitional process more vibrant.  
Due to civil society’s historic contributions to the country’s democratic 
transition, South Korean activists took great pride in engaging in a space that 
could transform the power dynamics of the society (Joo et al., 2006). Thus, 
even after the 1987 democratic transition, civil society activists in the country 
continued to emphasise the resistance and emancipatory capacity of civil 
society, and such vision guided their activism. As Kim and Kim (2001) pointed 
out in their critical reviews on civil society studies in South Korea, civil society is 
often interchangeable with terms such as “civil movement” and “(social) 
movement organisations”, implying its strong connection to emancipation. 
Further, in a recent study on the status of South Korean civil society, Joo et al. 
(2006) noted that the civil society and civil society activists expressed their 
strong preference to preserve civil society as an emancipatory space that 
pursued progressive social change and sought to advance public interests.  
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Despite the important contribution that the emancipation vision has made 
in shaping the civil society agenda and in generating critical democratic debates, 
this dissertation concurs with the concerns voiced by academics such as Kim 
and Kim (2001) and Joo et al. (2006). They argued that looking at South Korean 
civil society through the Gramscian framework limits the scope and reach of 
civil society research in the country. Firstly, relying on one particular conceptual 
vision inevitably excludes organisations and activities perceived to be 
contradictory to progressive social, economic, and political ideals. While the 
majority of civil society space is taken up by casual social groups (i.e. leisure, 
sports, and alumni clubs), these apolitical social groups that sprang up after the 
transition were less focused by both scholars and activists in South Korea due 
to these organisations’ lack of willingness to politicise their constituents (Joo et 
al., 2006). Additionally, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many civic 
organisations sympathetic to conservative political parties and nationalist 
ideology emerged; yet, the dominant civil society conceptual framework in 
South Korea treats these entities as reactionary movements and inhibits 
constructive engagement with these groups (Kim, 2009). Secondly, this 
dissertation contends that, in addressing critical issues, the emancipation vision 
has implicitly encouraged civil society to create and escalate conflictual 
dynamics that contribute to producing and reinforcing oppressive and unjust 
social structures. The emancipation view inadvertently contributes to the 
neglect of the processes, values, and skills that civil society can utilise to diffuse 
tensions and conflictual dynamics among civil society actors in order to 
contribute to establishing a collaborative, democratic civil society space, 
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especially when one engages with those within the ‘oppressors’ group (Lee, 
2007).  
Another influential alternative perspective on civil society is the public 
sphere school of thought influenced by the work of Jurgen Habermas. Civil 
society, as the public sphere, is a space containing institutions and practices 
that exist between the private interests of everyday life and the realm of state 
power, where the processes of unconstrained communication take place 
(Habermas, 1984). In this discursive arena, arguments are raised in order to 
articulate the themes and topics worthy of public discussion. When it is weak, 
civil society becomes a social space in which individuals gather to discuss their 
common public affairs. On the other hand, the strong public sphere does not 
merely encourage the formation of public opinion on common concerns; it also 
serves as a participatory space for the democratic process. This is because the 
public sphere contains the transformative potential to promote societal 
democratisation and to reshape political society to be more responsive 
(Habermas, 1984).  
Within the literature on democratisation, the public sphere approach 
provides a normative basis for people to be engaged and to rejuvenate a more 
inclusive and egalitarian grassroots democracy – an alternative to liberal, 
procedural democracy. The public sphere vision embraces the participatory 
democrats’ democratic citizenship vision. Nonetheless, surprisingly, there have 
been relatively few efforts to apply the public sphere vision of Habermas to 
understand South Korean civil society5. This dissertation contends that the 
public sphere framework can serve as an important additional theoretical lens to 
                                                
5 CSO14 (Personal interview, 14 May 2007) indicated that the public sphere framework was considered 
by progressive scholars and activists to be a political conservative analytical tool to examine the South 
Korean civil society.  
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explore South Korean civil society and its contribution to the country’s 
democratic consolidation and deepening processes. The dissertation proposes 
that the public sphere framework appreciates civil society’s discourse-
generating capacity to bring about transformative social change without 
rejecting inclusiveness and liberal democratic values. Within the public sphere 
framework, civil society is a discursive and democratic participatory space, 
which facilitates individual expression of ideas and views worthy of public 
discussion (Habermas, 1984).  
Although each theory differs in its interpretation of citizen participation in a 
democratic polity, both liberal and public sphere discourses on civil society 
agree on civil society’s educational effect on citizens’ democratic skills and 
overall democratisation. Theorists in the mainstream and alternative schools of 
thought contend civil society provides citizens an opportunity to interact and 
freely express their views. By continuously engaging in such space, people 
obtain democratic skills and knowledge. However, such theoretical assumptions 
require much more elaboration when they are applied to new democracies, as 
they underestimate the difficulty many citizens in new democracies experience 
when they begin to participate in a political space (Shonholtz, 1997). In new 
democracies, many people remember that their democratic habits and skills, for 
example, freedom of expression or right to organize, have been long 
suppressed. Often some of these democratic qualities have caused personal 
danger and threatened one’s well-being. Such a legacy deeply affects people’s 
attitudes and competency. Even after political changes, attitudes and 
behaviours are not easily altered. Furthermore, without instilling the values and 
skills required to practice their rights and responsibilities, people can turn a civil 
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society into a space where uncivil forces can mobilize to silence minority views, 
as was the case in post-World War I Germany and in many divisive societies in 
the 1990s where grassroots youth movements turn into chauvinistic, 
xenophobic phenomena (Berman, 1997). This is precisely where conflict 
resolution methods can play a positive role in new democracies.  
Throughout South Korean political history, as presented above, the 
emancipation vision had guided the development of civil society discourses in 
the country. In this dissertation, the emancipation vision will serve only to 
understand the historical context of civil society; it will be less utilised in 
analysing organisations featured in the field research because of the 
ambivalence of the vision towards PCR activism. Instead, this dissertation 
interprets case study organisations based upon the liberal vision of civil society, 
and their discourse formation capacity and critical distance from the liberal 
democratic value will be examined through the public sphere framework. By 
serving as a space to allow diverse views to be expressed, civil society 
ultimately contributes to enhancing the existing liberal democratic system and 
facilitates the meaningful participation of citizens in newly democratised states. 
By utilising the combination of the public sphere and liberal frameworks, this 
dissertation reviews the processes in which South Korean civil society engage 
to embed democratic norms and skills that are central to enhancing civil 
society’s ability to generate discourse in a constructive and democratic way and 
to deepen meaningful citizen participation.  
The combination of these two theoretical lenses provides this dissertation 
with an opportunity to apply less examined civil society theory to understand 
South Korean civil society’s activities in support of strengthening civil society’s 
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capacity to nurture democratic norms, values, skills, and processes. Embracing 
the public sphere and the liberal democratic vision of civil society does not 
reject nor undermine the important contribution made by civil society activism 
inspired by the emancipatory vision. Rather, these alternative conceptual 
frameworks help to bear witness to micro-level changes that civil society 
organisations have brought about to strengthen citizen participation and to 
embed a collaborative, democratic civil society.  
Civil society in Practice: Organisations and Activities  
 Based upon the theoretical frameworks outlined above, the following 
section discusses how civil societies manifest in modern democracy by 
examining their organisational structures and the types of activities in which 
they engage. Although civil society covers a wide range of actors and activities, 
civil society studies often focus on a particular segment of civil society. Such a 
narrow focus is necessary, especially when examining civil society 
organisations’ contribution to political development in new democracies. Among 
various entities in civil society, this dissertation introduces four different types of 
actors in civil society, chosen because they are relevant to explaining the 
current composition of the South Korean civil society as well as its past actors: 
voluntary associations, social movement networks, non-governmental 
organisations, and multi-purpose hybrid organisations. 
First, inspired by Tocqueville and further popularized by Putnam, voluntary 
associations refer to associations run voluntarily by interested citizens. 
Embedded strongly within North American political contexts, voluntary 
associations are at the core of democratic citizenship. As rightly pointed out by 
Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), voluntary associations provide space for civic 
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engagement, thus contributing to producing social capital, a vital element for 
fostering collective trust and vibrant democratic civil society. Voluntary 
associations are horizontal and network-based in principle as they differ from 
professional interest groups or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which 
have much more rigid organisational structures and hierarchies. Voluntary 
associations exist at the grassroots level and include church groups, neighbour 
associations, community groups, and social clubs.  
Within the North American political context, voluntary associations do not 
engage in activities that challenge the state. However, in developing countries, 
voluntary associations are a mix of apolitical groups and politically motivated 
entities. For example, in countries that have transitioned from authoritarianism 
to democracy, voluntary associations are divided into two types: state-
administered voluntary associations that often serve to advance the state’s 
authoritarian propaganda; and other voluntary associations that tend to be 
community organisations of a local and membership-based nature that do not 
pursue activities pursuing profits. Yet, they are organised to mobilize their 
grassroots constituents in support of collective goals particular to their localities. 
These community groups include community associations and cooperatives. 
For example, in Latin America, community associations play a critical role in 
mobilising the grassroots population to advance the rights of the poor and 
marginalised (Carothers, 1999). In this regard, many community organisations 
in developing countries share similar characteristics of social movement 
networks as they attempt to transform the existing status quo. This trend is not 
an exception in South Korea, and one of the organisations featured in this 
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dissertation is a voluntary association that emerged in response to the lack of 
political responses to address school violence in public schools.  
Second, theorists from the Gramcian tradition who see civil society as a 
space for emancipation and radical discourse formation examine social 
movement networks. Goodwin and Jasper defines social movement as “a 
collective, organised, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, 
power-holders or cultural beliefs and practices” (2004, p. 4). Tilly (2004) 
elaborates further by contending social movement is a series of contentious 
performances, displays, and campaigns expressed by ordinary citizens who 
pursue the collective common good. From this perspective, social movement 
networks/organisations engage in a wide variety of activities designed to 
challenge the status quo (e.g., campaigns, protests, demonstrations, and 
petition gathering). In contemporary social movement discourses, non-violent 
action plays a strong role and theorists tend to agree that, by their commitment 
to non-violence, they are distinguished from other non-state actors such as 
rebel groups or terrorist organisations that violently engage with the state to 
pursue their own political agendas.  
In the democratisation literature, social movement networks and 
organisations are considered to play a significant role in opening a space for 
transition, as was witnessed in various Latin American countries, Eastern 
European nations, and South Korea (Johnson & Lovemen, 1995; Nogeira, 
1995; Diamond, 1994). Under authoritarian and near-totalitarian situations, 
citizen-led, politically motivated activities are designed to alter state behaviours 
and often appear contentious. In this regard, social movements are credited 
with mobilising citizens and leading to a positive social change in various new 
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democracies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the consolidation period, 
social movement networks are portrayed to advocate the rights of the 
marginalized population (Cohen 1995). Liberal democratic scholars, however, 
often exclude social movement networks from their research when looking at 
democratic consolidation processes due to their contentious relationship with 
the state. Such contentious relationships are often viewed as antagonistic to a 
civil society that supports the democratic state. Yet, this dissertation does not 
exclude social movement networks from the civil society in South Korea as 
many civil society organisations’ historical roots in the country’s democratic 
movement and the democratisation contributed to transitioning them to more 
legally established organisations.  
Third, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are commonly defined as 
private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, 
concerned with pursuit of the common good. In studies of democratisation, 
NGOs are most commonly included, given their increasingly influential role in 
political affairs. NGOs engage in a wide variety of activities including service 
delivery, policy advocacy, and information dissemination. They include 
organisations devoted to environment, development, human rights, peace, and 
their international networks. In many parts of the world, the distinction between 
NGOs and voluntary associations tends to be legal in nature, as NGOs are 
often required to register with an authorising body to be recognised legally while 
voluntary associations can exist outside legal obligations.  
While NGOs undertake a wide range of tasks and activities, most NGOs 
examined in the democratisation literature as well as in this dissertation are 
advocacy NGOs. They aim to influence public policy from outside the formal 
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structure of elected government, and engage in lobbying, public advocacy, 
awareness-raising, and policy agenda-setting activities (Ahmed & Potter, 2006). 
Advocacy NGOs stimulate public participation with a view to advancing various 
policy issues (e.g., human rights, environment, gender, anti-corruption, and 
economic justice) (Carothers, 1999). These NGOs are most extensively 
examined for their contribution to democratic consolidation, due to their ability to 
hold the state accountable by mobilising citizens, providing policy analysis, or 
closely working with media to publicise issues. South Korea is not an exception 
to such trend, and organisations that received most scholarly attention are 
NGOs with strong advocacy profiles (Kim, 2009).   
Finally, Gidron et al. (2002) introduced the notion of multiple purpose 
hybrid organisations in order to explain some of the organisations that have 
overlapping objectives of voluntary associations, non-governmental 
organisations, and social movements. Gidron et al. (2002) describe how these 
multi-purpose hybrid organisations differ from social movement organisations, 
NGOs, or voluntary associations; first, they seek to bring about social change, 
but not necessarily through protest or other direct action. Second, their services, 
such as social or educational services, are strategies for social change. Third, 
these organisations embrace collectivist, horizontal, network-based models 
while they incorporate some levels of bureaucratic elements (Gidron et al., 
2002). Multiple purpose hybrid organisations provide a valuable theoretical 
category to explain numerous NGOs or non-profit organisations that do not fit 
into the definitions described above. Further, this concept is highly valuable in 
understanding South Korean civil society organisations engaging in PCR 
activism.   
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Conflict Resolution and Peace 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the conflict resolution 
movement became popular. As the abundance of literature on the subject 
suggests, conflict resolution is no longer unfamiliar jargon understood by a 
select few. Inspired by a wide range of activities undertaken in the real world, 
academics and practitioners ask complex questions about conflict and the ways 
in which to manage it. However, the term ‘conflict resolution’ is still rather 
ambiguous and it is highly contested by scholars and practitioners (Fast, 2003).  
The ambiguity is related to the historical background, which influenced the 
emergence of the conflict resolution movement. Mayer (2004) explained that 
the field of conflict resolution emerged prominently in the late 1960s in North 
America, and gained momentum in the 1990s. During its initial phase, the field’s 
connection to the social movement and peace activism was strong and explicit 
as it intensely interacted with the environment affected by progressive 
discourses underpinning the civil rights movement and anti-war demonstrations 
(Mayer, 2004). However, the boundaries between peace activism6 and the 
conflict resolution movement have become clearer in recent days as conflict 
resolution has gained more currency among funding agencies, thus claiming its 
unique and distinct identity (Mayer, 2004). As a theoretical exercise, developing 
the boundary of conflict resolution may be helpful as argued by Fast (2003).  
However, the author encountered difficulty in applying the clear-cut 
definition of the concept to the field research for this dissertation examining civil 
                                                
6 According to Nigel Young, “the peace movement refers to social or political movements which 
consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, 
which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the ’peace movement’ or are overtly opposed to war, 
militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986,p. 185). 
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society organisations engaged in the PCR activism in South Korea7. Initially, 
this dissertation intended to look at organisations embracing conflict resolution 
activities. Yet, as the research continues, it became apparent that conflict 
resolution was pioneered by progressive civil society organisations in South 
Korea who identified themselves closely with the social movement tradition; 
they shaped the conflict resolution agenda in the country. Thus, describing the 
organisations examined in this dissertation as ‘conflict resolution organisations’ 
in English is highly misleading and ignoring its contextual nuances. Therefore, 
instead of using the clear-cut definition on conflict resolution, this dissertation 
adopts the term ‘Peace and Conflict Resolution activism (PCR activism)’ to 
explain how conflict resolution manifests in South Korea.  
Having the aforementioned background in mind, this section reviews 
briefly the core concepts related to peace and conflict resolution; it also 
considers how these core concepts apply to and are relevant to understanding 
South Korean civil society organisations.  
Theories on Conflict Resolution and Peace  
As stated above, the field of conflict resolution began in the late 1960s in 
North America in the midst of civil rights and anti-war movements when 
governmental institutions in advanced democracies revealed their lack of 
capacity to manage a wide range of conflicts emerging in all levels of society 
(Wehr, 1998; Mayer, 2004). The historical origin of conflict resolution implies the 
field emerged in response to inadequacies in procedural democracy in terms of 
resolving contentious issues expressed outside of formal institutional spaces, 
                                                
7 This is not unique to this dissertation. In countries experiencing violent conflicts or new democracies, 
boundaries between peace activism and conflict resolution movement are blurred, and highly overlapping. 
For example, a number of organisations featured in van Tongeren (2005)’s work are professionalised 
conflict resolution non-government organisations while they continuously engage and operate in the social 
movement space. Gidron et al. (2003) indicated in their study on PCR organisations operating four 
conflict-affected areas that PCR organisations are part of social movement organisations.  
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namely, party politics and interest groups (Mayer, 2004). By offering an 
alternative framework for social conflict in democracy, the field of conflict 
resolution has contributed to institutionalising a mechanism for the constructive 
management of contentious social issues at various levels of society.  
Increasingly, the field became recognised in the 1990s as an important 
tool for effective intervention in global conflicts. The growth of the field in the 
1990s coincides with a massive wave of democratisation, which affected 
numerous countries in the world and changed international contexts as internal 
violent conflicts were increasingly on the rise. In this context, conflict resolution 
– a highly North American academic and practical discourse – began to be 
introduced to various newly democratising countries (Mayer, 2004). Among 
these new democracies, conflict resolution was promoted prominently in 
transitional countries with high levels of violent conflict.  
The conflict resolution approach highlights the positive aspects of conflict 
that can serve as an agent for social progress and provides a blueprint for 
violence prevention. The notion of conflict resolution rests on the premise that 
conflict is an inevitable part of human life and advocates “the source, cause, 
and process of (social) conflict can be turned from life-destroying to life-building 
ends,” depending on how the process of social conflict is managed (Augsburger, 
1992, p.5). By placing individuals and communities’ participation at the core of 
its approach, the field of conflict resolution advocates a process empowering 
individuals and communities to address issues affecting their lives without 
resorting to destructive and ineffective methods (Mayer, 2004).  
The field of conflict resolution promotes a collaborative approach, which 
“empower(s) participants to advocate effectively for their own interests in a safe 
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and constructive environment” (Mayer, 2000, p.170). As a short-term goal, 
conflict resolution is an effort to change adversarial relationships among parties 
in disagreement into constructive partnership (Mitchell, 2005). In the longer-
term, to deal with a multi-faceted conflict triggered by a wide range of personal 
and structural elements, any meaningful resolution requires a holistic approach 
addressing all the underlying issues of social conflict and handling the different 
dimensions of it (Mayer, 2000).  
In this perspective, conflict resolution is “all process oriented activities 
aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, cultural, and structural 
violence” (Reimann, 2004, p. 10). Riemann defines “structural violence as the 
social, political and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal 
power, domination and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence 
refers to the social and cultural legitimisation of direct and structural violence” 
(Reimann, p. 10-11). Thus, conflict resolution is a preliminary step adopted for 
“a deep transformation in the parties and their relationships and in the situation 
that created the conflict” (Miall et al., 1999, p. 29).  
This holistic view on conflict resolution advocates that different levels of 
leadership in society, ranging from governmental institutions to grassroots 
organisations, make a concerted effort to address the various problems 
underpinning a social conflict (Lederach, 1997). In this context, a peace 
movement is a form of the broader and holistic notion of conflict resolution as it 
attempts to transform the structure and negative dynamics perpetuating social 
conflicts. In studying South Korean civil society organisations, this dissertation 
adopts the broader, holistic notion given that the civil society organisations 
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examined have explicit goals to transform the negative dynamics and concerns 
about structural and cultural violence (Park, 2007).  
Civil Society In Support of Conflict Resolution and Peace  
Based upon some of the concepts discussed above, the following 
sections represent a review of specific activities undertaken by civil societies 
under the broader theme of ‘peace and conflict resolution’ in countries with 
different levels of political development – conflict-affected transitional, relatively 
stable transitional, and advanced democratic societies. The core processes 
underpinning the aforementioned conflict resolution methods are “face-to-face 
activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote 
collaborative conflict analysis and problem-solving among parties engaged in 
social conflict” (Fisher, 1997, p.8).  
 Civil society actors advocating PCR activities aspire to accomplish three 
objectives through various educational, training, and mediation techniques 
(Barnes, 2007). First, these actors attempt to develop new, innovative conflict 
resolution mechanisms to complement the state’s capacity to handle conflictual 
social issues that can become sources of violence (Fisher, 2007). Second, 
through education and mediation activities, civil society actors provide the 
individuals and communities vulnerable to social conflicts with an opportunity to 
learn how to take control of their own common problems through direct 
involvement. This, in turn, empowers citizens and communities to address, 
manage, and transform difficulties and antagonism into sources of positive 
social change (Buah & Folger, 1994). Third, skills training and personal 
experience with solving common problems through facilitated dialogue is 
intended to provide ordinary citizens with the means to handle future conflicts in 
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a constructive manner (Shonholtz, 1997). Thus, civil society actors contribute to 
the prevention of violent social conflict.  
Inspired by existing literature (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008; 
Mayer, 2004; Shonoltz, 1997), this dissertation categorises conflict resolution 
activities undertaken by civil society actors based upon socio-political contexts 
in which civil society organisations operate: transitional and conflict-affected, 
transitional without much visible violence, and advanced democratic deepening 
contexts.  
First, in transitional and conflict-affected countries, conflict resolution 
refers to an effort attempting to address various aspects of conflict, thus 
reducing the intensity of violence (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008). In 
conflict-affected countries such as the Balkan states, Latin America, and sub-
Saharan Africa, these conflict resolution activities focus on relationship building 
and changing conflict dynamics between conflictual parties (Barnes, 2007). 
Such programmes include training civil society leaders for negotiation and 
conflict resolution skills, restorative justice, peace education for inter-ethnic 
tolerance and understanding, reconciliation projects, developing indigenous-
based conflict/dispute resolution systems, training journalists to be more conflict 
sensitive, capacity building for women leaders to be part of peace process, and 
so forth (Barnes, 2007; Bartoli, 2008; Fisher, 2008). The aforementioned 
activities have clear objectives to alter people’s behaviours as well as to 
transform conditions sustaining conflict dynamics in society (Van Tongeren, 
2005). 
Second, in transitional countries with a low level of violent conflict, peace 
and conflict resolution focuses on training aspects and introduces the basic 
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element of conflict resolution to strengthen citizen participation as well as to 
reduce conflicts among different social actors (Shonholtz, 1997). South Korea 
fits into this category. In transitional countries, conflict resolution programmes 
are not much different from dispute resolution mechanisms existing in North 
America. Such activities include adult education for democracy, civic education 
(e.g., election, citizens’ rights, and independent media), peace education 
(tolerance, inter-ethnic/religious/cultural understanding), community mediation 
programmes, civil society capacity building for increased advocacy, dialogue, 
and problem-solving skills (Shonholtz, 1997). To understand better the 
underlying assumptions of conflict resolution activities undertaken by civil 
society in transitional societies with low levels of violence, the following section 
reviews advanced democracies’ conflict resolution activities.  
Third, in advanced democracies, conflict-resolution NGOs have been 
leading the effort in community mediation and public dialogue, as facilitators 
and capacity-builders. Unlike the aforementioned contexts, in advanced 
democracies, conflict resolution NGOs are more specialised and are less 
connected to the peace movement (Mayer, 2004). These specialised 
organisations provide training, advocate the practices, lobby governments on 
inclusion, and directly facilitate these activities. The common values – improving 
communications, education, and supporting their ability to analyse and 
understand conflicts – empower citizens to enhance the quality of interaction 
between different social groups (Liebmann, 1998, p. 43). Three particular 
activities have gained popularity within civil society and policy circles in 
advanced democracies, especially in North America, and they have been 
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reviewed extensively: community mediation, conflict resolution skills training 
(conflict resolution education), and public dialogue.  
Community mediation centres on the notion of individual and community 
responsibility in constructively engaging with local-level conflicts, providing local 
residents with a chance to choose a settlement process requiring their active 
participation (Pavlich, 1996). In other words, community mediation is a venue 
for civic conversation providing opportunities for communities to bridge the 
divisions that separate them. Community mediation refers to an informal 
process helping parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the help 
of a neutral third party that has no power to impose a resolution (Bush & Folger, 
1994).  
Community mediation has an educational effect on “how to resolve future 
disputes” before they develop into crises requiring state intervention (Pavlich, 
1996, p.711). Proponents such as Bush and Folger (1994) argue that 
community mediation, at the individual level, has a transformative power to 
change people’s attitudes toward conflict. At the same time, community 
mediation strengthens the quality of democratic participation as it develops the 
capacity of popular justice (people-based justice). Community mediation 
embodies community power and provides a means to express community 
values. Community mediation is often portrayed by its advocates as “an 
empowerment tool” that enables “individuals and communities to take back 
control over their lives from a state institution” (Hedeen, 2004, p. 103). 
Community mediation also provides parties in dispute with an opportunity to see 
underlying issues causing tension with their neighbours and to understand the 
need for social change to solve their problems. In mediation, in particular, 
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during the problem-solving phase, disputants often come up with effective 
strategies to address specific issues related to a larger structural problem and 
learn to work with their adversaries to tackle common problems. This process 
allows disputants who felt relatively powerless to take part in a democratic 
process and provides them with “a new sense of participation in civic life” (Bush 
& Folger, 1994, p. 19).  
Conflict Resolution Skills Training: As in conflict-affected societies, 
advanced democracies need citizens capable of dealing with social conflicts 
affecting their lives. These organisations operate on the assumption if citizens 
have opportunities to explore different options available for conflict resolution, 
they will respond to violent situations in a constructive way. These organisations 
offer a series of training programmes that help individuals become familiar with 
different types of conflict and supply them with specific skills to manage 
circumstances that can lead to violence constructively. In certain contexts, 
conflict resolution training is contextualised as part of broader peace education, 
which aims to enhance citizens’ awareness on a range of issues affecting the 
society’s peace.  
Public Dialogue: A healthy democracy embraces the notion of competing 
interests through organised groups designed to cope with such contentions in a 
constructive manner (Ury, 1999). Yet, in recent years, policy-related conflicts in 
advanced democracies including the US have been expressed in a highly 
contentious manner, further increasing division among citizens who hold 
opposing perspectives. In an effort to reduce tensions around particular public 
policies and improve the state’s decision-making procedures, new collaborative 
techniques that can effectively incorporate public participation in policy 
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formation processes have been developed (Kovic, 2005, p.46). Public dialogue 
has been evident for over 15 years, and organisations such as the Civic Forum 
and Dialogue Circles are gaining support from political leaders in mainstream 
parties (McCoy & Scully, 2002). Collaborative decision-making processes are 
now receiving increasing attention from a governmental body struggling with 
contentious social issues (Lavigne, 2003). Public dialogue ensures the 
representation of all major interests, clarifies their disagreements, and 
discusses equitable solutions that could stimulate collaborative action and 
effective policy making (White, 2004). They promote the deliberative nature of 
democracy. This, in turn, improves the quality of democracy as it overcomes the 
limitation of representative democracy, that is, a lack of citizen participation and 
under-representation of a diversity of voices and concerns in the policy making 
process (Jackstreit, 1999).  
In summary, civil society organisations’ engagement with the 
aforementioned activities in advanced democracies as well as in new 
democracies with low levels of violence is presupposed to contribute to 
strengthening democracy based upon the following assumptions. First, these 
activities help citizens develop effective communication skills. They build citizen 
capacity for conflict resolution, a form of constructive communication. Such 
rational, constructive communications of citizens form a basis of citizen 
participation in public discourse, a critical element in strengthening the 
participatory dimension of democracy. Second, with an increased capacity for 
conflict resolution, citizens are empowered to engage constructively in the 
processes normally considered the realm of government. For example, as a 
number works in the literature on conflict resolution organisations in North 
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America testify, these organisations provide previously powerless individuals 
with an opportunity to find constructive ways to engage with others in the public 
sphere by working on common problems facing their respective communities 
(Mark, 2005). Third, these activities also help to enhance the quality of civic 
participation. Specifically, public dialogue is designed to capture citizen 
deliberation on critically contentious social and public issues effectively. But, all 
other activities including mediation and conflict resolution trainings empower 
citizens to engage in public and community affairs effectively.   
In South Korea, in 2007, when the author engaged in fieldwork, almost 
all the activities under the PCR movement were educational activities. Conflict 
resolution skills training was framed and presented to their constituents with a 
range of terms such as conflict resolution education, facilitation workshop, 
nonviolence training, and peace education. A majority of these educational 
programmes were a mixture of different conflict resolution traditions, peace 
activism, and nonviolence political discourses. These activities were 
implemented on the ground with a view to preparing citizens to engage in 
mediation, public dialogue, and other activities that could alter the conflictual 
dynamics existing in South Korea.  
Conclusion 
This section has reviewed various works of literature related to 
democracy, democratisation, civil society, and conflict resolution. By reviewing 
core concepts of various social and political phenomena that affected the late 
1990s and early 21st century, this section investigated how these different 
concepts are related to one another. In particular, this chapter attempts to 
explain how other theorists understand the contribution of civil-society-led 
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conflict resolution activities and their contributions to the overall process of 
democracy development, the overarching theme of this dissertation. In the next 
chapter, these concepts provide the foundation from which to identify a suitable 
methodological framework for this dissertation from among differing 
methodological perspectives.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY  
 
In the last twenty years, civil society organizations around the world have 
undertaken a wide array of activities: human rights advocacy, electoral 
education, women’s empowerment, anti-corruption awareness campaigns, 
mediation services, judiciary reforms, community development, and conflict 
resolution skills training. These measures have been taken in order to 
strengthen democratization processes in new democracies. In the last ten years, 
a number of policy research organizations, as well as bi- and multi-national 
agencies, have examined these activities, and evaluated the effect of civil 
society activities on democracy.  
In response to growing interest in civil society’s engagement with PCR 
activities, practitioners as well as scholars have examined civil society’s conflict 
resolution efforts (van Tongeren, 2005 and Gidron et al., 2003). These studies 
have analysed civil society organisations engaged in PCR in a variety of 
countries, many of which have undergone democratisation during the last 
twenty years. Compared to other regions, Eastern Asian experiences on this 
subject are less documented. The majority of existing literature investigates 
how PCR activities contribute to managing and transforming overt conflicts, 
whereas their use in support of democratic transition and consolidation is 
under-explored. To fill this research gap and to understand better how PCR 
activism can contribute to fostering democratic values, norms, and skills, this 
dissertation reviews South Korean civil society organisations engaged in peace 
and conflict work. 
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Given the novelty of the field, the majority of studies examining civil 
society’s PCR efforts have been conducted using qualitative methodology to 
provide context-rich information, and rely on data collection methods such as 
interviewing, observation, and field research. However, triangulation 
methodology has been increasingly utilised by practitioners and researchers; 
such studies rely primarily on qualitative data collection methods with the limited 
use of surveys inspired by quantitative methodology (Howard, 2003; Frankel, 
Linan, & Seligman, 2007). While an array of scholarship has contributed to 
developing the core ideas underlying this dissertation, the following three 
publications have played the most influential roles in choosing a suitable 
methodological framework for the dissertation and in designing the research 
project: Improving the Practice by Shonholtz and Goncz (2000), People Building 
Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society by Van Togeren (2005), and 
Mobilising for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, 
and South Africa by Gidron et al (2003).  
Shonholtz and Goncz (2000) discuss how the incorporation of conflict 
management systems has helped build democratic institutions in former 
communist countries, based upon case studies on Partners for Democratic 
Change in Central and Eastern Europe. These case studies utilize multiple 
methods ranging from observations and interviews with programme participants 
to field visits that investigate how Partners for Democratic Change programmes 
have contributed towards advancing a culture of conflict resolution in new 
democracies. Similarly, van Tongeren (2005) illustrates how civil society 
organizations have contributed to the restoration of peaceful relations among 
conflicting parties and to interventions in difficult social conflicts in conflict-
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affected areas. The sixty case studies van Tongeren (2005) explores draw upon 
interviews and global ethnography, and provide a detailed description of the 
peace-building activities undertaken by civil society organisations.  
Whereas the aforementioned research projects have been undertaken 
by civil society practitioners, Gidron et al.(2003) provide a scholarly endeavour 
to compare the work of peace organizations systematically in three different 
conflict settings. This book is the outcome of a multi-year research project 
involving a number of academics working in different countries. It highlights the 
difficulties and rewards of comparative research across conflicts, societies, and 
cultures. Gidron et al.(2003) elaborates on the process involved in designing 
this research project and outlines the challenges of combining different data 
methods in order to capture peace organisation activities and their histories. 
These studies examine civil society organisations’ engagement in PCR using 
case study methodology. They capture in detail how civil society organisations 
have utilised PCR and what impacts these activities have had in the specific 
contexts in which these organisations have operated.  
Inspired by the methodological choice reflected in the work of Gidron et 
al.(2003), van Tongeren (2005), and Shonholtz and Gonz (2000), this 
dissertation uses case study as an overarching methodological framework. 
Credited for its strength in investigating ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions, 
case study is a holistic research methodology suitable to examining 
strategically-selected cases occurring in specific contexts and it is a popular 
research approach among PCR scholars (Verschuren, 2003). Furthermore, with 
the limited archival information available on the PCR movement in South Korea, 
and the newness of this subject in general, case study serves as the most 
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suitable research methodology for exploring the core thesis of this dissertation, 
and for providing detailed accounts of South Korean civil society groups 
engaged in PCR practices.  
The first section of this chapter explains why the case study research 
strategy is most appropriate in conducting this dissertation, and how this 
methodological choice has shaped, guided, and influenced the overall research 
design. This section also presents the three case study subjects that are the 
focus for this dissertation, and presents the criteria used to select these 
particular subjects. The second section of this chapter introduces the fieldwork 
undertaken by the author in 2007 to collect the primary data, and shares the 
insights that the author gained during this period. The final section introduces 
the three data collection methods: interviews, observation, and documentation.  
Case Study Methodology 
Based upon the literature review conducted on different methodologies 
and their applications in the study of civil society, conflict resolution, and 
democracy, case study methodology emerges as the most suitable guiding 
framework for this research project because of its emphasis on reflexivity, 
context-specificity, and integrative approaches to combining methods. Further, 
the case study enables the research outcomes to be relatively generalizable to 
theoretical propositions (Yin, 1989). Specifically, the following three attributes of 
the case study strategy provide particular relevance to this dissertation:   
First, as Yin elaborates, a case study approach is appropriate when ‘how’ 
or ‘why’ questions are asked about “a contemporary set of events over which 
the researcher has little or no control” (2003, p. 9). The approach also helps a 
researcher to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions by identifying “operational links 
 76 
76 
 
needing to be traced over time” (Yin, 2003, p.11). This dissertation investigates 
two specific ‘how’ questions. As previously stated, it investigates a nascent 
social phenomenon – PCR in civil society – in depth, and aims to understand 
how this phenomenon emerged in the context of South Korea’s post-democratic 
transition, and why this phenomenon is considered a novel response to the 
growing challenges that Korean civil society has faced. By using case study 
methodology, the author has been able to capture the context of South Korean 
civil society and the processes leading to the emergence of PCR activism 
through examining civil society participants’ reflections. In addition, this 
dissertation looks for answers as to how civil society’s PCR activities help to 
embed democratic norms, processes, and skills into the South Korean civil 
society space by focusing on three organisations. The operational links 
between PCR practices and civil society participants’ exposure to democratic 
norms, process, and skills are identified by the people who participated in them 
through the contextualised interpretation of the three case study organisations.  
Second, a case study approach is useful when an investigator attempts 
to examine “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident” (Yin, 
2003, p. 13). This aspect of the case study approach allows a researcher to 
cover contextual conditions highly pertinent to a particular phenomenon, and 
overcomes a disadvantage of traditional quantitative methodology – separation 
of phenomena from context. As presented in the previous chapters, civil society 
in South Korea is a highly fluid contemporary phenomenon, and it corresponds 
to particular political, historical, and social contexts of the country. Throughout 
modern history, the boundaries and core functions of civil society in South 
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Korea have changed and co-evolved over time, and the fluidity of civil society 
characteristics in the country results from its adaptation to the country’s 
changing political, social, and historical contexts.  
For example, from the late 19th century until the democratic transition in 
1987, civil society in South Korea served as a space to mobilise and strengthen 
progressive political ideals in response to repressive measures introduced by 
the state apparatus (Kim, 2000; Moon, 2002). This dissertation maintains that 
Korean civil society prior to 1987 reflects societal needs to resist and seek 
emancipation from oppressive social orders that restrict freedom of thinking, 
expression, and other basic rights of democracy. Thus, prior to 1987, there was 
limited space to engage in PCR discourses. After the transition in 1987, the 
country’s civil society expanded its boundaries to adapt and operate within the 
transitory political and social context, specifically by incorporating the watchdog 
functions of civil society in democracy (Kim, 2000). In the absence of strong 
institutions advocating citizens’ need for democratic reforms, civil society’s 
advocacy function at the expense of instigating public policy disputes was 
welcome and appreciated. Since the late 1990s, when deepening democracy 
has become an issue, South Korean civil society has paid attention to new 
functions such as democratic learning, citizenship enhancement, and 
constructive facilitation of public discourses. During this period, civil society has 
integrated key issues and processes underpinning PCR practices (Moon, 2002).  
Against this dynamic and changing background, it is inappropriate and 
premature to divorce the PCR phenomenon occurring in South Korean civil 
society from its constantly evolving socio-political context. The country’s civil 
society, and the ways in which civil society participants define PCR practices, 
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cannot be explained by a precise and singular definition, nor fully understood by 
answering a cause-effect research question. Thus, the author argues that a 
case study methodology allows the integration of contexts and phenomena in 
an integrative framework, and can better explore key themes of this dissertation. 
As eloquently proposed by Bennett and George (2002, p.19), a case study 
methodology allows this dissertation to achieve “high levels of conceptual 
validity” on the negotiated meaning of the PCR movement within South Korean 
civil society. Based upon the conceptual validity obtained through contextual 
understanding, the case study methodology further captures the process of 
integrating democratic norms, skills, and values within civil society, as reflected 
in participants’ own narratives of how they have interacted with PCR practices. 
One of strengths that a case study strategy brings to the research process is 
that it can be used to identify the adaptability of PCR in non-Western, new 
democracies, in that it allows the author to present findings and reflections 
obtained in a specific cultural setting. 
Third, Yin (2003) argues that the case study approach is appropriate 
when a researcher constructs a preliminary theory related to the topic of study. 
While a case study is not suitable for investigating causal effects and making 
scientific generalizations, it is effective for the development of preliminary 
theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). As presented in the previous two chapters, 
the core argument of this dissertation is that the PCR movement emerged as a 
practical response to civil society’s growing need to address conflictual social 
dynamics in a constructive manner, and that this movement helps to enhance 
democratic norms, processes, and skills, thus strengthening civil society’s 
democratic nurturing function. This core argument is built upon the liberal 
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democratic and public sphere visions of civil society and liberal and 
participatory democratic perspectives, and it presupposes that a civil society 
that deepens democratic processes and citizen participation also empowers 
citizens to obtain democratic norms, values, and skills (cf. Chapter 2). By 
engaging with civil society, individuals develop their understanding of 
democratic citizenship and can participate in public discourses in a constructive 
and democratic manner (Dryzek, 2002). While the case study approach may 
not allow for scientific generalization, it does permit the author to examine 
preliminary arguments and conceptual assumptions in detail through context-
specific analysis, and to explain how these arguments and assumptions are 
linked to the specific context in which South Korean civil society groups operate.  
Fourth, Yin (2003, p.18) explains that a case study methodology is useful 
when a researcher “relies on multiple sources of evidences, with data needing 
to converge in a triangulating fashion”, and that it can accommodate four 
different types of triangulation (data, investigators, theories, and methods). This 
dissertation use three data collection methods – observation, internal 
documentation, and interviews to strengthen construct validity (Yin, 2003). The 
findings obtained through these methods are presented in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6; the conclusions of this dissertation are based upon inductive 
reasoning to set the stage for additional research.  
The author maintains that through the many strengths of this 
methodology presented above, the case study is a rational choice to explore the 
worth of this research project’s core premises. Nonetheless, the author 
acknowledges that a case study strategy has limits, and that specifically, its 
context-based selectivity poses methodological challenges. As Church and 
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Shouldice (2003) argue, the field of civil society, conflict resolution, and 
democratisation faces the challenge of more fully explaining the relevance of 
grassroots activities to broader social change. Although sophisticated analyses 
of particular activities undertaken by civil society organizations have increased, 
researchers still confront the difficulty of examining theoretical assumptions and 
connecting the changes occurring at different levels of society (Church & 
Shouldice, 2003). By utilising the case study methodology, this dissertation 
focuses on the analysis of micro-level change occurring in South Korea, rather 
than on generalizing about macro-level social change. Like many other existing 
studies on civil society’s PCR practices, including those conducted by 
Shonholtz and Gonz (2000), this dissertation’s methodological choice does not 
purport to link micro-level events and their impact to broader, macro-level social 
and political changes scientifically. Rather, the dissertation relies on inductive 
logic stemming from the findings of multiple case studies to investigate the links 
between micro and macro changes.  
The first-hand data was collected and then analysed to understand better 
the relationship between conflict resolution activities and the democratic quality 
of civil society in South Korea. In order to link this micro-level intervention to 
broader social change, the dissertation turns to the existing literature and 
analyses how other scholars draw the theoretical linkage between the 
democratic quality of civil society and its effect on the deepening of democratic 
processes.  
Nonetheless, the author emphasises that this dissertation is a first step 
to exploring the implicit assumption that a link exists between conflict resolution 
and civil society’s capacity building in South Korea, and argues that a case 
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study approach provides an in-depth investigation of this assumption. The next 
section introduces the case study selection processes, presents the specific 
methods utilized to conduct this research project, and further explains the case 
study units.  
Case Study Organisations and Selection Criteria 
Since the 1980s, numerous countries have experienced democratic 
transition. This dissertation chose to look at South Korea, and within the South 
Korean context, it selected three civil society groups as case studies. 
Concurring with Yin’s (2003) and Scholtz and Tietje’s (2003) terminology, this 
dissertation is a form of embedded case study because the three case studies 
are embedded within the larger case study of South Korean civil society 
engaging in PCR activities after the democratic transition in 1987. In addition to 
the practical reason that the author is a Korean native, this dissertation chose to 
examine South Korean civil society from specific interest in the following: the 
integration of civil society leaders into mainstream politics; the time associated 
with the development of civil society’s capacity after the transition; and the ways 
in which South Korean civil society has engaged with external actors in terms of 
funding and sustainability (cf. Chapter 1).  
Through a broader study of South Korean civil society in the context of 
democratic consolidation and deepening, this dissertation aims to explore the 
links between PCR practices and civil society’s function for democratic learning, 
and how or whether these practices can contribute to developing four sets of 
democratic values, norms, and skills. Bennett and George (2003, p.24) warn 
case study researchers to be aware of case selection bias - bias can 
“overestimate or underestimate” the relationship they aim to explore. Further, 
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Bennett and George (2003) emphasise the importance of stating the selection 
criteria in conducting case studies. This dissertation investigates three civil 
society entities in post-transitional South Korea, based upon multiple case 
studies reflecting the literal replication logic. While the sampling logic widely 
used in surveys assumes a number of subjects represent a larger pool of 
respondents, the literal replication logic selects multiple cases, expecting similar 
patterns to be found in different case units (Yin, 2003). Multiple case studies 
require a rich, theoretical framework to construct the validity of research (Yin, 
2003). In addition, Bennett and George (2003) explain that cases should not be 
seen as representative of the population as they are seen in the cases of 
quantitative or statistical methods.  
After reviewing the literature on civil society’s engagement with PCR, two 
criteria were formed to select case study entities (Fast, 2002). The first was to 
select existing networks providing PCR services to their constituents or raising 
awareness on PCR – where conflict resolution practices included a wide variety 
of activities including skills trainings, mediation, and non-violence and peace 
education. The selected case study subjects were those that operated 
programs or projects to address conflictual social issues that were problematic 
in the stage of democratic consolidation. The second criterion was to embrace 
the principle of inclusiveness, viewed for example as a willingness to encourage 
the participation of people with differing political viewpoints (Fast, 2002). To be 
specific, this criterion determined whether an organisation was willing and able 
to bring people who held different viewpoints together in one place.  
There is one important feature of conflict resolution that this dissertation 
did not use in selecting case study subjects: impartiality. One of the core 
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attributes of impartiality in conflict resolution is that a third party who would 
intervene in a conflictual situation should be free of bias and should set aside 
his or her opinions, feelings, and agendas (Gibbs et al., 1996). In the context of 
third-party intervention, the notion of impartiality is critical for an intervening 
organisation to maintain its credibility for parties in conflict. Yet, this dissertation 
does not use impartiality as a selection criterion because it does not capture the 
nuances of South Korean civil society organisations engaged in PCR activism 
in the country. One of the recurring themes during field research was the 
challenge of ensuring the empowerment of citizens, as PCR activism emerged 
in a civil society space primarily dominated by those who advocated social 
change (cf. Chapter 5 & Chapter 6). Thus, the author excluded impartiality as a 
selection criterion as it would have inhibited the dissertation from capturing fully 
the emergent phenomena of the PCR movement in South Korea. The issue of 
impartiality will be further addressed in later chapters.  
Given the novelty of PCR activities in the country, the pool of samples 
that this dissertation could choose from was limited, and the selected case 
study entities were the organisations that introduced PCR practices into the 
country: School Making Peace (School Peace), Woman Making Peace-Conflict 
Resolution Centre (WMP-CR Centre), and Peace Activists Network (PAN). 
School Peace is a grassroots, community-based organization providing 
peace education and conflict resolution skills training to elementary and junior 
high schools located in the city of Gwacheon, a suburb south of Seoul. The 
organisation was founded in 2003 after an incident resulting in the suicide of an 
elementary school student who suffered from chronic isolation and violence 
from his classmates. Organised by concerned parents, Schools Peace attempts 
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to provide young students and parents in the local community with skills to 
manage violence and anger more effectively. Volunteers in this organisation 
also offer a weekly extra-curricular class about conflict resolution in a number of 
schools in the city of Gwacheon.  
The WMP-CR Centre addresses the small-scale conflicts occurring daily 
in schools and civil organisations (particularly those working for the rights of 
women). Founded in 1998, WMP is a pioneering organisation providing conflict-
resolution training services. The organisation’s programme began in 2000, in 
collaboration with other Korean NGOs and the American Friends Service 
Committee. WMP provides a regular series of workshops, based on the 
principles and techniques of conflict resolution, for NGO practitioners and 
secondary public school teachers. The organisation has also developed 
manuals that their participants can take with them to use in their work 
environments. WMP works to raise awareness of conflict resolution by 
organising a conflict resolution network.  
The Peace Activists Network (consisting of two ad-hoc coalitions, the 
Global Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict – Korean Committee 
and the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activists Retreat) brings civil 
society practitioners together and provides them with the opportunity to discuss 
various issues impeding the promotion of conflict resolution in the country, 
including in the civil society sector. Established in 2004 as an ad-hoc committee, 
the Global Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict – Korean 
Committee (GPPAC-Korea) was comprised of civil society practitioners from 
diverse sections. The Committee’s main activities included discussions of 
various conflict-related issues facing South Korea, which were held during 
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workshops, seminars, and series of meetings. After the Committee’s dissolution 
in 2006, the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activists’ Retreat has 
continued to provide a space for interaction and capacity building for PCR 
practitioners.  
Field Research: Reflective Moments 
Field research is “the study of people acting in the natural course of their 
daily lives ... (and) a method of study whose practitioners try to understand the 
meanings that activities observed have for those engaged in them” (Emerson, 
1983, p.1). Field research aims to fulfil the same goal as other types of research 
done in the library or on the internet—it aims to gather information contributing 
to researchers’ understanding of an issue or question and to organise those 
findings in a cohesive and persuasive document offering new insight, answers 
or solutions (Mason, 2001). The appropriateness of this dissertation’s choice of 
field research is quite apparent. Because of the field’s short history in South 
Korea, there are a limited number of written essays on civil society 
organisations’ PCR activities in the country. Further, no other practical options 
existed to obtain the primary data and to add original pieces of information other 
than meeting individuals who engaged in the PCR activities of the three case 
study entities. Field research in South Korea was the essential and virtually the 
only way to obtain information to understand civil society’s PCR activities.  
The field research had three specific purposes: observing civil society 
and conflict resolution practices, collecting documents and other unpublished 
resources, and conducting interviews with relevant individuals. Taking 
advantage of the author’s linguistic and cultural familiarity with the research 
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setting8, the duration of the field research was set to be no more than four 
months (January 2007 and April to June 2007). In retrospect, four months was 
not a sufficient length of time to grasp fully the entire field of PCR in South 
Korea. Nonetheless, the four-month research trip enabled the author to meet all 
the aforementioned goals: she observed various forums, sites, events, and 
general scenes of South Korean civil society; she acquired numerous 
documents; and she conducted a series of interviews with over 50 individuals.  
In addition to these specific tasks, the fieldwork enriched the author’s 
understanding of the contexts and situated realities in which PCR activities 
operated, and strengthened her insights into the research process. The 
qualitative interviews with 54 civil society practitioners and participants formed 
the most critical part of the field research, and they contributed immensely to 
developing the findings of the case studies presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6. The field research, however, went beyond the interviews. In essence, the 
field research was a process of gaining access to the community of civil society 
practitioners and scholars engaged in PCR activities in South Korea. Gaining 
access to this community was a guarantee for successful data collection as it 
offered opportunities to observe and interact with key individuals.  
As the research took place in a country where formality is important9, 
identifying appropriate ways to request interviews and access to particular 
events required more creativity than was anticipated initially. Spradely (1979) 
                                                
8 Studies on the field research and qualitative driven academic work highlight the importance of 
acknowledging the inevitable bias of the author in interpreting the reality she or he observes (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2007). Thus, such studies encourage the author to acknowledge his or her situated reality to 
make the author’s interpretation and possible bias explicit (Denzin & Lincoln, 2007). This is to 
acknowledge that the author of this dissertation is a female South Korean native speaker who was born 
and raised in Seoul with upper-middle class upbringing, and received university and graduate education in 
the U.S.  
9 As Owen (2007), an English businessman who worked in South Korea, elaborates, the South Korean 
vertical social structure is based on age and social status. The society also operates upon hierarchy, 
social harmony, and collectivism, and meets the core characteristics of high-context culture (Kim et al., 
1998).  
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highlights that eliciting information and establishing rapport with research 
subjects are two key elements for quality in fieldwork. Particularly, establishing 
rapport was critical to gathering the information needed. In a highly formal 
culture such as South Korea, building trust and harmonious relationships with 
research subjects required more time than four months, even for a native 
Korean who was familiar with the cultural and social setting. Fortunately, the 
author’s entry into the community of PCR activists was facilitated and secured 
through two individuals with whom the author had already developed personal 
relationships (cf. Chapter 1). These two individuals were insiders of the 
community, and were highly respected in the field. On the author’s behalf, they 
wrote emails, made phone calls of introduction, and allowed the author to use 
their names when approaching important interviewees. Their introduction of the 
author to the community played a critical role in allowing the author to gain 
access and to develop relationships with the majority of the interviewees from 
the case study organisations. In addition to these two individuals, the author’s 
former high school classmates also helped to establish contacts with young civil 
society activists. Although building individual relationships with the interviewees 
required additional effort on the part of the author, a smooth entry into the 
community of PCR activists was a great advantage.  
The entry into the core community was just the beginning of the author’s 
encounters with expected and unexpected intellectual, ethical, and practical 
dilemmas. In retrospect, these challenges – whether anticipated or not - 
emerged not only in the context of the right to research and knowledge versus 
the rights of the studied, but also in relation to the situated realities of both the 
researcher and the researched (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992; Cassell, 
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1980). The author noted and reflected upon specific recurring patterns and 
dynamics that emerged during the field research process. These patterns 
involved detecting and responding to varying degrees of power dynamics 
between interviewees and the author, and balancing the author’s dual identities 
as an insider (Korean national and native Korean speaker) and an outsider (a 
researcher educated and living her formative years in the U.S. and the UK).  
First, as Neff and Suizzo (2006) rightly summarise, perceived power 
inequality in human relations is likely to have a strong influence on authentic 
self-expression, and this has an impact on the research process. In particular, 
as researchers such as Lee (2002) have frequently articulated, Korean culture 
has specific effects on one’s relationship with others and on the ways in which 
one engages with other people. Lee (2002) explains that an individual’s 
existence is determined by her or his relationships with others, and that social 
and power dynamics constantly redefine the concepts of self and roles. The 
collectivism, hierarchy defined by social status and age, and emphasis on 
harmonious relationships found in Korean culture all affect engagement with 
other people. In Korea, there are clear social and gendered hierarchies – while 
youth define the norms of popular culture, the old, educated, and socially 
established are dominant over youth and emergent in workspace. Strong male 
dominance in politics and intellectual circles exists despite the change in gender 
dynamics witnessed in the last twenty years because of women’s 
empowerment in workplaces. However, during the research, age and social 
status played more significant roles in defining the researcher-researched 
relationship than did gender. This can be partially explained by the fact that the 
male interviewees with whom the author met operate in a socially progressive 
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space, and they are more advanced in internalising gender-empowerment 
perspectives than their mainstream counterparts whose gender bias often goes 
unchallenged.  
During the author’s encounters with research participants, the 
relationships and modes of engagement changed depending on the social, 
cultural, and gendered norms of South Korea. For example, the majority of 
research participants were older than the author who was 27 years old at the 
time of the fieldwork, and age is a key element that defines relationships with 
others in South Korea (Lee, 2002). In approaching older research participants, 
the author’s general attitudes were rather submissive, courteous, and highly 
formal. The degree of informality between the author and an older interviewee 
was highly dependent upon the latter’s personality – if he or she was formal, the 
author adopted an extra-formal attitude. If he or she was more informal, the 
author became more relaxed. The degree of formality reduced dramatically 
when the author interacted with participants whose ages were similar to hers (in 
2007, between 25 and 32). In addition to age, research participants were well 
established within South Korean civil society, and were closely linked to an 
extensive network of civil society practitioners and progressive political circles—
in short, they were in a position to open the door for career advancement for the 
author. Many of the interviewees were engaged in activities that the author 
wished to pursue after completing the PhD degree. Certainly, this additional 
layer of power differentiation added formality during the author’s interaction with 
interviewees.  
Furthermore, despite the respectful rapport established with research 
participants, there were a number of occasions that reminded the author and 
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the researched of the author’s outsider identity. Certainly, the author was a 
Korean national, and familiar with linguistic and cultural codes of Korean society. 
Further, her interest in civil society and peace studies located her within the 
progressive political stance of many of the civil society activists. Nonetheless, 
the author was an aspiring academic studying in a foreign country, and had little 
exposure to the country’s civil society activism. The insider-outsider dynamic 
due to the author’s lack of lived experience as a social movement activist was 
especially pronounced during her interaction with younger practitioners. Several 
individuals in their late 20s and early 30s challenged the author’s credentials 
with regard to activism and social movements, and questioned whether the 
author’s lack of experience provided a proper framework in which to understand 
the nuances of the South Korean civil society movement. For example, during 
an interview conducted on 17 April 2007 in Seoul, PAN9 (Personal interview, 17 
April 2007) said,  
 
You will not be taken seriously by civil society practitioners, given your lack of 
exposure to student activism and progressive social movements. You have not 
demonstrated your commitment and dedication to the causes of civil society in 
your life. This raises a question for me as to whether you are fully equipped to 
interpret the country’s civil society movement and its contributions to democracy.  
 
In addition to the author’s lack of experience in the civil society 
movement, the insider-outsider dynamics were inevitable because the 
research trip was a mission to fulfil the requirements of her academic task. 
Certainly, the author was genuinely curious about civil society activists’ 
perspectives on peace and conflict resolution, and the trip was part of the 
author’s overall commitment to, and solidarity with, civil society activists 
and their goals. However, entering into the community of activists was a 
temporary intellectual excursion. Moreover, the knowledge extracted was to 
 91 
91 
 
be displayed through findings and outcomes within a PhD dissertation that 
would be shared with academics and researchers in English-speaking 
academia.  
One of the moments in which the author experienced this dynamic 
most vividly occurred when a research participant made a casual comment. 
On 5 April 2007, CR 2 (Observation & Personal communication, 5 April 
2007) asked her peers to help the author successfully complete her field 
research by donating their time for interviews, and noted, “Ms. Da Woon 
needs information from us to complete her dissertation to become a Doctor 
in Peace Studies. We should help her so she can pass her exam”. Her 
casual comment illustrated that the community perceived the author as an 
outsider, and revealed their acknowledgement of the author’s core mission.  
Another moment in which the author felt her status as an outsider (not 
only to the community of civil society activists, but also to other Koreans) 
involved language and translation. Many times, the author was asked to provide 
some information about PCR based upon her knowledge. Because the author 
had not been living in South Korea for over 8 years at the time of the field study, 
she had difficulty identifying suitable translation for certain key terms and 
articulating civil society, and peace and conflict resolution, activities in a way 
that resonated with those who operated in the activism space. After one month, 
the author identified effective ways of communicating the core notions of the 
research project to others. During this time, the author also became aware that 
the term ‘PCR activism’ was an effective way of describing the activities 
undertaken by civil society activists.  
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The author’s engagement with South Korean civil society actors working 
in PCR activism and democratisation movements enriched the overall quality of 
the research. In particular, through these encounters and reflections, the author 
gained a more nuanced understanding of the field, and was able to 
conceptualise better the ways in which the narratives and observations could be 
presented to the British research community.  
In addition, by reflecting on the insider-outsider dynamics, the author was 
able to re-define her role as a bridge-builder between the English-speaking 
academic world and Korean civil society. This enhanced her awareness of the 
potential impact of her research, as it was one of the first attempts to present 
narratives of South Korean PCR to English-speaking academia.  
Data Collection in the Field 
During the fieldwork, three commonly adopted data collection methods 
were utilised: observation, quantitative interviewing, and documentation. The 
qualitative interviewing process provided the most critical and original data for 
this dissertation and was most useful in forming the core propositions and main 
findings reflected in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This section will present each 
data collection method, and describe how the author utilised these techniques 
to engage with research subjects and obtain information.  
Qualitative Interviews 
The majority of the field research was dedicated to meeting 
individuals for interviews, as their first-hand insights were rarely available 
through other archival means. As Mason (2002, p. 225) articulates, 
interview methodologies are employed with “the assumption that it is 
possible to investigate elements of the social by asking people to talk, and 
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to gather or construct knowledge by listening to and interpreting what they 
say and to how they say it.” As previously stated, few publications on 
conflict resolution and social conflict in South Korea exist. It was also 
difficult to use archival studies to understand how civil society practitioners 
conceptualised peace and conflict practices, partly because of the difficulty 
in identifying how common jargon of the field in the West was understood 
and interpreted by Korean civil society activists. For this reason, 
interviewing was an effective way to understand PCR activism in South 
Korea more accurately, as it allowed for a better understanding of 
individuals’ experiences and insights into the activities offered by civil 
society organisations.  
The author adopted a semi-structured quality interview method. As 
Fife explains, semi-structured interviews are:  
An attempt to capture something of the control of structured interviews without 
the need to use close-ended questions or force people into the role of a 
respondent rather than that of an initiator of information. Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews are a chance to develop a conversation along one or more 
lines without most of the usual chatter that accompanies such talk. At the same 
time, through the use of open-ended questions, the interviewee is given the 
opportunity to shape his or her own responses or even to change the direction of 
the interview altogether. (2005, p. 94-95) 
The insights elaborated on by Fife (2005) were particularly relevant to 
interacting with interviewees. In South Korea, qualitative interviews were rather 
new, and except for a few individuals with more well-known public profiles, most 
people had never been asked to talk about their experiences in the form of an 
interview. Furthermore, informal and casual interactions with South Koreans 
required extensive relationship building that could not be easily accomplished 
within a four-month period. In this context, pre-developed, open-ended 
questions were helpful in getting the interviewees to agree to interact with the 
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author. Semi-structured interviewing also allowed interviewees to provide 
additional information that went beyond the authors’ questions, and allowed the 
author the flexibility to modify terminology that may have seemed confusing or 
misleading to interviewees.  
Initially, the main questions were pre-developed in order to identify the 
following eight issues: 1) the way in which interviewees defined conflict 
resolution and civil society; 2) their experience with the democratisation process; 
3) their motives for engaging in conflict resolution activities; 4) particular 
activities / programmes in which they were participating or which they were 
implementing; 5) the benefits of conflict resolution work; 6) the weaknesses of 
their conflict resolution programmes; 7) the challenges they had found in further 
expanding conflict resolution programmes in the country; and 8) the value of 
conflict resolution programmes in relation to democracy. All interviews included 
interviewees’ responses to the eight pre-developed questions. (Please see 
Annex 1 and Annex 2 in order to review how the author provided the 
aforementioned questions to research participants.)   
It should be acknowledged that as the field research continued, new 
terms were added and certain terminologies were rephrased to help 
interviewees better understand the questions being asked. For example, peace 
activism, peace education, conflict resolution, dispute resolution, or conflict 
transformation were rather interchangeable to interviewees. Specifically, when 
using the term “conflict resolution,” interviewees frequently related it to a range 
of peace activism, peace movements, or peace educational settings. Thus, in 
this dissertation, the author introduces their encounter with conflict resolution by 
using the term ‘PCR methodology’, ‘PCR activism’, and ‘PCR movement’ to 
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highlight the interconnectivity between peace activism and conflict resolution 
movements in South Korea.  
The interviewees were identified primarily through archival studies and 
expert interviews with the two key individuals who played a critical role in 
introducing the author to the community. Two sampling criteria were used to 
identify interviewees. First, the author utilised an elite interviewing strategy — a 
“specialised case of interviewing that focuses on interviewees considered to be 
influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people in an organisation” (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1999, p.113). Leaders and senior staff members were selected for 
interviews because of their expertise and extensive knowledge of their 
organisations’ history and programme development, which might not have been 
available in documents provided by the organisations. Second, the author 
adopted the theoretical or purposive sampling strategy, which selects “groups 
or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to one’s research 
questions, analytical framework, and arguments or explanation that one is 
developing” (Mason, 2002, p.124). The purposive sampling strategy helped the 
author identify individual participants who had engaged in the country’s PCR 
activism. The interviews aimed to understand how the interviewees’ 
experiences with conflict resolution practices had shaped their participation 
patterns in a public sphere.  
The profiles of interviewees are organised in the Table1. The Table 1 
includes the date and venue of the interviews, as well as the interviewees’ 
aliases, genders, ages, and experiences with democratisation. To honour the 
confidentiality and anonymity agreement made between the author and 
interviewees, the names of specific individuals are not identified at any time in 
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this dissertation10. When their statements are incorporated into the dissertation, 
their aliases indicate whose statements have been used: interviewees from 
WMP-CR Centre, School Peace, and Peace Activist Network are given code 
names CR, SP, and PAN respectively, plus numbers. All other interviewees are 
given the initial ‘CSO’ plus a number.  
Table 1: Profiles of 54 Interviews 
Date and Location  Alias  Gender Age Democratisation  
May 24, 2007 at a youth center, Seoul  CR1 F 40s Yes 
Jan 26, 2007 & June 19, 2007  
at CR2’s office in Seoul 
CR2 F 40s Yes 
May 21, 2007 at CR3’s office in Seoul CR3 F 30s N/A 
April 10, 2007 at CR4’s office in Seoul CR4 F 20s Yes 
May 23, 2007 at CR5’s office in Seoul CR5  F 20s N/A 
May 24, 2007 at a pub in Seoul  CR6  F 40s Yes 
May 30, 2007 at CR7’s office in Seoul CR7 M 30s N/A 
May 28, 2007 at CR8’s office in Seoul CR8 M 30s Yes 
May 30, 2007 at a café in Seoul CR9 F 40S Yes 
Jan 26, 2007 & June 20, 2007  
in CR10’s office in Seoul 
CR10 M 30s N/A 
May 21, 2007 at CR11’s office in Seoul CR11  M 30s N/A 
May 21, 2007 at CR12’s office in Seoul CR12 F 20s N/A 
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Temple in Yeojoo CR13 M 30s Yes 
April 23, 2007 at a SP1’s office in Seoul SP1 F 40s Yes 
April 25, 2007 at a SP2’s office in Gwacheon SP2 F 30s N/A 
April 30, 2007 at a Nation Zoo in Gwacheon SP3 F 40s Yes 
April 23, 2007 at a SP4’s office in Seoul SP4 M 30s N/A 
April 25, 2007 at a SP5’s office in Gwacheon SP5 F 40s Yes 
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon SP6 F 40s Yes 
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon SP7 F 40s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN1’s office in Seoul PAN1 M 50s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a pub in Seoul  PAN2 F 20s N/A 
April 16, 2007 at a PAN3’s office in Incheon  PAN3 M 40s Yes 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN4’s office in Seoul PAN4 M 30s N/A 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN5’s office in Seoul PAN5 M 30s N/A 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN6’s office in Seoul PAN6 M 50s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN7’s office in Seoul PAN7 M 50s Yes 
May 11, 2007 at a café in Seoul PAN8 F 40s Yes 
April 17, 2007 at a PAN9’s office in Seoul PAN9 M 30s N/A 
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Tempe in Yeojoo PAN10 F 40s Yes 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN11’s office in Seoul PAN11 M 20s N/A 
April 30, 2007  
on the subway from Ansan to Seoul 
PAN12 F 40s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN13’s office in Seoul PAN13 F 20s N/A 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN14’s office in Seoul PAN14 M 40s Yes 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN15’s office in Seoul PAN15 M 50s Yes 
May 26, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO1 F 30s N/A 
Jan 30, 2007 
At CSO2’s office, moved to her car, and  
continued interviews at a restaurant in Seoul  
CSO2 F 60s Yes 
June 15, 2007 at a Buddhist temple in Yeojoo CSO3 F 50s Yes 
May 28, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO4 F 30s N/A 
June 1, 2007 at a CSO5’s office in Seoul CSO5 F 50s Yes 
June 1, 2007 at a CSO6’s office in Seoul CSO6 M 40s Yes 
                                                
10 In addition to their names and initials, the author did not include the organizational affiliation of the 
individual interviewed to prevent their identity from being exposed.  
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May 25, 2007 at a CSO7’s office in Seoul CSO7 M 40s Yes 
May 26, 2007 at a CSO8’s office in Seoul CSO8 M 30s Yes 
June 4, 2007 at a CSO9’s office in Seoul CSO9 M 40s Yes 
June 1, 2007 at a café in Seoul CSO10 F 20s N/A 
April 18, 2007 at CSO11’s office  CSO11 F 20s N/A 
April 26, 2007 at CSO12’s office CSO12 M 40s Yes 
April 18, 2007 at CSO13’s office CSO13 F 50s Yes 
May 14, 2007 at a school cafeteria in Seoul  CSO14 F 40s Yes 
April 26, 2007 at a CSO15’s office CSO15 F 40s Yes 
April 3, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO16 F 30s N/A 
April 6, 2007 at a café in Seoul CSO17 F 20s N/A 
April 4, 2007 at CSO18’s office in Seoul CSO18 M 20s N/A 
April 5, 2007 at CSO19’s office in Seoul CSO19 M 30s N/A 
 
In January 2007, seven interviews were conducted with key informants 
who were actively engaged in the field of PCR in South Korea. This initial set of 
interviews played a critical role in developing a general overview of PCR 
activities in Korean civil society. The participants also introduced the author to 
other interviewees who were interviewed during the field trip between April and 
June 2007. Dan (2008) cautions researchers not to assume that key informants 
are representative of the group to be studied. As stated above, during the field 
research, two individuals were especially helpful, as they helped the author 
build rapport and trust with group members. They were considered the key 
informants for this research. Without their willingness to participate in the study, 
critical information on their work would not have been obtained. Additional 
interviews with those introduced by the key informants, as well as interviews 
with individuals who the author contacted independently, were extremely 
valuable in assessing the information obtained during the author’s interaction 
with the two key informants. 
 Most interviews were conducted in Seoul, the capital city of South Korea 
where peace and conflict activism was concentrated and where the majority of 
civil society organisations were registered. This does not dismiss efforts 
undertaken outside of Seoul where approximately ten interviews were 
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conducted, requiring extra travel. The venue for interviews varied, but the 
majority of interviews took place in interviewees’ offices and nearby cafes and 
pubs. Some interviews were undertaken in subways, parks, or other informal 
settings. The style of interviews changed depending on the venue. For example, 
the interviews conducted in offices were more structured and questionnaire-
based, due to time constraints, whereas the interviews outside of the office 
environment were more conversational and less structured. Except for two 
interviews, all of the interviews with male participants were conducted in their 
offices, whereas the venue of interviews for female participants varied. The 
formality of the office venue highlighted the gender dynamics between the 
author (a female in her late 20s) and the interview participants (males between 
30s and 50s). 
In total, 85% of the interviews were recorded with the interviewees’ 
permission, and 15% were not recorded due to technical problems 
encountered during the field research. Throughout the field research, a total 
of 54 political activists, NGO practitioners, academic-practitioners, and 
citizens were interviewed - 13 in relation to WMP-CR Centre, 7 in relation to 
School Peace, and 15 in relation to the PAN. The remaining 19 interviewees 
were met to identify more comprehensively the existing conflict resolution 
practices being implemented in South Korean civil society. In terms of 
gender breakdown, 31 interviewees were female and 23 were male. The 
higher proportion of females represented in the interview data is related to 
the fact that conflict resolution practices were first implemented by women’s 
movement organisations, which attempted to bring about social change 
through cultural and attitudinal shifts, as well as institutional reform. PAN3 
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(Personal interview, 16 April 2007) raised an interesting point during the 
field research with regard to the higher representation of females in the field 
of PCR in South Korea.  
 
Hard politics (policymaking in diplomacy and security issues) is considered a 
masculine realm reserved for male activists. Reunification, advocacy, or major 
political activities involved are often considered as a more masculine space. In soft 
politics such as the cultural realm, for example, conflict resolution education or 
peace education in school – all of the topics related to grassroots politics and 
ordinary people’s day-to-day life – are considered to be more feminine subject.  
 
The majority of interviewees were engaged in the oppositional 
democratic movement in the 1980s and early 1990s. Some interviewees had 
joined the movement as university student activists, while others had 
participated in the movement through progressive faith-based organisations. 
The research found that their activism experience in the 1980s played a 
significant role in defining their views on the role of civil society in the 
democratic process. About 20% of interviewees were in their late 20s and early 
30s, and had attended university in the mid and late 1990s, when student 
activism began to decline on campuses. Many of these participants had been 
politically active throughout their university lives and they were considered the 
first generation of NGO professionals, working exclusively in the third sector as 
full-time staff members.  
In terms of organisational association, most interviewees (both 
practitioners and participants) contacted for this research project had worked for 
a wide variety of advocacy groups related to women’s rights, consumer rights, 
social justice, global peace, regional peace, political reform, anti-corruption, 
North Korea, environmental issues, human rights, and the urban poor. In terms 
of their political spectrum, most of these organisations were considered reform-
oriented and liberal.  
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Anonymity and confidentiality were reoccurring themes for many 
research participants – particularly those who were younger and new to the field 
- due to the fear of misperception by established civil society veterans. 
Furthermore, some interviewees expressed concern that conservative 
newspapers and groups wishing to undermine civil society’s contribution to 
South Korea might misuse their statements or insights. Despite the statement of 
assurance that the recording would be transcribed by the author only and that 
their identities would remain anonymous, interviewees wanted to reconfirm that 
statement of assurance in moments in which they were compelled to assess 
critically or challenge the status quo of South Korean civil society activism. 
Such concern was legitimate given that one of the civil society research projects 
that Joo et al. (2006) undertook as part of the Global Civil Society Index Project 
was quoted out of context by conservative newspapers, and it undermined the 
contributions made by civil society organisations (CSO 14, Personal interview, 
14 May 2007).  
The interviewees’ caution made the author more mindful of the research 
project’s potential impact on these interviewees and the progressive civil society 
circle, given that a range of audiences could access the final outcome of the 
dissertation through library searches, and that the constituency critical of civil 
society activism could interpret the findings of this dissertation differently. There 
is a wide consensus among social scientists that researchers “have the 
obligation to weigh carefully the potential benefits or contributions of a proposed 
project against the costs to individual participants” (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1992, p.78). Further, as Denzin and Lincoln (2007) reflects, action 
research often struggles to balance what the author can view as a critical 
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priority and what the research participants think is relevant to advance their 
causes. At the same time, such encounters allow reflection on objectivity—the 
critical distance of the author from research subjects—and neutrality – how one 
can maintain objectivity without jeopardising the researched.  
Documentation  
The review of documents, as Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 116) note, 
is “an unobtrusive method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of 
participants in the setting”. It has two distinct advantages in case study 
methodology. First, reviewing documents helps researchers develop an in-
depth understanding of the setting or group studied. Second, as Yin (2003, 
p.87) emphasises, documents gathered on-site help “corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources”, and support research findings from other means 
(e.g., qualitative interviews and observation). During field research, a 
researcher receives a number of valuable documents from case study 
organisations including program overviews, press clips, publicity materials, and 
annual reports that are not available to outsiders.  
 The documents obtained from the three case study organisations were 
extremely important data because little published information on the 
organisations was available. While documents from the same organisation have 
been reviewed and analysed together, cross-organisation analysis has not been 
conducted with these pieces of data. The detailed overview of the types of 
unpublished documents that the author used for Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is 
outlined in Annex 4.  
Observation  
 102 
102 
 
Observation is a qualitative data collection method entailing the 
systematic noting and recording of events and behaviours in the social setting 
chosen for study (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). As explained by DeWalt and 
DeWalt (2002, p.92), observation helps the author develop “a holistic 
understanding of the phenomena under study” This highly important and 
fundamental method enables the investigator to discover complex interactions 
in natural social settings, to learn things that cannot be revealed in interviews or 
questionnaires, and to understand the context of activities in depth. The 
observation undertaken during the field research period for this study was not 
merely limited to events, meetings, or workshops convened by the three case 
study organisations. While the data obtained from such visits was primary 
information for this dissertation, the author also obtained insight by observing 
the civil society arena and the overall societal contexts of South Korea.  
Spending approximately four months in South Korea was helpful to 
understand better the overall societal context in which PCR activism was 
practiced. Furthermore, such observation provided the author with the 
opportunity to interact regularly with ordinary individuals. Extensive 
conversations with these individuals were helpful to understand more fully how 
the mainstream population understood PCR practices. Such observation 
processes required the author to introduce the research project to ordinary 
South Koreans. Inevitably, these observations were interpreted through the 
author’s class and educationally privileged lens, but they also resulted in a 
greater frequency of interaction with people from similarly privileged 
backgrounds – educated and politically conscious individuals who were familiar 
with Korean politics, international affairs, and civil society discourses. However, 
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it became apparent that PCR practices were highly cutting-edge subjects. This 
observation was made based upon the fact that the author had to explain the 
core notions of PCR multiple times. The Korean translation of the basic 
terminology of PCR had not yet been fully mainstreamed, and it required a 
great deal of additional explanation.  
In addition, because civil society is a politically charged concept to the 
right wing or conservative population, the author’s research project provoked a 
negative reaction from individuals who identified themselves as conservative 
leaning. When the author interacted with a politically conservative male in his 
late 50s, he lectured her about the role of South Korean civil society in 
interrupting social harmony. He said, “How can you assume that civil society, 
which contributes to disharmonising the Korean society through protests, can 
be connected to peace making and problem-solving? Civil society’s presence 
creates conflicts in our society.”11 Within the more progressive civil society, 
advocacy, rights, and reform agendas were the main activities undertaken by 
influential organisations, and PCR activism was considered something of an 
experiment undertaken by a few pioneers. 
 In addition to observing the civil society dynamics and general 
perception on PCR in close proximity, the observation method allowed the 
author to attend a wide range of meetings, seminars, and training programmes 
open to civil society practitioners and/or the public. There were specific benefits 
to attending these meetings, seminars, and training programmes and 
interacting with other participants. It helped to assess whether interview 
                                                
11 The conversation took place on 8 April 2007 when the author attended a meeting organized by a 
Catholic Church parish in Seoul, and the gentleman is an educated professional in his late 50s and works 
in a respectful corporation with senior ranks. The conversation was noted because it represented one of 
many reactions that the author experienced during the field research process.  
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samples were sufficient to obtain the necessary information to develop the 
dissertation. For example, by attending these gatherings over a period of four 
months, the author was able to identify the general profile of participants 
engaged in PCR activism. At the same time, attending helped to identify those 
who were not present in these settings. Visiting these meetings helped the 
author better understand how PCR terminologies were shared with others by 
civil society practitioners. Furthermore, observation was specifically helpful as it 
allowed the author to note to what extent conflict resolution activities and their 
benefits were manifested in people’s behaviour in their natural work settings.  
Conclusion 
This chapter began by explaining why this dissertation chose case study 
methodology as an overarching methodological framework. It demonstrated that 
the case study is suited to investigating a key research question of this 
dissertation – contributions of PCR activities to civil society’s democracy 
nurturing function – in a context-specific and in-depth manner. As this 
dissertation is an exploratory study on the emergent field of PCR in South 
Korean civil society, a quantitative study, which would require a large number of 
samples, was unsuitable. The case study approach helps this dissertation to 
convey more fully the negotiated meaning of PCR activism by South Korean 
civil society activists, and allows the author to take a more nuanced approach to 
assessing peace and conflict activism in South Korea. Specifically, the author 
argues that the case study methodology allows this dissertation to capture the 
ways in which civil society participants interpret the experiences with PCR 
activities provided by the three civil society groups featured in this dissertation. 
In addition, by allowing the author to utilise multiple data collection methods, the 
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case study strategy helps the author understand the assumptions and 
motivations civil society participants have with regard to PCR activism, and how 
they articulate the values obtained through their exposure to these civil society 
groups’ activities.  
Guided by the case study strategy, the author identified the necessary 
information needed to develop this dissertation and designed four months of 
field research, which involved qualitative interviews, observation, and 
documentation. The chapter explained why this dissertation utilised multiple 
data collection methods, and how the findings from these different methods 
contributed to corroborating the same phenomenon – that is, three case study 
units during the field research in South Korea. This chapter also presented the 
reflections that the author made during the field research, such as the power-
cultural dynamics affecting the researcher-researched relationship and insider-
outsider dynamics observed throughout the fieldwork. Further, the author 
shared practical challenges encountered in utilising these three different data 
collection techniques – documentation, qualitative semi-structured interviewing, 
and observation – and described the profiles of the interviewees and the 
author’s engagement with them.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH KOREA  
 
 Civil society is not a fixed concept separated from one’s historical 
contexts, as Kumar (1993) rightly indicated. Its emergence is a response to the 
particular political context in which a civil society is situated. Similarly, the 
occurrence of PCR activism is reflective of one’s political history as illustrated in 
Gidron et al. (2003, cf. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)’s study on PCR organisations 
in four conflict-affected areas. Therefore, the author argues that a detailed 
account of South Korea’s political history over the last 100 years provides 
insights into the context in which the country’s civil society emerged and 
evolved over time.  
This dissertation explores PCR organisations that emerged in post-
transitional South Korea, and aims to understand their contributions to 
deepening democratic processes. One of the key arguments is that PCR 
activism is civil society’s pragmatic response to growing social conflicts. The 
historical analysis of the South Korean civil society and its evolution helps to 
contextualise this claim as it demonstrates that antagonism, fierce struggles, 
conformity, and outcome-focused reasoning were defining features of civil 
society for over 100 years. Thus, this dissertation contends that PCR activism is 
a nascent phenomenon within South Korea’s civil society because it advocates 
constructive problem solving and engagement with others, and it emphasises 
processes of forming discourses over outcomes of activism.  
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrating that until the 
democratic transition, the country’s civil society, which emerged in the late 19th 
century and early 20th century to challenge the despotic social order and 
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imperialism, served as a space for resistance and struggles. The first section, 
therefore, highlights the last 100 years of challenges to democratisation efforts 
and contingent demands of developing a democratic practice in South Korea. In 
light of over 100 years of turbulence – forced modernisation (1875 – 1910), 
imperialism (1910-1945), North-South Korean conflictual dynamics (1948-
present), and military dictatorships, and authoritarianism (1948-1987), 
antagonism had long been the defining feature of civil society in its attempt to 
create a democratic space. The consistent suppression of civil society voices 
throughout the country’s modern history radicalised civil society, and 
confrontation was utilised to preserve a democratic space where citizens’ 
voices could be channelled (Chang, 2008; Sohn, 1996). The first section of this 
historical chapter further substantiates that the Gramcian emancipation vision 
endorsed by South Korean civil society activities is an inevitable product of the 
country’s historical context, and that the emancipatory vision legitimized the civil 
society’s antagonistic and conflictual dynamics with state apparatus and vested 
interests in the country.  
The second part of this chapter looks at South Korea’s democratic 
transition in 1987, and the subsequent consolidation processes from 1987 to 
2002, and examines to what extent civil society plays a role in various stages of 
democratisation. This section highlights the rapidly changing political context in 
which South Korean civil society operates, and illustrates the evolving role of 
civil society. By emphasising civil society organisations’ contributions to 
democratic reform through its advocacy function and their contributions to the 
democratic transition and consolidation processes, this section continues to 
illustrate that due to growing democratic reform needs, the country’s civil 
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society has not fully re-defined its core characteristics from a space for 
emancipation to a space for facilitation of public discourses and the 
advancement of democratic learning.  
The final section of this chapter focuses on key challenges that South 
Korea faced in furthering democratic consolidation, and highlights the context in 
which PCR organisations have developed and their evolving role in Korean civil 
society. Specifically, this section will examine how social conflicts and civil 
society’s role in this context have become problematical to policy makers, 
commentators, and civil society practitioners, and what responses have been 
made to resolve these conflicts. This dissertation concurs with Kim et al. (2005) 
and Lee (2005) that democratisation in the country opened a space where 
various social conflicts – pre-existing and emergent – could surface freely. This 
section will highlight that civil society’s partiality to social issues was less 
problematic, and to a certain extent welcomed by citizens until the mid-1990s, 
when very few institutions in the country were equipped to raise critical 
democratic reform issues. With the further integration of the democratic 
consolidation process in the late 1990s and early 2000s, citizens’ overall 
capacity to raise their concerns and government’s responsiveness have 
expanded, and progressive civil society had become less representative of the 
country’s civil society. As a result, the author contends that civil society’s 
partiality to certain social issues, and its fixation on civil society’s role in 
challenging the status quo and altering unequal social structures began to be 
viewed as a contributing factor to growing social conflicts in the country.  
This chapter is founded on a comprehensive literature review of Korean 
political history and civil society movements as well as on interview transcripts 
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from the 2007 field research. Given the impact of South Korean political history 
on the development of the country’s civil society, a number of interviewees 
referred to historical incidents or their experiences with some of the critical 
historical moments. Because the focus of the interviews was on the country’s 
PCR activism, this chapter used segments of transcripts in which interviewees 
referenced the country’s history12.  
Contemporary Political History: Prior to Democratisation in 1987 
Modernization and Japanese Occupation (1875-1945)  
 Modern Korean history began in 1875 when the last monarchy— the 
Chosun Dynasty — was forced to open its border by Japan. In an attempt to 
modernise a centuries-old monarchy that had maintained a closed-door policy 
for over a half century, ruling political elites and aristocrats put into place 
various measures and introduced modern political, economic, educational, and 
military systems. Despite their efforts, realpolitik of the late 19th century in East 
Asia negatively affected Korea, which was surrounded by major powers 
including China, Russia, and Japan. In 1910, the country was officially annexed 
to the Japanese Empire, experiencing a thirty-six year colonial rule (Hytreck & 
Shin, 2002, p. 150).  
While the legacy of colonialism is highly contested, scholars in the field 
of Korean Studies agree the colonial experience had a lasting effect on the 
political development of the Korean Peninsula (Shin, 2002). As Kim (2000, p. 
24) rightly summarises, Japanese colonial rule in Korea greatly contributed to 
“the emergence and development of a pattern of ‘conflictual engagements’ 
between the repressive state and the resistant civil society”. The Japanese 
                                                
12 For interviewees’ profile, please see Chapter 3 or Annex 3.  
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colonial period effectively limited the development of autonomous groups and 
democratic civil society space (Steinberg, 1997). Private groups of a non-
political nature were allowed to exist, but they were kept under strict 
surveillance. Although severely disempowered and manipulated by a colonial 
state apparatus, (civil) society emerged in an attempt to preserve an 
emancipatory space for radical political discourses, such as those regarding 
national resistance struggle, anarchism, socialism, and communism (Steinberg, 
1997). Every time civil society was mobilised in protest against the colonial rule, 
they were severely prosecuted by colonial authorities. The powerful state 
apparatus of the Japanese Empire engaged with the mass population in an 
extremely exploitative way throughout its occupation (Hytreck & Shin, 2002). A 
case in point was the 1919 National Resistance Movement, which mobilized the 
population to demand independence from the Japanese authority. A series of 
more than 1,500 demonstrations lasting roughly 45 days attracted more than 2 
million Koreans. Over 7,000 people were killed, 15,000 were wounded, and 
approximately 45,000 were arrested (Park, 1920).13  
In addition, throughout the colonial period, workers and peasants were at 
the forefront of violent struggles against Japanese capitalists and imperialism 
(Kim, 2000). They resisted unfair treatment and exploitation from the Japanese 
authorities. Consequently, unions were outlawed, and using their extensive 
network of police and security forces, the Japanese colonial government 
effectively suppressed peasants and labour union movements, further 
                                                
13 It should be noted the number provided by Park Eunsik, a Korean historian who played an important 
role in the national resistance movement, is different from the official statistics the Japanese Empire’s 
district governor announced in 1919. The Japanese Official report indicated 553 people were killed, with 
over 12,000 arrested, while eight policemen and military policemen were killed and 158 were wounded.  
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radicalising activities and embedding antagonistic patterns of engagement 
between civil society and the state.  
The author agrees with Kim (2000) who argues that the colonial 
experience between 1910 and 1945 significantly influenced the course of 
Korea’s political history over the next fifty years. It activated the radicalised civic 
space where left-wing intellectuals, peasants, and labour unions mobilised the 
population with a view to challenging and replacing the status quo colonial 
authority (Kim, 2000). Further, the authority’s continued exploitation of its 
colonial subjects radicalised a majority of the population, particularly educated 
citizens. A lot of intellectuals and activists engaged in national resistance 
movement drew their inspiration from socialism, a popular ideology in the early 
20th century among the colonised population throughout the world. Civil society 
was synonymous with the underground nationalist resistance and activism, and 
thus the core characteristics attributed to South Korean civil society became 
emancipation.  
Post-Colonial Transition and Korean War (1945-1953)  
In 1945, when the Japanese Empire collapsed, the Korean Peninsula 
gained independence, and underwent a three-year military occupation by two 
rising super-powers of the post-World War II world order — the Soviet Union 
and the U.S. Although extremely limited, independence from the Japanese 
Empire replaced the country’s governance structure, providing Koreans with an 
opportunity to experiment with democracy. For example, the U.S. Army Military 
Government (USAMG), which occupied the Southern part of the country 
between 1945 and 1948, claimed that the U.S. advocated pluralistic democracy 
in the South (Kim, 2000). The USAMG’s antagonistic engagement with radical, 
 112 
112 
 
progressive civil society forces, however, testified that the U.S. tolerance of 
pluralism was limited to right-wing organisations (Park, 1992).  
Immediately after independence, progressive social forces that had been 
suppressed during the colonial era, including peasant organisations and labour 
movements, began to proliferate (Kim, 2000). The USAMG was deeply 
suspicious of various society organisations representing the interest of 
labourers and peasants in particular due to their close association with the 
Korean Communist Party. In order to suppress the explosion of left-wing civil 
society, political parties, and media, the USAMG introduced several laws to 
prohibit labour and peasant movements, closed progressive newspapers, and 
arrested leftist leaders (Kim, 2000). Furthermore, the U.S. Military Governor 
restored key colonial administrators and various police collaborators to 
establish control in the South (Walter, 1966). He has also supported right-wing 
social organisations advocating anti-communism and anti-Soviet sentiment 
(Kim, 2000). In so doing, the transitional period in South Korea witnessed again 
the suppression of diversity within civil society, and reinforced the conflict 
dynamics between the state and civil society.  
Reports indicated that in North Korea the Soviet authority supported 
communists loyal to Moscow and suppressed the more nationalist/independent 
communist and socialist leaders — a number of non-Soviet loyal communists 
were prosecuted during this time (Kim, 2000). However, the Soviet intervention 
in the Korean Peninsula was much less confrontational than the United States’ 
intrusiveness, because the educated population, peasants, and labourers 
generally supported socialist ideals versus capitalism. On the other hand, the 
United States put forth a major effort to strengthen US loyalists, to convince the 
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population of the danger of communism, and to establish active civil society as 
a root cause of social chaos (Park, 1996). In other words, the military 
occupation by these superpowers created a complex social dynamic and ignited 
a power struggle between different factions of social, economic, and political 
elites (Hahm, 1994).  
As a result, the transitional period not only created a region intensely 
influenced by the Cold War’s ideological battle, but also generated situations 
conducive to violent clashes and civil wars between various social groups (Shin, 
1999). Between 1945 and 1950, there were a number of violent engagements 
between militant socialists and right-wing militias, and thousands of innocent 
civilians in the South were killed, as they were labelled communists or 
communist sympathisers (Shin, 1999). Although there are not many accurate 
historical documents testifying to situations in the North, eyewitnesses and 
remaining historical records confirm similar situations took place in the Soviet-
controlled North.14  
In 1948, the plan to hold free elections throughout the Peninsula failed. 
As a result, two separate nations were established in the North and South, with 
ideologically different political, economic, and social systems. Yet between 
1948 and early 1950, Koreans were able to move freely between the arbitrary 
borders of the two Koreas. During this period, most radical, left-leaning civil 
society organisations in South Korea either went to the North or went 
underground. The Republic of Korea’s history began officially in 1948 with the 
election of the First Republic headed by President Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), 
                                                
14 It is greatly contested as to what happened in North Korea during this post-colonial transitional period. 
Furthermore, a number of documents on North Korea are highly classified. Available documents 
elaborating the cruelty of extra-judiciary killings of innocents were often developed by conservative and 
right-wing figures.  
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a strong anti-communist politician backed by the United States (Schmitz, 1999). 
There were a number of problems with the Rhee administration in terms of 
managing the country’s democratisation process (Kim, 2000). In particular, his 
administration further reinforced the antagonistic dynamics between the state 
and civil society by suppressing the development of autonomous civil society in 
the country (Kim, 2000).  
In order to minimise the influence of communists and ideology-based 
social conflicts, Rhee engaged with the colonial state apparatus, including those 
officials who held key positions during colonial rule (Kim, 2000). By absorbing 
colonial elites into his powerbase, Rhee was confronted by civil society 
organisations and opponents who demanded the prosecution of collaborators 
who accumulated wealth during the colonial period. During the interview, 
CSO13 (Personal interview, 18 April 2007) explained that the issue of handling 
colonial collaborators became “an issue for progressive civil society” because of 
Rhee’s policy. In an effort to deal with his political dilemmas and suppress 
oppositional voices within civil society, Rhee’s regime institutionalised anti-
communism measures. In 1949, the Special Act on Anti-Subversion (commonly 
known as the National Security Law) was passed in order to prohibit all 
activities that aimed at “subverting the state” and preventing “unsound thought” 
(Lim, 2006). The law allowed people to be punished for any activities suspicious 
of disturbing the state’s status quo, and enabled the government to arrest 
people for their thoughts and intent. A number of intellectuals and activists were 
prosecuted under this law; in 1949 alone, more than 118,621 persons were 
arrested and imprisoned under the National Security Law (Lim, 2006).  
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The author concurs with the analysis of Kim (2000), who posited that the 
post-colonial transition era set a precedent for oppressive measures against 
civil society and played a detrimental role in the democratisation process in 
South Korea. Despite a window of opportunity to nurture civil society for 
dialogue, any open discussion on controversial subjects or ideologically 
contracting views were suppressed and anti-democratic political manoeuvres 
were encouraged in order to install a U.S.-friendly government in the Korean 
Peninsula. In addition, the transitional period allowed future Korean 
governments to exploit anti-communism as a way to suppress opposition and 
civil society groups. Thereafter, rooting communism out of the country was 
always viewed as justifiable at any cost — human rights abuses against 
individuals were allowed as long as the state named the recipients as 
communists. Individuals associated with communism or anti-state ideals were 
denied rights to due process and fair trials.  
In the midst of political chaos, the country entered into a full-scale conflict 
with Soviet-backed North Korea on 25 June 1950 (Gorchakov et al., 1993). 
North Korea claimed to want to liberate the South from the US and other 
Japanese collaborators who continued to oppress Koreans. The intense conflict 
continued for over three years, killing or wounding over 2.5 million people 
throughout the Korean Peninsula; 80% of casualties were estimated to be 
civilians (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Countless human rights abuses were reported 
as both North Korean and South Korean militaries committed serious war 
crimes — innocent civilians were executed through extrajudicial processes as 
they were suspected of supporting the other side (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In 
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1953, the civil war ended with the Korean Armistice Agreement - a cease-fire 
agreement, not a peace agreement.  
The Korean War not only ended the existence of progressive, left-
leaning ideals in civil society, but also created complex perceptions toward 
democracy and diversity within civil society (Kim, 2000). While people desired 
the right to influence the political process through elections, many were also 
fearful of the chaos or social disharmony that transitional democracy had 
brought to the country. The memory of the Korean War created the perception 
that proliferation of progressive social groups was destructive to the society’s 
well being. To a certain extent, this explains why a majority of Koreans tolerated 
military rule in the 1960s and 1970s despite their disapproval of the military 
government’s anti-democratic measures (Lee, 2002).  
After the Korean War and the Rise of Park Chung-Hee (1953-1979)  
As the war destroyed a majority of the country’s industrial 
infrastructures, South Korea became increasingly dependent on the US for its 
national security and economic survival. In post-war South Korea, popular 
support for Rhee was extremely weak and he was constantly confronted with 
opposition. In response, Rhee’s regime became increasingly authoritarian, and 
government corruption and injustice were widespread. The ruling party 
manipulated the two presidential elections that took place in 1952 and 1956, 
irregularities and fraud were reported, and the ruling party prosecuted 
oppositional and critical voices that emerged in civil society (Kim, 1995). In 
1960, after Rhee won a fourth term in office, a wave of pro-democracy 
uprisings initiated by pro-democracy student groups and labour unions swept 
across the country, condemning the election fraud and calling for Rhee’s 
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resignation (Kim, 1995). Eventually, Rhee was forced into exile and replaced by 
a democratically elected administration headed by Prime Minister Jang Myon 
(1960-61) and President Yoon Bo Seon. During the Second Republic (1960-
1961), the country switched to a parliamentary cabinet system of governance 
from a presidential system in order to avoid a concentration of power in a 
single individual (Lee, 2002).  
The Second Republic fits into a replacement model of democratisation 
as the people’s uprising supported by student activists overthrew the illegitimate, 
authoritarian regime (Huntingdon, 1992); it also offered the second opportunity 
for South Koreans to experiment with democracy. Due to the critical role that 
civil society played in overthrowing Rhee’s regime, the Second Republic 
recognized the proliferation of civil society organisations, particularly from the 
leftist grassroots entities, labour unions, and student groups (Kim, 2000). These 
groups’ voices were expressed in the form of public protests. Around 2,000 
demonstrations were held during the eight months of the Second Republic 
(Yang, 1999). The most important political agenda items this progressive 
political force advocated were re-visiting US-Korean relations and a strategy for 
rapid reunification. During an interview, PAN1 (Personal interview, 29 January 
2007) explained that the idea of peaceful reunification was misunderstood in the 
1960s, and misunderstood perceptions had an impact on the development of 
the early peace movement in South Korea. He said,  
The roots of peace activism in South Korea can be traced to the 1960s when 
theorists such as Hahm Seok-Hyeon advocated peaceful reunification and 
non-violence. Yet, the early peace movement was based upon abstract ideas, 
and did not secure the support from broader population due to the fact that the 
Second Republic was established only 8 years after the end of the Korean 
War.  
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The proliferation of progressive autonomous groups provoked the 
conservative population, triggering the mobilising of right-wing organisations. 
They advocated the anti-communism slogan and fiercely opposed the rise of 
progressive organisations. A series of demonstrations took place, initiated by 
both rightists and leftists, and some turned into violent clashes (Kim, 2000). The 
Second Republic was unable to resolve the ideological polarisation and 
Koreans’ intensifying fear of another civil war because of increased tension 
between right-wing groups and leftists (Kim, 2000). In addition, the country’s 
economic conditions had become worse — currency lost half its value against 
the US Dollar within six months, and inflation and unemployment soared (Nahm, 
2000).  
Social and economic instability and the inability of the Second Republic 
to manage these effectively further burdened the fragile democracy in the 
country and left it ripe for military overthrow. In 1961, military officers staged a 
coup, claiming the country needed strong leadership to restore political order 
and pursue rapid economic development. The country’s second 
democratisation experiment ended unsuccessfully as it regressed to another 
authoritarian rule. Military juntas blamed progressive civil society organisations 
for failing the country’s potential political and economic well-being, and 
propagated that diversity and political pluralism were dangerous to South Korea 
(Kim, 2000). The military order put strong restrictions on autonomous civil 
society movements, and banned numerous political activities of civil society 
groups.  
After two years of emergency military rule, the leader of the 1961 coup, 
Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) was elected to head the new government in 1963. 
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The legacy of Park’s military rule is highly contested by Koreans, and is 
currently one of the issues, which defines one’s political spectrum in South 
Korea. Park represented an era when Korea rose to economic power at the 
expense of democracy, and his rule has created heated debates among 
conflicting ideologies of economic progress, political freedom, and social justice.  
Conservative academics such as Hahn (1993) tend to be apologetic for 
the authoritarian behaviours of Park and argue that political oppression was 
necessary to pursue a coordinated economic policy in a focused way. During 
his 18-year rule, the country grew by 8.5% on an annual basis (Hahn, 1993), 
and the per capita GNP rose rapidly from USD 87 in 1961 to USD 1,242 in 1978.  
On the other hand, as echoed by revisionists or progress academicians such as 
Kim (1993) and Park (1992), the effect of such military rule was detrimental to 
the development of democracy and civil society in South Korea. By prioritising 
centralised rapid economic development over political democratisation, Park 
justified his authoritarian rule, which severely suppressed oppositional civil 
society leaders, politicians, intellectuals, and religious figures. Several 
interviewees that the author met during the field research, including PAN1 
(2007), PAN6 (2007), PAN7 (2007), and CSO2 (2007), engaged in pro-
democracy movements during Park’s regime, and CSO2 (Personal interview, 
30 January 2007) expressed the restriction that she felt during this era and 
recounted the damage that Park’s rule had inflicted on the country’s equitable 
development and political freedom. The following summarises the negative 
impact that Park’s rule had on the country’s democratic development and civil 
society.  
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By staying in power for 18 years, Park undermined various democratic 
procedures introduced during the short-lived Second Republic and banned the 
rights of citizens to participate in presidential elections. In 1972, Park introduced 
the Yushin Constitution, which gave unlimited power to Park and eliminated the 
direct electoral system. The Park regime justified this by announcing this 
change was necessary to avoid any internal security risks that might make 
South Korea vulnerable to its counterpart in the North (Kim, 1978). In response, 
pro-democracy student groups were fiercely opposed and organised a series of 
protests. On a monthly basis, there was an average of 100 protests recorded in 
1972 (Chang, 2008). In response, Park issued a series of Emergency Decrees 
to silence protests. To silence oppositional civil society and justify his anti-
democratic measures, Park also exploited the population’s hostility toward their 
communist neighbour by fabricating criminal cases, targeting oppositional 
political figures and civil society activists. One notable case was the ‘People’s 
Revolution Party Incident15’, which was officially announced in late 2007 as 
fabrications of Park’s regime. These fabrications evoked emotional reactions by 
a civil society activist that the author met in 2007, and CSO5 (Personal 
interview, 1 June 2007) explained that the People’s Revolution Party Incident 
was one of many examples of why she had a “difficult time to hold more tolerant 
perspective towards conservatives in South Korea”. She asked how to apply a 
                                                
15 The People’s Revolution Party Incident involved twenty-three individuals who were alleged to re-
establish the People’s Revolution Party, an underground communist party supported by North Korea. 
Park’s regime accused this party of attempting to overthrow the South Korean administration. These 
individuals were arrested due to their alleged connection to the Democratic Students Movement, a leading 
student group that staged anti-government/anti-dictatorship demonstrations in the 1970s. Eight of them 
were sentenced to death, and the rest were sentenced to life imprisonment. Those who were sentenced to 
death were executed eighteen hours after the verdict was announced in the High Court. In 2007, the 
Korean Supreme Court corrected its original verdict of 1975 and announced all those who were 
prosecuted in 1975 were innocent. In April 2007, the author visited a public event which commemorated 
the death of those who were executed during People’s Revolution Party Incident, and tear-filled 
testimonies of the wives of those executed provoked strong emotional reaction to Park’s rule.  
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conflict resolution technique to engage in such a case “where there is a clear 
wrongdoing by the state” (CSO5, personal interview, 1 June 2007).  
Park further used anti-communist rhetoric to suppress any criticisms 
toward him and introduced various dictatorial measures under the banner of 
anti-communism. To silence dissidents, Park’s regime restored the National 
Security Law in 1961 and 1962 (the law was discarded by the Second Republic 
to protect political and civil rights) and introduced the Special Act on Anti-
Communism. Under these rules, numerous dissidents, including politicians from 
the opposition, were arrested and prosecuted (National Human Rights 
Committee, 2008). The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was 
strengthened to arrest and detain anyone suspicious of wrongdoing or 
harbouring anti-state sentiments. Citizens complaining about the regime were 
often alleged to violate the National Security Law and were detained without 
due process. Anti-government organisations led by university students and 
urban intellectuals were suppressed through special decrees, campus 
shutdowns, and curfews (Kim, 2000). Under the National Security Law, 
dissident intellectuals, movement groups, student activists, and religious 
leaders critical of the regime were frequently declared illegal or anti-national 
(Steinberg, 1997). The National Security Law was another point of contention 
among progressive civil society activists that the author met. CSO9 (Personal 
interview, 4 June 2007) questioned: “how one can apply a problem-solving 
approach to engaging with conservative parliamentarians who refused to 
abolish this out-dated and anti-democratic legislation which had been 
instrumentalised by authoritarian leaders to silence civil society”. 
 122 
122 
 
In addition to intellectual activists, dissidents, student activists, and 
religious organisations, labour unions voiced their criticisms towards Park’s 
regime. The emergence of labour union movements in the 1970s was notable 
because all labour-related activism was suppressed and prosecuted during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s due to its close connection to the Korean 
Communist Party (Kim, 2000). The 1970s labour union movement focused on 
working conditions and workers’ welfare, given numerous conditions that 
Korean industrial workers had to endure in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. long 
working hours, no minimum wage, no right to organise, etc.) (Kim, 2000). To 
suppress labour union movements and workers’ politicisation, in 1973, when 
the fourth constitution was announced, Park made it clear no workers could 
strike in state or local autonomous governments, state-run enterprises, public 
utility businesses, or enterprises that had serious influence on the national 
economy (Kim, 1978). Under the fourth constitution, virtually all Korean 
companies were protected, as most of them were promoted under the export-
oriented policy. Park’s policy on the suppression of workers’ rights indirectly 
contributed to the formation of a militant labour movement, further politicised 
industrial workers, and fostered the antagonism between the state and labour 
unions. The issue of labour union activism would later become one of the most 
contentious social issues in the country after democratisation. During an 
interview, CR8 (Personal interview, 28 May 2007) mentioned, “developmental 
economic policy at the expense of workers’ rights allowed the state under Park 
to brutally exploit and suppress any union movements, and the historical legacy 
further reinforced the antagonistic labour movement in civil society”. 
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Under Park’s rule, democratic development was undermined; diverse 
views and discontents were suppressed, dialogues were non-existent, citizens’ 
participation in the political process was extremely limited, and numerous 
human rights of individuals were denied. In addition, his rule further 
institutionalised the confrontational relationship between the state and society 
— his constant monitoring and controlling of dissidents and his security 
apparatus discouraged the ideal among activists of nonviolence. Despite its 
limited capacity, civil society continued to mobilize oppositional voices, and pro-
democracy student activism, dissident intellectuals, and progressive church 
groups sustained the oppositional space for resistance against authoritarian 
regimes. Chang (2008) argued that Park’s repression had unintended 
consequences of consolidating oppositional civil society movements. Yet, 
compared to civil society activism in the mid 1980s, oppositional voices under 
Park’s era were less consolidated and activities lacked mass participation (Kim, 
2000). This dissertation noted that Park’s rule intensified people’s ambivalence 
toward democracy when economic conditions of the country became difficult 
(Chang, 2008). As described later in the chapter, as every economic crisis 
affected the population, nostalgia for the authoritarian rule gained strength 
among the conservative population of the country (Chang, Chu, & Park, 2008). 
The End of Park and the Rise of New Military Dictatorship (1979-1986) 
The 18-year regime ended with the assassination of Park by his 
associates in October 1979. Despite citizens’ aspirations for democracy, in 
December 1979, two months after the assassination of Park, young military 
officers led by General Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1987) staged a coup and 
reinstated military rule. Under the martial law of May 1980, all political activities 
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were banned; leading politicians, government officials, journalists, and dissident 
intellectuals were arrested; and university campuses were closed down (Kim et 
al., 2006). By arguing that the new leadership needed to purify the society from 
communists and anti-government mobs, Chun deployed the military to do police 
work, arrest activists, and go into campuses to stop students from mobilising for 
pro-democracy protests. 
Despite the repressive measures, Chun continued to be confronted with 
fierce pro-democracy forces in early 1980. Specifically, in May 1980, citizens in 
the city of Gwangju were mobilised to challenge the Chun regime’s legitimacy, 
calling for the restoration of democracy in the country. The Gwangju Democratic 
Uprising, which lasted approximately 10 days, was brutally crushed by 
extremely repressive measures of special military forces, resulting in the death 
of approximately 200 civilians and the severe injury of over 2,000 citizens 
(Korean National Human Rights Committee, 2008). All those prosecuted during 
the uprising were labelled anti-government and pro-communist rebels, and 
commemoration was considered an anti-government activity until the late 1980s. 
In discussing a historical moment that requires peace movement’s attention, 
PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) accounted, “Gwangju in May 1980 
served as a constant reminder to the democratic oppositional movement of why 
we engaged with the dictatorial forces. The Democratic Uprising had deep 
impacts on the democratic oppositional movement and civil society (after the 
transition)”  
Three months after the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, Chun became 
the president of the country based upon the support of the national conference 
for unification, without direct presidential election. Thus, his legitimacy was 
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continually challenged and this gave more strength and moral authority to the 
opposition. To consolidate his power further, Chun continued to introduce 
intrusive and dictatorial measures throughout 1980, and these measures were 
targeted specifically to suppress the oppositional civil society.  
First, the authorities randomly arrested citizens without warrants, and all 
of those arrested were denied their basic right to due process. One of the anti-
democracy policies launched by Chun’s regime was the social 
purification/cleansing campaign that specifically targeted university students 
participating in pro-democracy activism. Throughout history, the university 
campus has been a space to mobilise politically conscious citizens, and student 
activism played a significant role in shaping the oppositional movement in the 
country. Between 1981 and 1983, over 1,000 student activists were forcefully 
enlisted in the military (Im, 2000). These students were sent to special training, 
were tortured, and were forced to spy on their fellow university students after 
being released from their service in the military (Im, 2000). Furthermore, 
university administrators and faculty members were forced to report to various 
government agencies about their students and their political engagement. As 
Cummings (1989) explained, for example, a Dean of Students had to report 
almost daily to several government agencies: police, the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency, military intelligence units, civil government, and 
neighbourhood governments. These routine reports identified radical students 
staging anti-government demonstrations on campuses. These policies were 
launched to terrorise society and to silence young dissidents, labour activists, 
and college students participating in anti-government demonstrations (Kim, 
2000). Several interviewees that the author met during the field research, 
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including CR1 (2007), CR2 (2007), CR6 (2007), CR9 (2007), SP1 (2007), SP5 
(2007), PAN12 (2007), and CSO 15 (2007), mentioned that they began their 
activism in the early 1980s as university students, and described the impact on 
their lives of their experiences with student activism in the 1980s. A few of them, 
including CR6 (2007), CR9 (2007), SP5 (2007), and PAN12 (2007), described 
the heavy-handedness of police they witnessed on campus. CR6 said,  
Repression in the 1980s made us question about the government’s legitimacy 
and moral authority. Its continued repression to maintain their power gave little 
option but to antagonistically engage with the state. In the 1980s, it was clear 
for us who engaged in the movement which forces you were fighting against. 
(Personal interview, 24 May 2007) 
 
Second, in order to consolidate the media into a pro-government 
institution, Chun closed down two privately owned stations and introduced the 
Basic Press Law. This authoritarian media law asked radio, television stations, 
newspapers, and magazines to register with the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, which retained the right to revoke the registration, thus removing 
the legal right to publish (Chira, 1987). The law also allowed governments to 
censor the content of print and electronic media — newspapers and television 
stations frequently received instructions as to what events could be covered 
and how they should be described. The Bureau of Information Policy issued 
daily press guidelines to control the media; for example, one item under the 
press guidelines specifically instructed the press to label anti-government 
protesters as pro-communist (Youm & Salwen, 1990; Chira, 1987). During the 
field research, almost all the interviewees that the author met maintained their 
critical stance against three major daily newspapers in the country because of 
their support of the regime by distorting democratic movement’s legitimacy in 
their reporting; interviewees portrayed them as the vested interest, which was 
hostile to the progressive values that civil society advocates.  
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Third, the regime passed labour laws that were more restrictive than 
Park’s regime in order to decrease union bargaining power. Chun issued the 
“Purification of Labour Unions”, which prohibited labour unions from engaging in 
any disputes, denying the right of labour organisations to provide support to 
industrial workers (Shin et al., 2007). Unlawful disruption in the workplace 
(including any protests against employers) had to be reported to the Labour 
Office. One hundred-eighteen unions were dissolved, numerous union leaders 
were arrested for engaging in labour activism, and workers were fired and 
blacklisted due to their support for unions. Such repression destroyed the space 
for trade union movements, thus further intensifying the antagonistic 
engagement of labour unions with the state and the country’s economic elites.  
As Shin et al. (2007) illustrated in their analysis of Korea’s democratic 
movements, very few demonstrations were reported between 1981 and 1983 
due to Chun’s extremely repressive measures, which terrorised citizens and 
monitored anyone suspected as anti-government. As Cummings (1989) rightly 
pointed out, Chun, like his predecessor Park, exercised exclusive coercive 
power to control Korean society using its military (more than 600,000 active 
members on duty), various intelligence agencies (intelligence agencies had 
influences over virtually all government and public institutions), and paramilitary 
riot police (more than 150,000 members). Ironically, his brutality and the 
severity of these anti-democratic measures provided an opportunity for the 
oppositional movement to form alliances and gain nationwide momentum from 
other supporters (Cummings, 1989). In spite of the repressive measures, 
society witnessed the expansion of oppositional civil society, made up of 
militant industrial workers, reform-minded white-collar workers nicknamed the 
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‘neck-tie squad’, progressive intellectuals, university students, religious leaders, 
and traditional conservative opposition politicians (Lee, 1993). The pro-
democracy alliance in the mid 1980s was more consolidated than ever before 
by focusing on a single issue – democratisation of South Korea (Kim, 2000).  
Consistent with its antagonistic engagement with the repressive, 
dictatorial, and morally corruption state, oppositional social forces in South 
Korea defined civil society as an emancipatory space battling against the 
dominant hegemonic power, (i.e., the authoritarian state). Many dissidents in 
this period staged militant street demonstrations, enduring tear gas barrages 
and beatings at the hands of the police, and risking torture. As resistance to 
Chun’s regime increased, the government applied the National Security Law to 
dissidents more frequently. From 1980 to 1987, more than 2,000 people were 
charged with violations of the law, and 1,565 were prosecuted (Lim, 2005). The 
regime continued to label these pro-democracy activists communists and North 
Korean loyalists.  
By reviewing the political history of South Korea, the author presented 
that Korea’s two experiments with democracy since 1945 ended in failure; these 
failed democratisation experiences had serious repercussions on the country’s 
political development. This section further demonstrated that South Koreans 
experienced a series of authoritarian leaders who suppressed basic human 
rights and ignored the political liberties of citizens in favour of national economic 
development and capitalist ideology. Specifically, this dissertation contends that 
two previous failed attempts at democratization contributed to legitimising 
authoritarian leaders’ arguments that open contests in the civil society sphere, 
diverse interests advocated by civil society groups, and civil society activism 
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were counterproductive to the country’s well-being. Further, by framing the 
existence of diverse civil society organisations as a root cause of social conflict, 
authoritarian leaders exploited South Koreans’ fear of another civil war and 
justified their repression against oppositional civil society.  
The author agrees with Kim (2000) who argues that two failed 
democratization attempts and subsequent state repression institutionalised civil 
society’s antagonistic engagement with the state. This dissertation noted that 
due to this historical legacy, South Korean civil society has internalized 
antagonistic measures into its core survival strategies; raising legitimate 
concerns in aggressive and confrontational manners was accepted in civil 
society activities as they were considered necessary means to attain justice and 
freedom. With the denial of an autonomous space where non-violent ways of 
expressing criticism and grievances against the state were entertained and 
encouraged, oppositional civil society activities resorted to antagonistic tactics, 
which demonstrated their discontents; yet these tactics included protests, 
campaigns, and other types of nonviolent direct action. Nonetheless, as 
presented in this chapter, throughout history, progressive politicians, pro-
democracy movements, and progressive civil society figures in South Korea 
were portrayed by mainstream media, government agencies, and dictators as a 
wing of violent opposition to the state supported by North Korea in order to 
disrupt the capitalist economic system and anti-communist social order (Kim, 
2000).  
As the state-society conflict intensified in the 1980s, street protests often 
ended with violent clashes – most offensive measures were taken by the 
military police, and some of the protestors threw gasoline bombs (Kim, 2000). 
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The use of gasoline bombs and street protest culture was reflected by CR8 
(Personal interview, 28 May 2007) who recounted that the historical 
circumstance in the 1980s gave very little opportunity for pro-democracy 
activists to reflect upon the issue of nonviolence and peaceful engagement with 
the state authority in street protests. Activists were constantly confronted with 
violent responses from riot police, and many of their fellow activists were killed 
and injured because of these violent measures from riot police. While these 
protestors and pro-democracy movement activists were portrayed as militant 
left-wing radicals attempting to overthrow the government by media and 
authoritarian leaders, their visibility grew in the 1980s as the opposition became 
consolidated, and South Koreans’ political consciousness increased.  
Contemporary Political History: Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(1987-2008) 
After nearly 40 years of experience with dictatorship, South Korea 
began its transition to a democracy in 1987. By reviewing historical contexts, 
the following section introduces key issues raised during the democratic 
transition and consolidation periods and the significance of civil society in such 
processes. Specifically, this section will demonstrate that the successful 
democratic transition in 1987 legitimatised progressive civil society space and 
validated tactics to engage with the state and political and economic elites in 
the country. Further, this section will stipulate that, because of the civil society’s 
successful engagement with the democratic transition, progressive forces in 
civil society shaped the South Korean civil society after the transition that 
advocated for a democratic reform agenda.  
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Negotiated Democratic Transition (1987)  
While no direct presidential elections had been held since 1971, both 
Park and Chun did not eliminate regular elections for National Assemblymen. 
The ruling parties headed by the presidents and enforced by the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency manipulated three such elections, held respectively in 1973, 
1978, and 1981. The opposition party, which united various political factions in 
opposition, secured 29% of the seats, while the ruling party won only 35% of 
votes at the 12th National Assembly election (Park, 1997). The 12th National 
Assembly election gave further strength and momentum to oppositional civil 
society, which had long been engaged in democratisation struggles (Park, 
1997). Based upon the electoral outcome, the opposition party, with strong 
support from civil society movement groups, increased the pressure to Chun, 
demanding the restoration of direct presidential election and constitutional 
amendments (Park, 1997).  
Defying the opposition’s continued demand for presidential elections 
and constitutional reforms, Chun announced in April 1987 that he would 
suspend discussions with the opposition on constitutional reform. Chun claimed 
the opposition party was unsuitable for such negotiations and the continued 
debate on constitutional reform would delay the transfer of power to his 
successor (Han, 1991). Chun long promised he would step down voluntarily in 
February 1988, prior to the 1988 Summer Seoul Olympics Games (Haberman, 
1987). Chun’s refusal to amend the constitution for direct presidential elections 
further triggered oppositional civil society. Further, in May 1987 during the 7th 
Commemoration of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, an activist priest 
announced that a 20-year old student activist found dead in January 1987 was 
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tortured to death, and police had fabricated the cause of his death. In early 
June 1987, the image of a 20-year old student activist who was killed by tear 
gas shot by riot police was covered in the mainstream daily newspapers, further 
triggering citizens’ sympathy towards democratic movement activists (Kim, 
2000).  
On 10 June 1987, nationwide demonstrations were held to 
commemorate the death of the student activist and to demand the end of 
authoritarian rule. Unlike previous street demonstrations, which generally 
attracted student activists, trade unionists, and oppositional political leaders, 
street protests during this time attracted ordinary citizens — white-collar 
workers, mothers, street vendors, taxi drivers, and so forth - people who had 
not previously joined demonstrations. Nationwide protests were held on a daily 
basis; firebombs were thrown at riot police and tear gas was sprayed endlessly 
on the crowds. Foreign correspondents reported Koreans were gambling for 
democracy with their blood, and some even worried about the violent eruption 
of conflicts in South Korea (Chira, 1987; Hiatt, 1987; Solarz, 1987; Wilbur, 
1987). Due to Seoul’s close proximity (30 miles) to the 38th parallel, there was 
concern over North Korea’s provocation as South Korea’s political turmoil and a 
potential confrontation among 800,000 North Korean Troops, 600,000 South 
Korean Troops, and 40,000 US Solders. The instability continued (Hiatt, 1987 
and Solarz, 1987). It was estimated that approximately 4 million citizens 
participated in nationwide demonstrations. The New York Times reported Chun 
considered military intervention to restore order, and the country came close to 
experiencing violent military interventions (Haberman, 1987).  
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On 29 June 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, a presidential candidate of the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and Chun’s close ally, issued a statement announcing 
the reinstitution of presidential elections, which the 1972 Yushin Constitution 
had eliminated. The declaration included eight major political promises including 
peaceful transfer of presidential power through direct, free elections under a 
new democratic constitution. Roh, a former general and a key member of the 
1979 coup, was credited with this action as the declaration contributed to 
halting a likely bloody clash between the army and protestors (Sneider, 1989). 
His political gesture on 29 June played a significant role in electing him as the 
next president. South Koreans overwhelmingly welcomed the declaration. On 1 
July, Chun announced he would accept Roh Tae-Woo’s recommendation 
based upon the declaration. The declaration paved the way for the transition 
from military dictatorship to political pluralism, and preventing violent conflict 
from taking place (Sneider, 1989 and Haberman, 1987).  
The opposition, with strong support of civil society activists, entered into 
negotiations on constitutional reform with the ruling party16. Throughout 
negotiations, civil society activists continued to organise and to pressure 
politicians from the ruling party. After concluding negotiations over the 
constitutional revision, the Act of Constitutional Reform was approved by the 
National Assembly in early October. On 27 October 2010, the 6th National 
Referendum took place, with the participation of over 70% of South Koreans, 
and 90% of voters approved the content of the revised constitution. The revised 
constitution promised direct, regular presidential elections and limited the 
                                                
16 Because the transition began as a result of the regime and the opposition’s negotiation to reach to a 
settlement, the country’s democratisation in 1987 is categorised as transplacement-style democratic 
transition (Huntingdon, 1992). The 1987 transition also differed from the two previous democratisation 
attempts based upon a ‘replacement’ model (Huntingdon, 1992). The first democratisation began right 
after gaining independence from Japan because of the Allie’s victory over Japan, and the second attempt 
took place in 1960, when Rhee was overthrown by a popular uprising. 
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presidential term to five years without the ability to seek re-election. The revised 
constitution reduced the possibility of concentrating power to a single individual, 
strengthened the rights of the National Assembly, and raised the status of the 
Supreme Court.  
The first direct presidential election in 17 years was scheduled to take 
place in December 1987, and the country witnessed fierce presidential 
campaigns launched by the ruling party and opposition leaders. During this 
period, a number of civil society movement groups within a pro-democracy 
alliance engaged in protests, demanding the rapid implementation of 
democratic reforms (Kim, 2000). In response, Chun’s regime employed anti-
communism fear tactics to increase the population’s support for the ruling party; 
numerous political dissidents were arrested during this time and all of them 
were labelled radical leftists and communist loyalists (Kim, 2000). In the midst 
of the fragility of the transition, the opposition failed to nominate a single 
candidate representing the democratic movement; instead, the most well known 
opposition leaders of the country, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, each ran 
a separate presidential candidacy. As Ahn and Jaung (1999) rightly indicated, 
the 1987 democratic transition failed to develop political parties based upon 
principles and issues, and civil society groups emerged to fill this void as a core 
advocate of various democratic transitional issues. Because of this split in the 
opposition, Roh Tae-Woo and his ruling party won the presidential election with 
approximately 34% of votes. While the opposition obtained over 60% of the 
votes, its division caused them to wait for another five years to run for the 
presidency (Haberman, 1987). Protesting the result of the presidential election, 
civil society activists supporting the opposition held protests.  
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As presented above, South Korea’s two previous attempts at 
democratisation ended in failure and authoritarian dictatorship was reinstated. 
Both attempts ended in failure, partially due to democratic forces’ inability to 
manage various social contentions. The 1987 democratic transition continued 
without disruption until present day. This begs a question: what has made this 
transition process different from the previous democratic transitions, and what 
role has civil society played in this process. A number of political, social, and 
economic factors, and their interaction can explain the process of 
democratisation in South Korea, but this dissertation notes the following three: a 
growing middle class because of economic development, changed international 
relations, and effective civil society mobilisation. First, as presented in Chapter 
2, a majority of foreign scholars contend the economic development of South 
Korea led to political liberalization, particularly the growing middle classes, who 
called for increased freedom (Diamond, 1994; Underwood, 1987). Throughout 
Chun’s rule from 1980 to 1987, the country witnessed growth at an average rate 
of 9.4%. Lee (1993) supported this view by emphasising the contribution of 
urban white-collar workers to the process of democratisation. The growth of 
these highly educated, modern, professional young workers and their 
participation in the democratic opposition turned anti-regime rallies and riots 
into a nationwide popular movement (Lee, 1993). Second, scholars like Yeo 
(1992) and Cummings (1989) explain that changed international politics, as well 
as the US policy toward South Korea, pressured political elites to accept the 
democratic demands of citizens. The US administration was under pressure to 
advocate the democratic transition in South Korea, as numerous articles were 
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published on the subject in major US newspapers and the Democratic Act of 
the Republic of Korea was introduced in the US Senate (Haberman, 1987).  
Third, the persistence of the ‘oppositional’ civil society and their effective 
mobilising strategy that focused on a single issue (democratic reform through 
the restoration of presidential election) contributed to making the historic 
democratic transition possible (Howard, 2003; Kim 2000). The oppositional civil 
society existed throughout contemporary political history; however, repression 
was severe, and the oppositional civil society movement had been consistently 
crushed by the regime. In the 1980s, student activists and labour unionists 
became more politicised, radicalised, and embraced more disruptive tactics to 
stage the democratic movement. While this radicalised democratic movement 
created fierce confrontation, it successfully raised peoples’ awareness of the 
regime’s brutality (Kim, 2000). Furthermore, as democracy — specifically direct 
presidential elections — became a central issue of the oppositional civil society, 
it was able to attract diverse social actors. Traditionally, students, religious 
activists (progressive Catholic priests and protestants), and blue collar workers 
were the main social forces behind the democratic movement, yet by focusing 
on a single issue, an end to an authoritarian rule through free elections, it 
attracted more diverse participants, such as concerned parents, and white-
collar workers (Kim, 2000). In other words, civil society activists formed an 
effective, broad, and nationwide coalition, which encompassed a range of social 
groups advocating a range of reform agendas.  
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Democratic Transition (1988-1992): Roh Tae-Woo and Kim Young-Sam 
Administrations 
Amid such doubts and uncertainty over the success of South Korea’s 
democratisation, Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992) was inaugurated as the President 
of the Republic of Korea in 1988 (Hiatt, 1987; Haberman, 1987; Kempe, 1987; 
and Chira, 1987). His administration took a series of liberalisation measures, 
including tolerance toward political opposition, media freedom, autonomy of 
social organisations, lifting the ban on overseas travel, and legalisation of 
unions (Lee, 1993). As a result, civil society emerged openly as a space for 
political discourses. Previously, oppositional civil society focused on regime 
change and reinstituting democratic rule in the country. With the advent of a 
democratically elected administration, citizens put an emphasis on democratic 
reforms in various parts of society (Lee, 1993). For the first time, the focus of 
the civil society movement changed from regime change to specific reform 
issues, which ranged from elections, media literacy, environmental regulations, 
and education reform to economic justice. Kim (2000) presented that out of 69 
nation-wide advocacy organisations existing in South Korea in 1993, 47 were 
established after 1987. One notable example illustrating the change within civil 
society is the establishment of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CCEJ), one of the most influential non-governmental organisations in the 
country. CCEJ was founded in 1989 by 500 professionals — professors, 
lawyers, church leaders, and other former intellectual dissidents — who wished 
to address the socio-economic concerns of middle and working class 
populations (Lee, 1993). This organization argued that authoritarian, regime-led 
development had created socio-economic conditions not benefiting ordinary 
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citizens. Their main function was to watch corporate activities, particularly large 
conglomerates that accumulated wealth during the authoritarian regime (Lee, 
1993). In the next twenty years, they grew into one of the largest organisations 
in the country, with 35,000 memberships nationwide (Lee, 1993). In the early 
stage, CCEJ engaged with the state in a rather antagonistic manner as the 
state was reluctant to accept CCEJ’s request to reform legislative measures 
that protected Korean conglomerates (Lee, 1993).  
Although Roh introduced various institutional measures to democratise 
the country’s political system, progressive civil society organisations including 
CCEJ considered his administration as quasi-democratic due to Roh’s strong 
connection with the previous military dictatorship. Further, he was criticised for 
demonstrating a number of anti-democratic characteristics in engaging with the 
transitional civil society movement in the country. During an interview, PAN5 
(2007) mentioned that student activists did not treat Roh’s era differently from 
that of Chun and they engaged struggle against his regime. By challenging the 
legitimacy of Roh’s administration, civil society engaged antagonistically with 
the state, and continued to organise a series of protests, calling for the 
acceleration of democratic reforms. One of the specific issues for which Roh 
was criticised by opposition and civil society was his failure to investigate past 
human rights abuses fully or to prosecute those who were responsible for 
abuses and corruption. Due to civil society’s continued emphasis on and 
promotion of this issue, public hearings on Chun’s regime were negotiated at 
the National Assembly in 1988, and as a result, a few key allies of Chun were 
sentenced for rampant corruption; specifically, Chun and his allies were 
accused of extorting USD 107 million, at the exchange rate of 1988, from 
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Korean businesses (Mydans, 1988). Chun was also forced to offer a national 
apology for his administration’s human rights abuses and corruption scandals 
and went into self-exile in a rural Buddhist temple in an eastern province of 
South Korea. However, civil society argued that such gestures exposed nothing, 
failed to address affected citizens’ grievances, and denied genuine investigation 
efforts to prosecute properly those who were responsible for wrongdoings (Billet, 
1992). 
In 1993, Kim Young-Sam (KYS 1993–1998) was inaugurated. Although 
he became the first civilian president since 1961 – Park, Chun, and Roh all 
retired from their military ranks in order to become president – he was severely 
criticised for making an alliance with Roh’s ruling party during the 1992 
presidential campaign,17 and his legitimacy as a long-time oppositional 
dissident leader was undermined and questioned throughout his presidency. 
Nonetheless, his administration implemented a number of key democratic 
reform measures including the development of civil society. During the KYS 
administration, South Korea saw the expansion of civil society “accompanied by 
its qualitative transformation” (Moon, 2002, p. 484). A large number of NGOs 
were formed; they replaced traditional voluntary associations, which used to 
administer mass organisations created by military regimes to implement their 
public policies. For example, about 1,034 civil society groups (a majority of 
which were Government-administered, mass organisations and political, 
                                                
17 The 1992 presidential campaign is often criticised as it further intensified the country’s regionalism 
through party politics. Since 1961, all presidents came from one particular region and put more emphasis 
on regional development of their native hometowns. As a result, other parts of the country rarely enjoyed 
the benefits of regional developments (transportation, education, rural development, industry development, 
and major infrastructure). This created grievances toward the regimes against a particular region. The 
regimes mobilised people from their hometowns to support their power by intensifying regionalism. Despite 
democratisation, the 1992 presidential campaign was based upon one’s regional association, and political 
parties were based upon regional loyalties rather than political or social agendas. President Kim Young 
Sam formed an alliance with the ruling party, as his regional powerbase was closely aligned with ruling 
party leaders (Ahn & Jaung, 1999).  
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social/leisure-based groups) were registered in 1974, whereas this number rose 
to 2,181 in 1994 (Kim, 2004). This rapid growth in civil society groups was a 
result of the introduction of government funding for such groups by 1994. For 
the first time in the country’s political history, even advocacy organisations, 
which tended to be critical of the government’s policies, were eligible to apply 
for funding.  
Furthermore, in the early 1990s, NGOs began to address a broad 
spectrum of issues ranging from human rights, peace, unification, 
environmentalism, and feminism to rights for people with disabilities. All of these 
issues had been suppressed within the former oppositional civil society, whose 
primary focus was to topple the authoritarian regime. In addition, autonomous 
interest groups, organised by businesspeople, workers, farmers, the urban poor, 
progressive artists, teachers, and journalists, proliferated. Around this time, two 
very influential NGOs were also founded (1994) — the Korean Federation of 
Environmental Movement (KFEM) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD). KFEM brought the public’s attention to various 
environmental issues that had been neglected during the oppositional civil 
society era. As an environmental watchdog, over the next twenty years, KFEM 
grew to become the largest civil society organisation, with 60,000 members 
across the country. PSPD was established to mobilise citizen action at various 
levels of society and contributed to election reforms and the monitoring of 
corruption.  
Throughout his administration, a number of democratic reform 
measures, all of which were advocated by civil society, were implemented to 
enhance further democratic elements in South Korea’s economic, social, and 
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political areas. First, KYS issued a wide-ranging political amnesty; over 40,000 
political dissidents, including the well-known activist Reverend Moon Ik Hwan, 
who visited North Korea in 1989, were released. Furthermore, a long-time 
professed communist and political prisoner since the Korean War was released 
and repatriated to North Korea on humanitarian grounds. As Cha (1993) rightly 
indicated, these acts were highly symbolic to the dissident community in South 
Korea, who were often accused of being communist and anti-government 
activists due to their activism during the authoritarian period. During this time, 
over 1,000 university students and faculty members who were dismissed from 
their universities due to their activism were re-enrolled to their respective 
universities. The release of political prisoners and restoration of students’ status 
were long advocated by civil society throughout the 1980s, and his action was 
one of the first attempts of the state to develop a less confrontational and 
conflictual engagement with civil society (Kim, 2000).  
Second, KYS made political efforts to overcome the authoritarian legacy 
of South Korea’s political system. For example, KYS attempted to demonstrate 
that the government was independent from the old establishments of the 
military regimes by appointing academics rather than career bureaucrats or 
senior ruling party politicians to key government positions such as those in the 
Foreign Ministry, the Unification Ministry, and the National Planning Ministry. In 
addition, in response to civil society’s appeals, KYS initiated a fact-finding 
mission on the Gwangju Democratic Uprising of 1980, and established a special 
commission that investigated those who were responsible for killing civilians in 
1980. As a result, former presidents Chun and Roh and their close associates 
were arrested and sentenced; Chun was sentenced to death and Roh was 
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sentenced to 22 years. PAN3 (Personal interview, 16 April 2007) explained 
during an interview that civil society groups advocated the full, accurate 
investigation of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising, and “connecting with 
international human rights movements were helpful to frame this issue as a 
transitional justice matter”.  
Third, KYS introduced measures to strengthen local governments’ 
autonomy by restoring local municipal elections in 1995. From 1948 to 1960, 
South Koreans elected leaders of local municipal governments through 
elections; however, when Park took power in 1961, he eliminated local 
autonomy, and the government in Seoul centrally controlled various 
development agendas. Civil society had long argued that a lack of power 
among local municipalities caused South Korea’s imbalanced regional 
development (preference of Southeast over Southwest) (Kim, 2000). Thus, the 
restoration of local autonomy was an important political reform agenda in 1987, 
yet Roh did not fully implement it. KYS restored the election of local municipality 
leaders in 1995, and established a presidential commission to assist in the 
acceleration of local municipal development. The restoration of local autonomy 
not only contributed to remedying inequitable regional development, but also 
activated grassroots local organisations in the country (Kim, 2000).  
However, his reform efforts, as well as other political and economic 
policies, were seriously undermined at the end of his tenure due to corruption 
scandals and the financial crisis that hit the country. Roh’s administration was 
insufficient to change state-civil society dynamics due to Roh’s close connection 
with the past military regime, and his antagonistic manner of engaging with civil 
society. Yet, the opening of a democratic space because of 1987 allowed the 
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emergence of advocacy civil society organisations focusing on a range of 
issues related to democratic reforms. KYS as a civilian President and long-time 
oppositional leader undertook a range of democratic reform measures, and 
contributed to expanding civil society space. Cha (1993) argued that the KYS 
administration witnessed the rise of advocacy civil society groups and non-
governmental organisations, and the decline of student activism and 
movement-oriented groups. The transitional period provided the first-time 
opportunity to legitimize a civil society movement as a way to form critical 
political discourses. Throughout history, until 1987, civil society’s focus was to 
mobilise anti-government forces to challenge illegitimate, authoritarian regimes.  
With the opening of a democratic space, civil society was able to 
redefine its role in society. In this process, progressive civil society groups 
incorporated into their role a number of democratic functions such as monitoring 
of the state, supporting of the state’s efforts, and facilitation of citizen 
participation in critical political discourses. At the same time, due to its long 
tradition of oppositional movement and political partiality towards progressive 
values, South Korea’s civil society neglected to address issues of reconciling 
politically conservative populations into the civil society space. Its strategy to 
reach out to the politically conservative centred on outreach and educational 
activities, assuming that knowledge and awareness of certain issues would shift 
their political stances.  
Transition to Consolidation: the Rise of Opposition (1998-2003)  
In 1998, South Korea, which had experienced decades of one-party 
hegemony, witnessed an electoral victory by the opposition-party presidential 
candidate, Kim Dae-Jung (the most influential and respected dissident in the 
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country). This was the first transfer of power from the ruling party to the 
opposition through elections in contemporary Korean political history. The 
election of President Kim Dae Jung (KDJ, 1998-2003) marked a new phase of 
democratic consolidation.  
Whilst KDJ’S administration was in a position to prioritise economic 
policies over any other social and political reforms due to the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis that affected South Korea, he chose to undertake various 
measures that have had a positive effect on Korea’s democratic consolidation.  
First, he shifted the policy toward North Korea from confrontational to a 
partnership; KDJ’s greatest accomplishment during his tenure was his policy 
toward the North, and he was the first Korean president who was able to meet 
with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il. As KDJ further strengthened this 
constructive engagement with the North, the practice of labelling anti-
government voices as communists almost disappeared. Peace activists the 
author met, such as PAN1 (2007) and PAN7 (2007), credited KDJ’s sunshine 
policy from giving birth to diverse peace movements in South Korea.  
 
This policy shift is fundamental to the development of peace activism in South 
Korea. This policy change allowed peace organisations that formally focused 
on the development of constructive relationship with the North to diversify their 
areas of interest. Further, the administration’s policy change weakened our 
position as the only progressive voice advocating the reconciliatory approach to 
North Korea. This allowed us (peace organisations) to develop alternative 
peace narratives and focus on global solidarity. (PAN1, personal interview, 29 
January 2007)   
 
Interviewees such as CR2 (2007) and CSO2 (2007) explained the notion 
of conflict resolution was brought to South Korea’s civil society during the KDJ 
era because progressive civil society groups viewed conflict resolution as a 
technique to prepare a peaceful reunification and engagement with North 
Koreans.  
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Second, KDJ pushed for controversial democratic reforms in social, 
political, and legal areas. For example, he contributed to establishing the 
independent national commission on human rights. Due to South Korea’s 
authoritarian past and its frequent human rights abuses, there had been strong 
demand for an independent commission investigating human rights abuses 
since the early 1990s. However, the Ministry of Justice, responsible for various 
legal matters, strongly opposed the establishment of an independent human 
rights commission; it argued such matters should be managed within the 
Ministry of Justice. After three years of negotiations, in 2001, the National 
Assembly passed the Human Rights Commission Act, which founded the 
Korean Human Rights Commission. Other notable reform efforts included the 
legalisation of the controversial Teachers Union,18 the establishment of the 
Ministry of Gender Affairs, the withdrawal of the government’s plan to build a 
dam in one of the most preserved river19 areas, and pursuit of balanced 
regional development.  
Third, KDJ brought about a dramatic qualitative transformation of civil 
society. In 1998, the KDJ administration passed the Assistance for Non-for-
Profit and Non-Governmental Organisations Act, an effort to strengthen a 
mechanism to provide financial assistance effectively to NGOs for their 
sustainable operations (Lee, 2005). In 1999 and 2000, two ministries (the 
Ministry of Government and Home Affairs and the Ministry of Labour) and local 
                                                
18Over ten years, various attempts to establish a nationwide teachers union were suppressed for two 
reasons: public teachers were civil servants, meaning they were not allowed to organise unions, and 
teachers were equivalent to priests and should not be viewed as workers (the cultural reason is based 
upon Confucianism’s social values). However, under KDJ, in order to guarantee the educational 
independence of teachers, the National Teachers Union became a legally permitted organisation.  
19This was noted because it was one of the first incidents of the ruling administration choosing the 
environment or other social factors over economic growth and prosperity. Until this incident, the Korean 
Government was notorious for ignoring other stakeholders’ voices on any national planning issues or 
regional development.  
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governments, including the city of Seoul, launched various projects supporting 
civil society organisations, and almost USD 12 million was disbursed for the 
support of NGOs (Lee, 2005). In addition, in 2000, the Special Law on Non-
Profit Organisations passed in parliament. Under the new law, so-called ‘red’ 
organisations were able to register with the government as legitimate social 
entities. Civil society actors, who had maintained antagonistic relations with the 
State, gradually adopted cooperative strategies.  
Scholars such as Lee (2005) argued that there are two main reasons 
explaining the KDJ administration’s intensive support for the growth of civil 
society. Firstly, KDJ needed progressive social forces that would help his 
economic reform agenda, especially those policies targeting chaebol 
(conglomerates) and establishments in South Korea. As Lee (2005) explains, 
KDJ needed political allies to push for his agenda without jeopardising the 
state’s relationship with the business community, one of the most powerful 
groups in South Korea. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, influential NGOs in 
South Korea took the lead in a series of campaigns to pressure big 
conglomerates to enhance their corporate governance and transparency. A 
case in point was PSPD’s effort to protect minority shareholders’ rights from 
large shareholders (mostly owners and founders of big conglomerates). As a 
result, the KDJ administration was able to implement various reform policies on 
big conglomerates without damaging its relationships with them; instead, big 
conglomerates directed their resentment toward NGOs and civil society in 
general, and civil society’s relationship with the business community became 
much more contentious. Secondly, the KDJ administration needed an active 
voluntary sector, which had played an instrumental role in providing social 
 147 
147 
 
services to the urban poor, the homeless, and the unemployed who were 
severely affected by the economic downturn (Moon, 2002). Under the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Structural Adjustment Programs, the 
government was required to cut off public expenditure allocated to welfare 
programs and was unable to extend its support to the marginalised; the 
voluntary associations filled the void of State support to the poor. It was during 
KDJ’s era that a-political, voluntary organisations became a significant part of 
the country’s civil society movement (Moon, 2002). During an interview, CR 11 
(Personal interview, 21 May 2007) highlighted that “young activists began to 
pay attention to a-political voluntary organisations due to increasing 
participation of citizens in these organisations.”   
Based upon the significant strength gained during this administration, 
civil society organisations successfully led the Fair Election Campaign during 
the nationwide General Election in 2000. The Campaign blacklisted some of the 
politicians for their links to corruption, unethical practices, and/or their dictatorial 
pasts. By blacklisting these politicians, the Campaign hoped to persuade party 
leadership not to nominate these individuals for election. However, the results 
were mixed, as only 40 out of 110 blacklisted candidates did not win their 
respective parties’ nominations (Park, 2004). The Campaign then launched 
another round of blacklisting, which identified 86 candidates who they argued 
should not be elected for their failure to meet the democratic requirements of 
the country. Of the 86 candidates, 59 lost the General Election in 2000 (Park, 
2004). This Campaign proved the ability of civil society organisations to 
mobilise citizens in order to influence the political process effectively. As Seong 
(2000) explained, the tradition of social movements during democratisation was 
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replaced with politicised NGOs in South Korea. Particularly, in the absence of 
issue-based political parties, these NGOs have quickly gained social and 
political hegemony over other social entities (Kim, 2009). This was evident at 
the end of KDJ’s tenure, as various surveys (i.e. Gallup and the World 
Economic Forum) on institutional trust indicated over 75% of South Koreans 
chose NGOs as the most trustworthy institutions, over other entities such as 
labour (57%), the military (56%), the media (48%), the private sector (35%), the 
government (25%), and the National Assembly (11%) (Kim, 2009, cf. Chapter 1 
& Chapter 7).  
KDJ completed the democratic transition process, and he paved the 
way for further consolidation or deepening of the process of democracy in the 
country. Through his progressive “Sunshine” policy toward North Korea, he 
modelled the government’s role in building a constructive relationship with its 
counterpart in the North, and he pursued more of an independent reunification 
policy despite the Bush Administration’s uneasy relations with North Korea. KDJ 
also led various democratic reforms in controversial areas and provided more 
space for progressive political and social discourse than any other 
administration. However, his legacy suffered from corruption scandals involving 
his sons and close allies receiving bribes. In addition, with the expansion of 
socially progressive spaces, social conflicts surfaced more frequently, as 
citizens became familiar with exercising their rights in a vocal manner.  
Consolidation and the Rise of Social Conflicts (2003-Present) 
After defeating a conservative candidate from the opposition by a very 
small margin (2% difference: 49% vs. 47%), Roh Moo-Hyun (RMH: 2003-2008), 
a centre-left politician from the ruling party, became the President of South 
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Korea in 2003. As a result, conservative voters constantly questioned RMH’s 
legitimacy, and his tenure is remembered as a continued confrontation between 
the conservative and the progressive. Under the slogan of Participatory 
Government, RMH began his presidency by promising to democratise all 
aspects of South Korea and to deepen democracy through citizens’ authentic 
participation in the decision making process. As RMH continued to implement 
KDJ’s progressive reform measures, collaborations between NGOs and 
governmental institutions were further enhanced; one of his top 15 policy 
priorities was enhanced cooperation with NGOs to address social, political, and 
economic issues (Lee, 2005).  
By partnering with NGOs, RMH implemented a number of controversial 
policies: the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an 
independent investigative body that looked into human rights abuses that took 
place between 1945 and 1992, independent foreign policies toward the US, 
continuation of the Sunshine policy toward North Korea, discussion of the 
abolition of the National Security Law, and conglomerate reform. In addition, 
RMH introduced innovative policies through collaboration with NGOs; two of the 
notable policy priorities RMH undertook were related to the establishment of 
comprehensive conflict management mechanisms, and several interviewees 
that the author met, including CR2 (2007), CR8 (2007), and PAN8 (2007), 
participated in the development of RMH’s policy measures on conflict resolution. 
In addition, with his centre-left political position, he expanded KDJ’s democratic 
reforms into the economic sphere in order to reduce income disparities among 
populations and enhance the fair share of large corporations and affluent 
populations. 
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Fifteen years after the democratic transition began, throughout the RMH 
administration, various progressive reform agendas were able to integrate into 
mainstream political agendas; in this regard, progressive intellectuals and 
liberal politicians assess RMH’s tenure as the accomplishment of the 1987 
democratisation (Kim, 2009). During his tenure, not only his allies, but also 
more progressive social forces, were able to enter into mainstream political 
space. A case in point is the electoral victory of the first issue-based political 
party, the Korean Democratic Labour Party; during the 2004 general elections, 
they secured 10 seats at the National Assembly. As a result, his tenure further 
politicised moderate conservative populations and led to the growth of rightwing 
civil society organisations. The RMH administration contributed to South 
Korea’s democratic consolidation, particularly their efforts to integrate 
progressive voices formerly suppressed into mainstream politics. However, his 
controversial policies, the ruling party’s inability to reconcile with conservative 
social forces, and the global financial crisis, which negatively affected the 
country’s economic performance, turned moderate populations away from RMH 
and resulted in the decline of progressive politics’ influence in the country. In 
2007, South Koreans elected Lee Myung-Bank, a centre-right politician, former 
Mayor of Seoul, and former CEO of Hyundai, as South Korea’s next President. 
With the 2007 presidential election, South Korea demonstrated its democratic 
maturity in terms of selecting leaders and expressing discontent through the 
electoral processes (Doucette, 2010).  
In the past twenty years, the South Korean government introduced 
various political, social, and economic policies to foster the institutionalisation of 
democracy. Regular elections have been held, the transfer of power from ruling 
 151 
151 
 
parties to opposition has been accepted without violence, basic human and civil 
rights of individuals are now being protected, past wrongdoings are being 
investigated to redress grievances of those who were severely affected by the 
country’s authoritarian past, diverse social issues have been freely raised 
through independent civic organisations, and civil society has been significantly 
empowered. Institutionally and procedurally, South Korea’s democratisation 
process has been relatively successful, yet twenty years of experimenting with 
democracy has also raised new challenges. South Korea needs to address 
these challenges to enhance the quality of its democracy and to consolidate its 
democratic process further. This section will focus on two of these issues: 1) the 
NGOs’ role in the democratic deepening process, and 2) better management 
and transformation of rising social conflicts.  
First, as seen above, the RMH administration further strengthened 
cooperative relationships with progressive civil society organisations. For 
example, a new position was established in the Blue House to institutionalise a 
close consultative relationship between NGOs and the President’s office. In 
addition, throughout his tenure, civil society leaders were occasionally recruited 
as ministers and heads of governmental institutions for anti-corruption, fair trade, 
consumer protection, human rights, sustainable development, and 
decentralisation, and some were elected as national legislators and regional or 
local leaders. Nonetheless, civil society organisations’ politicisation and close 
association with KDJ and RMH administrations invited criticism from the 
opposition and the conservative population regarding NGOs’ claims of non-
governmental, autonomous relationships with the state. For example, a 
controversial report entitled “PSPD Report” was released when over 300 
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positions in various government agencies and committees were filled by NGO 
practitioners working for PSPD (out of 417 former and current staff members or 
associated activists) (Yoo & Wang, 2010). During an interview, PAN12 reflected 
the growing influence of NGOs in the policy-making arena, sharing an episode 
on her address book.  
 
To be effectively organising, we do engage in politicians, and my address book 
a few years ago contained a number of key contacts in the administration. 
When I lost my address book, the person found it thought I was working for a 
government agency. This gave me an opportunity to reflect civil society’s 
growing influence and how others may perceive our interaction with 
government officials and politicians whether I would agree with conservatives’ 
accusation of our bias or not. (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
 
Another controversy arose with a report that a number of NGOs 
receiving government funding played a significant role in furthering the 
governments’ controversial reform agendas (Kim, 2009). Political appointments, 
frequent recruitment of NGO leaders, and government funding allocation to the 
administration-friendly NGOs were highly criticised by the opposition, who 
stated NGOs acted as political advocacy groups supporting the RHM 
administration. As a result, institutional trust in NGOs/civil society declined 
significantly from 2003 to 2006. For example, as quoted above, in 2003, civil 
society ranked as the most trustworthy institution in South Korea, and surveys 
conducted in 2006 ranked civil society as the fifth most trustworthy institution 
(Kim, 2009). As Kim (2009) rightly indicated, despite its critical role in 
monitoring the democratic reform process, civil society’s credibility was 
damaged due to its highly politicised activities and close associations with 
particular administrations.  
Another problem with civil society, raised during the RMH era, was the 
lack of genuine citizen participation in NGOs and interest-based civil society 
organisations. For example, according to the latest statistical overview of South 
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Korean civil society, released in 2006, an estimated 5,556 NGOs (out of 
approximately 30,000 civil associations) were registered in the country (Joo et 
al., 2006). A majority of NGOs in South Korea were founded in the 1990s, yet 
30% emerged in the early 2000s with the spread of the internet spurring civic 
activism through online activities (Joo et al., 2006). While a majority of civil 
society entities (32.8%) serve as social and welfare service providers, 25.5% 
are advocacy-oriented NGOs working in the areas of human rights, peace, 
consumer rights, women’s rights, social justice, political reform, anti-corruption, 
and media literacy (Joo et al., 2006). Culturally motivated organizations and 
environmental NGOs represent 11.1% and 10.4%, respectively, of South 
Korean civil society space (Joo et al., 2006). Despite exponential growth in 
numbers, citizen participation in these organisations rather declined in the 
2000s.  
According to research on social capital and citizen participation in South 
Korea conducted by Lee (2008), participation in civil society organisations 
significantly declined from 1996 to 2006; it was reported over 90% of South 
Koreans indicated their affiliation with civil society organisations in 1996, 
whereas only 77% indicated their affiliation with these groups in 2006. More 
notable findings were citizens’ participation in interest-based civil society 
organisations (most NGOs fit into this category); of those who maintained 
affiliation with civil society groups, only 32% participated in interest-based civil 
society organisations in 2006, a decline from 43% in 1996 (Lee, 2008). This 
indicates that, most recently, most citizens affiliated with civil society groups 
participate in cultural, social, and friendship-based, non-politicised civil society 
groups (Lee, 2008). During an interview, CR2 (2007) and PAN12 (2007) shared 
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their personal reflections on the decline of citizen participation in advocacy 
activities and civil society movement by explaining that civil society activism 
placed too much emphasis on great political discourses at a macro level and 
suffered from a lack of attention to micro issues close to citizens’ lives. CR2 
elaborated on this,  
 
In the late 1990s, we began to be keenly aware that we have internalized too 
much violence and confrontation, and forgot to engage with others in a 
humanistic way. We were lost in great discourse, and neglected to pay 
attention to processes, which guide change and progress. (Personal interview, 
26 January 2007) 
 
Another issue directed toward South Korean NGOs was their failure to 
nurture civic skills and virtues due to their antagonistic ways of managing 
conflicts and differences (Shin, 1999). Because of their close affiliations with 
political reform issues in the country, civil society organisations developed 
policy influencing and campaign skills and became some of the most influential 
opinion makers in society, but they have focused less on developing the various 
democratic virtues of citizens. While most civil society organisations aim to 
create a participatory democratic society, they neglect nurturing the very 
instrument to sustain a well-functioning civil society, which is promoting 
discussions and interactions among citizens. For example, in Assessment of 
Civil Society in South Korea, Joo et al. (2006) found civil society in the country 
to be relatively weak in promoting democracy and nurturing tolerance and non-
violence.  
As Kim (2004) indicates, South Korean civil society has been 
increasingly perceived as a party to social conflict (often protracted, extreme, 
and militant); while conflicts between NGOs and the State have decreased 
since the late 1990s, conflicts among NGOs or interest groups (conservative vs. 
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liberal) have continued to rise. In addition to the increase of social conflicts in 
which civil society organisations were engaged, the perception change is 
closely linked to citizens’ expectations of civil society. From the 1980s to the 
late 1990s, civil society’s antagonistic manner of raising its concerns was less 
challenged due to the urgency of democratisation and the need to accelerate 
democratic reform agendas and other policy priorities that civil society 
aggressively advocated. Yet, by the late 1990s, urgent democratic reform 
measures had been integrated, and civil society’s advocacy role began to 
decrease quickly from the early 2000s to the mid 2000s. In other words, the 
author agrees with Kim (2009) who argued that citizens’ expectations of civil 
society’s role shifted from a mobiliser of democratic movement to a facilitator of 
democratic discussion. Further, after the 1997 Economic Crisis, conservative 
populations in the country were reminded of the early 1960s when social 
conflicts triggered by the rise of progressive civil society groups contributed to 
the decline of the country’s economic performance (Chang et al., 2008). As 
Chang et al. (2008) argued, economic hardship experienced by citizens 
provoked certain population’s nostalgia for the authoritarian past, and 
conservative politicians exploited this perception that civil society’s left-wing 
policy created conflicts in society and weakened South Korea’s economic 
performance. As a result, the author argued that during Roh’s administration, 
civil society began paying attention to the issue of social conflict and its 
constructive management, and conflict resolution and peace activism emerged 
as an instrument to strengthen civil society’s capacity in this regard. The details 
of conflict resolution and peace activism in civil society will be introduced in 
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greater detail in the next two chapters, the core findings of the field research the 
author conducted in South Korea in 2007 (Hahm, 2005).  
Second, in addition to redefining civil society’s role in nurturing 
democratic citizenship, the matter of social conflict has emerged as a 
challenging political and social issue. In administrations prior to RMH, the term 
‘social conflict’ was mostly linked to regionalism and labour disputes that 
intensified immediately after the democratic transition. Yet, in the early 2003s, a 
wide range of social conflicts emerged in South Korea and affected a broader 
population. Both RMH and the current president, President Lee20, could not 
avoid addressing this rise of social conflict and its management system. 
Nicknaming South Korea “the Republic of Social Conflict”, the media has 
increasingly ridiculed the state’s inability to reduce the intensity and frequency 
of social conflict (Han, 2009). During RMH’s tenure, the issue of social conflicts 
and their management became political agendas of democratic reforms. In 
2003, RMH launched a special Presidential Commission on Social Conflict and 
Conflict Management and introduced a number of policies to strengthen South 
Korea’s ability to manage the difficult social issues that often turned into 
conflicts among the parties involved. 
Nonetheless, the root causes of the various social conflicts more 
prominently covered by the media in the late 1990s and 2000s were closely 
related to South Korea’s political history, and thus required more than a 
government effort to establish laws and committees (Kang & Chung, 2006). As 
scholars such as Diamond (1994) agree, these institutional measures must 
                                                
20The Samsung Economic Research Institute determined South Korea’s social conflict was one of the 
worst among the OECD countries – 23rd out of 27th. Soon after the release of the report, President Lee 
established the Social Reconciliation Commission, which looked into the development of a conflict 
resolution mechanism in society.  
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accompany citizens’ democratic virtues, skills, and willingness to accept 
democratic norms and culture. In 1987, when the democratic transition began to 
take place, foreign correspondents of the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, 
and Washington Post questioned whether democracy would prosper in South 
Korea, a place where people rarely embraced democratic norms and skills such 
as negotiation, compromise, and open and horizontal dialogues. South Koreans 
surprised the world by sustaining its democratic transition for over two decades, 
proving the scepticism of the late 1980s wrong. Unfortunately, to a certain 
extent, the reasons for foreign observers’ concerns became more evident as 
democracy became consolidated and diverse and pluralist interests surfaced 
(Haberman, 1987).  
While social conflict became a political issue during RMH’s era, Hahm 
(2005) explains social conflict surfaced because of democratisation, which 
allowed free expression of diverse views. As reviewed in this chapter, 
throughout the modern history of South Korean, expressing different viewpoints 
(ideologies) was highly discouraged and suppressed by authoritarian regimes, 
which focused on social control to sustain their power. Under authoritarianism, 
diverse social views were suppressed, not only by the state, but also by the 
oppositional civil society, which focused on a single goal: democratisation. With 
the opening of civil and political spaces for free expression, numerous issues 
suppressed during the authoritarian regime have rapidly surfaced. Most 
frequently expressed social conflicts are caused by the following factors: 
ideological differences (most prominently expressed in the area of foreign 
relations and North Korea), class differences (commonly in the area of labour 
disputes, as well as in conflicts between progressive civil society and large 
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conglomerates), disagreements over public policies (infrastructure development 
projects involving the environment and neighbourhood autonomy), and 
regionalism (rivalry and prejudice toward particular regions) (Chun et al., 2005).  
As presented throughout this chapter, South Korea’s political history, 
including a failure to investigate properly their colonial legacy, the exploitation of 
anti-communism, repressive authoritarian measures, and civil war experiences, 
explains why social conflict has emerged in a more contentious manner with the 
expansion of space for public discourse. The authoritarian experience provided 
citizens with limited opportunities to practice how to resolve differences or 
address contentious social issues in a constructive manner through dialogue or 
institutional, political frameworks (often party politics and elections). Historically, 
due to authoritarian leaders’ repression, South Korean civil society actors had 
limited means to engage citizens in voicing any concerns against the state, and 
such means (public protests, anti-government statement issuance, etc.) 
continuously reinforced antagonistic relationships with the state. Further, civil 
society’s demands for democracy during the authoritarian era were almost 
irreconcilable with political elites who maintained their powerbase by 
suppressing diverse voices in civil society and controlling the population. These 
further embedded the conflictual relationship between the state and civil society 
in the country. In addition, until the early 1990s, the various grievances that 
emerged in the South Korean civil society, including workers’ rights, democratic 
reform, and human rights abuses of the state, were met with violent repression 
by the state, and were framed as anti-government, pro-North Korean forces’ 
disruptive action.  
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As a result, South Koreans were never exposed to democratic problem 
solving in political situations until 1987, in response to authoritarian repression; 
politicised citizens wishing to express their concerns had to be willing to engage 
with the state in a confrontational manner. Non-violent ways of addressing 
differences were virtually non-existent in authoritarian South Korea, and even 
after the transition, expressing differences outside of street protests or 
demonstrations was not considered a viable option by most citizens. It has 
taken almost two decades for citizens to regain their confidence in legal 
institutions. Political debates in the National Assembly were not constructively 
managed — fistfights in the Korean National Assembly were broadcasted a few 
times through the international media (Chun et al., 2005). Furthermore, South 
Korea’s culture created additional barriers to constructive management of 
contentious social issues in South Korea. For example, in Korean culture, 
compromise has always been regarded as an act of dishonest and unethical 
individuals, with individuals willing to stand by their own principles being more 
valued than those making deals or compromising their own stances (Sohn & 
Wall, 1993). In such circumstances, social conflict and its management became 
rather urgent issues, requiring the collective efforts of society.  
When surveyed to solicit their perspectives on social conflict and its 
management, citizens agreed a holistic approach is necessary to transform the 
current pattern of negative engagement with contentious social issues (Chung 
& Kang, 2006). The survey suggested the following measures to improve South 
Korea’s capacity to deal with conflict: 1) enhanced legal and institutional 
measures, led by Government agencies (36%); and 2) educating citizens and 
raising awareness on conflict resolution mechanisms (30%). Interestingly, the 
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survey also revealed a lack of understanding of the meaning of social conflict in 
citizens of South Korea, specifically its root causes, and democratic ways of 
addressing conflict areas. Citizens blamed political and economic elites for 
creating social conflict (over 80% of respondents) and rising individualism 
(nearly 50%), and suggested conflict could be reduced or better managed if the 
government punished those who made inadequate arguments, all of which are 
indicative of South Koreans’ inability to address difficult social issues (Chung & 
Kang, 2006).  
In 2007, when political pundits through major newspapers heatedly 
debated the negative role of civil society in social conflicts, the author engaged 
in the field research, and met civil society actors reflecting on civil society’s 
PCR activism. Viewing this type of activism as an emergent response to the 
changing environment in which progressive civil society in South Korea 
operates, CR2 (2007), CR10 (2007), PAN7 (2007), and PAN8 (2007) 
emphasised in their interviews the value that PCR activism brings to the 
country’s civil society. Further, CR2 (Personal interview 19 June 2007) 
explained, “PCR activism is gaining momentum, yet they remain marginal in 
mainstream progressive civil society in South Korea.” In the next two chapters, 
this dissertation will examine the status of PCR activism in the country, and 
review three civil society organisations’ various efforts to integrate PCR within 
the country’s civil society space.  
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the political history of South Korea and discussed 
how the democratisation process has affected the development of civil society 
in the country. The country’s civil society has gained strength, both in quality 
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and quantity, over the last 20 years. As Shin (2003) rightly put it, state-society 
relations in South Korea have transformed from strong state-weak society 
relations, but they have yet to evolve into strong state-strong society relations. 
The challenge remaining for the country’s civil society is to promote further 
democratic values, habits, and skills among its citizens through much more 
active engagement with their constituents. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CASE STUDIES IN SEARCH OF PCR PRACTICES IN SOUTH KOREA 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, highly politicised and advocacy-centred 
NGO activism in South Korea has contributed to critical reform agendas in the 
context of democratisation. Yet, faced with growing social conflicts and public 
policy disputes, it is criticised for its inability to serve as an educational space to 
nurture citizens’ democratic values, virtues and norms including tolerance, 
nonviolence, and diversity (Joo et al., 2006). This dissertation prefaces its 
investigation with the assumption that the PCR movement in South Korea 
contributes positively to the development of the country’s civil society. It 
presupposes that engagement in the PCR movement has a positive effect on 
the democratic quality of civil society.  
To explore the central thesis, this dissertation examines South Korean 
civil society organisations engaged in the PCR movement. Specifically, it looks 
at three civil society organisations in-depth and aims to understand how these 
groups emerged and how these three organisations affected public awareness 
and engagement in the PCR movement and lastly what effect they have on the 
democratic quality of civil society. As presented in Chapter 2, there are four sets 
of democratic values, skills, and norms that this dissertation focuses on. The 
selection criteria were that they are beneficial to advancing participation-
oriented liberal democracy through active civic participation, respect for 
tolerance and diversity, respect for non-violent, constructive, problem-solving, 
and willingness to engage in dialogue. This chapter’s case study on three 
organisations intends to capture to what extent civil society activists and 
participants in South Korea conceptualise the democratic value of the PCR 
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movement, and in what ways their enhanced understanding are manifested in 
practice.  
To begin, the chapter briefly gives an overview of PCR activism in South 
Korea, based on the information collected through field research and archival 
studies. This will help provide the context in which the case study organisations 
operate. Then, this chapter introduces the individual case studies in-depth. 
Each case study includes two themes relevant to explaining the contexts in 
which a particular case study organisation operates; historical background 
which explains its emergent context; core activities undertaken; positive 
contributions of an organisation based on interviewees’ input and media 
analysis; specific challenges participants experienced in advancing a PCR 
agenda after engaging with an organisation; and reflections on democratic 
nurturing capacity expressed by an organisation. The information highlighted in 
each case study will be analysed in the next chapter that compares similarities 
and differences of these organisations.  
PCR Activism in South Korea 
To contextualise the environment in which the three organisations 
operate in, this section presents the historical background that has influenced 
the emergence of the PCR movement in South Korea. The historical overview 
of the PCR movement was constructed based on archival studies and 
interviews conducted during field research. Conflict resolution is, with less than 
10 years of history, a very recent phenomenon in South Korea and is 
categorised as a sub-activity within the country’s peace activism21. It emerged 
                                                
21Inspired by Nigel Young’s definition, peace activism here refers to “social or political movements that 
consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, 
which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the ’peace movement’ or are overtly opposed to war, 
militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986, p. 185). 
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in the early 20th century as an intellectual exercise by prominent educators in 
the country (Park, 2002). 
 Peace activism as a concerted effort advocating the value of (positive) 
peace did not appear in Korea’s traditional political discourses, which were 
heavily affected by Confucianism.22 The very first development of peace 
activism can be traced back to the early 20th century when the Japanese 
Empire annexed the country and incorporated it in its imperial order (Lee, 2006). 
Intellectuals in this period, including Ahn Joong-Geun (1897-1910), Yoon Dong-
Joo (1917-1945), and Ahn Chang-Ho (1878-1937), articulated that 
independence was a central element for obtaining peace in Korea, and called 
for Koreans to engage in national resistance. This initial form of peace activism 
in the country existed as a meta-frame rationalising the national resistance 
movement, and was sceptical about nonviolence struggles. For example, Ahn 
Joong-Geun assassinated a Japanese governor in South Korea and 
rationalised his decision to shoot a Japanese politician by arguing that his 
presence was destructive to maintaining peace in Asia (Lee, 2006).  
 From 1945 to 1953, South Korea experienced a series of violent 
conflicts including a full-blown three-year long civil war over ideological 
differences. Yet, despite its rather traumatic historical past, peace or pacifism 
did not emerge as a viable political alternative in South Korea. In the early 
1950s, the opposition leader ran for presidency and one of his political slogans 
was to promote peaceful reunification, as opposed to the overthrowing of the 
communist regime in North Korea. His ideology was considered dangerous and 
he was executed for treason (Park, 1994). Further, in the 1960s, when a military 
                                                
22 Confucianism contemplates ways in which elites and scholarly aristocrats could promote peace in the 
world through politics. Peace has always been understood in the context of social harmony; as the 
absence of visible confrontation obtained through social manners and norms (Lee, 2006).  
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dictatorship began in South Korea, the term peace was hijacked by the 
authorities and became closely linked to the military strength that would deter a 
North Korean invasion. The authoritarian leaders, such as Park, justified his 
anti-democratic rule by arguing that military might and economic development 
as the only way to maintain peace in the country.  
In this context, alternative voices in opposition to the dictator were 
prosecuted sharply and were labelled as forces disrupting social harmony and 
peace. Amidst severe suppression of peace discourse in civil society, there 
were a few intellectuals such as Hahm Seok-Heon (1901-1989) advocating the 
value of peace and opposing the authoritarian regime’s militaristic approach to 
social problems. However, their message was philosophical rather than easily 
accessible to a wide range of citizens. PAN1 elaborated Hahm’s influence on 
the country’s peace activism during an interview.  
 
Mr. Hahm has been highly influential during my college era. His elaboration 
on the notion of peace was powerful, and he maintained his position on 
peace and peaceful reunification even when he was threatened by Park’s 
regime. He inspired us (college students). His idea was, however, complex, 
and highly conceptual. When people suffered from poverty and exploitative 
labour conditions, his message on peace sounded too metaphysical and 
irrelevant to the grassroots’ reality. Nonetheless, his message shaped the 
contemporary peace movement, and inspired many of us to sustain our 
activism. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) 
 
The peace discourse of the 1960s and 1970s failed to reach a wide 
range of people (Lee, 2006). Case in point was the country’s first deployment of 
its own troops in foreign wars. In 1965 Park announced the deployment of 
Korean soldiers to Vietnam at the request of the United States. In response, a 
series of demonstrations were held to protest against this decision. Instead of 
anti-war messages the dominant meta-frame uniting demonstrators was anti-
Americanism and anti-Park’s sentiments (Lee, 2006). The term ‘peace’ in the 
South Korean movement tradition usually refers to positive peace and absence 
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of structural violence that perpetuates conflictual dynamics in society (Galtung, 
1969).  
Contemporary peace activism slowly emerged in the early 1990s. Lee 
(2006) elaborates the three historical contexts that influenced its emergence. 
First, the transition to democracy allowed civil society to reflect on the issue of 
peace. Second, with the democratic transition, as well as a shift in international 
politics, South Korea’s stance toward North Korea has shifted towards a more 
reconciliatory direction recently and with a major international crisis focused on 
the North Korean nuclear armament, more Koreans have become conscious of 
peace as an important political issue. Third, more diverse social activism 
emerged in the 1990s, which has sparked the inclusion of a wider variety of 
concerned citizens. Specifically, starting from the mid-1990s, a number of 
pioneering organisations began to advocate for peace by promoting a wide 
range of activities including peaceful reunification advocacy, an anti-nuclear 
movement, and a movement to reduce the defence budget.  
Nonetheless, until the late 1990s peace activism had existed in South 
Korea’s civil society in the context of reunification and the relationship with 
North Korea, as those two elements were directly related to the conditions 
threatening peace in the country. As inter-Korean dynamics were highly 
affected by international political arrangements similar to Cold War politics, 
citizens’ organisations felt disempowered about their influence on reunification 
strategies (Lee, 2006). Thus, the country’s peace activism was defined by the 
anti-American discourses. PAN3 (Personal interview, 16 April, 2007) noted that 
strong anti-American sentiments underpinning the country’s peace activism 
have had negative impacts on the country’s peace discourses because the 
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movement strategy tends to focus on critiquing American imperialism and 
neglected to nurture diverse peace discourses in South Korean civil society. 
More diverse forms of peace activism began to gain strength in the early 
2000s23. For example, civil society began to advocate peace issues that go 
beyond the Korean territory including human rights abuses in Vietnam (1965-
1973) by Korean soldiers, the global peace movement, relief activities in 
conflict-affected countries, international solidarity with people in Palestine, the 
anti-nuclear movement, and conscientious objectors24. The organisations 
working on these peace discourses adopted a range of activities including 
education, outreach, international solidarity, and campaign. A more detailed 
description of peace activism in the 2000s will be introduced when examining 
peace activists’ networks in South Korea in the latter part of this chapter. 
The conflict resolution movement in South Korea emerged in the early 
2000s as one of strategies designed to strengthen the peace movement and its 
outreach capacity for ordinary citizens. While the restoration of democratic 
institutions and legislations were still being implemented, some sections of civil 
                                                
23At the time of the field research, 60 large national NGOs have self-identified themselves as engaged in 
peace activism through their regular appearance in the network of peace activists (Peace Retreat 
Committee, 2007). Out of these NGOs, 16 engaged in reunification and North-South related issues, seven 
are working on human rights including minority issues, nine focusing on general progressive politics and 
peace discourses, 10 working on Eastern Asian peace discourses including the Korean Comfort Women23, 
five involved in educational activities, four supporting media literacy, five engaged in peace activism 
including peace museum, nonviolence, and anti-nuclear movement, and four working on environment and 
ecological issues. Yet, in reviewing the list of NGOs in South Korea, this dissertation noted that such self-
assessment does not include at least 50 other influential non-governmental organisations engaged in 
similar topics and activities.  
24 While the conscientious objectors and anti-nuclear movement are one of the early topics discussed in 
the peace movement emerged in advanced countries, these two topics only became political issues in the 
early 2000s. The lack of politicisation on the anti-nuclear movement and conscientious objectors is closely 
related to the country’s historical background. With regard to the nuclear disarmament, lack of political 
consciousness among Koreans is closely related to the Japanese Occupation era. Throughout the 
contemporary history, South Korean dictators framed that nuclear attack in 1945 liberated the country from 
the Japanese Empire. Thus, despite the fact that there were numerous Koreans victimised by the 1945 
autonomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Korean Government suppressed any political 
alternative discourses around this issue. The Government also dismissed alternative discourses around 
nuclear disarmament as anti-American political discourses (Lee, 2006). In the mid-2000s, the Korean 
Supreme Court announced the verdict that conscientious objection to the country’s military conscription is 
illegal under the Korean constitution. CR10 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) highlighted that his 
organisation works closely with conscientious objectors and identify ways in which this issue can “better 
appeal to a broad population in South Korea”.  
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society organisations, in particular organisations focusing on gender and peace-
related issues, became aware of the legacy of authoritarianism–a strong 
emphasis on hierarchy, militancy, division between in-group and out-group, 
enemy psychology and secrecy—which remains strong at all levels of society. 
Even civil society, which aimed to overcome this legacy, has subconsciously 
internalised attributes such as a firm hierarchy, highly charismatic leaders, and 
misunderstanding of non-violent peaceful activism in their operations (CR 2, 
personal interview, 26 January 2007). 
The conflict resolution practices were introduced to the country’s civil 
society when civil society activists contemplate their dilemmas of being unable 
to practice nonviolence and other democratic values they advocate. In an effort 
to overcome the legacy of authoritarianism, as well as an effort to bring new 
ideas into peace activism, a group of NGO activists decided to receive conflict 
resolution training. The training programmes were offered by a US-based NGO, 
which perceived the introduction of conflict resolution as a good opportunity to 
transform various social conflicts in South Korea (Feffer & Lee, 2000). For one-
and-a-half years, these NGO members attended a series of trainings and 
participated in capacity-building programmes. In the early 2000s, a pilot training 
programme was set up to train public school teachers and then expanded as a 
regular training programme for NGO members. In the last five years, conflict 
resolution practices have become one of the fastest growing trends in the 
country’s civil society and more NGOs have slowly integrated conflict resolution 
practices.  
Currently, conflict resolution practices in South Korea’s civil society are 
exercised in three different ways. Three case studies representing these three 
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categories will be introduced and discussed in detail. The first case is an 
organization incorporated into national peace advocacy organisations as part of 
its peace education and outreach programmes. Peace advocacy organisations 
represented by this case study have engaged in a wide variety of issues 
ranging from reunification, humanitarian assistance to North Korea, 
international peace solidarity action, Northeast Asian relations, war crimes in 
Vietnam, overcoming an authoritarian and colonial legacy, to peace museums, 
and the integration of North Korean defectors into South Korean society. The 
second case study discusses NGOs that integrated PCR practices into their 
operations and that are deeply inspired by the core principles such as problem-
solving underpinning community mediation and alternative dispute resolution 
systems. The third case study focuses on small community-based organisations 
working on violence prevention or inclusive community development. Similar to 
the first category, they utilise PCR methods in their operations to advocate 
particular community-related issues. Due to their limited resources and 
voluntary nature, these groups have selected PCR practices as their main 
programme focus. They use them as a key strategy to increase active 
participation of ordinary citizens in civil society space and to draw them into 
engaging in public discourses. 
In North America, there are numerous specialised NGOs promoting 
conflict resolution activities such as the Consensus Institute, the Search for 
Common Ground, and the Community Board. This represents a key difference 
to Korean organisations: PCR practices in South Korea are often adopted by 
multi-purpose hybrid organisations (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). South Korean 
civil society organisations currently engaged in PCR activities evolved from a 
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wide range of grassroots democratic oppositional movement groups. Almost all 
the NGOs registered in South Korea consider progressive social change and 
the pursuit of public goods as the most important mission of civil society (Lee et 
al., 2006). In the 1980s, these groups existed to mobilise the public through 
protests and information dissemination and the goal was to create greater 
democratic opposition movements. Yet, with the transition to democracy, 
instead of radical social movement strategies, the current multi-purpose hybrid 
NGOs utilise social and educational services and “adopt a mix of collectivist and 
bureaucratic elements for their internal organisational structure” (Hasenfeld & 
Gidron, 2005, p. 98).  
These multi-purpose hybrid organisations are advocacy-oriented groups, 
promoting particular policy changes. Conflict resolution practices are often part 
of their social change strategies and are routinely integrated into their activities. 
This was well reflected during the interview with CR 12 (2007) who articulated 
her motivation to integrate conflict resolution techniques into her advocacy work. 
CR 12 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) stated, “My work is primarily centred 
around advocacy on consumer rights. I have been engaged in conflict 
resolution because its techniques highly relevant in building our constituents’ 
capacity in effectively articulating their views in a constructive way.”  
These views are not unique to CR 12 (2007). In fact, civil society 
practitioners engaged in conflict resolution that the author met during the field 
work are working in organisations whose core mission is to bring about social 
change, whether their specific objectives are related to women, consumers, 
youth, or environment. In other words, rather than a desire for an immediate 
resolution to particular social problems, conflict resolution practices draw the 
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attention of South Korean civil society due to their strategic values to advance 
the civil society’s social change objective.  
Examining Three Case Study Organisations 
 This section introduces individual case study examples selected based 
upon two criteria: the first involved selecting existing networks providing conflict 
resolution practices for its constituents or raising awareness on subjects – 
where conflict resolution practices include a wide variety of activities ranging 
from skills trainings, mediation, and non-violence and peace education. Case 
study subjects were those who operate programmes or projects working on 
conflictual social issues that are problematic during democratic consolidation. 
The second was to embrace the principle of inclusiveness, as viewed for 
example as a willingness to encourage the participation of people with differing 
political viewpoints. The field research process informed the second criterion 
was partially fulfilled, as this research process was unable to verify whether 
conservative constituents were actively engaged in the third case study entity, a 
network of peace activists. 
 Individual case study examples illustrate how conflict resolution 
activities are manifested by different forms of organisations and practitioners. 
The first case study organisation is a grassroots association run by local 
citizens. This organisation chose conflict resolution techniques in order to enrich 
its outreach programmes to youth and parents. The second case study 
organisation is a pioneering organisation that was the first to introduce conflict 
resolution training programmes in the country; thus, conflict resolution is 
integrated into this organisation’s core mission. The third case study entity is a 
network of peace practitioners that can be divided into two ad-hoc committees. 
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Established to prepare a global meeting on conflict prevention and peace-
building and to promote regular interaction among peace activists, this case 
study illustrates how global civil society affects the norms, affects discussions 
and helps further advancement in the context of South Korean civil society’s 
awareness of peace-building and conflict prevention. 
 Each case study presents the following information. First, in order to 
contextualise their uniqueness as a case study sample, two themes will be 
introduced describing how each case study represents a certain type of peace 
and conflict resolution activism that emerged during the democratic 
consolidation process. For example, grassroots activism and education are 
highly novel phenomena in South Korean civil society, and the first case study 
entity represents how these two themes inform this organisation to adopt 
conflict resolution methodologies into their activities. Similarly, specialisation on 
conflict resolution and women’s inclusion in the peace processes are underlying 
themes of the second organisation, and help to understand better how these 
activities could emerge in the post-transition context. The third case study entity 
elaborates how peace activism is gaining momentum with the changing political 
context, and to what extent democratic consolidation has influenced peace 
activism in the country. Second, each case study introduces historical 
background information – when the organisation began and how their activities 
have gained momentum for recognition. Third, main activities undertaken by 
each case study organisation will be presented to help better understand how 
these organisations apply conflict resolution methodologies in their operations. 
Fourth, based upon interviewees’ input and media analysis, each case study 
presents positive contributions of their activities and their presence. Fifth, each 
 173 
173 
 
case study ends with specific challenges participants perceive regarding 
advancing a peace and conflict resolution agenda in the country, and highlights 
their critical reflection on the issues. 
Case Study 1: School Peace Making  
School Peace Making (School Peace), a community-based organisation, 
was founded in 2002 to raise awareness of school violence and to identify ways 
to prevent violence in both primary and secondary schools through local 
residents’ involvement. In addition to awareness-raising campaigns and 
advocacy activities about violence prevention in schools, this organisation 
provides peace-education programmes and conflict-resolution skills training to 
local residents and youth. This is done to strengthen their capacity to address 
the issue of violence. This organisation is one example of how local residents 
can apply peace and conflict-resolution practices to address community issues. 
Furthermore, School Peace illustrates how grassroots activism undertaken by a 
small-scale volunteer association can address one of the most important issues 
to South Koreans—education. 
Contextual overview of School Peace. 
Grassroots volunteer associations and activism in South Korea. As 
reviewed in Chapter 2, volunteer associations are regarded as being at the core 
of democratic citizenship because they serve as primary spaces for civic 
engagement and produce social capital, a vital element for fostering collective 
trust and a vibrant democratic civil society (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006; Putnam, 
1993). Scholars such as Lee (2005), inspired by Putnam’s social capital theory, 
have explained how South Korea’s strong emphasis on associations has 
contributed to the creation of an environment conducive to a strong civil society. 
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In fact, numerous social networks and neighbourhood volunteer associations 
have existed in the country throughout its history. According to the 1996 World 
Value Survey, 80 per cent of respondents indicated their membership in 
volunteer associations.  
Authoritarian leaders in the past, however, have taken advantage of 
South Korea’s strong associational life. Co-opted by political elites and tightly 
controlled by authoritarian governments, strong associations consisting of 
traditional social networks and other informal neighbourhood groups were being 
turned into government propaganda machines up until the mid 1980s (Moon, 
2002). As Moon (2002) explains, associational life in South Korea prior to the 
democratic transition was dominated by administered mass organisations25 
created by the government to implement the regime’s policies. For example, 
community-based organisations and traditional social networks in rural areas 
served as major intermediaries for institutionalising the message of the New 
Village Movement (cf. Chapter 4). These organisations and networks also 
called on community members to work hard, value self-sacrifice, and remain 
intensely loyal to the government (Han & Ling, 1998, p. 66).  
In this context, the country’s progressive forces were somewhat 
ambivalent about community-based civil-society organisations and their effects 
on the democratisation process (Ha, 2003). Specifically, due to these 
organisations’ general tendency to stay away from political and social issues, 
community-based groups were evaluated in terms of whether they would be 
                                                
25 In addition to implementing public policy, administered mass organisations drew their membership from 
entire categories of people, recruited their members in the absence of competing organisations, had their 
leaders appointed by regimes, and were focused on activities and goals determined by those regimes 
(Moon, 2002; Kaza, 1995).  
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able to mobilise grassroots populations and initiate public discourse around 
critical social and political issues.  
Like other social spaces, grassroots associations too were tightly 
controlled and managed by the regimes (Han & Ling, 1998). Therefore, as there 
was no grassroots autonomy in South Korea, scepticism about grassroots 
movements continued until the democratic transition. In the 1990s, with the 
restoration of municipality elections and increased local autonomy, a new era of 
grassroots politics began in South Korea. Institutional democratic procedures 
were introduced through regular local elections and the presence of a local 
assembly consisting of elected officials. As well, citizens were given a space in 
which they could voice concerns specifically related to their own reality (cf. 
Chapter 4). With this new change, grassroots organisations and community-
based associations were organised around a wide range of issues affecting 
community needs. According to Lee (2005), approximately 50 percent of civil-
society organisations established in the 1990s now operate outside of Seoul 
and focus specifically on regional issues. Furthermore, government funding, 
increased interest in voluntarism, and legislation support for non-governmental 
organisations have all contributed to the quantitative growth of community-
based organisations.  
In addition to grassroots organisations growing exponentially, activism 
and progressive agendas began to be integrated into these community-based 
organisations. With the increased opportunity to participate in municipal politics, 
large and influential national NGOs, such as the Korean Environment 
Federation Association, opened their regional branches in various small and 
medium-sized cities and rural towns around the country and mobilised the 
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grassroots population. These national advocacy organisations focused on 
issues of grassroots politics not only to broaden their political base but also to 
empower the grassroots population to participate effectively in regional political 
processes (Lee, 2005). This is in contrast to the focus of grassroots 
organisations during the authoritarian era. As indicated above, grassroots 
organisations in the past were strictly controlled by regimes, and thus most 
remained apolitical. In some cases, in order to prove their loyalty to the regimes, 
these community groups took very conservative views on various social and 
political issues. However, during democratisation in the 1990s, as Bystydzienski 
and Sekhon note, many grassroots organisations emerged ‘as a significant part 
of efforts to create and expand spaces for democratic decision making’ (1996, p. 
10). 
The rise of grassroots activism and enhanced civic participation at the 
local level has become a part of the democratic consolidation process. School 
Peace is part of this new phenomenon and is highly regarded as a model of a 
healthy grassroots movement and an ideal association (Beautiful Foundation, 
2007). It is a volunteer association with NGO status under South Korean law, 
and it embraces the ideal of grassroots activism—stimulating collective action at 
the community level for social change. As reviewed in the previous chapters, 
cutting-edge social and political issues have often been brought into South 
Korean society by civil-society organisations that are larger and more influential 
(cf. Chapter 4). Yet, as a small grassroots organisation, School Peace 
illustrates how peace and conflict-resolution activities can be utilised to address 
community issues. 
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Education and democratisation in South Korea. Education is one of 
the most important social rituals for South Koreans. For the first twenty years of 
life, the average South Korean spends most of his or her time in school and 
doing school-related activities. According to Doh’s (1992) nationwide survey on 
youth and their daily lives, more than 70 percent of adolescents indicated they 
spent an average of eleven hours in school and an estimated three hours doing 
activities related to schooling. Furthermore, according to the Korean 
Educational Development Institute (2010), over 95 percent of teenagers 
graduated from high school in 2009, and 83.8 percent of these students went 
on to university in 2010. This statistical data is particularly impressive when 
compared to past data on education. In the late 1940s, over 50 percent of the 
population was illiterate, and less than fourteen percent of people graduated 
from elementary schools. In the 1970s, only 42 percent of teenagers went to 
middle school, and seven percent of high school graduates went on to 
university. Development economists and political scientists such as Diamond 
(1994) and Fukuyama (1997) explain that the rapid expansion of educational 
opportunities combined with South Koreans’ obsession with education has 
become one of the most important factors influencing the country’s economic 
growth and democratic development. 
No other local issue is more important to South Koreans than education. 
However, despite its significance, educational space used to be strictly 
controlled by authoritarian regimes and no educational autonomy ever existed 
at the level of individual schools until 1987—the entire curriculum was 
centralised and all the textbooks used in public schools were controlled by the 
Ministry of Education (Seth, 2006). Authoritarian leaders justified the centralised 
 178 
178 
 
educational system as producing efficiency and effective anti-communism 
education. As Seth (2006) points out, education and public schools were 
primary instruments used by authoritarian regimes to control the population. As 
well, no democratic ideas were presented in schools. Thus, very limited 
opportunities existed for students to raise their concerns, and no space existed 
for parents to provide any input into their children’s school system. Any 
teachers or administrators who disagreed with the state’s control over education 
were met with harsh disciplinary measures, and students’ lives were closely 
monitored by teachers. As well, teachers suppressed violence and conflict in 
schools—corporal punishment was justified to control students’ violent 
behaviours. Thus, no constructive mechanism for conflict resolution between 
students was ever introduced to schools.  
With the democratic transition, greater autonomy was given to schools, 
but the authoritarian legacy continued to negatively affect the country’s 
education system. The School Governing Committee Act was introduced in 
1995 but did not take effect in most schools. In 1999, the Korean Teachers and 
Education Workers’ Union was recognised as a legitimate organisation and has 
been advocating for better working conditions and more autonomy for teachers 
as well as improvement to students’ learning environments and to the education 
system overall. In 2000, legislation was passed to strengthen the participation 
of the school governing committees, composed of teachers, administrators, and 
parents. Further, with this legalisation for the Korean Teachers and Education 
Workers’ Union, combined with the increased status of the school governing 
committee, grassroots activism that focused on education gained strength at 
the local and regional levels. For example, in 2005, public groups focusing on 
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education had fewer than 1,000 members, and many of these small NGOs were 
run by volunteers, not structured as professionalised organisations (Seth, 2006)   
In this regard, an organisation such as School Peace demonstrates how 
local politics can take up the cause of democratisation through peace education, 
conflict resolution, and violence prevention. This organisation can be 
understood as local citizens’ efforts to transform school culture as well as 
introduce practical democratic skills and qualities to students, teachers, and 
other stakeholders, such as parents.  
Descriptive overview of School Peace.  
Background.26  School Peace was established as an ad hoc citizen 
initiative in 2002 after a sixth grader in a neighbourhood public school 
committed suicide because of ongoing violent bullying from his classmates 
(Gwacheon News, 2001). Certainly, bullying is not a new phenomenon in South 
Korea. Like any society, incidents of school violence, including bullying, are 
common. Yet, it was widely perceived that school violence and bullying affected 
secondary school students and that teachers could have intervened with proper 
disciplinary measures. After this incident, community members in the 
neighbourhood began to realise that all students were being exposed to school 
violence, and questions were raised regarding how to address this issue (SP5, 
personal interview, 25 April 2007).  
This particular incident grew into a controversial social issue and was 
widely covered by mass media because of the teachers’ and school 
administrators’ lack of assistance for the student when he was alive. Despite 
                                                
26 While everyone’s interviews contributed to developing the historical context of School Peace, SP5’s 
narratives play a central role in constructing the historical background on School Peace. She has been 
engaged with the group since the beginning of School Peace and is frequently given invitations to speak 
about the organization from media and other civil society organisations engaging in violent prevention.  
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the victim’s appeals and the teachers’ knowledge of the situation, no specific 
action—such as disciplinary measures, counselling programmes, or meetings 
with the parents of the students who had committed the violence—had been 
taken (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). The victim had written a long 
report outlining his experience with school violence a few months before his 
death and was later diagnosed with serious depression. As well, even after the 
student’s death, no action was taken to address the issue. School 
administrators did not report the incident to the Ministry of Education, which 
instructs public schools to report such incidents for further investigation.  
One of the interviewees explained that it became apparent the 
leadership in the school was not equipped to prevent and intervene in school 
violence, and no procedures or systems were in place to handle the situation 
(SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). In response, the school’s governing 
body organised a meeting to facilitate conversations between teachers, 
administrators, the parents of the bullies, and the parents of the victim, but it 
ended without any resolution. In particular, the victim’s parents felt deeply hurt 
and extremely disappointed with the meeting (SP5, personal interview 25 April 
2007). For example, SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) described some of 
the discussions exchanged at the meeting.  
 
School administrators indicated they wished to move on, and appealed to the 
victim’s parents to forgive everyone involved in the situation as part of a 
Christmas gift to the school. It was winter and the school was preparing for a 
winter vacation. No apology or follow-up measures were ever offered by 
school officials or the parents of the perpetuators. This was very 
disappointing to all of us. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007)  
 
When the outcome of the meeting was report to the community, the lack 
of genuine effort to systematically look at school violence angered numerous 
parents (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). In an effort to introduce a 
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systematic response to school violence, in early 2002 a group of neighbourhood 
citizens organised an ad hoc initiative called the Gwacheon Citizens’ Meeting to 
End School Violence. At its inaugural meeting, the group issued a statement 
directed to the President’s Office, the Ministry of Education, and all the major 
newspapers around the country, calling for the introduction of systematic 
measures to prevent school violence. Specifically, the statement demanded that 
the government do the following: introduce legislation regarding school violence 
prevention, establish a committee on school violence prevention (consisting of 
parents, teachers, and child/adolescent psychologists), introduce a series of 
mandatory violence-prevention courses for violent students and their parents, 
and provide government-supported medical treatment for students suffering 
from bullying (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
In addition to a nationwide message, the group made demands that were 
more specific and locally based, such as asking the principal of the victim’s 
school ‘to resign from his post because of his failure to address this issue’ (SP3, 
personal interview, 30 April 2007). In order to achieve this goal, the group 
organised a series of awareness campaigns throughout the city of Gwacheon 
and sought support from local residents. With the campaign continuing in the 
local community and with nationwide media engagement, the group succeeded 
in raising awareness of the seriousness of school violence by drawing attention 
to this particular incident. The Korean media, including periodicals that tended 
to avoid covering political and social topics, reported on the case extensively.27 
                                                
27 SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) said to the author, ‘the incident was quite depressing. It even 
got an attention by Lady Trends (a women’s life style magazine equivalent to Marie Claire or the Vogue). 
With the momentum created by the campaign, we received many supportive messages from fellow 
mothers in the country”.  
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As a result, the principal of the elementary school was forced to resign.28 
Although School Peace’s initial activity had been in response to a specific issue 
affecting the community, the group grew into a grassroots advocacy movement.  
As School Peace’s campaign continued to attract community members’ 
attention, the group organised regular meetings to discuss ways to reduce 
school violence and identify specific tools or educational resources that could 
be offered to students, parents, teachers, youth workers, and other community 
members. SP5 (personal interview, 25 April 2007) explained that ‘this was not 
only helpful to maintain the organisation’s sustainability, but was also necessary 
to engage with diverse community members who may not have been 
comfortable with political and social action’. Educational activities and 
counselling services for parents and children affected by bullying and school 
violence were identified as being more practical and useful to community 
members than discussion forums that civil society in South Korea usually 
utilised (SP Members News Letter, Spring 2003). On a regular basis (bi-weekly 
or monthly, depending on the members’ other commitments and the availability 
of volunteer instructors), seminars and interactive workshops were held 
targeting both students and parents.  
In 2003, the initiative turned into an independent, non-for-profit entity 
registered with the Provincial Government of Kyungki in an effort to apply for 
government funding and maintain the organisation’s financial sustainability and 
qualitative growth (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). SP5 explained that 
registering the association with the provincial government was meant to provide 
a range of educational programmes to local residents.  
                                                
28 SP7 (personal interview, 30 April 2007) acknowledged that because of the campaign they had begun, 
conservative population and educators in the district perceived School Peace as a radical, antagonistic 
civil society group.  
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Other community organisations advised us that we should register as a non-
profit organisation. Initially, we were hesitant, as we wanted to maintain our 
voluntary-run organisational structure. Further, we did not want to deal with 
all the paperwork required. However, with the help of community members 
who are familiar with these procedures, we were able to register and began 
to apply for the government funding to maintain our core activities. Yet, we 
still receive our membership fee, but the government funding subsidises 
various educational programmes that we organise (Personal interview, 25 
April 2007). 
 
Since then, it has been offering various forms of conflict resolution and 
peace education workshops to community members—both youth and adults. 
SP4 (Personal interview, 23 April 2007), who provided the initial training, said 
that School Peace’s peace education and conflict-resolution skills training ‘is 
one of the first local-based regular conflict resolution training programmes’. In 
2005, the group was invited to provide conflict resolution and peace education 
classes to public schools in the city of Gwacheon. Such educational efforts 
continued in public schools during the 2007 school year, when the interviews for 
this research took place.  
Main Activities.29  School Peace has been offering three main services 
to its members and community constituents: youth education, parent/adult 
education, and advocacy. 
Youth education. School Peace regularly offers a wide variety of extra-
curricular educational programmes for students aged from seven to fifteen 
years old. Through collaboration with other grassroots organisations, local 
municipalities, and national NGOs, its education programmes help young 
students become familiar with conflicts in their lives and find constructive ways 
to resolve them.  
                                                
29 Main activities are identified based upon its internal reports and newsletters. For more information, 
please see Annex 4.  
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These educational programmes are divided into two categories: peace 
education30 (human rights, conflict resolution, and peaceful coexistence) and 
self-esteem improvement (creative writing, art therapy, music therapy, and so 
forth). Conflict resolution and peace-education programmes were first offered in 
2003, in the very early stage of conflict-resolution education in South Korea. Its 
youth-educational programmes are usually offered during the weekend and 
school holidays—both summer and winter—and recruit young students from the 
community. Since 2005, School Peace and its volunteer teachers have been 
invited to local primary and secondary schools to provide a weekly peace-
education workshop throughout the semester. 
School Peace offers peace-education programmes to youth with a view 
of providing students with knowledge, attitudes, and skills for addressing the 
conflict that they experience daily in their school lives. The main content of 
these programmes is borrowed from conflict-resolution education programmes 
used widely in North American public schools, the aim of which is to enhance 
students’ capacity for conflict resolution and democratic citizenship. Conflict-
resolution education is being widely offered at public schools in North America 
in an effort to strengthen students’ perception of democratic citizenship as well 
as reduce school violence (Bickmore, 2001). As Bickmore (2001) summarises, 
in North America conflict-resolution education is introduced into public school 
systems with an expectation of providing a set of skills beneficial to students’ 
                                                
30 Harris (2004, p. 6) defines peace education as educational activities ‘teaching about peace: what it is, 
why it does not exist and how to active it’. By Harris’ definition, peace education includes teaching about 
the challenges of achieving peace, developing non-violent skills, and promoting peaceful attitudes. 
Conflict-resolution education is a sub-category of peace education and is defined as educational activities 
that ‘model and teach, in culturally meaningful ways, a variety of processes, practices and skills that help 
address individual, interpersonal, and institutional conflicts, and create safe and welcoming communities’ 
(Jones, 2004, p. 233-234). When examining the case study organisation, the definitional boundaries 
between peace education and conflict-resolution education were rather unclear and used interchangeably. 
While they used the term ‘peace education’, their educational purposes and activities were more closely 
aligned with conflict-resolution education. Thus, in this dissertation, when introducing this case study entity, 
both peace education and conflict-resolution education are used interchangeably.  
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democratic citizenship, such as the ability to listen respectfully to alternative 
viewpoints, analyse problems, identify solutions, and participate in collective 
decision making. In so doing, as Hedeen contends, conflict-resolution education 
‘empowers students to exercise their own self-determination and respect’ and 
contributes to creating safe and welcoming communities (2005, p. 186). 
School Peace offers peace and conflict-resolution educational 
programmes based upon the assumption that nonviolent conflict-resolution 
skills and an enhanced understanding of differences will help students engage 
constructively with peers whom they may perceive to be different. SP5 
highlighted that School Peace’s education programmes emphasise on the 
importance of accepting and acknowledging difference because of the value of 
conformity that the Korean school culture values. She continued,  
Our education programmes provides students with an opportunity to reflect 
how young people’s fear and intolerance of difference could turn into 
discrimination and end up hurting other people. We try to help our youth 
better embrace diversity (Personal interview, 25 April 2007).  
 
Table 2 shows the two sample curricula of peace-education 
programmes that School Peace offers to students. They illustrate what aspects 
of PCR are emphasised in School Peace’s education approach. 
Table 2: School Peace Youth Education Curricula 
 
 Curriculum (I) Curriculum (II) 
Title Hello Kids, Let’s Play with Peace Human Rights, Violence Prevention and 
Conflict Resolution 
Target Elementary school students aged from 
10 to 12 
Secondary school students aged from 13 
to 15 
Recruitment Advertisement; School Invitation; and 
Local Community Groups 
Local Municipalities’ Volunteer 
Programmes; School Invitation; and 
Community Groups  
Group Size 15-20 students 15-20 students 
Time 
Commitment 
8 hours  
(one-and-a-half hour per session) 
20 hours 
(two hour per session, plus street 
campaign and survey) 
Course 
Overview 
This workshop aims to raise children’s 
awareness around various issues 
related to peace and conflict. In 
particular, it aims to help children 
This workshop aims to enhance 
students’ understanding of human rights 
and school violence, and helps them 
better understand ways to resolve 
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better manage various types of conflict 
they may experience with their peers. 
It also teaches young students to 
manage conflict in their daily lives in a 
peaceful way by strengthening their 
decision-making skills and democratic 
group communications techniques. 
violent conflicts students are exposed to 
during their school lives. By teaching 
political organising and interpersonal 
conflict resolution skills, this course helps 
students be active participants to 
prevent school violence. 
Detailed 
Content  
§ Understanding Peace &Conflict;  
§ Understanding Difference& 
Discrimination 
§ Understanding School Violence;  
§ Decision Making Process in a Group 
Setting;  
§ Nonviolent Conflict Resolution 
Communication Skills; 
§ Understanding Human Rights – Street 
Survey with Youth on Human Rights  
§ Human Rights and Youth – 
Responsibilities and Rights and 
Human Rights Instruments  
§ Human Rights Violation in Schools 
through Case Studies  
§ School Violence – Types of School 
Violence / Scenario-Based Role Play  
§ Understanding Difference and 
Embracing Diversity 
§ Alternative for School Violence  
§ Peer Mediation and Nonviolent 
Communications 
§ Effective Decision Making 
§ Organising Campaign for Violence 
Prevention and Human Rights – 
Poster Making 
§ Street Campaign  
Teaching 
Method 
Role Play; Scenario; Games; and Group 
Activities 
Lecture; Role Play; Scenario; Group 
Activities; Street Surveys; Street 
Campaigns 
 
As seen in Table 2, ‘Hello Kids, Let’s Play with Peace’ is an introductory 
educational programme for students between ten and twelve years old and 
integrates basic elements of peace and conflict-resolution education. In 
promoting the programme, the Hello Kids curriculum makes specific reference 
to the fact that nonviolent conflict-resolution skills are closely related to the 
democratic decision-making capacity of students. This eight-hour course has 
been offered to a wide range of students, but volunteer teachers such as SP2 
emphasised during the interview that this amount of time is insufficient for 
creating the desired outcome.  
 
Our primary dilemma is having such a limited amount of time to share a 
range of information to our students. We are teaching values, processes, and 
skills that require more than cognitive understanding and memorisation. Yet, 
schools to which we are invited expect us to deliver a comprehensive 
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programme with immediate results. We think of these educational 
programmes as an opportunity for students to become familiar with conflict 
resolution concepts. (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
To make all these concepts more accessible to students, Hello Kids 
utilises a great number of interactive teaching methods involving role play, 
games, and various group activities. Students are recruited through general 
advertisement, outreach to local community groups, and invitation by 
neighbourhood elementary schools. 
Compared to the education programme for elementary students, the 
conflict-resolution programme targeting secondary-school students approaches 
this subject by emphasising human rights. School violence and violent 
interpersonal conflicts in public schools are contextualised as a form of human 
rights violation and a denial of individual rights and dignity. Students also learn 
different conflict-resolution techniques as alternatives to violence in times of 
disagreement with peers. They are also asked to become active advocates of 
conflict resolution and violence prevention through awareness campaigns.  
In the absence of a systematic approach to peer mediation and conflict-
resolution mechanisms in secondary schools, SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 
2007) argued that their educational programme offers “a hands-on opportunity 
for students through street surveys and campaigns”. Students are invited to 
participate in the street survey in order to collect information about their peers’ 
perceptions of human rights and youth and to organise a campaign advocating 
violence prevention, human rights, and conflict resolution. Campaign processes 
teach students the necessary skills for organising awareness campaign, 
including developing a campaign theme, creating campaign posters, and 
reaching out to local community members in their neighbourhood.  
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Given the amount of the extra time that secondary-school students 
spend on studying for exams, the author was curious about ways in which 
School Peace recruits students. In response, SP3 answered,   
We recruit youth through community groups working with young people. We 
also make general advertisements through local newspapers and posters on 
the street. We contact local municipalities’ youth volunteer programmes to 
recruit the students. Local municipalities were great places because students’ 
participation with our programme can be counted as a volunteer activity for 
them. By promoting human rights and violence prevention in local 
communities, these students can earn necessary credits for volunteerism, 
which many universities include in their evaluation during the entrance exam.  
(Personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
 
School Peace’s youth-education programme is a community-driven 
movement run by volunteers, interested NGOs and civil society practitioners, 
and educators (mostly counsellors and art therapists). As it is a community 
movement, its educational programme lacks a systematic mechanism to 
analyse the effect of its educational activities on young students or on a local 
community. In the absence of analytical capacity, School Peace reaches out to 
other organisations with more experience and invites practitioners and 
educators to develop their own educational programmes. It also meets regularly 
to reflect on volunteer teachers’ engagement with youth and on how School 
Peace can improve its teaching. Interviewees such as SP5 (Personal interview, 
25 April 2007) emphasised such specialised activities, noting however that a 
systematic analysis of its effects are rather unrealistic and are beyond its 
mandate and capacity. 
Parent and adult education. During the field research, parent and adult 
education was discussed by interviewees who were participants of School 
Peace’s parent and adult educational programmes. The importance of parental 
education about children’s educational and behavioural outcomes has been 
confirmed by numerous studies (Dubow et al., 2009). In the context of conflict 
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resolution, Ross (2007) notes that parents’ experience with conflict-resolution 
training has a positive effect on their children’s ability to constructively handle 
conflict because parents are able to model good behaviours and offer feedback 
that is more constructive to children experiencing interpersonal conflict. 
Similarly, School Peace emphasises the importance of parents and 
adults in the local community for promoting conflict-resolution values to young 
students. It also emphasises their effective intervention in violence-related 
conflicts that their children may experience in schools. SP5 highlighted the 
value of adult education:  
 
Adults’ heightened awareness of conflict resolution is particularly important 
because we are often unable to intervene in conflict situations our children 
are exposed to. When we grew up, we were taught by our parents to 
suppress such disharmony, and the conflictual situations we created were 
met with strict disciplinary measures embedded in traditional Korean 
parenting discourses. Unfortunately, that does not work with our current 
reality. A prime example is the 2002 incident of school violence that led to the 
death of a student. Our old parenting styles were limited to address the issue. 
In the absence of knowledge, and skills, our efforts to address school 
violence ended in failure—all those involved felt very hurt and dissatisfied 
with the outcomes. (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
School Peace holds the view that adults’ enhanced knowledge of 
constructive ways to resolve conflict is helpful for advocating the systematic 
integration of approaches to school violence that are more constructive. School 
Peace’s adult education programmes are offered to local community members 
through regular seminars and workshops. These educational programmes 
transfer useful knowledge to adults interested in proactively engaging in the 
issue of school violence and provide them with volunteering opportunities to 
engage with students and local community members. Specifically, all of School 
Peace’s adult educational programmes focus on practical skills and knowledge 
that can be easily applied to one’s daily life. Its educational programmes are 
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divided into two broad categories: the training of conflict-resolution skills and 
parenting education. Table 3 shows sample descriptions of the two workshops. 
Table 3: School Peace Adult Education Workshops 
 
 Curriculum (I) Curriculum (II)  
Title Workshop for Trainers of Conflict 
Resolution Skills and Peace 
Education 
Parents’ Education 
Target School Peace adult members;  
local community members  
School Peace adult members;  
local community members  
Size No more than 30 people  No more than 30 people 
Commitment 54 hours (three hours per session)  42 hours (three hours per session)  
Overview This workshop helps attendees better 
understand different types of conflict 
in our lives and ways to 
constructively manage various 
conflicts. Specifically, the workshop 
will introduce conflict resolution 
theories and teach different 
techniques that can be applicable to 
conflict situations. Upon successful 
completion of this workshop, 
participants are invited to participate 
in volunteering for school violence 
prevention education programmes 
School Peace offers to local public 
schools. 
This workshop helps to enhance 
parents’ understanding of their 
children by reviewing various 
developmental stages. Furthermore, it 
provides a wide range of techniques 
that can be used to improve parents’ 
relationship with their children as well 
as enhance the effectiveness of 
parenting.  
Content § Peaceful Resolution of Conflict 
§ Understanding Conflict Resolution 
§ Patterns of Conflict and Conflict 
Analysis  
§ Basic Techniques for Peaceful 
Conflict Resolution  
§ Nonviolent Communications 
§ Problem Solving 
§ Anger Management  
§ Prejudice Management and 
Respecting Difference  
§ Conflict Resolution & Mediation: 
Theories and Practice  
§ School Violence and Peace 
Education 
§ Curriculum Development and 
Practice 
• Self-Reflection 
• Parenting Skills for Children’s 
Development 
• Understanding Children with 
Children’s Life Cycle 
• Understanding Parent-Children 
Boundaries  
• Respecting Children as 
Independent Individuals 
• Understanding Children’s 
Emotions 
• Expressing Emotions and 
Supporting Children’s Emotional 
Development 
• Understanding Adolescent Culture 
• Communication Techniques for 
Dialogue 
• Methods for Stress Reduction 
Coming from Parenting  
Teaching 
Methods  
Lecture, Role Play, Group Activities; 
Scenarios; and Practicum 
Lecture and Group Activities  
 
School Peace’s workshop on parenting skills was one of the first 
programmes offered to its members and local residents. This workshop brought 
in a range of experts in the field of counselling and child development 
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psychology and focused on improving the individual parent-child relationship. 
Based upon traditional pedagogy, this workshop was delivered to participants 
through lecture and a few group activities.  
A qualitative change in School Peace’s adult education occurred in 2004 
when peace and conflict-resolution education programmes were introduced. As 
the field of conflict resolution was extremely new in 2004, NGO practitioners 
from two national NGOs focusing on conflict resolution (The Korea Anabaptist 
Centre and the WMP-CR Centre) led the workshops. During the interviews, 
SP4 (Personal interview, 23 April 2007) shared how he came to lead the 
workshop.  
I was looking for an opportunity to share the value of conflict resolution skills 
with ordinary Koreans that may not be frequently exposed to civil society 
activism. We reached out to School Peace, hoping that engaging with its 
constituents would help us further integrate conflict resolution practices into 
grassroots communities. (SP4, personal interview, 23 April 2007) 
 
I met SP4 at a conference on school violence. I learned about the conflict 
resolution training, and asked whether they would be able to come to our 
neighbourhood. I thought that this would be of great interest to our members, 
and we were interested in new, practical ways to address our challenges. 
(SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
School Peace, which was searching for more pragmatic methods to 
address school violence, initially framed this workshop as a capacity-building 
exercise regarding communications skills. Later, with increased interest in 
School Peace’s youth education programme, the conflict-resolution training 
programme, which prepares participants to be school volunteers, became a 
regular workshop. The four interviewees (SP2, SP3, SP6, and SP7), whom the 
author met during field research, began to engage with School Peace after they 
participated in the conflict-resolution training programme.  
Because of this, the integration of PCR into its core activities has greatly 
contributed to strengthening the organisation’s sustainability and effect. 
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However, similar to the youth education programme, there is lack of systematic 
information regarding the effects of these educational activities on participants. 
Furthermore, while a majority of its teaching content includes macro and 
systematic perspectives, its outreach materials put great emphasis on the inter-
personal dynamics of conflict resolution as well as on parenting skills. 
Regarding this, SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) said,  
 
We feel a great need to enrich our curriculum and better reconcile 
interpersonal communication skills and conflict resolution skills that are more 
systematic and community oriented. But, we do not necessarily make our 
training too politicised or heavy in social conflicts. We want our community 
members to find this training relevant to their life. This is something we 
continue to reflect upon. 
 
Advocacy and community outreach. Initially, School Peace began as an 
ad hoc grassroots advocacy group for addressing specific issues related to 
school violence. While a majority of its current activities are closely related to 
education, School Peace continuously engages in public advocacy work in an 
effort to raise local community members’ awareness of school violence and the 
need for holistic ways to address the issue in the public school system. A case 
in point has been a series of campaigns calling for the revision of the 2004 
Special Law on School Violence. School Peace, in solidarity with other national 
education NGOs, cautioned against the 2004 Special Law on School Violence 
because the law failed to address the importance of both prevention and 
proactive measures for addressing school violence (Hahn, 2006)   
In addition to rather politicised public advocacy, in an effort to expand a 
pool of its supporters, School Peace also organises easily accessible outreach 
activities to raise awareness about peace, conflict resolution, and violence 
prevention. Together with its youth participants, it holds regular human rights 
and peace education campaigns in the neighbourhood. For instance, every 
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September, School Peace organises an annual event in honour of the 
International Day of Peace, and in October, on Apple Day, it holds a day-long 
street performance event, a special day designated to providing students with 
an opportunity to apologise for acts of violence directed at their peers (in 
Korean, ‘apple’ and ‘apology’ have the same sound and spelling). 
As previously mentioned, School Peace’s public advocacy campaign in 
the early 2000s was considered highly effective. Nonetheless, due to this work, 
School Peace is often perceived as a progressive grassroots organisation by 
local constituents, an image that has somewhat deterred conservative 
constituents from joining its activities (SP7, Personal interview, 30 April 2007).  
Analytical overview of School Peace.  
  Interviews and observation. As a small grassroots volunteer 
association, School Peace is operated by one full-time staff and numerous 
volunteer members who actively participate in the running of School Peace’s 
three main activities. Because this organisation is a community-based group 
focusing on education and school violence, an overwhelming majority of its 
members (including a staff member and active volunteers) are female. These 
adult females, between twenty and 40 years old, are highly educated and tend 
to be middle class. Many of them have children attending neighbourhood 
schools, and a majority have chosen to become full-time homemakers or have 
decided on a flexible part-time work arrangement for childrearing purposes. The 
high representation of females in grassroots organisations is not surprising, 
given the gender segregation commonly observed in all aspects of public and 
private life in South Korea. 
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While prominent periodicals such as the Economist and Atlantic Weekly 
celebrate the increasing gender equality in South Korea since democratisation, 
traditional gender roles continue to define South Koreans’ daily lives and 
heavily affect social discourses about women’s participation in the public space. 
Certainly, there is no exception when it comes to women in activism and 
progressive civil society. As Khor (1999, p. 648) articulates, the cultural 
acceptance of gender roles validates social discourse on the unique 
perspective of women that is more useful and effective in addressing activities 
undertaken “within culturally prescribed women’s spheres such as marriage, 
family, children, school, the elderly, health, peace/anti-war and ecology”. In 
addition, Moon (2002, p. 490) notes that South Korean civil society 
organisations engaging at the grassroots level often address less controversial 
matters, such as education, consumer rights, childcare, and the environment, in 
order to reach out to a diverse group of community members, a majority of 
whom tend to be conservative politically and socially. In this context, School 
Peace’s higher female membership reflects the accepted socio-political 
discourse, which emphasises that women’s areas of expertise are education, 
child development, and peaceful inter-personal and community relationships. 
Therefore, female adults feel more comfortable voicing their concerns within 
these ‘women’s spheres’ (Khor, 1999).  
Except for one interviewee, all of those whom the researcher met for the 
School Peace case study were females in their 30s and 40s. Although their age 
group represents the most politically conscious group in South Korea, only one 
interviewee—a professional non-governmental practitioner—was actively 
engaged in the democratisation process. The rest of them were sympathetic to 
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the cause of the democratic transition but did not consider themselves 
democratic activists. Altogether, seven interviews were conducted in order to 
understand School Peace: two of the interviewees provided skills-training 
workshops to School Peace members, and five others directly engaged in 
School Peace’s daily activities.  
The workshop trainers’ perspectives were used in order to understand 
how these programmes were introduced to School Peace and what changes 
the trainers had observed during their interactions with School Peace members 
in the last five years (2003-7). Interviews with five active School Peace 
members were conducted to understand how they define opportunities and 
challenges to integrating their peace and conflict-resolution practices into their 
volunteering and interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, interview transcripts 
from these meetings helped to identify how participants frame the elements of 
PCR that are incorporated into School Peace’s programme and how they apply 
them to the broader context of democracy. Unlike the interviewees from the 
other two case studies, the individuals who participated in this study had less 
experience with professional political organising and non-governmental affairs. 
This lack of a political background is reflected in School Peace’s semi-formal 
and voluntary structure. 
No observation was made regarding specific educational initiatives, but 
there were opportunities to visit School Peace’s office and attend social 
gatherings. These visits allowed the researcher to understand how firmly the 
organisation is rooted in the local community. Its office is located next to 
residential areas where a majority of members reside, and its social gatherings 
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are rather informal and less hierarchical within South Korean cultural and social 
boundaries. 
Motivation. The interviewees engaged in School Peace expressed two 
primary motivations regarding their engagement with the organisation’s peace 
and conflict-resolution activities: the integration of conflict resolution into 
grassroots activism for cultural transformation and an expectation of enhanced 
capacity for nonviolent conflict resolution.  
The trainers tend to have a great amount of strategic motivation for 
engaging with School Peace, specifically promoting nonviolent conflict 
resolution and peace in local communities.  
 
Shifting our violent patterns of engaging difference by spreading the culture 
of PCR was one of the primary purposes that interest me in peace and 
conflict resolution. When we learned about School Peace, we were looking 
for an opportunity to spread our conflict resolution programmes to ordinary 
citizens. School Peace’s constituents seem perfect for our programmes. (SP4, 
personal interview, 23 April 2007)  
 
Activism targets politically conscious populations. Often, we do not engage 
with housewives (homemakers). Thus, going to a suburban neighbourhood 
and reaching out to housewives actively engaged in School Peace was 
thought to be an excellent opportunity to connect with ordinary citizens who 
are less exposed to civil society activism (SP1, personal interview, 23 April 
2007).  
 
These interviewees’ motivations are in line with the mission of the 
organisations to which they belong. Both of them work for organisations that 
aim to use conflict-resolution practices to transform the violent culture ingrained 
in the Korean society as a result of its historical legacy.  
On the other hand, interviewees who are active members of School 
Peace have a greater amount of practical motivation closely related to their 
personal lives. Five interviewees (SP2; SP3; SP5; SP6; SP7) explained that 
their personal experiences with their children or their own interpersonal conflicts 
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have motivated them to take part in conflict-resolution skills training. With an 
enhanced understanding of the main concepts of peace and conflict resolution, 
they see a need to be involved in the organisation and to make a voluntary 
commitment to advocate the core messages of School Peace. The narrative of 
SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) summarised these sentiments well.  
 
I had very difficult time resolving my differences with my son in a constructive 
manner. I always yelled at him and felt disempowered. One day, I saw this 
poster in the bulletin, and thought that the training can help me interact better 
with my family members including my children. I wanted to try although I was 
not sure whether this would work. I am very glad that I bothered to make a 
call to SP4 to inquire about the training.  
 
The community members’ motivations are particularly illustrative of the 
value of peace and conflict-resolution practices when engaging with ordinary 
South Koreans who are often excluded from the civil society movement. 
Echoing Moon’s (2002) analysis, homemakers in South Korea had been 
portrayed in two different ways. A positive image is given to the mothers of 
activists who provided moral support to the civil society movement. On the other 
hand, homemakers are thought of as being apolitical or as having political 
opinions identical to those of their husbands. Thus, their roles have often been 
discounted within civil society activist discourses, including by women’s’ 
organisations who work closely with women employed outside of the domestic 
sphere.  
Reflections on positive aspects of engaging with School Peace. 
There are two positive contributions that the interviewees highlighted regarding 
their engagement in the activities offered by School Peace: first, a 
strengthening of community participation and, second, an enhancement of 
individuals’ awareness of conflict and its nonviolent resolution and of their 
enhanced capacity for conflict resolution. 
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Attracting local populations to politics: In the last five years, a number of 
national periodicals have published articles introducing the work of School 
Peace, highlighting the important role that voluntary grassroots associations 
can play in raising awareness of community-related issues (Kim, 2006; Jeong, 
2007; Naeil, 2009). Among progressive civil society advocates, School Peace 
serves as an ideal model of a healthy grassroots movement because it is run by 
local residents and addresses issues important to all community members.  
Established in 2002, School Peace has been active for the last eight 
years and has successfully mobilised community members, specifically female 
residents. Informality, volunteerism, and a community-centred approach have 
contributed to motivating ordinary citizens to engage with School Peace. This is 
nicely expressed by an interviewee explaining the composition of its 
membership and noting that the high representation of female residents with 
children played a significant role in motivating her to participate in School Peace. 
The following quote illustrates the interviewee’s perspective on this aspect of 
School Peace:  
 
Although the issue of conflict resolution and peace education is new and sounds 
difficult, it was rather easy for me to get involved in the organisation as all those 
who participate in the training share common challenges and found this issue 
useful to address our own problems. Although I was not comfortable speaking to 
people about the issue we advocate, the fact that this group has so many 
mothers like me gave me confidence and motivation to continue to be involved. 
(SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
 
Conflict-resolution training practices are considered particularly 
useful when reaching out to local residents because School Peace frames 
such training as an opportunity to empower residents and effectively 
address various interpersonal conflicts to which they are exposed. By 
illustrating the positive aspect of conflict resolution—as a method for 
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learning good parenting skills—School Peace provides ordinary citizens, 
many of whom would not usually participate in advocacy organisations, 
with an opportunity to engage in grassroots civil society. An interviewee 
summarised this point:  
 
I was never politically active. But I experienced interpersonal conflict with my 
family members and my child and I had difficulty in communicating as he got 
older. When the conflict resolution training programme was announced, I thought 
that this could help my own personal problem. After completing the programme, I 
found this extremely useful, and wanted to bring this to my child and his friends. 
Since then, I have been participating in some of the activities as a member. (SP2, 
personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
Specifically, interviewees appreciated the opportunity to volunteer at 
public schools because it allowed them to use, in their own communities, 
the knowledge and skills gained through conflict-resolution education. 
Furthermore, through conflict resolution, School Peace identified ways to 
address specific community problems in a less confrontational manner and 
reached out to more people (Hah, 2006). For example, to be invited by 
local public schools, members of School Peace first need to establish 
contacts and engage with different parent groups, school governing 
committees, and school administrators. Through this process, SP2 
(Personal interview, 25 April 2007) explained that she became familiar with 
skilful ways to articulate the importance of bringing PCR education to the 
public school system in order to communicate with those who would not 
otherwise be interested in this subject.  
Enhanced awareness of conflict and capacity for its peaceful resolution: 
Interviewees found their experiences with peace and conflict-resolution 
education positive and useful because they were able to better understand 
basic concepts of conflict and conflict resolution. The increased awareness 
 200 
200 
 
helped them reflect more clearly on their inability to address their daily 
interpersonal conflicts. One interviewee recalled her experience of confronting 
her desire to resolve conflicts without listening to others:  
 
I instructed my children, husband, and friends to do certain things in times of 
conflict. I desired to solve conflict on my terms and ignore what others 
needed to say. I did not fully realise how much I internalised negative ways of 
addressing conflict. (SP6, personal interview, 30 April 2007)  
 
In addition to conflict-resolution education, interviewees emphasised the 
importance of an opportunity to participate as instructors in peace and conflict-
resolution education programmes for youth; it helped them understand young 
people’s perspectives on conflict and violence. An interviewee recounted the 
positive effect of her new knowledge on her own child’s perspective regarding 
violent ways of resolving conflict: 
 
 After I attended the conflict resolution education, I changed my ways of 
communication with my child. I used to say, ‘do this’, ‘listen to what I said’ to my 
daughter. After the training, I have improved my ability to ask a question about 
what she wants, in times of our disagreement. This has certainly helped improve 
our relationship. In addition, I found that my changed communication styles 
altered my child’s behaviour. Before, she was hesitant to articulate her viewpoints 
and expressed frustration with anger. But, now, a year after my initial attempt, my 
daughter has learned to elaborate her views and ask what others think about. I 
feel my engagement with School Peace had a small effect in my life. (SP2, 
personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
As interviewees had positive experiences in School Peace’s conflict-
resolution programme, they began to appreciate the opportunity to teach peace 
and conflict-resolution concepts to young students. The interviewees explained 
that their peace and conflict-resolution programme provides young students 
with an insight into conflict, violence, and its resolution. However, they 
acknowledged that the current youth education programme, given its ad hoc 
approach, is not effective enough to expect any visible behavioural changes.  
Challenges. As much as the interviewees highly appreciated their 
activities and the accomplishments of their organisation, they indicated a wide 
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range of aspects that needed improvement. There are three specific aspects 
that they found kept them from making greater contributions to their local 
community: a misunderstanding of peace education in the community, conflict 
resolution and grassroots activism; a lack of interest in the issue among 
teachers and school administrators; and a lack of opportunity to provide 
programmes that are more systematic to students. 
Misunderstanding PCR and grassroots activism: Two types of 
misunderstanding regarding PCR programmes made the interviewees initially 
hesitant to join the organisation: 1) a lack of visible change after taking the 
courses and 2) a difficulty understanding the notion of peace education and 
conflict resolution. 
Firstly, when asked how the interviewees shared their experience of 
engaging with the organisation, all of them indicated they had difficulty talking 
with their friends and family members about their participation in the workshop. 
Particularly, they were afraid of letting people know they were trying to improve 
their awareness of conflict and to enhance their constructive conflict-resolution 
skills. This is because they were concerned about a lack of visible change. An 
interviewee recollected her memory of the early days:  
 
 One of the books that I had to read was Nonviolent Communications, but I 
was so afraid that other family members would notice. So I wrapped the 
book with newspapers. I was particularly concerned as I felt no change in 
my attitudes toward my family and friends, and I was afraid that they would 
judge me and the subject I study. (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
 
Such concern stems from a lack of understanding of conflict resolution—
many thought it would be easily integrated into their daily lives without 
continued practice. Furthermore, they did not fully understand how much they 
had been affected by South Korea’s authoritarian legacy, which discourages 
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constructive ways of resolving differences and contentions. SP5 (Personal 
interview, 25 April 2007) reflected on her lack of awareness of the impact of the 
country’s history and culture on her ways of dealing with violence, saying that 
‘until I was given an opportunity to reflect, I did not fully understand the extent in 
which I was affected by the general pattern of conflict resolution in our society’.  
Secondly, when peace education or conflict-resolution programmes were 
introduced to others outside of the organisation, people had difficulty 
understanding the concept. An interviewee recollected the early days when she 
saw the term ‘peace education’ and ‘conflict resolution’ on a flyer recruiting 
participants for the training programme:  
I thought that peace meant world PCR was for those who engaged in serious 
violent conflict in Africa. Thus, I was not sure why the organiser said that this 
was relevant to solving problems in our daily lives. (SP2, personal interview, 
25 April 2007) 
 
Interviewees found this aspect particularly challenging when explaining 
the notion of PCR to younger students. Due to such a difficulty, out of the 30 
community members who complete the conflict-resolution training, an average 
of three participants become active supporters and volunteer instructors for 
children and students (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007). Trainers who 
introduced the peace and conflict-resolution practices to School Peace noted 
that such a difficulty is closely related to the issue of translation:  
 
When we first customised our training modules to School Peace, we worked 
hard to translate all the key concepts into Korean. All these concepts were very 
new, and it is extremely challenging to find corresponding words. It was difficult 
to differentiate macro-conflict from interpersonal and community conflicts. We 
would have had a hard time describing the Conflict Layer Model if they had not 
named it as the ‘Onion Model.’  This is just one example. To explain each 
concept, we developed a series of scenarios and examples based upon Korean 
contexts. Yet, our examples are primarily targeted to those who are working; 
thus, we had to spend a long time thinking about the situations that housewives 
would be exposed to. (SP1, personal interview, 23 April 2007)  
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When first introducing peace education to school principals and 
administrators, the trainers were confronted with ambivalence to the term 
because principals thought peace education was an anti-capitalist education 
programme put forward by radicals criticising South Korea. SP6 (Personal 
interview, 30 April 2007) recalled her conversation with a school official who told 
School Peace that their ‘school does not need peace education as I often 
emphasise the importance of anti-communism in my weekly meetings with 
students’. In South Korea, as Kim (2005) recalls, peace education has long 
been regarded as synonymous with anti-communist education. Thus, any 
alternatives to this anti-communist education can be understood as anti-
government and pro-communist ideas advocated by the progressive and radical 
segments of society.  
Lack of cultural foundation for conflict resolution: In addition to the 
difficulty of explaining the notion of conflict resolution and peace education, 
interviewees lamented the lack of cultural foundation for fostering conflict 
resolution and peaceful ways of managing differences. All of the interviewees 
grew up during the reign of authoritarian regimes, and five out of seven 
interviewees were exposed to student activism during their time in university. 
Except for one interviewee, SP4, all of them commented on this historical 
legacy and how it affected their ways of looking at differences between people 
and at the behaviours used to solve such conflict situations. An interviewee 
stated,   
The environment I grew up in was highly militant and suppressed differences; I 
was not exposed to peaceful resolution of conflict in my daily lives. It took a 
while for me to fully understand how I could explain easily to my children the 
notion of peaceful coexistence and constructive ways of solving problems. (SP5, 
personal interview, 25 April 2007)  
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In addition to the authoritarian tendency, SP2 (Personal interview, 25 
April 2007) noted the cultural tradition regarding how to look at conflict and its 
management. Particularly, interviewees indicated the practical difficulty of 
applying conflict resolution skills to family or close friends, where there is a clear 
hierarchy. One interviewee said,  
 
I don’t think other family members who are older than me feel any difference 
about my change. As you know, in (South) Korea, we cannot argue with others 
and explore our common interest because such communication styles could be 
perceived to be extremely rude by the elderly. (SP2, personal interview, 25 
April 2007)  
 
Similarly, SP3 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) expressed her 
dilemma in helping her children apply conflict-resolution practices and peer 
mediation to a Korean school culture, where there is a hierarchy even between 
students in different age groups. When her child was exposed to conflict 
between his classmates and older students, she felt hesitant to tell her child to 
utilise the peer mediation techniques she had learned because ‘younger kids 
cannot intervene in conflicts with older students (SP3, personal interview, 30 
April 2007). Their efforts would be perceived as disrespectful to older kids.  
Lack of opportunity for providing programmes that are more systematic to 
students: Interviewees were particularly concerned about the lack of awareness 
regarding the importance of conflict resolution, and they were critical of the 
public schools’ lack of interest in providing more systematic support to students 
concerning this issue. Specifically, when asked about the effect of their 
educational outreach on students, SP5, SP6, and SP7 commented that such 
effects cannot be measured unless a systematic approach is incorporated into 
the formal educational programme.  
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Peace and conflict-resolution training requires more than the sporadic 
introduction that School Peace offers students. As many peer-mediation 
specialists indicate, consistent exposure to this programme is required in order 
to measure visible change (Heeden, 2005). However, in neighbourhood public 
schools in Gwacheon, teachers and administrators ‘are ambivalent toward 
peace education and conflict resolution programmes and avoid taking 
innovative steps to address school violence’ (SP7, personal interview, 30 April 
2007). SP7 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) and SP6 (Personal interview, 30 
April 2007) believe that such ambivalence is caused by two factors: teachers 
and administrators’ insecurities and concerns for their reputation as well as a 
lack of understanding of these programmes. Regarding insecurity and 
reputational damage, an interviewee said, 
 
Teachers seemed to feel that parents offering conflict resolution trainings and peace 
education to their students was implicitly criticising their inability to handle school 
violence and students’ ability to constructively handle these problems. Further, 
principals refused to take up this issue as they thought that their schools offer such 
course to students because they have serious problems with conflict—they 
negatively responded to the term conflict. (SP3, personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
 
As well, because the teachers and administrators did not fully 
understand the basic concepts and principles underpinning peace education 
and conflict-resolution skills training, they believed the programme wasted 
people’s time without producing outcomes. SP7 (Personal interview, 30 April 
2007) said a teacher surveyed his or her students about the effectiveness of 
this educational effort by asking them to raise their hands. By minimising the 
efforts required to constructively resolve difficult issues in schools, teachers and 
administrators seemed “to disregard the need to look at this issue in a 
systematic, holistic, and comprehensive manner” (SP5, personal interview, 25 
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April 2007). Without systematic implementation, interviewees agreed that such 
educational efforts would not produce any visible outcomes or make a 
difference in students’ lives in schools.  
Reflection on democratic nurturing. As of 2010, School Peace 
continues to provide conflict-resolution skills training to local community 
members and offers workshops on PCR in local public schools. School violence 
continues to exist in schools, and there continues to be lack of a systematic 
approach to violence prevention.  
Yet, some positive news has been reported regarding peace and conflict-
resolution education in the city of Gwacheon. A report stated that more 
organisations host workshops about conflict-resolution and nonviolent 
communication methods for enhancing local residents’ knowledge in this area. 
In 2009, it was announced that re-training courses for teachers would include 
programmes about nonviolent communication skills and conflict-resolution 
techniques (Gwacheon News, 2010). In 2010, the Anyang-Gwacheon 
Educational Ministry, a local municipality covering the neighbourhood where 
School Peace is operating, reported that they had adopted non-violent 
communication and conflict-resolution skills in order to effectively empower 
schoolteachers and administrators when handling conflicts that arise in schools 
(Gwacheon News, 2010). Such change has paved the way for the creation of a 
school environment that is more open to what School Peace advocates: a 
proactive, holistic approach to school violence. 
In addition to specific policy changes at the macro level, there are a 
number of notable contributions that School Peace has made towards 
improving the democratic quality of civil society. First, as outlined in 
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interviewees’ narratives, an organisation like School Peace mobilises a 
grassroots population and creates space for civil discourse about community 
issues. As seen in the historical overview, School Peace emerged as a specific 
response to a student’s death resulting from school violence (bullying). They did 
so because there was no constructive space in the school in which to engage in 
debates about this issue. In the absence of a space for open discussion, local 
residents were mobilised to initiate public discourse about school violence 
outside of the public school system. This alternative space for discussion about 
schools in the neighbourhood attracted the participation of local residents. The 
group linked school violence, and other politicised issues, to educational 
opportunities and opened itself up to learning about conflict-resolution skills. 
Today, instead of mobilising local residents around specific causes, School 
Peace broadens its support base through education and volunteering 
opportunities. In this context, conflict-resolution education serves as a 
preparatory tool for civic engagement in specific community issues.  
Second, School Peace’s educational programmes help its participants 
improve those communications skills that are beneficial to resolving conflict in a 
constructive manner. As indicated by SP3 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) 
and SP6 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007), their experiences with conflict-
resolution training provided them with an opportunity to reflect on the 
importance of listening respectfully to others, acknowledging differences, and 
promoting cooperative problem solving. As Dryzek (1994, cf. Chapter 2) 
explains, these skills are critical to mainstreaming participatory democracy and 
active civic discussion.  
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Third, School Peace’s active members are exposed to opportunities to 
engage with a wide range of constituents, including those who hold different 
positions. While interviewees are critical of school administrators, teachers, and 
local residents who are sceptical of the interviewees’ efforts, their interviews 
illustrate the members’ willingness to work with different constituents to find a 
common solution. This effort and willingness is reflected in SP5’s recollection of 
her experience with school officials:  
‘We reach out to various school officials and teachers. They sometimes 
misunderstand our educational activities, and express concerns about an 
ideological bias of peace and conflict resolution. In such contexts, we 
highlight that this programme is related to our common desire—reducing 
school violence. (SP5, personal interview, 25 April 2007) 
 
In examining School Peace, the author was reminded of the article 
written by Church and Shouldice (2003). Their assessment of peace and 
conflict-resolution evaluation practices revealed that understanding the effect of 
micro-level change on macro issues that are often structural is extremely 
challenging (2003). In the context of School Peace, it is unclear whether a 
micro-level contribution to democracy (democratic skills) has an effect on the 
overall democratic quality of South Korean civil society. The lack of clarity on 
the impact of micro-level change on a broader society is particularly prominent 
in the absence of systematic assessment of School Peace and the effect of its 
educational programmes on students. It is rather unrealistic to expect a small 
community-based organisation to conduct systematic research on its 
educational programmes and their effects on their main constituents.  
Furthermore, despite its willingness to engage with various local 
community members as presented above, School Peace is considered to be a 
progressive-leaning civil society organisation due to its advocacy activities. 
Specifically, its views on the 2004 Special Law on School Violence, its demand 
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for the resignation of the principal in 2002, and its occasional policy seminars 
implicitly indicate the organisation’s political perspectives. The organisation, 
therefore, tends to be more accepted by progressive and liberal-leaning 
constituents and is less effective in reaching out to conservative residents, who 
are often sceptical of the notion of conflict resolution. The author notes that 
School Peace is a reflection of gendered civil society, which has a clear division 
of labour, and it clearly operates within the women’s sphere. In this context, its 
main constituents are female; therefore they are less effective at promoting 
conflict-resolution values to male constituents, especially those values that are 
closely linked to democratic skills.  
Case Study 2: Women Making Peace – Conflict Resolution Centre  
The Women Making Peace Conflict Resolution Centre (WMP-CR Centre) 
is a pioneering organisation in South Korea. It is an example of how a national 
NGO has adapted Western conflict resolution practices to a country-specific 
context and has utilised them to advance the country’s democratic development. 
In addition, the WMP-CR Centre demonstrates how a conflict resolution 
programme enhances the quality and diversity of the women’s movement in the 
post-transitional era by allowing the WMP-CR Centre to reach out to a broad 
range of constituents.  
Contextual overview of WMP-CR Centre 
Conflict resolution, civil society, and democratisation. As Reimann 
(2004, p. 10) summarises, “conflict resolution refers to all process-oriented 
activities aiming to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural, and 
structural violence.” Riemann defines structural violence as “the social, political, 
and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination 
 210 
210 
 
and dependency are perpetuated, while cultural violence refers to the social 
and cultural legitimisation of direct and structural violence” (p. 10-11). By 
emphasising the transforming potential of conflict, conflict resolution scholars, 
such as Burton (1993) and Mitchelle (2006), have contended that conflict 
expressed in a nonviolent manner serves as an essential catalyst for social 
change.  
The field of conflict resolution, as an academic discipline and practice, 
began in the late 1960s and gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s in both 
North America and Western Europe. By offering an alternative framework for 
social conflict in democracy, the field of conflict resolution has contributed to 
institutionalising a mechanism for the constructive management of contentious 
social issues at various levels of society. Examples of such mechanisms 
include: dispute resolution, community mediation, problem-solving workshops, 
and facilitated dialogue. Conflict resolution became increasingly recognised in 
the 1990s as an important tool for effective intervention in global conflicts. The 
growth of the field in the 1990s coincided with a massive wave of 
democratisation, which affected numerous countries worldwide, changing 
international contexts as internal violent conflicts were increasingly on the rise. 
In this context, conflict resolution began to be introduced to various newly 
democratising countries. Among these new democracies, conflict resolution 
was promoted prominently in transitional countries with high levels of violent 
conflict.  
As presented in Chapter 2, the author contends that core concepts and 
underlying assumptions of the conflict resolution movement are derived from 
liberal democratic theories, including neutrality, impartiality, confidentiality, open 
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communication, compromise, inclusiveness, tolerance, and respect for 
differences; moreover, they are interest-based and aim to separate people from 
issues. Furthermore, its goal—altering the underlying causes of violence so 
conflict can be expressed in a constructive manner—is more likely to be 
attainable in a democratic society (Ury, 1999). For example, as Reychler 
elaborated, non-democratic regimes “refuse to acknowledge the value, utility, 
and healing power of conflict” (p. 141), and thus, have suppressed the 
development of institutional foundations for constructive transformation of 
conflict. In contrast, democracy “legitimates conflicts that are peacefully 
expressed and resolved. By its very ideology, democracy welcomes diverse 
opinions and expression of ideas, and its various procedures are created 
primarily to address contentious issues peacefully” (Reychler, 1997, p. 439). In 
other words, without basic democratic procedures, the effectiveness of various 
conflict resolution methods—third party intervention, problem-solving 
workshops, mediation, negotiation, educational efforts, public dialogue, and so 
forth—is significantly limited.  
Conflict resolution advocates for successful democratisation, such as 
Bianchi (1997), Shapiro (1997), and Shonholtz (1997, 2003) consider capacity 
building for conflict resolution a highly complementary element to formal 
democratisation, which focuses on the strengthening of procedural and 
institutional measures. In this context, the emergence of conflict resolution 
NGOs and professional conflict resolvers in South Korea signals the society’s 
need for effective management of conflict. It has surfaced as the result of 
democratic transition and consolidation. In Chapter 4, this dissertation 
discusses the increasing need for Korean civil society to embrace PCR 
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practices to transform the adversarial and antagonistic position in which civil 
society actors are increasingly entrapped in their pursuit of social change. This 
dissertation also contends that the emergent PCR movement in South Korea is 
a testament to civil society’s response to such needs.  
In the process of building a society’s capacity for constructive conflict 
resolution, civil society organisations reach out to the grassroots population in 
order to raise their awareness of conflict resolution norms and skills. For 
example, according to Reychler (1999, p. 142), civil society organisations in 
new democracies play a significant role in the process of challenging old values 
and introducing new ones by facilitating open communication. These efforts are 
particularly notable in contrast to certain segments of civil society, which play a 
supportive role in escalating violent conflict by providing political hardliners with 
moral, intellectual, and political justification for violence, such as in the case of 
Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia (Fischer, 2008).  
While some notable NGOs are specialised, such as the Community 
Board, a community-mediation specialised non-for-profit organisation, Search 
for Common Ground, a US based non-governmental organisation promoting 
conflict resolution, and International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution think tank, 
most NGOs working in the field of peace and conflict also have many other 
mandates, and thus conflict resolution practices are part of their overall 
strategies to accomplish their organisational missions (Barnes, 2005; Debiel & 
Stict, 2005; Peck, 2002). Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005, p.98, cf. Chapter 2) 
termed these NGOs “multi-purpose hybrid” organisations because of their 
unique features that are distinctive from not-for-profit organisations, volunteer-
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run associations or social movement networks.31 The emergence of multi-
purpose hybrid organisations is strongly related to the expansion of the public 
sphere and not-for-profit sector (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005).  
Specific political contexts that contribute to opening a civil society space, 
such as democratisation, serve as a prerequisite for the activation of conflict 
resolution organisations. This is also reflective of the emergence of WMP and 
its CR Centre. Emerging ten years after the democratic transition, WMP was at 
the forefront of promoting the country’s peace movement and alternative 
reunification discourses. Hence, it brought conflict resolution practices to its 
outreach strategy with a view to developing and strengthening peace 
constituents in South Korea and embedding constructive problem solving in 
Korean society. The establishment of the WMP-CR Centre was possible 
because there was a space for diverse forms of peace activism, which was 
enabled by the post-transitional context.  
Diversification of the women’s movement in South Korea. As Moon 
summarises, because of gender norms in Korean society that associate 
physical violence with masculinity, “the violent relationship between civil society 
and the state under the political conditions of military authoritarian rule and 
national division accentuated the masculinisation of the public sphere and 
discouraged women’s access to civil society before the 1987 democratic 
transition” (2002, p. 482). During the militant struggle for democratisation of the 
1980s, progressive male activists criticised the women’s movement for its lack 
of militancy; women’s organisations emphasise legal and procedural reform-
                                                
31Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005, p. 98) outlined three key features of these groups: “(a) multi-purpose hybrid 
organisations seek to bring about social change, though not necessarily through protest and non-
institutional means; (b) the services they provide, such as social and educational (including conflict 
resolution training), are a strategy for social change; (c) their internal structure is a mix of collectivist and 
bureaucratic elements.” (cf. Chapter 2) 
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oriented approaches to social change and democratisation (Moon, 2002). 
Furthermore, prior to the 1987 democratic transition, gender equality and 
women’s rights were not pursued as a separate political agenda because 
embracing diversity of social and political issues were considered to weaken the 
effectiveness and coherence of the opposition movement.  
As Lee (1993) observed, from 1987 on, South Korea witnessed the 
activation and expansion of civil society with the emergence of 
nongovernmental organisations advocating diverse social issues, such as 
environmental protection, economic justice, women’s rights, consumer 
protection, education, and so forth. In particular, the democratic transition 
provided female activists with a space for reinterpreting various social and 
political issues through the lenses of gender in addition to advocating the 
unique needs of women. With this increased opportunity, women’s NGOs 
emerged rapidly and advocated for the integration of gender perspectives into 
various social, political, and economic issues that perpetuated gender relations 
in society.  
However, as Moon (2002) explained, despite the diversification of 
women’s activism, these issues did not receive equal attention from women’s 
groups. In order to reach out to ordinary female citizens in largely conservative 
local communities, women’s groups had to frame certain social, political, and 
economic issues as extensions of women’s concerns (Moon, 2002; Khor, 1999). 
Furthermore, in their emphasis on the importance of women’s perspectives, 
these groups tended to focus on issues taking place within culturally prescribed 
women’s spheres of activities. These “women’s spheres” often involved 
marriage, family, children, school, the elderly, health, and consumerism. Those 
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advocating these less controversial issues considered the women’s perspective 
without challenging traditional roles, thus contributing to the reproduction of 
feminine gender roles within the institution of marriage and family (Moon, 2002; 
Khor, 1999). In this context, women’s issues within culturally masculine spheres 
of activities such as employment, law, business, politics, diplomacy, and 
security received less attention by moderate women’s organisations because 
these issues tended to directly challenge unequal gender power relations in 
South Korea.  
The absence of women’s voices in traditionally masculine spheres 
reflected a broader gender inequality in such areas. Until the late 1990s, 
women cadres were denied the opportunity to apply for military, naval, and air-
force academic study; less than 2.5% of women currently hold high-ranking 
military positions; only as recently as 2000 were women police officers allowed 
to apply to a special academy for superintendent candidates, and currently only 
2% of superintendents or higher are women; less than 3% of women hold high 
ranking civil servant positions above the director level; less than 15% of elected 
parliamentarians are females; 20% of district attorneys are women; 18% of 
journalists are women; 10% of diplomats are women, but less than 1% of 
diplomats hold high-ranking positions. 17% of professors at universities are 
females; less than 5% of top management are women; and men’s overall 
income is 1.9 times higher than women on average (National Statistics Office, 
2009). The lack of women’s representation as high ranking officials in the areas 
of security, politics, diplomacy, business, and journalism does not necessarily 
indicate the overall inequality of South Koreans. Indeed, 47% of the labour force 
is female, and women’s educational level, on average, is about the same as 
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their male counterparts in terms of high school graduation and university 
admission; 25% of PhD graduates are females; and approximately 40% of civil 
servants are females (National Statistics Office, 2009). 
The statistics suggest that the general opportunity for women’s 
participation in the public realm has been expanded, whereas gender ideology, 
which discriminates against women’s access to traditionally masculinised public 
spheres, continues to prevail. The lack of representation is particularly 
prominent in the areas of security and diplomacy because both issues are 
closely related to the division of the Korean peninsula. Reunification and South 
Korea’s relationship with the North have been long framed as a security issue 
requiring military intervention and toughness (Moon, 2002). Military 
engagement and security-related issues have been the exclusive domain of 
South Korean males. A case in point is universal military conscription in the 
country, which calls for the military service of all healthy males in their late 
teens and 20s; however, it excludes women from participating. This explains 
the low level of high-ranking female officials in the military and police force in 
South Korea. In this context, women are highly discouraged from debating 
public issues related to military and security matters; such attempts often 
provoke emotional reactions from males, who argue they are the only ones 
entitled to such debates because of their dedicated military service to the 
country.32 Thus, reunification debates, as well as international political debates, 
are the exclusive realm of South Korean males. 
                                                
32 In the mid 1990s, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs began to lead the movement, calling for the abolition 
of the test bonus for those who served in the military service for over 24 months when they applied to 
exams for civil servants. After a few years of the campaign and appeal to the Korean Constitutional Court, 
the bonus test scores were announced as discriminatory against females. During this campaign, the 
women’s movement was met with a series of criticisms from the conservative population, and provoked 
emotional reactions from Korean males who served military service. Even 10 years after the abolishment 
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The exclusion of females from debates on peacemaking is not limited to 
South Korea. In general, males dominate international peacemaking processes, 
as these activities exist primarily in male spheres such as diplomacy, security, 
and politics. In response, over decades, international women’s NGOs and 
prominent female politicians have advocated for a higher representation of 
females in such processes. Women’s groups particularly criticized the fact that 
political outcomes after conflict lack considerations of gender and often exclude 
women’s perspectives. In 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 1325, which calls on UN member-states to ensure the equal 
participation of women at all decision-making levels for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflict. Security Council Resolution 1325 
marks a milestone in feminist peace and security policy. It is the first Security 
Council decision in UN history calling for women’s equal participation in 
decisions concerning peace and security that is legally binding under 
international law. 
Established in 1997, WMP was founded to advocate for women’s 
perspectives in public debates about peaceful reunification and international 
affairs affecting the Korean Peninsula. By reaching out to the public, WMP 
raised women’s consciousness of the role of women in reunification and 
international political debates and has stimulated women’s participation in such 
debates. WMP frames reunification and peace as issues closely linked to 
women’s lives and highlights to what extent the exclusion of women from peace 
and reunification debates perpetuates the unequal gender balance in South 
Korean society (Lee & Meeks, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                          
of such test bonuses, conservative politicians continue to use this as their election campaign slogans 
(Kang, 2010).  
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Initially, their member bases were intellectual, highly educated feminists 
with significant activist experience. The WMP also integrated practical and less 
politically intense activities in order to reach out to a broad range of constituents 
(including both males and females). WMP uses conflict resolution 
methodologies are strategies to broaden its constituency and make peace and 
reunification an issue that is accessible to the public. Like conflict resolution, 
debates about the role of women in peacemaking within South Korean civil 
society are indicative of the country’s progress in the areas of democratization.  
Descriptive overview of WMP-CR Centre  
Background.33  WMP was founded with the assumption that a peaceful 
and reunified Korea will not only liberate the country from the continuing threat 
of war but also contribute to reducing the conditions that perpetuate gender 
inequality (Lee & Meeks, 2003). The idea for the WMP-CR Centre emerged in 
response to WMP’s search for a new peace paradigm accessible to Korean 
women. As presented in Chapter 4, with the inauguration of Kim Dae-Jung in 
1998, the South Korean government began to embrace more inclusive and 
reconciliatory approaches to North Korea. Known as the “Sunshine Policy,” this 
was the most important legacy of his presidency.  
In the context of changing the North-South relationship as well as 
alternative ways to prepare for reunification, WMP and a few other non-
governmental organisations were exposed to conflict resolution by the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), with whom they worked closely 
in a number of reunification related activities (Lee & Meeks, 2003). Particularly, 
in the preparation for a reunified Korea, these civic groups thought that conflict 
                                                
33The historical background was constructed based upon interviews, archival studies, and media analysis. 
A majority of the information was obtained during the interviews with CR 2, CR 10, and CR 5.  
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resolution-related content and methodologies could help foster peaceful co-
existence among people who grew up in different political systems and 
ideologies (Feffer & Lee, 2000). In the context of democratic consolidation, 
confrontation and social conflict have become more frequently observed 
throughout South Korean society (cf. Chapter 4). Thus, there was a need for a 
new approach to conflict and alternative ways to address this rather new social 
phenomenon (Park, 2006).  
In September 1999, WMP, together with two other Korean NGOs and the 
AFSC, hosted a Workshop on Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Fostering, 
which was attended by 26 young civil society practitioners/activists (WMP, 
2000; Feffer & Lee, 2000). This two-day workshop was the first conflict 
resolution programme conducted in Korean.34 It introduced the following 
content: active listening, interest-based problem solving, win-win approaches, 
negotiation skills, and mediation principles. The workshop also provided 
participants with an opportunity to think about ways to apply conflict resolution 
to Korean society “at the interpersonal, group, and international levels” (Feffer & 
Lee, 2000, p. 6). 
An article published in WMP’s 2000 Newsletter described the novelty of 
this workshop as follows: 
This two-day workshop provided a lot of new information on conflict resolution to 
me, who barely understood the meaning of the workshop’s title. First, I thought I 
would learn how to successfully resolve various conflicts in my daily lives and 
workplace. Through this workshop, I was humbled that I was too ambitious – 
resolving conflict and fostering tolerance is extremely difficult to obtain. I felt 
happy that I became aware of the fact that there are different approaches to 
problems or conflict. (Kim, 2000, p. 10-11) 
 
                                                
34The author learned about this workshop in 2003 during her email exchange with CJJ. She took part in 
the training, and received a master’s degree in conflict resolution from a foreign university at the time of 
the email exchange. In the email exchange, the author first developed a sense of an overview of the 
country’s conflict resolution.  
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In an effort to deepen civil society’s capacity for conflict resolution skills, 
WMP, together with two other Korean civic groups and AFSC, embarked on a 
13-month-long conflict resolution and mediation skills training course for which 
15 civil society activists were recruited. The course consisted of 10 modules 
focusing on various items related to conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence. 
At the end of this course, participants were expected to develop potential 
conflict resolution programmes that their organisations could utilize, as well as 
to produce Korean language conflict resolution manuals for future training. 
Table 4: Training on Conflict Resolution and Mediation Skills 
June 2000 – July 2001 
Summarized and Translated based upon two articles published in WMP Newsletter in 2001 (Park, 2001) 
Contents  Duration  
1. Orientation & Introduction  Two Days 
2. German Reunification and Conflict Resolution: How to understand social conflict that 
emerged after German reunification and what efforts Germany makes to resolve such 
conflict? (guest instructors from Germany) 
Two Days 
3. Conflict Resolution Skills Training (guest instructor from George Mason University)  Five Days 
4. Women and Conflict Resolution (guest instructor from International Alert)  Two Days 
5. Useful Tools and Methodologies for Conflict Resolution (guest instructor from USIP) Two Days 
6. Application and Conflict Resolution Programme Development  Five Days 
7. Workshop on Content Development Two Days 
8. Workshop on Labour Disputes and their Resolution and Field Visit  Three Days 
9. Studying Conflict Resolution Theory at George Mason University & Field Visit  
§ Fairfax County Public School-Lake Braddock High School (Peer Mediation)  
§ United States Institute for Peace (Peace research) 
§ Search for Common Ground (conflict resolution NGO) 
§ Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (conflict resolution NGO) 
§ Resolve (environment dispute resolution NGO) 
§ National Association for Community Mediation (community mediation)  
§ Help Increase the Peace (youth and peace education) 
§ Superior Court of the District of Columbia – Multi-Door Dispute Resolution 
Division (arbitration at the judiciary) 
Two Weeks 
10. Development of Conflict Resolution Manuals and Resources  Five months  
 
Upon completion of the activists’ participation in this long training course 
in July 2001, WMP took the lead in integrating a conflict resolution programme 
into its core activities for two purposes: promoting citizens’ awareness of peace 
and bringing peace activism into citizens’ daily activities. In its 2001 overall 
strategy, WMP stated that it would explore a way to strengthen a “conflict 
resolution and tolerance fostering programme” in order to reach out to ordinary 
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citizens (WMP, 2001). In May 2001, a “conflict resolution team” was organized 
within WMP in order to study conflict resolution theories and methodologies, 
and to develop tools and resources applicable to South Korean society, 
particularly in the area of peace education. Initially, only four members 
participated in this group (Park, 2001).  
This group first introduced conflict resolution to public school educators 
with the vision of strengthening teachers’ capacity for peace education (Park, 
2001). In August 2001, the group planned a summer workshop on conflict 
resolution in which female public school teachers could participate. However, 
due to lack of understanding of the notion of conflict resolution, the group failed 
to recruit a single participant. As Park (2001) recalled, 
 
 When we planned our second workshop in winter, we paid a great deal of attention 
to the recruitment process. Based upon our experience in summer, we realized that it 
was critical to explain conflict resolution in greater detail, and reach out to public 
school teachers to provide a detailed briefing of their intention. After many attempts 
since September 2001, thankfully, we were able to connect with one public school 
teacher who was interested in this issue. She reached out to her colleagues and 
brought them to the workshop (Park, 2001). 
 
The year 2001 marked the beginning of civil society-led conflict 
resolution programmes in South Korea with the delivery of a workshop for 
female teachers on peaceful resolution of conflict in schools (CR5, personal 
interview, 23 May 2007). In 2002, these programmes brought conflict resolution 
education into public schools and, beginning in 2003, organized regular training 
programmes for conflict resolution practitioners. “As conflict resolution receives 
more attention, there is a need for a more systematic approach to conflict 
resolution programmes than WMP provided at the time” (CR2, personal 
interview, 26 January 2007). In response, WMP established the Conflict 
Resolution Centre, which was the first conflict resolution programme operated 
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by a non-governmental organization in South Korea.35 Staff members engage 
in consulting activities on conflict resolution. 
As a membership organisation, the WMP-CR Centre is funded by 
membership fees. The WMP-CR Centre also receives funding from government 
agencies, such as the Seoul City Government, Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Gender and Family Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Justice and private foundations (CR2, personal interview, 19 
June 2007; WMP, 2010). There was no discussion on contributions from private 
corporations, which is common in progressive civil society circles due to the 
ambivalent relationship with Korean conglomerates. Compared to School 
Peace, the WMP-CR Centre has a broad funding base. However, it should be 
noted that funding is always a central problem for civil society organisations in 
South Korea (Lee, 2009).  
Main Activities:36 The WMP-CR Centre engages in three main 
activities: education and training, conflict resolution service delivery, and conflict 
resolution research and policy advocacy. In earlier stages, WMP-CR focused 
mainly on education and training programmes, as well as leading efforts to 
strengthen conflict resolution research and policy advocacy work. With an 
enhanced conflict resolution capacity, WMP-CR increasingly intervenes in real 
conflict cases in the area of public conflict and adolescent victim-offender 
                                                
35In 2005, the CECJ, one of the largest and most influential NGOs in South Korea, established a Conflict 
Resolution Centre (the name is slightly different in Korean as resolution can be translated into a few other 
words). The author met the practitioners running this programme. Their conflict resolution programmes are 
similar to the one run by the WMP-CR Centre. Yet, this dissertation chose to focus on WMP-CR Centre 
because the CCEJ is highly influential, and their influence in the political process can interfere the public’s 
perception on their impartiality and neutrality. Further, due to its political influence, it is much less likely 
that the CCEJ could bring the conservative constituents.  
36Main activities were identified by interviews (mainly with CR2, CR5), internal documents, and archival 
studies. For documents, please see Annex 4.  
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relations.37 This section focuses on conflict resolution education and training, 
and conflict resolution activities.  
Conflict Resolution Education and Training. In the early 2000s, when a 
conflict resolution programme was first brought into South Korea, there was 
little awareness of the notion of conflict resolution. For example, very basic 
concepts underpinning the field of conflict resolution were new to South Korean 
civil society practitioners and academics, let alone to most ordinary citizens. In 
an effort to generate awareness of conflict resolution, it was essential for the 
WMP-CR Centre to focus on education and training programmes. As 
highlighted by CR 5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007), “without general 
awareness of the basic principles underpinning the field of conflict resolution, 
other plans—promoting the culture of conflict resolution and integrating conflict 
resolution principles into the lives of South Koreans—would not be attained.”  
WMP-CR’s education and training programmes reach out to a wide 
range of constituents—youth, teachers, educators, school administrators, public 
servants, civil society practitioners, ordinary citizens, and grassroots organisers.  
§ Conflict Resolution Training for Teachers, Educators, and School 
Administrators: When awareness of conflict resolution was low, the 
WMP-CR Centre approached elementary and secondary educational 
institutes and reached out to schoolteachers, who are constantly 
exposed to a wide range of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts their 
students are experiencing. WMP-CR offers regular workshops for 
teachers to enhance their capacity to handle conflicts emerging during 
their encounters with students. Furthermore, by introducing conflict 
                                                
37This was not a full reality during the time of the fieldwork in 2007. The pilot programmes began to be 
implemented in 2008.  
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resolution skills and principles to teachers and school administrators, 
the WMP-CR Centre, together with WMP’s Peace Education Team, 
aimed to promote a peaceful school culture and reduce school violence. 
In addition to educators and administrators, the WMP-CR Centre 
organises a regular workshop for elementary and secondary school 
students aged 10 to 17 years old. A majority of the workshops offered at 
schools are linked to the issue of violence prevention in schools or are 
supplements to reunification education.  
§ Conflict Resolution Training for Public Administrators: During the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration, conflict management has become a policy 
priority due to rising social and public conflict involving major 
development and infrastructure projects in which the government is 
involved. Reflecting the government’s interest, the WMP-CR Centre was 
invited by various government agencies to provide public servants with 
a basic knowledge of conflict analysis and resolution techniques. These 
government agencies included the Central Officials Training Institute 
(2003-6), Ministry of Public Administration and Security’s Human 
Resources Development Bureau (2004-6), Korean Housing Corporation, 
Training Institute for Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (2005-6), 
Legal Research and Training Institute (2005-6), Korea Labour Institute 
(2005), Korea Human Resource Institute for Health and Welfare (2005), 
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (2005), Seoul City Officials 
Training Institute (2006), National Institute for Environmental Human 
Resources Development (2006), and the National Unification Advisory 
Council (2006). WMP-CR’s outreach to public sector organisations was 
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designed to prepare civil servants to improve the integration of conflict 
resolution techniques into their work. In addition, “by raising awareness 
of policy implementers, it aims to prepare the ground for 
institutionalising conflict resolution systems in South Korea” (CR2, 
personal interview, 26 January 2007).  
§ Conflict Resolution Training to Grassroots Civil Society Groups: After a 
few years of experience in organising regular workshops and training 
programmes, WMP-CR began to reach out to grassroots civil society 
groups located outside of Seoul. Educational programmes offered to 
grassroots organisations were introduced in the context of addressing 
rising public conflict and environmental disputes that had become critical 
social issues. Many grassroots organisations were involved in public 
conflicts “as an advocate for local citizens and were pulled into conflict 
dynamics” (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007). These groups 
lacked the capacity to approach public or social conflict (in addition to 
the lack of the government’s ability to resolve constructively), which had 
become a serious obstacle to community building as well as effective 
implementation of public policy.  
Thus, The WMP-CR Centre invited grassroots activists and civic 
group members to understand better the conflict dynamics they were 
involved with and to help them identify ways to transform destructive 
conflict patterns. The training programme for grassroots activists 
focused on conflict analysis: how to objectively assess conflict dynamics 
and parties involved; problem-solving approaches; how to identify 
common challenges and interests; effective communication skills; how 
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to engage with those who have differing perspectives and build trust 
with them; and how to engage in effective and democratic decision 
making processes. In 2004 and 2005, the WMP-CR Centre convened 
for the “Conflict Resolution Workshop for Community Cohesion and 
Reconciliation” in three provinces in the southern part of South Korea, 
and in 2004, “Training for NGO Activists to Improve Conflict Resolution 
Capacity” was organised in four major cities outside of Seoul.  
§ Specialised Training for Conflict Resolution Practitioners: One of the 
most important educational activities the WMP-CR Centre has been 
engaged in is the annual “Conflict Resolution Training for Trainers”, 
which began in 2003. CR2 (personal interview, 26 January 2007) 
recalled the challenge in recruiting participants due to the extensive 
commitment required to complete this course (90 hours plus a weekend 
retreat):  
 
The first training course had to recruit participants through activists’ 
networks, and we were able to attract 15 civil society practitioners. 
This year (2007), we completed five training courses, and 70 people 
participated in the courses. Twenty of those who completed the 
training continue to work with the WMP-CR Centre by supporting the 
WMP-CR Centre’s activities. Our programme’s advantage is to allow 
our students to re-take the course without additional charge. The 
purpose is to ensure that those who take the course fully internalise 
the skills (CR2, personal interview, 26 January 2007) 
 
Conflict Resolution Service Delivery. Although the opportunity is rather 
limited due to the absence of a comprehensive conflict resolution system in 
South Korea, the WMP-CR Centre staff intervenes in social and public conflicts 
and serves as mediators and facilitators.  
One of the first cases that WMP-CR participated in was as a member of 
a four-person mediating committee during the Hantan River public dispute. The 
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public dispute was related to the government’s plan to build a dam to control 
frequent flooding at the expense of the local community and natural 
environment. CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) recounted her 
experience as one of the facilitators:  
 
This was one of the first public disputes intervened in by a government-
appointed mediation committee, and the mediation committee spent over five 
months working to form an official agreement from both parties (pro-Dam and 
against-Dam). The statement asserted that the parties involved would not 
protest any decision made by the mediation committee within a month. The 
mediation committee’s decision was to build a smaller dam exclusively 
designed to prevent flooding. As this was one of the first mediation cases in 
public dispute, there were mixed evaluations because the process did not 
result in the agreed outcome concerning the actual decision on the building of 
the dam. This serves as one of the experiments where a civil society 
organisation participated in mediating complex public disputes in South 
Korea.  
 
Analytical overview of WMP-CR Centre  
Interviews and Observation. The WMP-CR Centre is run by two full-
time staff members and supported by a number of volunteers who are members 
of WMP. Because WMP is an NGO advocating for the integration of gender 
perspectives into peace and reunification, more females than males were met 
during the field research for both observation and interviews. Eight females 
responded positively to interview requests, and five males were interviewed for 
the research. All of the interviewees are familiar with civil society activism in 
South Korea, and eight of them were NGO professionals working on a range of 
issues including consumer rights, environmental activism, community building, 
peace, and social justice. Only five interviewees directly experienced the 
democratic transition as activists. All were involved in student activism in the 
1980s, and the rest of the interviewees are young practitioners in their late 20s 
and early and mid 30s. Three interviewees have been involved with WMP for 
 228 
228 
 
over five years, and the rest of the interviewees became affiliated with WMP 
within two years prior to the interview.  
In terms of political orientation, all interviewees are considered to be 
liberal, and have a strong understanding of various political, social, and 
economic issues. This orientation reflects the WMP-CR Centre: as a 
membership-based organisation, it attracts highly politicised and highly 
educated South Koreans aged between the late 20s and late 40s. As a result, 
their understanding of political and social issues in South Korea is extremely 
informed, and their interviews provided an in-depth understanding of South 
Korean civil society and emerging issues in the 21st century. In terms of 
specific content, two interviews were conducted with WMP insiders to 
understand better the context in which conflict resolution practices were 
introduced to the organisation and how their conflict resolution activities have 
evolved in the last five years. The rest of the interviewees were met in order to 
understand their motivation in becoming involved in WMP-CR Centre’s training 
programmes, and to elicit their reflections on conflict resolution activities and 
their application to South Korean civil society.  
During the field research, four different training sessions were observed 
in order to understand how these activities were communicated to WMP-CR 
Centre’s participants and how conflict resolution concepts were explained to 
others during the training. These training sessions provided the researcher with 
the opportunity to interact informally with many other participants who attended 
the training sessions, retreats, and seminars. A majority of the training 
attendees are females who have been engaged in civil society activism and 
women’s rights issues. This observation confirms that conflict resolution training 
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is a preferred method for female practitioners engaged in civil society 
organisations, which is related to the fact that conflict resolution is perceived in 
South Korea as among practices applicable to youth and educational 
programmes or activities appropriate to women’s spheres (Kohr, 1999).  
Motivation. Interviewees’ motivations to become involved in WMP-CR 
Centre’s conflict resolution activities are related to their desire to fulfil both 
personal and professional needs. In terms of personal motivation, one-third of 
the interviewees indicated they had a difficult time dealing with the range of 
conflict they had experienced in their lives. When they were introduced to the 
conflict resolution training programme, they hoped it could help them better 
manage the negative conflict patterns that they had internalised. CR 9 
(Personal interview, 30 May 2007)’s narratives reflect this motivation:  
I was angry when I was engaged in activism in my youth. I tried to unleash my 
anger through writings. One day, my mentor, who read my writing, told me that 
my supposed peace story was full of violence. This made me think about ways I 
engage with others. I have internalised violence without realising it. This 
motivated me to learn more about conflict resolution.  
 
The rest of the interviewees explained that the negative conflict patterns 
they observed through their professional work had motivated them to explore 
alternative methods. Some of these interviewees work for advocacy 
organisations and were drawn into conflictual situations when they intervened in 
controversial policy issues on behalf of their constituents. With repeated 
experiences of confrontational engagement in conflict situations, they felt the 
strong need to find alternative methods to deal with these situations in a 
constructive manner. For example, CR 13 (Personal interview, 14 June 2007) 
said that he used to spend “a majority of working hours fighting and engaging in 
confrontational debates with” his opponents. CR 13 (Personal interview, 14 
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June 2007) wanted to find a better way to manage his working relationship, and 
was exposed to conflict resolution trainings.  
Other interviewees work for organisations that often facilitate dialogue 
among their constituents regarding controversial and difficult issues, and they 
often realise that their constituents lack various conversational skills and basic 
attitudes required for negotiation and constructive dialogue. As practitioners, 
they felt unable to help their constituents improve these skills, and they wanted 
to enhance their ability to coach others to solve conflictual issues in a 
constructive manner. CR12 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) said, “I felt 
frustrated with my inability to facilitate contentious discussions. Definitely, 
cultural elements and Korean stubbornness work against me, but I felt I needed 
something else to intervene such situations in an innovative way.”  
Reflections on Positive Contributions. The interviewees assessed 
three positive contributions as the strength of WMP-CR Centre’s activities: 
raising awareness of conflict resolution principles (difference, tolerance, 
problem-solving, separating people from issues, active listening, and so forth); 
increased capacity to handle conflictual situations at home and in their 
workplace; and an opportunity to bring people into civil society activism and 
public discourses.  
Raising awareness of conflict resolution principles: Overwhelmingly, 
all interviewees greatly appreciated the opportunity to participate in skills 
training as either student or instructor because it allowed them to be more 
aware of various conflict resolution principles. Two main aspects of the 
experience provided interviewees with an “aha” moment of appreciation. 
First, their perspective on the function of conflict has changed. Frequently, 
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the interviewees expressed how negatively they had perceived “conflict” and 
its value in society, depending on the ways it is resolved, and they indicated 
that this paradigm shift helped them better confront a wide range of conflicts 
they experience in their daily lives. Such comments were made by 
participants with soft-spoken voices and less confrontational personalities.38 
CR 5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007) recounted the negative response 
that she had when she heard the term “conflict.” She said:   
I was afraid of conflicts, and avoid conflictual circumstances at any cost. My 
colleagues were often curious about how I managed to stay engaged in civil 
society activism given my tendency to run away from any tense moments. I 
think that such fear stems from my inability to constructively handle strong 
emotions associated with conflicts (CR 5, personal interview, 23 May 2007).  
 
Second, interviewees overwhelmingly highlighted that they were able 
to embrace and practice “tolerance” and made an effort to understand and 
accept different positions held by others. This particular point was reflected 
well in the following interviews: 
 
I did not realise that others did have a genuinely different perspective from me. I 
rather thought that such difference in a conflict situation was others’ intention to 
refuse conversation with me. I was critical of the difference, and interpreted the 
difference as other’s willingness to fight with me. (CR 4, personal interview, 10 April 
2007)  
 
Before the training, I was not able to sit through the arguments made by those who 
had seriously different perspectives from me. But, now, I have a bit more tolerance 
of difference. I am doing my best to remind myself that others could have such 
different perspectives. (CR 5, personal interview, 23 May 2007) 
 
I am still confused. But, one interesting change that happened after the training is 
my perspective shifted on righteous anger toward oppressors. Given the reality and 
social structure, it is important to advocate for the disfranchised. However, I feel 
much more hesitant in being angry and aggressively judgemental toward those who 
I consider as holding an oppressor’s position. I used to think that there should be a 
clear target to resist for social change whether they are conservative politicians or 
the ruling bourgeoisie. But, really now, I am constantly struggling with the idea that I 
should accept others’ humanity and their differing position because we strive to co-
exist. (CR 6, personal interview, 24 May 2007) 
                                                
38Throughout the interviews, CR 5 and CR 3 quietly recounted their experiences. During the interviews, 
they repeatedly mentioned that they do not like confrontations in conflictual situations.  
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Interviewees’ initial suspicion about conflict resolution is deeply related to 
the South Korean cultural perspective toward conflict in the political history of 
the country, which created polarisation, suppression, resistance, and denial of 
pluralistic ideas. Culturally, avoiding direct confrontation is highly encouraged in 
order to avoid any embarrassment (Miyahara et al., 1998). However, regarding 
political oppression of authoritarianism, for those who hold oppositional 
perspectives, conflict suppression is considered defeated only through direct 
confrontation against the oppressive state (Miyahara et al., 1998). Interviewees 
value the conflict resolution programme because it provides an alternative 
framework for various strategies to deal with difference.  
Increased capacity to handle conflictual circumstances. Shockley-
Zalabak explained that systematic training in coping skills contributes to 
individuals’ development of positive “alternatives for functioning in conflict from 
personal actions and reactions at the cognitive, emotional and behavioural level” 
(1984, p. 493). Similarly, interviewees highly value the importance of teaching 
various skills, such as active listening and problem-solving, as these help them 
perform their work better, but also enable them to handle contentious social 
issues. All the interviewees worked as civil society practitioners or active 
supporters, and had engaged in civil society organisations as staff members or 
committed activists during the democratisation movement. They noted that 
enhanced conflict resolution skills helped not only their interpersonal 
relationships, but also their work-related conflictual situations. For examples, 
two interviewees noted as follows:  
I annually organise a peace camp and interact with young people interested in this 
topic. Yet, our camp as a human community is full of conflict. We dreamed of 
peace and peaceful coexistence as a broader politics, but I was unable to 
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intervene in different types of conflict that erupted in our programme. In such a 
context, I participated in the conflict resolution training workshop, and I was happy 
with various skills that I learned to engage with our camp participants when they 
were in a conflictual situation with other camp members—a problem solving and 
process-oriented mind-set has been particularly helpful. With also better listening 
skills and communication techniques, others also seemed to feel more genuine 
and comfortable around me. (CR 3, personal interview, 21 May 2007) 
 
In my work, I engaged in a wide range of grassroots politics—local politics or in 
any community conflict. In our area, with continued pursuit of development, there 
are confrontations between those who would like to bring leisure facilities and 
community members who are critical of such facilities’ environmental affect. I used 
to engage in debates fiercely. I argued why my perspective was right and why 
others were wrong. It was very stressful, and the same debates continued on and 
on, etc. Now, I actually enjoy conflict situations because I feel confident in how to 
engage constructively with difficult situations that have clear positional differences. 
Before, I pointed out their wrongdoings. Now, I ask whether they have considered 
others’ perspectives. If so, I ask how they plan to address or understand such 
differences. I cannot speak for one incident, but such attitudinal change or skill 
improvement help me to get involved in various issues in our community without 
being exhausted. (CR 8, personal interview, 28 May 2007)  
 
While interviewees appreciated their enhanced capacity for conflict 
resolution, they also emphasised how difficult it is to practice various skills in 
their daily lives and apply them to their organisations.  
Opportunity to bring people into civil society activism. Interviewees 
positively assessed the importance of conflict resolution programmes in 
bringing more people back or welcoming them to civil society activism in a 
democratic era. Interviewees were quite confident about both their progressive 
political orientation and how such views are important for positive social change 
in South Korea. However, they noted that the movement or single-handed focus 
of activism often neglected processes, details, and methods to obtain their 
larger goal. After many years of involvement in activism, veteran practitioners 
often feel exhausted and desire to go back to ordinary life without too much 
involvement in big political issues. After being exposed to conflict resolution 
training or related activities, they believed they found ways to reclaim their 
political consciousness and remain relevant to social discourses. In particular, 
their positive assessment is linked to their involvement in educational 
 234 
234 
 
programmes with youth, and outreach to citizens, informed citizens, and 
educators. One interviewee summarised his experience in the following 
conversation: 
 
I was drawn to conflict resolution for its healing potential for my mind. I wanted to be 
more at ease with various conflicts that happen in my life. I was not quite interested 
in taking up social issues again as I was a bit exhausted with the whole intensity… 
but as I continued my participation in the training programme, I realised that I could 
remain highly active and relevant to social issues without putting myself into 
exhaustion and extreme dedication. I was happy that I could reclaim this space 
without sacrificing other important aspects in my life. (CR 1, personal interview, 30 
May 2007)  
 
In their own experiences, some interviewees saw the huge potential for 
this programme to genuinely reach out to the general public, who find politics, 
activism, and civil society engagement highly difficult and far from their own 
reality.  
Challenges. A wide range of personal reflections were made regarding 
the WMP-CR Centre’s programme, but as the interviewees were mostly 
supportive of the WMP-CR Centre’s programme, their criticisms were directed 
at external circumstances and the overall quality of conflict resolution activities 
and the training programme. Interviewees identified four challenges that could 
be considered further: difficulty in reaching out to ordinary citizens; difficulty in 
describing the concept; difficulty in understanding how individual change and 
cultural shifts would contribute to problem solving that requires structural and 
systematic change; challenge of bringing and applying conflict resolution 
principles and programmes into mainstream South Korean society; lack of 
systematic support from the government to utilise conflict resolution expertise 
and knowledge; and lack of opportunity to connect to conservative civic 
organisations and/or individuals with conservative ideologies.  
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Bringing the concept of conflict resolution to mainstream South Koreans. 
WMP-CR Centre’s conflict resolution training programmes have become 
increasingly popular among NGO professionals, educators, civil servants, and 
informed citizens, who have extensive backgrounds in civil society activism or 
who have been previously involved in political activism. Specifically, the 
demand for high-quality conflict resolution training has increased as issues 
surrounding social conflict have become an important policy debate in the 
country. However, except for regular youth education and periodic local 
community programmes, WMP-CR Centre’s conflict resolution programme has 
not been attended by ordinary citizens. Some interviewees explained that the 
lack of ordinary citizens’ participation is largely due to the complexity and 
unfamiliarity of various ideas underpinning conflict resolution. An interviewee 
whose organisation does outreach with community members in a rather 
conservative neighbourhood illustrated the difficulty of trying to explain some of 
the basic conflict resolution concepts learned during the training to ordinary 
citizens:  
WMP-CR Centre’s programme is the most advanced conflict resolution training 
programme in the country. Yet, the training we received does not necessarily help 
us to articulate these concepts in a pragmatic manner that can be understood by 
ordinary citizens in the community or conservative populations. In part, such 
difficulty comes from the fact that main concepts come from the Anglo-Saxon 
cultural context, which is very different from our culture. So far, we have not yet 
translated these concepts [to be] applicable to our daily lives. In order for us to 
reach out to broader constituents, we need more efforts. (CR 11, personal 
interview 21 May 2007) 
 
Highlighting the difficulty in explaining the various terminologies 
translated from conflict resolution manuals written in English to ordinary citizens, 
an interviewee recalled her personal experience of giving up trying to explain 
what she learned from her training to those who are not engaged in civil society 
activism:  
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When I met my friends, they asked me what conflict resolution is about. I tried to 
explain what the concept is. But, so many terms that I learn from the training are not 
shared by ordinary citizens. They are very foreign concepts which require extensive 
background explanation. Furthermore, some terms sound very unnatural in Korean. 
The fact that I have to explain so much for them to understand the basic concept is 
quite challenging to me, and it was boring to my friends. So, in the end, I ended up 
not explaining to my friends. I just told them I joined the training. (CR5, personal 
interview, 23 May 2007)  
 
Interviewees emphasised the strong need for developing scenarios and 
examples applicable to local community members who are not necessarily 
politically active, as well as identifying culturally appropriate frameworks for 
conflict analysis to enhance these programmes’ accessibility to ordinary citizens.  
Difficulty in understanding the affect of micro-level changes on a macro-
level social structure. All interviewees are politically active and advocate a 
progressive social change agenda. As discussed in previous chapters, a 
majority of civil society activists in South Korea are deeply inspired by a neo-
Marxist theoretical framework such as that of Gramsci, and thus view civil 
society as an emancipatory space existing to transform unequal and oppressive 
social relations (Lee, 1993). These activists are more accustomed to address 
structural challenges, and they seek to transform the negative structural 
patterns creating injustice or inhibit social justice. From such perspectives, 
conflict resolution’s emphasis on micro-level issues seems unable to address 
various structural issues, which perpetuate negative conflict patterns in society. 
Thus, for many, conflict resolution is rather difficult to share with their activist 
colleagues, as they feel it is difficult to connect micro-changes or cultural shifts 
taking place at the individual or community level to a broader social change. 
Many felt it was difficult to articulate specific links between conflict resolution 
practices that they have been integrating into their lives, both at the personal 
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and workspace level and in the context of overall social change goals. An 
interviewee illustrates the aforementioned challenge below:  
I often ask myself how much my own perspective change or [how much] resolution 
of small conflicts in my community can bring about broad social change which 
requires structural transformation. In order to make meaningful social change, we 
cannot ignore structural elements that reproduce oppressive social relations. 
However, the conflict resolution training programmes either lack such reflections 
or do not raise these questions of structural elements. I have advocated that 
activism and movement must address structural injustice and work to alter the 
negative structural elements through policies and systematic approach. Without 
addressing this fundamental question of structure, conflict resolution is limited in 
attracting a broad range of constituents from activists circle. Without articulating 
how the change taking place at the individual level affects a broader social change 
agenda, conflict resolution becomes a spiritual tool to teach us how to accept and 
tolerate the existing social structure and status quo. (CR 6, personal interview, 24 
May 2007)  
 
In order to bring more mainstream activists into conflict resolution, 
interviewees assessed the need for a clear linkage between conflict resolution 
and a broader social change agenda.  
Lack of participation of conservative constituents. As Fisher contends, 
training in conflict analysis and resolution can serve as a form of interactive 
conflict resolution “when it brings together members of conflicting groups to 
share a common learning experience that is based in part on the conflict 
between the two sides”(1997, p. 335). Some social conflicts in the country were 
escalated to the destructive level due to differences between progressive and 
conservative constituents. A civil society that often advocates progressive 
agendas contributes to mobilising conservative constituents around an 
opposing position. This pattern appears more visibly with regard to issues 
related to development (environmental public policy) and policy toward North 
Korea. In discussing one of the contentious social issues in South Korea, CR2 
(Personal interview, 19 June 2007) expressed the difficulty in engaging those 
who hold differing positions from the stance advocated by her organisation:  
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It is genuinely difficult for us to intervene in certain social conflicts such as the 
Maehyangli case.39 My organisation, along with others with whom we interact 
closely, has a strong stance. We are sympathetic to villagers, and are in 
solidarity with them. We also believe that the SOFA Agreement should be 
renegotiated. Under such circumstances, we are aware that we are not fit to 
mediate tensions between progressive and conservatives. Our society including 
civil society is polarised, and it is challenging to identify ways to bring these 
opposite sides together in a constructive manner. (CR2, personal interview, 19 
June 2007)  
 
While the WMP-CR Centre occasionally reaches out to conservative 
constituents through ad-hoc workshops, their regular training programme tends 
to attract participants who are more liberal. In explaining an ad-hoc encounter 
with conservative constituents, CR2 (Personal interview, 19 June 2007) recalled 
a lady who the author met briefly on 15 June 2007 during the meeting 
observation. “SJY whom you met at the training works for one of the most 
conservative women’s organisations in the country. In the past, it was very 
unlikely that you would have had someone from that organisation in an event 
that we organised” (CR2, personal interview, 19 June 2007).  
A majority of the people who remained connected to the WMP-CR 
Centre, or who have participated in conflict resolution training programmes, are 
similar in many ways: politically progressive, feminist friendly, highly educated, 
and politically active. CR2 (Personal interview, 19 June 2007) highlighted the 
importance of promoting conflict resolution skills and principles to a wide range 
of South Koreans, but indicated that time may be needed to connect with more 
people with different political positions. CR 9 shared an episode when she and 
                                                
39 Since 1952, the U.S. Air Force has used the land and facilities of the range in Maehyang-Ri for free, 
without any rent, on the basis of the SOFA agreement, which obliged the Korean Government to grant 
areas to the U.S. Armed Forces for free. Residents organised in early 2000 to demand the immediate 
closure of the range and reparation of and compensation for the damages to livelihood, violation of human 
rights, and destruction of environment and ecology. As a result of the continued campaign by residents of 
this village and civil society coalition, the Korean Government and the U.S. Armed Forces agreed in 2006 
to the closure of the range. This issue created two conflictual positions between Koreans—those who 
supported the villagers, and those who argued that Koreans should honour the SOFA Agreement for its 
security purposes.  
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her colleagues were asked to provide conflict resolution training to a 
conservative population.  
A few months after I began to provide conflict resolution training, CR 2 said that 
we were invited to provide training to members of the conservative advisory 
group on reunification. At the beginning, my colleagues and I were unsure 
whether we could manage the situation well, given that we almost all the time 
disagree on reunification related issues. However, in the end, we accepted the 
offer and provided the training. It was very educational for me, and was a good 
opportunity to engage with those who advocate differing positions. However, 
this will take a longer time for me to better internalise conflict resolution skills. 
(Personal interview, 30 May 2007) 
 
Lack of systematic support to utilise conflict resolution expertise and 
knowledge: One of the most frequently cited challenges in advancing conflict 
resolution programmes in the country is the lack of systematic support from 
governments to utilise conflict resolution expertise and knowledge. In a country 
where conflict is often considered negative or culturally taboo, it is critical to 
have systematic support from the public sector, such as the government.  
The RMH administration attempted to introduce legal infrastructure for 
conflict resolution and an infrastructure for public administration on conflict 
management, but CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007) highlighted that 
further efforts are required to institutionalise the conflict resolution mechanism 
in South Korea. The interviewees, including CR2 (2007) and CR 10 (2007), 
emphasised the need for the introduction of a conflict resolution system to all 
levels of society by establishing mediation centres, embarking on nationwide 
campaigns on conflict resolution, or institutionalising victim-offender restorative 
justice programmes. Without such systems in place, individuals with skills will 
not have any practical opportunity to sharpen their skills as well as advance the 
field in general. However, CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January and 19 June 
2007), CR7 (Personal interview, 30 May2007), and CR10 (Personal interview, 
26 January and 20 June 2007) cautioned that the conflict resolution system will 
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only be widely successful if it is brought into mainstream society with proper 
conflict resolution training facilities and quality assurance mechanisms. CR2 
said:  
 
Conflict resolution has become too fashionable. Numerous organisations have begun to 
claim their expertise. But, our basic infrastructure on conflict resolution remains 
unchanged compared to a few years ago. We need better education, and have clear 
expectations of what conflict resolution can do and what it cannot deliver. (Personal 
interview, 26 January and 19 June 2007) 
 
Reflection on nurturing a democratic system. Since the conclusion of 
the field research, there have been two notable developments in which the 
WMP-CR Centre has undertaken to advance conflict resolution practices in 
South Korea.40 First, the WMP-CR Centre has expanded its conflict resolution 
programmes into school violence intervention programmes through victim-
offender restorative justice.41 This programme began as an experiment in 2007 
in collaboration with the Seoul Metropolitan Police when six cases were 
reviewed. In 2008, the Family and Juvenile Court forwarded 14 cases for 
mediation based upon restorative justice principles. In 2009, six cases were 
sent to the WMP-CR Centre for mediation. The restorative justice mediation 
service is one of the first conflict resolution cases referred to a civil society 
organisation. However, all of these cases were intervened during the pilot test 
period, and restorative justice has not yet been integrated into the juvenile 
criminal legal system.  
Second, in late 2007, RMH announced a presidential decree on the 
Prevention and Resolution of Conflict within Public Institutions. This decree was 
                                                
40In relation to case study organisations presented in this dissertation, the author wishes to acknowledge 
that the events occurring after September 2010 were not captured.  
41Restorative justice is an approach to justice focusing on the needs of victims and offenders, instead of 
the need to satisfy the abstract principles of law or the need of the community to exact punishment. 
Restorative justice can involve a fostering of dialogue between the offender and the victim. The practices 
have shown the highest rates of victim satisfaction, true accountability by the offender, and reduced 
repeated offences (Mason, 2004).  
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symbolically significant because it introduced the resolution of public conflict 
into public political debates. However, its implementation lagged because of the 
weak enforcement authority of the presidential decree. Even with the 
inauguration of Lee Myung-Bak, who represented a conservative centre-right 
party, the issue of social conflict remains an important agenda, and in late 2010, 
the Act on the Prevention and Resolution of Public Conflicts was scheduled to 
be introduced to the National Assembly for their approval. The act makes the 
participation of civil society in the public policy decision-making process as an 
obligation. Given that the WMP-CR Centre played a pioneering role in 
advocating for a conflict resolution mechanism at a broader societal level, such 
policy development reflects that their efforts have been recognised by 
policymakers. 
The WMP-CR Centre brought about a number of positive changes in 
terms of nurturing the democratic capacity of civil society. These positive 
contributions can be divided into three categories: making peace discourse 
more accessible to grassroots populations; increased capacity for conflict 
resolution—particularly, tolerance and willingness to listen to others; and 
increased awareness of the need to connect with diverse populations. First, as 
indicated by a number of interviewees including CR 1 (2007), conflict resolution 
provides a useful tool to reach out to broader constituents and allows peace 
discourses to be easily accessible to ordinary citizens who perceive civic 
engagement as either an act of sacrifice or aggressive public engagement. As 
stated by CR 1 (Personal interview, 24 May 2007), “conflict resolution brings a 
macro-level peace discourse into a micro-level practical activity that anyone can 
engage within his or her daily lives” (CR 1, personal interview, 24 May 2007). 
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Thus, the conflict resolution activities of the WMP-CR Centre serve as a useful 
tool to enhance ordinary citizens’ participation in civil society’s space.  
Second, a number of interviewees, including CR 4 (2007), CR 5 (2007), 
and CR 6 (2007), indicated their satisfaction with the conflict resolution training 
because of their increased ability to tolerate differences. As emphasized by 
CR5 (Personal interview, 23 May 2007), the training helped them to be more 
patient with different opinions and provided them with skills to endure such 
differences without resorting to anger and emotional reactions.  
Third, in relation to increased tolerance of different opinions, 
interviewees such as CR4 (Personal interview, 10 April 207) acknowledged the 
need for engaging with others—that meant engaging with conservative 
constituents without attacking others’ differences. While this awareness has not 
been fully integrated into daily actions, except for a few interviewees who 
testified about their experience of engaging with former “others” in their 
workplace, increased awareness can contribute to changing their engagement 
pattern with those who hold different viewpoints.  
However, from the perspective of theoretical conflict resolution, WMP-
CR Centre has not been completely successful in mobilising more conservative 
and non-usual constituents around their activities. In part, this is related to the 
fact that the CR Centre is situated within WMP, an advocacy organisation 
founded in feminism and progressive political activism. As a result, to a certain 
extent, its affiliation with a progressive advocacy group negatively affects its 
neutrality and impartiality. As indicated by CR9 (Personal interview, 30 May 
2007) above, as individual members, WMP-CR Centre staff members or 
volunteers may be invited to intervene or facilitate difficult public dialogue 
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without losing their impartiality or neutrality as a facilitator or mediator. However, 
in situations where WMP has clear advocacy objectives, their affiliation 
becomes an obstacle to intervene without arousing the suspicion of those who 
hold ideological positions that differ from WMP members (CR2, personal 
interview, 26 January and 19 June 2007).  
In addition, The WMP-CR Centre has not effectively articulated the link 
between micro-level change with conflict resolution techniques and its affect on 
macro social change. For example, one of the initial objectives was to prepare 
the foundation for peaceful reunification by building peace constituents. 
However, it is not clear whether those who are trained in conflict resolution 
actually become peace constituents, as many of the training participants were 
already sympathetic to WMP’s overall goal. Without expanding its constituent 
base to reach a more grassroots population and to include more politically 
moderate South Koreans, their foundation for a peaceful society may have 
difficulty gaining a solid foothold in the broader activism of civil society. 
Case Study 3: Peace Activist Network  
The third case study emerged in the early 2000s. As an umbrella 
organisation with a semi-formal structure, it consists of a number of formally 
organised peace and conflict NGOs, and serves as a pioneering role in 
mobilising peace constituents within South Korean civil society. The network’s 
function goes beyond mobilising organisations in preparation for the Global 
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which took place in 2005 in 
New York. Since 2004, it has laid the foundation for a network of peace activism, 
such as an annual retreat among activists who are involved with peace and 
conflict organisations. A majority of organising committee members for this 
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annual peace activists’ retreat were active in the GPPAC-Korean Committee’s 
activities. Due to highly overlapping membership, this dissertation treats these 
umbrella groups (GPPAC-Korean Committee and Preparatory Committee for 
the Annual Peace Activist Retreat) as one entity. This entity will be called the 
Peace Activist Network.  
Contextual Overview of Peace Activist Network.42 
Peace beyond reunification. Studies on the peace movement43 in 
North America and Western Europe have described the post-World War II 
peace movement as closely linked to anti-war, anti-nuclear issues. As Salomon 
notes, “the peace movement may be considered as a human reaction to the 
level of armaments and to militarism, as an advocacy of alternative approaches 
to policies of national security” (1986, p. 115). As presented earlier in this 
chapter, in South Korean civil society discourse, issues concerning peace have 
been discussed in the context of broader democratisation strategies and 
reunification efforts (Koo, 2006).44 
With the democratic transition in 1987, diverse interests began to be 
expressed within civil society and numerous non-governmental organisations 
were formed to advocate a wide range of previously supressed social issues. 
Peace was one of the many themes to emerge after the 1987 democratisation. 
                                                
42This section is re-elaboration of the PCR field overview presented in the first section of this chapter. This 
section is constructed mostly based upon literature reviews and interviews with peace activists.  
43According to Nigel Young, “the peace movement refers to social or political movements which 
consciously, explicitly or implicitly, concern themselves primarily with peace as a term, concept or title, 
which define themselves (or are defined) as part of the ’peace movement’ or are overtly opposed to war, 
militarism or the organized use of force" (Young, 1986, p. 185). 
44 The only exception in this trend was found in the Christian church-affiliated social movement groups. 
Throughout modern history, progressive and radical Christian groups had not only played a critical role in 
mobilising the broader populations through their outreach activities, but also contributed to sustaining 
democratic activism due to their strong link to progressive political circles in the West – particularly the 
progressive Christian organisations in North America and Western Europe. In the 1970s, when 
democratisation was the single most important issue, progressive church organisations engaged in 
advocacy activities for South Koreans who were affected by Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombing. 
Specifically, on behalf of nuclear bombing victims, this group demanded compensation equal to that given 
to Japanese nationals (Lee, 1992).  
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However, unlike women’s rights, environmental conservation, consumer rights, 
or youth rights, peace activism in the early democratic transition period was 
invisible and remained at the very margin of civil society (Park, 2007). The 
relative absence of peace activism after the democratic transition is related to 
the fact that peace was framed within the reunification discourse, and both 
progressives and conservatives claimed their legitimacy on peace. As a 
progressive force, the peace movement confronted a particular challenge of 
authoritarian and cold war legacies in Korea – being labelled as red 
organisations. Even after the democratic transition, alternatives to the 
reunification strategy proposed by the South Korean government have a risk of 
being perceived as anti-government and pro-communist.  
In the early 2000s, South Korea’s peace activism became diversified 
and soon moved beyond a strictly reunification discourse. A wide range of 
issues was advocated under the banner of peace activism: anti-nuclear 
movement, anti-war movement, nonviolence movement, peace camps for 
young people, peace volunteering in conflict-affected countries, and peace 
education. For the first time, as PAN2 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) 
noted, peace is beginning to be understood outside of reunification logic and is 
becoming more relevant to ordinary people; advocating for peace outside of the 
Korean Peninsula is slowly becoming accepted by the broader population. This 
trend emerged because of two significant political changes – further 
consolidation of democratisation and changes in inter-Korean relations (Lee, 
2005) 
By 2000, three presidential elections had been held in South Korea, one 
of the most notable being the election of an opposition political figure as 
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president in 1997. A majority of democratic reforms had been introduced by that 
time. These reforms allowed civil society to look at a wide range of issues 
taking place outside of Korea – internal political and social issues were put into 
perspective within a global framework. In other words, peace activism in South 
Korea should be viewed as an outcome of the progress that occurred through 
democratic consolidation. In addition, with the 6-15 Korean Summit, an event 
wherein two Korean leaders meet in Pyongyang for the first time since the 
division, inter-Korean dynamics and the South Korean government’s ways of 
engaging with its counterpart in North Korea have shifted dramatically. As a 
result, for the first time, civil society has shifted its focus on the state and state 
behaviour toward North Korea when raising issues around peaceful 
reunification. Peace is more recently being framed as something that can exist 
outside the realm of inter-Korean diplomacy, or amidst advocacy work directed 
at top political leaders and diplomats. In this context, the Peace Activist Network 
is the first nationwide effort to claim civil society activists’ engagement in peace 
discourse, and is reflective of the activists’ desire to articulate a form of peace 
activism that is suitable for the country’s civil society.  
Toward the culture of peace and peace by peaceful means. One of 
the notable changes peace activism has experienced since the early 2000s is 
that civil society organisations have begun to focus on peaceful means or 
peace methodologies to foster the culture of peace. In this context, peace 
activism in South Korea integrates conflict resolution practices and principles in 
the context of cultural transformation.  
Highly critical of structures and cultural norms that perpetuate violent 
conflict, peace activism advocates the culture of peace, “a set of values, 
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attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent 
conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue” (UN 
Resolutions A/RES/52/13). In particular, peace activism in South Korea seeks 
to alter cultural elements deeply rooted in authoritarian legacies – militarism, 
extreme dichotomisation, and emphasis on outcomes (CSO2, personal 
interview 30 January 2007). As explained by CSO15 (Personal interview, 26 
April 2007), it stresses that authoritarian legacies affect all levels of South 
Korean society from ordinary citizens, institutional political systems and civil 
society to social movements. These legacies are detrimental to fostering a set 
of values, attitudes and behaviour conducive to peaceful resolution of 
contentious issues and peaceful coexistence with those who are ‘different’. By 
integrating conflict resolution methodologies into their peace education 
programmes or public outreach activities, peace activism aims to contribute to a 
cultural paradigm shift on peace.  
Conflict resolution methodologies are also increasingly appreciated by 
peace activists as a new way of promoting activism in South Korean civil 
society. One criticism recently directed to South Korean civil society is related to 
its methodology in its outreach activity, or its method of generating public 
discourse. One of the interviewees, PAN6, shared the following insight:  
 
Internally, within civil society, we would like to practice what we advocate – for 
example, there is a joke that there is absence of democracy for the organisations 
advocating democratic reforms; there is absence of peace for the organisation 
advocating peace. (Personal interview, 2 May 2007) 
 
This quote reflects peace activists’ self-reflection on how much civil 
society activists have themselves been affected by authoritarian legacies. 
Through the Peace Activists’ Network, practitioners do not only gain an 
opportunity to strengthen their knowledge on reducing violence and negative 
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conflict patterns that are often internalised through socialisation, but they also 
learn specific skills to help implement their activity through peaceful methods 
designed to foster attitudes and behaviours conducive to peaceful conflict 
resolution. 
Descriptive Overview of the Peace Activist Network.45 
Background. GPPAC-Korean Committee and the Preparatory 
Committee for the Annual Peace Activists Retreat emerged in 2003. Both 
networks emerged in response to an international call to civil society’s active 
engagement in peace work.  
This section will first discuss the context in which the GPPAC-Korean 
Committee was established. The Global Partnerships for the Prevention of 
Armed Conflict was established in 2003 “in response to Kofi Annan’s call to civil 
society organisations to elucidate their role in peace-building in his 2001 report 
on Preventing Armed Conflict” (Glasbergen, 2009, p. 17). The first global 
conference on the role of civil society in the prevention of violent conflict and 
peace building was scheduled to take place in New York in 2005, and 15 
regional centres were organised to mobilize civil society action and solidarity in 
their own respective regions.  
PAN8 (Personal interview, 11 May 2007) recalled that there was no 
regional centre initially covering Northeast Asia. In November 2003, after 
recognizing the need for a separate regional support center in Northeast Asia 
as its conflict dynamics differ from the ones in Southeast Asian countries, a 
centre was established with a headquarter in Tokyo (PAN8, personal interview, 
                                                
45This section is constructed based upon internal documents, meeting reports and interviews. The key 
document that the author referenced is the GPPAC Korean Activity Report (2006) as this is one of the 
most comprehensive reports that summarized the GPPAC Committee, Peace Retreat and overall peace 
activism in South Korea. For more information, please see Annex4.  
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11 May 2007). PAN8 described her experience in engaging with the early 
phase of the GPPAC-Korean Committee:   
 
A number of us (Korean civil society activists) working on peace related issues 
saw this as an important opportunity to strengthen the country’s peace 
discourse. We volunteered to lay the ground for the official launch of the 
GPPAC-Korea Committee, and our work began in early 2004. (Personal 
interview, 11 May 2007) 
 
The committee was officially launched on 8 April in 2004. Over 20 civil 
society organisations and individuals participated in the national committee with 
a view to elaborate on the role of civil society and the specific experience of 
South Korean civil society in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts. In 
addition, the national committee was aimed at strengthening and developing a 
network of peace practitioners in South Korea. PAN8 (Personal interview, 11 
May 2007) described the GPPAC-Korean Committee as “the first effort made by 
South Korean civil society organisations to engage with global civil society 
networks on the issue of conflict prevention and peace building.”  Over the 
course of 14 months, the GPPAC-Korea Committee engaged civil society 
organizations through national consultative meetings, regional forums, and 
international gatherings. With the conclusion of the GPPAC Global Conference 
in 2005, GPPAC-Korea was phased out, except for a few sporadic and ad-hoc 
basis gatherings (PAN8, personal interview, 11 May 2007).  
The Preparatory Committee for the Annual Peace Activists Retreat 
emerged in a much more ad-hoc manner – the first two workshops convened to 
discuss specific issues of concern to South Korean peace and conflict 
organizations, namely, the deployment of Korean troops in Iraq. In 2003, the US 
government requested the South Korean government deploy approximately 
3,000 troops to Northern Iraq to support U.S. reconstruction efforts (Korea 
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Defense Ministry, 2010). As reviewed in the earlier section, anti-war protests in 
the mid- 1960s and early 1970s existed at the very margin of South Korean civil 
society activism, and did not lead into the popular movement because such 
protests were considered anti-government, pro-democracy and anti-American 
radical movements (Lee, 2005).46  
By 2003, the context had changed due to the progress made in 
democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the RMH administration was highly 
critical of the traditional Korean diplomacy toward the U.S., and expressed the 
government’s discontent more freely than previous administrations. As a result, 
the previously labelled “anti-government,” “anti-dictatorial” and anti-American” 
radical protests were, for the first time, portrayed as international solidarity work 
that opposed the U.S. invasion in Iraq (Kim, 2009). To gain broader support, 
South Korean peace organisations began to use this campaign as a pro-peace 
and pro-international solidarity movement, and put more emphasis on peaceful 
ways of resolving conflict (Lee, 2005). To that end, civil society organisations 
focused on the integration of peaceful and non-violent methods in their 
engagement with citizens. For example, candlelight vigils and humming peace 
songs became a symbol of the anti-war movement in 2003. It is estimated 
about 10,000 citizens were mobilised in support of civil society organisations’ 
campaign against the deployment of Korean troops. Nonetheless, in mid-
October 2003, the National Assembly approved the Iraq Deployment Act, and 
                                                
46 As reviewed in Chapter 4, the United States has been the most important ally to the South Korean 
Government since 1945. It has not only provided a large number of U.S. troops in South Korea, but also 
played a critical role in inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asian security as a superpower. There is a 
precedent for South Korea’s deployment of its troops into war zones the U.S. was involved with: the 
Vietnam War. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, over 320,000 South Korean troops were 
sent to Vietnam  (Kim, 2001). The decision was made by Park in an effort to revise the military agreement 
between the U.S. and South Korea. At the end of the war, in total, 5,000 soldiers were killed, and 10,000 
were wounded. It is estimated approximately 20,000 soldiers who served in Vietnam suffered from being 
exposed to Agent Orange (Kim, 2001). 
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the anti-war movement lost strong momentum. In 2004, activists working with 
civil society organisations actively engaged in this process were “in need of 
space for reflection and re-energising peace activists” (PAN9, personal 
interview, 17 April 2007).  
In this context, the 2004 Workshop for Peace Activists and Professional 
NGO Practitioners for Peace Solidarity Work were convened in March 2004, 
and reviewed four themes: inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear 
crisis; South Korea- U.S. relations and independent diplomacy; deployment of 
troops to Iraq and international anti-war movement; and North Korean human 
rights. Due to the strong interest organisers received after the first workshop, 
they decided to organise a second workshop in November 2004. In late 2004, 
the anti-war campaign lost its momentum to a greater degree, and reflections 
that are more critical were made by peace activists. CSO2 recounted the 
intensity he felt during the November 2004 Workshop:  
 
Throughout my youth, I felt deeply sad that our society uncritically accepts the 
inevitability of wars and violence. I felt that I had to wait to raise peace in civil society 
activism, as democratisation is our foremost priority. In 2003, we organised a 
nationwide anti-war campaign for the first time. I felt sad about the situation, but was 
very encouraged to see fellow Koreans join us on the streets to oppose violence. Yet, 
by November 2004, we were faced with reality that we don’t have sustained peace 
movement, and felt like I disappointed our constituents. I even questioned my ability as 
an organiser to bring citizens into this important topic in a sustainable manner. I 
remember that I was not the only one with such sentiments. (Personal interview, 30 
January 2007) 
 
Echoing CSO2, the minutes from this meeting illustrated that serious 
reflections were raised about the lack of civil society’s capacity to make peace 
activism more accessible to ordinary citizens. A participant in this meeting 
reflected on his disappointment of the experience of organising broad peace 
activism: 
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Citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with the movement because all our 
activities centred on street protests. They were asked to come to a central place, 
and had to wait until professional activists initiated. Instead of making citizens more 
active participants, the movement objected. Secondly, the movement failed to 
create more innovative ways of framing this issue – always candlelight vigils or 
protests. It seemed that we had very little space for citizen participation in this issue. 
Thus, sustainability became a serious concern. (Peace Activists Retreat Minutes, 
2004)  
 
To overcome the challenge, it was suggested that peace activists in 
South Korea were in need of building capacity to engage with a wide range of 
constituents and identified ways to sustain the peace movement “from a one-
time anti-war protest against Iraq to a continuous movement advocating the 
culture of peace” (PAN7, personal interview, 29 January 2007).  
The workshop identified three major follow-up activities to integrate into 
South Korean peace activism. First, participants suggested traditionally 
neglected peace issues, such as human rights in North Korea, an anti-nuclear 
movement and nonviolent action. Second, innovative methodologies needed to 
be introduced to build broad peace constituents through a wide range of 
activities that could be easily communicated to ordinary citizens. Peace 
education, conflict resolution skills training and nonviolent communication 
techniques were suggested as a way to bring peace activism closer to the 
public. Third, participants recognised the need for regular gathering among 
peace activists and the need for a network among peace practitioners. PAN2 
(Personal interview, 29 January 2007) argued “the 2004 Workshops mandated 
the organisation of regular retreats for peace activists. We thought that these 
retreats would enhance the quality and depth of the peace movement in South 
Korea.”  
In 2005, as a majority of peace organisations focused their participation 
on the GPPAC Korean Committee and its related international solidarity work, 
the annual retreat did not occur. In 2006, the third workshop for peace activists 
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and professional practitioners convened, and the preparatory committee for this 
annual retreat was organised. A majority of the preparatory committee 
members for the annual retreats (up to date) have played a key role in the 
GPPAC Korean Committee. PAN2 who worked on the organisation of the 2006 
Peace Activist Retreat highlighted the importance of organising the 2006 
retreat:  
Right after our exposure to a major international peace conference, all of us 
were highly motivated, and felt a strong need to search for our own voices in 
peace discourses. It was a lot of work involved in preparing for the meeting, but 
I felt that this retreat was an important step to advancing peace activism in the 
country. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) 
 
Main activities47. These two networks have undertaken three main 
activities: action research concerning South Korean civil society engagement in 
peace and conflict activities; international solidarity work; and regular interaction 
among peace activists. 
Peace activism action research.48 The GPPAC-Korea Committee was 
organised primarily to document civil society’s efforts in conflict prevention and 
peace-building in the context of the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, the GPPAC-
Korea focused on collecting good practices and notable examples of civil 
society engagement in peace-building and conflict prevention activities in South 
Korea. PAN8 highlighted the value of generating knowledge around South 
Korean peace activism in civil society, arguing:   
The report writing process involved a series of consultations for us to gather 
necessary data. We convened a meeting among like-minded practitioners, and 
asked them to reflect upon our overall approach to conflict prevention and 
peace building. This process has not only allowed us to assess our work from 
the peace building and conflict prevention perspective, but also offered an 
                                                
47This section was heavily relied upon interviewees’ narratives. Some of the minutes from the meetings 
were also consulted (see Annex4).  
48 A primary purpose of action research is to produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in the 
everyday occurrences of their lives. A wider purpose of action research is to contribute to the increased 
well-being — economic, political, psychological, or spiritual — of communities and individuals. Action 
research is initiated and sustained by participants who are affected by, or who have lived through, aspects 
touched upon by specific research.  
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opportunity for us to think of ourselves as peace activists. (Personal interview, 
11 May 2007) 
 
The GPPAC-Korea frequently referenced global and regional themes in 
the development of the report on South Korean peace activism. This, in turn, 
led civil society organisations to further reflect on their activism through new 
conceptual frameworks. PAN2 (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) shared 
her experiences in reflecting her work based upon the four themes that the 
GPPAC Northeast Asia Report addresses: peaceful coexistence, peaceful 
engagement, culture of peace and economy of peace.  
 
Initially, I was not quite enthusiastic about these themes as I felt they were 
irrelevant to our contexts. I felt slightly irritated that we had to comply with the 
foreign-imported theoretical lenses. However, this was a useful exercise, and 
empowering experience. By allowing myself to look at the issues that I work on 
through alternative conceptual frameworks, I identified what is missing in my 
work. There is a serious gap in micro-level peace discourses, and all my energy 
was devoted to highlighting great discourses on peace. (PAN2, personal 
interview, 29 January 2007) 
 
By 2005, GPPAC-Korea contributed to developing two papers – one is 
an activity report on South Korean civil society organisations’ work in conflict 
prevention and peace-building, and the other one is a regional agenda and 
action plan. These two reports were considered one of the first efforts capturing 
peace activism undertaken by South Korean civil society organisations.  
Similarly, the Preparatory Committee for Annual Peace Activist Retreat 
provided a space for continual reflection on existing practices and took steps to 
archive such efforts. Based upon existing knowledge produced through the 
GPPAC-Korea’s research work, the committee identified areas for further 
reflection and empowerment, and surveyed how such challenges can be 
addressed and used as opportunities for peace activism in South Korean civil 
society (PAN2, personal interview, 29 January 2007). As a result, the 
committee produced one of the most comprehensive reports on South Korean 
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peace activists’ perspective on current peace activism and published an annual 
white paper on peace activism in South Korea. PAN7 explained the importance 
of having knowledge generated by Korean activists:  
As you can imagine, having our own voices and our critical lenses helped us 
continuously explore peace discourses corresponding to our own reality. I think 
that these reports would make an important contribution to young activists in 
their pursuit for peace in our country. (Personal interview, 29 January 2007) 
 
Regular interaction and network building. Prior to 2003, very few 
meetings were organised specifically to empower peace activists compared to 
other movements such as environmentalism, gender empowerment and human 
rights. PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) explained, “In my early 
encounter with civil society activism, I was not familiar with the term ‘peace 
activists’. I consider them existing in other countries, but not in our context.”  
Both GPPAC-Korea and Preparatory Committee brought previously 
disconnected activists together under the banner of peace activism. They 
reached out to a wide range of constituents interested in peace-related issues, 
and brought together NGO practitioners across the field. By regularly convening 
meetings, these two entities contributed to building a network of activists who 
identified themselves as peace practitioners in South Korea. 
GPPAC-Korea had a series of national meetings and workshops allowing 
sustained and focused interaction among over 20 organisations interested in 
conflict prevention and peace-building. As for the Preparatory Committee, their 
annual retreats currently bring together over 150 activists, practitioners and 
researchers to exchange ideas on peace activism relevant to South Korea. 
Their preparatory meetings further strengthen pioneering organisations’ 
leadership capacity for network building. Each retreat requires more than 15-20 
meetings as well as a financial commitment to build the network.  
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In order for GPPAC-Korea to better articulate their knowledge of certain 
themes in conflict-affected countries, a number of their meetings were 
organised as workshops examining global peace themes, trends and issues 
raised by other GPPAC regional centres and global agendas. Such workshops 
provided peace practitioners with new knowledge and methodologies to 
practice and share their agendas. For the Preparatory Committee of the Annual 
Peace Activist Retreats, a number of different programmes are offered to help 
activists gain new skills, such as peace education, conflict resolution skills, non-
violent communication and other relevant techniques with which South Korean 
civil society organisations are not familiar.  
International solidarity and cooperation. As stated earlier, GPPAC-Korea 
was launched in support of a global network of civil society organisations 
working on conflict prevention and peace-building. In this regard, a majority of 
their activities were related to engaging with civil society counterparts in the 
northeast region and participated in the 2005 Global Meeting. From 2004 to 
2005, a series of meetings and workshops were organised to bring together 
activists and practitioners in the region, and Korean peace practitioners were 
exposed to international solidarity work in this regard (GPPAC-Korea Activity 
Report, 2005). The Peace Activist Retreat continued this legacy by including 
international solidarity in their core themes and by discussing ways to include 
non-Korean speaking activists into their meeting (PAN2, 29 January 2007).  
Analytical overview of the Peace Activist Network.  
Interviews and observation. Fifteen interviews were used to better 
understand the work of the two semi-formal associations – a majority of them 
are veteran NGO practitioners working for PCR organisations. Thus, with a few 
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exceptions, most of them were fully involved in the democratic transition and 
opposition movements. NGO activists work to cover a wide range of issues and 
many of them share the characteristics of hybrid multi-purpose organisations.  
The issues covered by interviewees’ organisations include: political 
reforms, economic policy, democratic reforms, human rights, reunification and 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea, international solidarity action work, 
Northeast Asian relationships, youth work, peace camps, peace education, war 
crimes, peace culture, Christian ecumenical activism, women’s rights, the 
integration of North Korean defectors into the South Korean society, policy 
monitoring, anti-corruption and so forth.  
All of the interviewees indicated that they were involved in peace and 
conflict activities, and, to some extent, embrace conflict resolution 
methodologies in their work – whether they are policy-oriented, training-oriented, 
or service delivery. Nearly two-thirds of interviewees are males – this reflects 
gender divisions existing in civil society. For example, as an interviewee noted: 
 
Hard politics (policy making in diplomacy and security issues) is considered to be 
a masculine realm reserved for male activists. Reunification, advocacy, or major 
political activities involved are often considered as a more masculine space. In 
soft politics such as the cultural realm, for example, conflict resolution education or 
peace education in school – all of the topics related to grassroots politics and 
ordinary people’s day-to-day life – are considered to be more feminine subjects. 
(PAN3, personal interview, 16 April 2007)  
 
This research included not only activists working for innovative and 
emerging NGOs, but also practitioners engaged in prominent and politically 
well-connected civil society organisations. Furthermore, higher-ranking civil 
society officials were engaged for the interviews – most of them had been 
working for civil society organisations for over two decades and were either 
running the organisation or were responsible for a particular team. Senior ranks 
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combined with prominent NGOs partially explain a higher representation of 
males.  
All of the interviewees are highly educated – their educational 
background and strong knowledge on this issue were fully reflected in the 
interview transcripts – as compared to other interviews, which reflected much 
more informal narrative styles; the interview transcripts used for this case study 
consist of facts and specific knowledge related to PCR work in South Korea. 
Rather than personal reflection on the work, their interviews present historical 
overviews of their work and of the peace movement in general. This posed a 
challenge to the author in terms of interpreting and analysing their interviews. 
Instead of personal reflections, there were too many facts that the author had to 
constantly check back with existing literature to verify the accuracy of their 
narratives on certain subjects.  
Except for two seminars organised by one of the interviewees, no 
specific observations were made to better understand the peace activists’ 
network. However, the two seminars provided an opportunity to interact with a 
range of individuals interested in PCR issues within South Korean civil society – 
one noticeable observation was that the seminars were largely attended by 
young practitioners in their late 20s and early 30s, and attracted ordinary 
citizens without special civil society organisational affiliations.  
Motivation. Unlike interviewees who participated in the two other case 
studies, interviewees from the Peace Activist Network shared their motivation 
as stemming from a professional affiliation-standpoint with peace-oriented 
organisations rather than for personal reasons.  
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First, interviewees engaged in the GPPAC-Korea Committee with a 
vision of consolidating South Korean civil society’s efforts in the areas of conflict 
prevention and peace-building. This was related to the fact that they wanted to 
introduce the South Korean perspective into the global stage. PAN1 
summarised the views reflected by other interviewees:  
 
In peace discourse within global civil society, I realised that we were under-
represented compared to civil society organisations in other countries that 
western NGOs were more familiar with. I felt that our efforts are worth sharing 
with the global community, and decided to engage in the GPPAC-Korea 
Committee. (personal interview, 29 January 2007) 
 
Second, interviewees indicated they became involved in Peace Activists’ 
Retreat to strengthen their capacity to undertake peace activism. PAN13 
(Personal interview, 29 January 2007) described that there was a lack of 
opportunity to share personal reflections on peace activism, and he engaged in 
the retreat in order to enhance his personal and organisational capacity in this 
area.  
Reflection on positive contributions of having a peace activist 
network. Interviewees indicated a number of positive contributions these 
networks have made for them and more broadly, for South Korean civil society.  
Space for reflection. Positive responses were given concerning the fact 
that the space provided by these entities allows interviewees to reflect on how 
they engage with their constituents when advocating an issue linked to peace 
and conflict. Specifically, these spaces provided interviewees with an 
opportunity to reflect on their outreach and educational methods when 
communicating a peace agenda. A number of interviewees indicated they 
became more aware as activists and focused more on knowledge sharing 
rather than providing practical tools to build a peaceful culture. Concentration 
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on knowledge and critical interpretation of such information has been an 
impediment to reaching broader constituents. An interviewee summarised this 
point, as follows: 
 
We have a number of knowledge forums and seminars. These forums and 
seminars intellectually analyse all sorts of problems inhibiting peaceful inter-
Korean relations. However, compared to the knowledge realm, peace activism in 
Korea neglects process, values, and technical aspects of peace. Interacting with 
other peace activists highlight such aspects and make us more reflective on how 
we can promote a culture of peace through peace activism. (PAN1, personal 
interview, 29 January 2007)  
 
As highlighted above, interviewees recognise that knowledge-focused 
activism has failed to equip practitioners with non-knowledge related PCR 
techniques. Interviewees highlighted how interacting with other practitioners 
and collectively reflecting upon civil society’s peace activism practices helped 
them to identify techniques and practical tools that could be usefully 
incorporated into their daily activism. An interviewee shared his experience of 
integrating peace and conflict into his organisation’s reunification education 
programme: 
 
We provide an educational programme on reunification – background and historical 
development around reunification discourses. Then, we integrate more pragmatic 
items into a reunification agenda in order to stimulate their participation in peace 
activism on a daily basis. My colleagues and I have gained increased 
understanding on conflict resolution through regular interaction with other peace 
activists. (PAN4, personal interview, 2 May 2007)  
 
Through the network, some interviewees participated in international 
and regional seminars and were given an opportunity to interact with peace 
activists from different countries. An interviewee appreciated the opportunity 
to reflect further on peace activism:  
 
I enlarged my perspectives on peace through this opportunity. I was reminded 
peace cannot be attained only by altering structural violence and internal 
militarism. Rather, peace is a holistic process based upon shared appreciation 
for peaceful coexistence and requires all actors of society. (PAN9, personal 
interview, 17 April 2007)  
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Enhanced capacity for nonviolence and conflict resolution. With 
increased participation in capacity building programmes in the areas of conflict 
resolution, nonviolence communications, conflict transformation seminars, and 
so forth, interviewees felt more empowered to explain these concepts to their 
constituents. An interviewee recalled her experience:  
 
I was easily nervous when confronted with opposition who I considered wrong. But, 
with frequent exposure to peace methods and conflict resolution techniques, I feel 
more at ease in dealing with difficult situations. My colleagues used to joke about 
peace practitioners who are least peaceful in their ways to resolve differences. By 
interacting with others and sharing these concerns together, I feel more conscious 
about the ways I am engaged with others. I am grateful for various capacity building 
opportunities. (PAN14, personal interview, 10 May 2007) 
 
Bringing diversity into activism. Young interviewees welcomed the space 
provided by these networks and a new wave of peace activism, as they were 
more innovative alternatives to existing social movement organisations 
prominent in South Korean civil society. From young practitioners’ perspectives, 
the space provides an opportunity to reflect upon alternatives to traditional 
activism and fierce advocacy movements, which employ street protests, 
marches and policy statements. Specifically, these interviewees found that skills 
provided by conflict resolution, such as facilitation, dialogue, active listening and 
interactive ‘ice-breaker’ games are useful to diversify their outreach tactics 
toward youth. 
One interviewee noted, “I find the notion of conflict resolution and non-
violence highly valuable. These concepts taught me how to convey the 
message of big issues such as peace, regional security, North Korea and 
human rights through creative, reflective ways” (PAN9, personal interview, 17 
April 2007). Many voiced their concern that, initially, they felt sceptical about the 
way conflict resolution was framed because it often underplays the importance 
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of structural injustice and marginalisation of the poor and underprivileged in 
society.  
The younger interviewees such as PAN2 (2007), PAN9 (2007), PAN11 
(2007) and PAN13 (2007) highly value the importance of traditional advocacy 
work for its ability to mobilise collective action in order to change various 
structural issues facing the country. However, many of them believed 
something else needed to be brought into current NGO activism to broaden 
citizen participation, particularly among the younger generation. In their 
organisations, these interviewees worked closely with young adults and 
organised youth-based activities such as workshops, training programs and 
awareness-raising events. Their experience made them aware that traditional 
‘policy discussion’ and ‘radical activism’ ideas need to be translated into more 
interactive, experiential programs the younger population can easily approach. 
Unlike the previous generation, who lived through the authoritarian regime, the 
young population does not respond to traditional advocacy work and 
ideologically-driven social reforms that appeal to moral arguments. Increasingly, 
a strong demand has been made by the younger South Korean population, 
aged 17 to 30, to engage in political activism with a more practical approach 
and career-oriented values. The journey for younger practitioners in 
participating in conflict resolution is to engage more proactively with the 
population with which they intend to connect.  
Interviewees, such as PAN8 (2007), PAN9 (2007), and PAN12 (2007), 
who were not affiliated with any organisations, expressed difficulty in terms of 
involving individuals from a non-activist background to engage in activism within 
South Korean civil society. Even in the civil society space, PAN9 (2007) 
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highlighted that the existing authoritarian legacy deeply and unintentionally left 
out those who did not fit into the usual confines of civil society practitioners. 
PAN12 (Personal interview, 30 April 2007) highly appreciated that more 
individuals with less affiliations and less traditional social movement were 
allowed to join and interact with civil society colleagues through the Peace 
Activists Network.  
Reflection on challenges of advancing peace activism agenda. 
While interviewees appreciated many aspects of these peace networks, they 
also raised certain concerns regarding South Korean civil society’s peace 
activism.  
Difficulty in mainstreaming peace activism. Despite its continued growth, 
interviewees noted that peace activism remains marginal within South Korean 
civil society for three reasons. First, perception toward the term “peace” has 
been relatively negative or absent. An interviewee shared others’ reactions 
when he used the term “peace education” in order to demonstrate how little 
understanding exists concerning the term peace: 
Every time I introduced myself as a peace educator, people did not understand 
what I meant by saying that. They were thinking of ethics or morality education or 
looking at me as if I am a cult religious leader. Even within activist circle, the 
concept of peace and peace education are not well understood. People think 
peace is related to religion or spirituality such as peace of mind or they 
automatically link peace to reunification. In South Korea, peace is an extremely 
foreign and difficult concept to effectively advocate. (PAN7, personal interview 29 
January 2007)  
 
Another interviewee, PAN13 (personal interview, 29 January 2007), 
indicated that practicing peace in daily life is perceived to be extremely 
difficult for practitioners, and often peace activists mistakenly perceive that 
someone like Ghandi could only advocate peace on a daily basis. The lack 
of practical models on peace activism and lack of unique South Korean 
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peace discourses have further alienated peace activism from mainstream 
civil society practitioners, let alone ordinary citizens.  
Second, similar to the first point, peace as a political term is too often 
linked to inter-Korean relations and is understood as a radical discourse. This 
radical, inter-Korean related perception often provokes an emotional reaction 
from conservative constituents. An interviewee recalled a phone call she 
received from a conservative individual attacking her organisation’s position on 
peaceful reunification: “For older generations, peace should be equal to anti-
communism. Peace as a method of co-existence is perceived to be very 
dangerous and radical. I remember a phone call from old gentleman who called 
us communists when he learned about our work” (PAN13, personal interview, 
29 January 2007). In this context, some interviewees, including PAN2 (2007) 
and PAN13 (2007), indicated practical difficulty in engaging with conservative 
constituents who are entrapped in the Cold War mentality regarding the issue of 
peace, despite their enhanced capacity to manage difficult conversations. 
Third, veteran NGO practitioners indicated that a lack of structure within 
peace activism inhibits further growth of peace organisations in South Korean 
civil society. An interviewee explains this phenomenon:  
 
Many civil society organisations have an issue with sustainable organisational 
structure. However, peace organisations are significantly decentralised and work 
against various social and cultural norms in terms of organisational structure, 
hierarchy, and formality. Various peace issues emerge sporadically and disappear 
quickly without central focal points. Unless these organisational issues are more 
seriously reflected upon, peace activism would continue to remain at the margin of 
civil society. (PAN10, personal interview, 14 June 2007)  
 
In summary, interviewees emphasised the uniqueness of the peace 
movement in South Korea and illustrated how its innovative quality can turn into 
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its weakness when there is no sustainable organisational structure to continue 
the momentum.  
Relevance of Western peace theoretical framework. Numerous theories 
on conflict analysis, peace and different terminologies have been introduced to 
South Korean civil society practitioners. Regarding this knowledge base, PAN1 
(personal interview, 29 January 2007) questioned whether such reference 
points could be useful to strengthen South Korea’s own peace discourses and 
expressed a concern that such unreflective acceptance of a certain theoretical 
framework may distort civil society practitioners’ creativity to generate a 
discourse unique to the context of South Korean society. PAN1 (Personal 
interview, 29 January 2007) was particularly vocal, and argued, “some of the 
theories that are currently popular in the West are more useful to explain 
conflicts and violence erupting in their peripheries. As much as I am critical of 
the traditional realist international relation, the Korean peace context seems 
better explained by those than the peace discourse we were exposed to here in 
Seoul.”  Veteran peace activists, such as PAN7 (Personal interview, 29 
January 2007), highlighted the strong need to foster the country’s own peace 
discourses.  
Reflection on democratic nurturing component. The Peace Activist 
Network continued to organise their annual retreats, and published a book on 
Korea’s peace activism. By engaging with global civil society’s action agenda 
on conflict prevention, Korean peace activists were provided an opportunity to 
document their efforts and frame their experiences from the perspective of 
conflict prevention. Furthermore, consistent with action research objectives, 
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activists identified the areas of further engagement to strengthen peace 
capacity in the country.  
The network has contributed to enhancing participants’ ability to nurture 
democracy in the following three areas. First, in order to prepare for an 
international report as well as through regular interactions, peace activities were 
afforded frequent opportunities to build new tools and methods, including 
conflict resolution training and other peace methods such as nonviolence 
techniques, conflict transformation analysis, nonviolent communication and so 
forth. The activists’ exposure to these methods helped them reflect upon their 
overall strategy to engage with the general population as well as their methods 
to advance peace agendas (PAN14, personal interview, 10 May 2007). 
Interviewees, such as PAN4 (2007), PAN5 (2007), and PAN14 (2007) highly 
appreciated the opportunity to reflect upon the process and methods 
corresponding to their overall objective; that is, creating structure that sustains 
peaceful relations. In so doing, they identify that the field needs to value a 
process rather than an outcome, to place an emphasis on tolerance rather than 
judgement and embrace increased empathy toward others rather than criticising 
others’ differences.  
Second, the Peace Activist Network provided practitioners with an 
opportunity to explore how peace, often understood in the context of national 
reunification, which is separated from people’s daily activities, can become an 
issue that matters in the daily lives of ordinary citizens (PAN7, personal 
interview, 29 January 2007). Through research and exchange of viewpoints, 
peace activists identify that their peace agenda has not been successfully 
shared with a grassroots population, in part, because their agenda focuses on 
 267 
267 
 
macro-level political changes. With increased reflection around their ability to 
connect to ordinary citizens, the network identified the need to enhance its 
outreach and educational capacity through peace education programmes, 
conflict resolution training and other innovative methods focusing on peaceful 
processes.  
Third, younger practitioners, as well as veteran activists, indicated that 
the Peace Activist Network was beneficial to civil society in general, as it 
provides an opportunity to reflect upon a lack of democracy existing within 
South Korean civil society organisations. While a majority of NGOs uphold and 
advocate for progressive social values, the space reflects the culture of the 
larger society. The country’s cultural values to respect authority, elders, 
community and collective values have enormous potential to foster a 
harmonious society. Yet, when these values are imposed, they become 
culturally oppressive and undemocratic. An older practitioner reflected on this 
matter:  
Even for peace-like issues, you need to contact the executive body of the 
organization if you want to get things done. But, I hope civil society becomes a 
model of inclusive participatory decision-making bodies. I see the potential of CR 
practices that allow our young practitioners to articulate their views and opinions 
even before their bosses. (PAN1, personal interview, 29 January 2007)  
 
Various techniques learned through retreats are a useful reference to 
begin discussion on how to democratize internal civil society structures, which 
are often hierarchical, collective and less participatory. 
Despite its contributions, the Peace Activist Network has some limits to 
strengthening civil society’s capacity for nurturing democratic skills and attitudes. 
First, in response to increased interest in the field of peace and conflict 
resolution, practitioners from diverse NGOs began to engage in the network – 
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however, it still excludes the conservative population from peace discourses, 
and these organisations are increasingly questioned on their ability to interact 
with a wide range of constituents. These problems are in part related to the fact 
that there is a lack of procedural mechanism within progressive civil society 
organisations to address constructively different viewpoints around what peace 
constitutes.  
Second, in spite of activists’ increased awareness on process and 
communication techniques, their advocacy patterns have not changed 
significantly in the last five years. Within progressive organisations, peace 
advocates continue to resort to traditional advocacy techniques in relation to 
expressing their disagreement with the government. A prime example is a 2010 
incident on a South Korean naval ship that wrecked due to an alleged attack by 
North Korea; in an attempt to express their disagreement with the government’s 
official position, the organisation held protests, issued statements and engaged 
in advocacy campaigns. However, during this time, there was a lack of effort to 
engage citizens from a wide range of political backgrounds and to understand, 
and include, their perspectives.  
Conclusion 
After briefly discussing the status of conflict resolution activities in South 
Korean NGOs, this chapter has reviewed, in detail, three case studies. School 
Peace is an example of a grassroots organisation utilising conflict resolution 
activities in their educational activities for youth and adults. As a pioneering 
organisation, WMP-CR Centre illustrates how a small NGO introduces and 
develops the field of conflict resolution in South Korea. As reviewed extensively, 
it has contributed to raising awareness on conflict resolution and has advocated 
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the need to develop conflict resolution and leadership within civil society 
organisations. Finally, this chapter has reviewed the Peace Activists’ Network 
and has examined how global civil society’s agenda has helped to strengthen 
national-level PCR organisations. Further, the case study highlighted how 
building a support network of peace activists contributes to diversifying peace 
agendas within civil society. Based upon the aforementioned case studies 
examined in this chapter, the next chapter will compare the findings of these 
three organisations and will discuss to what extent these organisations have 
contributed to enhancing civil society’s capacity for nurturing democracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDY COMPARISON AND REFLECTION 
 
The previous chapter reviewed three case study organisations 
individually by focusing on the organisations’ overall structure, emerging context, 
and interviewees’ reflections on the opportunities and challenges of advancing 
the peace and conflict-resolution agenda that each organisation advocates. 
Each case study concluded with a short reflection on its contribution to 
enhancing civil society’s democratic quality, and discussion of its limitations. 
Built upon the in-depth analysis of each case study, constructed through 
interviewees’ narratives, observations, and archival study, this chapter 
discusses the similarities and differences between these organisations’ 
approach to peace and conflict-resolution activism. The comparison across 
case studies aims to outline how different types of civil society organisations in 
South Korea emerge and shape the country’s peace and conflict-resolution 
movement. The comparison of these case study organisations will be based on 
four levels of analysis: organisational overview; interviewees’ narratives on 
motivation, challenges, and opportunities; issue-framing on peace, conflict, and 
conflict-resolution; and reflections on democratic qualities.  
An overview analysis of the organisations helps to provide a better 
understanding of the similarities and differences in terms of organisational types, 
emerging context in relation to democratisation, main constituents, and how 
they utilise peace and conflict-resolution practices within their broader 
organisational contexts. This basic analysis also helps to identify specific 
patterns that can contribute to the emergence of peace and conflict-resolution 
organisations. An analysis of interviewee narratives discusses what motivates 
civil society activists and participants to engage in peace and conflict-resolution 
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activism that each organisation promotes. It also compares the aspects of each 
organisation’s peace and conflict-resolution activism perceived as strengths and 
opportunities to further enhance the country’s civil society, and what areas are 
considered as challenges to advance the peace and conflict-resolution agenda 
that each organisation represents.  
An analysis of conflict-resolution and issue-framing focuses on the 
issues these organisations advocate to their constituents. Specifically, this 
helps to explore how the concepts of peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution are 
presented to each organisation’s constituents and allows for an assessment of 
each organisation’s inclusiveness and impartiality, while also exploring their 
potential to facilitate social conflicts emerging in South Korea. The paper will 
analyze how these interviewees assess and elaborate the democratic qualities 
to which they are exposed as a result of their engagement with the peace and 
conflict-resolution activities. Specifically, it focuses on how these interviewees’ 
narratives reflect a set of four democratic qualities that this dissertation defined 
as key elements to strengthen civil society’s ability to nurture democratic 
citizenship. As elaborated upon in previous chapters, the author will argue that 
the following set of democratic norms, processes, and skills are beneficial to 
advancing the embracing of liberal democracy: respect for diversity and 
tolerance; commitment to non-violent and constructive problem-solving; 
willingness to engage in difficult conversations; and participation in the public 
sphere. The chapter concludes by reflecting briefly on the opportunities and 
challenges facing South Korea’s peace and conflict-resolution activists in 
pursuit of deepening democratic consolidation.  
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Organisational Overview 
Table 5 summarises each organisation’s overall activities and emerging 
contexts to compare the similarities and differences between the three 
organisations.  
Table 5: Comparison: Organisational Overview 
 School Peace WMP-CR Centre Peace Activist 
Network 
Type of 
Organisation  
§ Grassroots 
Voluntary 
Association 
§ Multi-Purpose Hybrid 
Organisation 
§ Network of NGO 
Practitioners/  
Civil Society Network  
Year of 
Establishment  
§ 2002 (15 years 
after the 
democratic 
transition) 
§ 2003 (WMP-CR Centre: 
16 years after the 
transition) 
§ 1997 (WMP: 10 years 
after the transition) 
§ 2003 (GPPAC-Korea: 
16 years after the 
transition)  
§ 2003 (Peace Retreat: 
16 years after the 
transition)  
Context / 
Background  
§ Suicide of a 12-
year-old boy in the 
neighbourhood as 
a result of school 
violence 
§ Response to 
address the lack 
of systematic and 
preventive 
measures for 
school violence 
§ Partnership with AFSC 
on conflict resolution 
training to build peace 
constituents in South 
Korea 
§ Preparing for a reunified 
Korea and building 
capacity for conflict 
resolution 
§ Searching for alternative 
ways to manage conflicts 
emerging after 
democratisation 
§ Launch of the GPPAC 
Global Secretariat 
§ Anti-War / Anti-
deployment of troops 
in Iraq movement in 
2002-2003, the first 
large scale peace 
movement in Korea 
Political 
Orientation  
§ Progressive / 
Liberal 
§ Progressive / Liberal 
 
§ Progressive / Liberal 
Constituents  § Local residents in 
the neighbourhood 
 
§ Citizens, but mainly 
informed citizens, 
feminists, progressive 
intellectuals, educators, 
and civil society 
practitioners 
§ Peace activists, peace 
scholars, and civil 
society practitioners 
interested in peace 
and conflict issues 
Strategies & 
Activities 
§ Policy advocacy 
§ Youth peace 
education 
§ Adult conflict 
resolution training 
§ Conflict resolution 
training – youth and 
adults  
§ Facilitation/mediation 
training  
§ Conflict resolution 
research  
§ Policy advocacy  
§ Conflict resolution 
service delivery 
§ Action research on 
peace agenda 
§ Network 
building/knowledge 
sharing 
§ Capacity building 
activities 
§ International solidarity 
 
Types of organisation. Each organisation represents a different aspect 
of civil society, demonstrating the applicability of peace and conflict-resolution 
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activities to various civil society settings. School Peace illustrates how local 
community members can utilise conflict-resolution in educational programmes 
to address a community problem in an inclusive manner. While it lacks 
specialised knowledge on peace education and conflict-resolution, School 
Peace’s informal, less hierarchical structure motivates its members to take 
active ownership of the materials they use to promote peace among young 
students and to stimulate further learning among members. However, its lack of 
formal structure creates difficulties when it comes to fundraising. As a result, the 
organisation’s ongoing sustainability is deeply dependent upon volunteers’ 
motivation, availability, and willingness to work, as outlined in School Peace’s 
2010 evaluative meeting on its future direction.  
Barnes (2005) highlights civil society’s ability to improve ordinary 
citizens’ conflict-resolution capacity as one of the advantages that civil society 
organisations have in the areas of conflict-prevention, resolution, and peace-
building. As the first specialised conflict-resolution non-governmental 
organization (NGO), WMP-CR Centre promotes the spreading of conflict-
resolution values and skills to the broader society. WMP-CR Centre began as 
an ad hoc team consisting of its members’ active contributions. Later, however, 
its operational capacity was strengthened by the employment of full-time staff 
members charged with managing funding applications, co-ordinating 
communications, and managing other daily activities. At the same time, it 
maintains its roots as a membership-based NGO seeking strong input and 
participation from its dues-paying members. Reflecting this, it is no surprise to 
find a majority of WMP-CR Centre’s activities are undertaken with the strong 
participation of its members. By combining a membership-based structure with 
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a professionalised organisational mechanism, WMP-CR Centre demonstrates 
how an NGO can motivate its members’ active engagement in conflict-
resolution educational programmes, while ensuring funding sustainability and 
the operational capacity to manage daily activities.  
As Rios (2000) explains, “A network structure emerges when linkages 
are formed to address a certain issue. Recognizing a type of coalition or 
network is necessary to accomplish a broad, common mission” (p. 176). The 
sustainability of networking structures is secured through various forms of 
partnerships: “networking partnerships for information exchange; co-operative 
partnerships with minimal linkages by middle and lower-level staff; co-ordinating 
partnerships involving shared, common goals, formal processes and structural 
patterns of co-ordination; and collaborative partnerships encompassing strong 
linkages, specific long-term purposes, a stable membership base, significant 
resource-commitment, formal process and structural pattern of collaboration” 
(pp.176-177). The Peace Activist Network (PAN) began as a networking 
partnership for exchanging information among peace practitioners about the 
challenges and opportunities facing them as they worked to promote peace and 
conflict-resolution agendas in the country. Later, with the advent of a more 
formal structure and significant commitments of resources, time, and staff 
members, the PAN began to co-ordinate partnerships—specifically, partnership 
network structures, which reached their peak when peace practitioners 
prepared for a report to share with global civil society. Furthermore, peace 
activists retreats organised in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were the results of a co-
ordinating partnership networking structure, as the committee regularly 
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organises meetings, develops formal processes and identifies follow-up visions, 
actions that all require collective effort.  
Formation context. Understanding the emerging context of these case 
study organisations helps to provide a better understanding of the 
circumstances under which these peace and conflict-resolution organisations 
were established and what motivated them to incorporate conflict-resolution 
methodologies into their activities. The useful conceptual frameworks are well 
articulated by Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfield’s 2002 study on peace and conflict-
resolution organisations in three protracted conflict areas: Northern Ireland, 
South Africa, and Israel-Palestine. The study explains how expanded political 
opportunity and the severity of violence motivated civil society’s actions to 
advocate a peaceful resolution of local conflicts. In addition, in an academic 
article on multi-purpose hybrid organisations, Hasenfield and Gidron (2005) 
summarise two specific societal conditions helpful to the proliferation of civil 
society organisations: the existence of the public sphere—a participatory space 
“in which actors with overlapping identities as legal subjects, citizens, economic 
actors, and family and community members, form a political body and engage 
in negotiations and contestations over political and social life” (Somers, 1993, p. 
589) and the richness of associational life. 
The emerging contexts of the three case study organisations reviewed 
in this dissertation illustrate the similarities of the aforementioned preconditions. 
The three organisations emerged in the early 2000s, around 15 years after the 
initial democratic transition in South Korea and ten years after the inauguration 
of a civilian president. It is also notable that most of the civil society 
organisations that work closely with WMP-CR Centre or were formally affiliated 
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with the PAN were established in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A couple of 
the South Korean NGOs affiliated with the PAN were founded in the early 
1990s, but their programmes did not explicitly include peace and conflict-
resolution principles until the early 2000s. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw 
a significant expansion of civil society space and an enhanced capacity of the 
public sphere, which led to the establishment of peace and conflict-resolution 
organisations.  
Four specific socio-political contexts explain the expansion and maturity 
of civil society and its enhanced capacity for generating public discourse. These 
socio-political contexts are closely related to the recent emergence of peace 
and conflict-resolution organisations in South Korea. Firstly, there was once 
only a limited capacity to advocate and reflect upon issues related to the 
peaceful resolution of various social conflicts, the democratic qualities of civil 
society, or alternative peace paradigms, owing to the urgent need to strengthen 
democratic reform processes. During the early transitional period, there were 
questions about the sustainability of democracy in South Korea owing to its two 
previous failures with democratisation. Consequently, civil society organisations 
in the early democratic consolidation period of the 1990s focused on urgent 
democratic reform and institutional development issues. A majority of the 
advocacy organisations that emerged in the 1990s played a critical role in 
generating public discourse around a wide range of social issues suppressed 
during the authoritarian period. In the early 1990s, civil society organisations 
advocated institutional reform, fact-finding committees on past regimes’ human 
rights abuses, civil rights-related issues and sustainable and equitable 
development of the country. In so doing, these organisations strengthened civil 
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society’s capacity for raising critical social and political issues and developed its 
ability to monitor the state and other elite institutions in the country, such as 
conglomerates representing the interests of economic elites.  
Secondly, there was a great need to expand civil society and strengthen 
its capacity to accommodate alternative socio-political paradigms. During the 
democratic struggle, civil society spaces emerged to consolidate opposition 
voices calling for the restoration of democratic elections. Over the two decades 
prior to the democratic transition, limited civil society space existed as a sphere 
for generating democratic discourses and mobilising progressive constituents to 
challenge the status quo of authoritarian regimes. Immediately after the 
democratic transition, civil society served to legitimise the suppressed needs of 
citizens during the authoritarian era, and citizens were exposed to the freedom 
of expressing their views without fear of coercive state power. In this context, it 
took roughly ten years for South Korean civil society to legitimise and 
institutionalise the liberal socio-political issues freely discussed in most 
advanced democratic countries, such as women’s rights, consumer rights, civil 
rights, environmental justice, public policy reform, and democratic governance. 
In so doing, civil society’s capacity to integrate new and emerging discourses 
has matured and expanded.  
Thirdly, civil society’s capacity to accommodate alternative paradigms 
has been influenced by changing inter-Korean contexts; specifically, South 
Korea’s collaborative and inclusive approach to North Korean issues. South 
Korea’s civil society has been negatively affected by the intense Cold War 
dichotomy reflecting North-South relations. Hostile North-South relations not 
only affected Korea’s overall security context, but also put great constraints on 
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society’s capacity to generate alternative frameworks. For example, any 
perspectives on North Korea inconsistent with the state’s official position were 
often considered forms of treachery or attempts to overthrow the South Korean 
government. This political climate not only discouraged the emergence of 
diverse views on peace within civil society, but also limited peace discourses 
within the inter-Korean context. Finally, until the late 1990s, the institutional 
mechanism for supporting civil society organisations was rather limited. With 
the inauguration of the KDJ administration, a legal and financial regulation on 
civil society has been further liberalised and expanded. More regular funding 
channels have been secured, and governmental restrictions on civil society’s 
freedom of expression have diminished.  
In terms of more specific emerging contexts, School Peace was formed 
in response to an incident affecting the local population, but the two other 
organisations were established in the context of national NGOs’ enhanced 
awareness of international issues and increased collaboration with global civil 
society. Compared to peace and conflict-resolution organisations operating in 
conflict-affected countries, South Korea’s peace and conflict-resolution 
organisations are relatively lightly influenced by global civil society and foreign 
NGOs that specialise in peace and conflict work (Mayer, 2002). Furthermore, 
their funding bases are less dependent on foreign sources. However, the two 
case study organisations’ emerging contexts are closely related to their 
affiliations with international civil society organisations. For example, an 
American NGO brought in the first institutionalised conflict-resolution 
programme for civil society practitioners. Consequently, the main contents and 
methodologies of the WMP-CR Centre are similar to North American conflict-
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resolution practices. Likewise, peace and conflict resolution organisations were 
mobilised into the network of peace practitioners in order to participate in global 
civil society discourses on conflict-prevention and peace-building. The global 
intellectual framework of peace and conflict-resolution has been used as a 
reference point for articulating their peace activism in support of South Korea’s 
peace and conflict-resolution efforts.  
Political orientation and constituents. As Joo et al. (2006) highlighted 
in the CIVICUS-affiliated study on South Korea’s civil society, South Korean 
civil society leaders, most of whom represent advocacy groups with extensive 
historical roots in the democratic movement, prefer to define civil society as a 
space where social-reform-oriented organisations operate in the pursuit of 
centre-left progressive social and political agendas for the public interest. As 
Joo et al. (2006) articulated, such a definition often excludes civil society 
entities—mostly voluntary associations and interest groups—that are pursuing 
more conservative and right-wing social and political values from civil society 
space. Such a perspective disagrees with the liberal notion of civil society, 
which exists as the arena, outside the family, the state and the market where 
people associate to advance common interests and fulfils a key role in civil 
society as a space to channel diverse societal values and interest in a peaceful 
manner. One of the main problems with such a view in terms of civil society’s 
democratic qualities is that such narrow perspective, that only privileges certain 
political viewpoints, inhibits the strengthening of civil society’s capacity to 
manage conflict-ridden social issues constructively. Defining civil society as a 
space for generating radical discourses and limiting the public interest on 
radical political ideals silences other perspectives and denies the participation 
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of citizens who are sympathetic to conservative social and political values. With 
such preferential and value-judgement perspectives, civil society can be 
perceived as a political party representing particular interests, and its ability to 
facilitate difference can be greatly constrained. To a certain extent, civil 
society’s judgemental attitude towards non-progressive/non-radical social views 
make civil society organisations a part of the conflict, as they negatively affect 
the neutrality needed to intervene in conflict-laden social settings.  
In terms of political orientation, all three case study organisations 
embrace centre-left political and social perspectives; however, their political 
orientation does not indicate that these organisations publicly denounce or 
discriminate against alternative viewpoints. Rather, they aim to bring diverse 
viewpoints together to generate alternative peace paradigms in their sphere of 
influence, South Korea’s civil society. For example, School Peace has 
demonstrated repeated attempts to engage in dialogue with school officials who 
tend to embrace more conservative positions on school violence prevention 
strategies. The WMP-CR Centre has offered workshops and courses on 
conflict-resolution to those who are unlikely to engage in civil society activities, 
such as civil servants. Although peace activists tend to embrace more radical 
and anti-establishment paradigms, the PAN continues to explore how these 
alternative values can be communicated to ordinary citizens. Despite such 
efforts to bring together diverse constituents, because of the general perception 
of civil society organisations as spaces for individuals advocating particular 
political perspectives, their recruitment efforts have been limited to citizens who 
embrace liberal centre-left values. Any experiences in reaching out to 
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conservative constituents are documented only as anecdotal examples of 
certain individuals affiliated with the organisations. 
Main activities and the use of peace and conflict methodologies. To 
a certain extent, the three case study organisations began as advocacy groups 
raising awareness of specific political and social issues—violence-prevention in 
the case of SP; conflict-resolution and cultural transformation for the WMP-CR 
Centre; and the inclusion of peace paradigms within civil society discourses by 
the PAN. Specifically, School Peace advocates the development of a 
systematic mechanism for preventing school violence and calls for the 
integration of educative methods, such as peace and conflict-resolution 
educational programmes into schools’ violence-prevention efforts. WMP-CR 
Centre advocates the holistic and proactive integration of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms into all levels of society and calls for a systemic and long-term 
approach to empowering individuals’ conflict-resolution capacities. As part of a 
larger peace NGO, the WMP-CR Centre emphasises the importance of conflict-
resolution as a critical, cultural foundation for promoting a culture of peace and 
preparing peace constituents in the country. The PAN emphasises the 
importance of civil society participation in conflict-prevention and peace-building 
and calls for the mobilisation of civil society organisations to promote alternative 
peace paradigms in South Korea.  
Conflict-resolution strategies and peace activism have been integrated 
into each organisation as key strategies for advancing their overall advocacy 
objectives. For example, School Peace aims to demonstrate the usefulness of 
peace education and conflict-resolution communication techniques through their 
youth and adult education programmes. Specifically, its outreach activities are 
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directed at parents and adult community groups, with the aim of enhancing 
these groups’ understanding of conflict-resolution activities and peace 
education, and therefore generating their support for the inclusion of these 
activities in schools. The WMP-CR Centre offers a training course for conflict-
resolution trainers in order to spread conflict-resolution values and programmes 
that can be applicable in various social settings. The PAN conducts different 
capacity-building workshops to enhance peace activists’ and practitioners’ 
overall capacity to promote a culture of peace and to develop their emotional 
intelligence as rooted in peace values. Furthermore, the PAN provides activists 
with an opportunity to discuss peace education and conflict-resolution methods 
to enhance the applicability of peace activism to ordinary citizens’ lives and to 
broaden their support bases.  
Comparing Interview Reflections: Motivation, Benefits, and Challenges 
Table 6 summarises the reflections made by interviewees regarding their 
experiences of engaging in three case study organisations. 
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Table 6 Comparison: Interview Reflections  
 
 School Peace 
  
WMP-CR Centre Peace Activist Network 
Motivation § Integrating conflict 
resolution into 
grassroots activism for 
cultural transformation  
§ Expectation of enhanced 
capacity for nonviolent 
conflict resolution 
 
§ Help improve the 
management of 
negative interpersonal 
conflict patterns  
§ Identify alternative 
methods for changing 
negative conflict 
patterns inhibiting the 
effectiveness of their 
work  
§ Consolidating South 
Korean civil society’s 
efforts in the areas of 
conflict prevention and 
peace-building 
§ Documenting the existing 
efforts to share with global 
civil society 
§ Strengthening 
practitioners’ capacity to 
undertake peace activism 
Positive 
Reflection 
§ Attracting local 
populations to politics 
§ Enhanced awareness of 
and capacity for 
addressing conflict and 
its peaceful resolution 
§ Awareness raising 
regarding conflict 
resolution principles 
§ Increased capacity to 
handle conflict-laden 
circumstances 
§ Opportunity to bring 
people into civil society 
activism 
§ Space for reflection and 
networking 
§ Enhanced capacity for 
nonviolence and conflict 
resolution 
§ Bringing diversity into 
activism 
Challenges § Misunderstandings 
about peace and conflict 
resolution and 
grassroots activism 
§ Lack of cultural 
foundation of conflict 
resolution 
§ Lack of opportunity to 
provide more systematic 
programmes to students 
§ Difficulty in bringing 
the conflict resolution 
concept to mainstream 
South Koreans 
§ Difficulty in 
understanding the affect 
of micro-level change 
on macro-level social 
structures 
§ Lack of participation 
from conservative 
constituents 
§ Lack of systematic 
support for utilising 
conflict resolution 
expertise and 
knowledge 
§ Difficulty in mainstreaming 
peace activism 
§ Questions about the 
relevance of Western 
theoretical frameworks 
regarding peace 
 
 Motivations to engage with peace and conflict-resolution activism. 
The interview process provided rich information, particularly about the 
motivation of NGO practitioners to participate in the case study organisations. 
The motivations differed from one individual to another, yet two themes 
emerged repeatedly during the research. 
Firstly, an overwhelming majority of NGO practitioners expressed their 
desire to strengthen their skills to better address conflict-laden social situations 
or interpersonal conflicts. The interviewees found conflict-resolution 
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methodology such as dialogue, engagement, non-violence and a collaborative 
working approach, extremely appealing for their empowering aspects, which in 
turn enabled the interviewees to manage difficult conversations or stressful 
human relationships constructively. In the case of SP, interviewees are 
engaged in conflict-resolution designed better to manage conflict erupting in 
interpersonal settings (for example, between family members or neighbours). 
Interviewees from the two other case study organisations indicated that they felt 
the need to improve their conflict-resolution skills and nurture peaceful attitudes 
to improve their management of conflicts encountered in the workplace and to 
ensure the sustainability of their civic engagement. A few interviewees 
specifically indicated that they attended the conflict-resolution training 
programme to develop their collaborative problem-solving skills, as these are 
often considered lacking among South Koreans, owing to some of the 
misconceptions regarding conflict within the Korean cultural context. For 
example, culturally, conflict is greatly discouraged in communities, as Koreans 
tend to perceive conflicts as negative situations that represent a shameful 
inability to maintain harmonious relationships (LeResche, 1992). However, once 
a conflict surges, individuals and communities generally feel that they should 
never withdraw from the conflict until their demands have been fully met (Kim, 
2004). This “all or nothing” cultural attitude leaves people very little room to 
withdraw gracefully from conflicts. These interviews reflected that the NGO 
practitioners wanted to learn conflict-resolution practices to alter such habits 
that have been influenced by the Korean cultural context.  
Secondly, a number of the interviewees working with School Peace and 
the PAN identified conflict-resolution as attractive because they think it will 
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enable them to practise social consciousness and political awareness on a daily 
basis in their community life. In the country’s mainstream activism scene, 
working for social justice, equality and the public good through civil society are 
like a religious vocation that often demands the sacrifice of an ordinary lifestyle. 
For civil society practitioners working on outreach and community engagement, 
conflict-resolution tools help them to find a balance between active participation 
in the civil space and an appreciation of their community-based life. 
Benefits. When asked to assess the main value that their experiences 
with case study organisations have presented, two dominant themes emerged: 
capacity-building and linkage to day-to-day activism. Almost all the interviewees 
across all groups indicated that their experiences have helped to enhance their 
capacity to deal with difficult social issues. For example, interviewees 
expressed that they feel more confident in their ability to articulate their values 
and opinions in a less confrontational manner than they could in the past (cf. 
SP5 (2007) and CR5 (2007) in Chapter 5). Civil society in South Korea has long 
been perceived as a space in which to struggle and fight for public causes, and 
it emphasises the value of stubborn debates. In such a space, person-to-person 
holistic interaction with those who hold different viewpoints has been minimised. 
The peace and conflict-resolution principles and techniques that interviewees 
have been exposed to have helped them to regain confidence in their ability to 
connect personally with other people. The increased confidence in basic 
conflict-resolution communication skills has also helped many interviewees to 
appreciate the process of problem-solving and compassionate dialogue in the 
midst of difficult debates and uncomfortable social circumstances.  
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Young practitioners and community groups expressed their satisfaction 
with the case study organisations’ conflict-resolution practices, owing to their 
ability to bring activism into day-to-day practice (CR11 (2007) & PAN11 (2007) 
in Chapter 5). For many years, becoming an activist was seen as a lifelong 
vocation, requiring a great deal of sacrifice. Furthermore, the focus of civil 
society activism was directed towards big policy issues that required 
government-level changes. The younger interviewees, including CR 11 (2007), 
highlight that these new methodologies have provided them with various ideas 
to approach the sharing of these complex political issues with their constituents 
more creatively. Certainly, many community organisers felt enthusiastic about 
the relevance of these tools for small-scale activism that addresses more local 
and decentralised topics. 
Reflections on challenges. Despite the enthusiasm and excitement 
built around peace and conflict-resolution methodologies the interviewees 
voiced concerns about some peace and conflict-resolution practices that are 
currently gaining popularity in the country’s civil society scene. For example, an 
overwhelming majority of interviewees indicated they are concerned about two 
conceptual pieces that are missing from conflict-resolution principles. One is the 
lack of emphasis on the issue of structural injustice, which often creates 
unequal power between parties in conflict (cf. CR 6 (2007) in Chapter 5). The 
other is difficulty in differentiating constructive engagement for alternative 
solutions from compromising their values and integrity. Activists working with 
advocacy groups including PAN2 (2007) repeatedly voiced these concerns. The 
first question has been one of the most commonly raised points wherever 
conflict-resolution has been practised, and therefore it has been long debated in 
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the conflict-resolution field, regardless of geographical location. Nonetheless, 
for South Korea’s NGO practitioners, a majority of whom have long advocated 
social and economic justice for the oppressed, the lack of attention paid to this 
structural component has posed enormous challenges. Many, including CR13 
(2007), indicated that their colleagues were extremely sceptical of applying 
conflict-resolution principles at first, because their advocacy work and the notion 
of conflict-resolution appear to be contradictory. The second conceptual 
challenge is directly linked to the first point. Because of the lack of attention to 
the structural issues and inequalities that often trigger conflict, conflict-
resolution principles often appear “to be deceptive concepts that glorify the 
compromise for the benefit of the powerful” (CR7, personal interview, 30 May 
2007). All voiced that these conceptual issues pose great challenges for them 
as they work to share the value of conflict-resolution practices with their 
colleagues.  
In addition, many interviewees identified a few practical challenges to 
mainstreaming conflict-resolution practices throughout society. With an 
increased interest in the field of conflict-resolution, PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 
May 2007) explained, “More expectations are raised to intervene successfully in 
a well-known social conflict case or to facilitate a multi-stakeholder process.” 
However, it has been extremely difficult to find a neutral third party among 
NGOs owing to the general perception from conservative constituents that 
NGOs have a specific political position favouring liberal political values. CSO5 
(Personal interview, 1 June 2007) emphasised the difficulty in creating a safe 
space for constructive dialogue between conservatives and liberals, and was 
rather pessimistic of such a possibility in the near future. She said, “Any conflict-
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resolution processes progressive civil society organise will be perceived as 
favouring liberal-leaning parties in the conflict. Conservatives will disarm their 
suspicion towards [progressive civil society activists].”  
Finally, some of the interviewees, such as CR 11 (2007), raised 
concerns that conflict-resolution training materials are still too theoretical for use 
with ordinary citizens. The materials are heavily influenced by North American 
literature, and some language that the conflict-resolution materials adopt is very 
awkwardly translated. Similarly, those interviewees working closely with the 
PAN1 also questioned whether Western-imposed theoretical frameworks could 
accurately elaborate South Korean civil society’s unique political and social 
context (PAN1 (2007) in Chapter 5).  
Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing 
Framing is generally defined as “The conscious strategic efforts by groups 
of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimize and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 6). Benford 
and Snow (2000) articulate two core functions of framing: framing functions to 
organise experience and guide action by linking culturally resonant meaning to 
specific events, issues or occurrences; and framing that “performs an 
interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects” of particular social 
issues, with a view to “mobilising potential adherents and constituents, 
garnering bystander support, and demobilising antagonists” (p. 614). Collective 
action frames are constructed “as a result of negotiations among movement 
adherents on shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation 
they define as in need of change, make attribution regarding how or what is to 
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blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements and urge others to act in 
concert to effect change” (p. 615).  
Framing is one of the most frequently investigated concepts in the social 
movement literature of the last two decades, as it helps scholars gain a better 
understanding of how ideas and meanings are produced and used to generate 
broad social support (Benford & Snow, 2000). In addition to studying social 
movement phenomena, framing references are helpful for understanding how 
civil society organisations articulate their missions and core strategies in order 
to justify and sustain their existence. There are three objectives that this section 
employs to frame an analytical approach to understanding how each 
organisation frames peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution. It is helpful to 
compare how each organisation defines peace and conflict and elaborates 
upon conflict-resolution as an important methodology for understanding peace 
and conflict issues. Framing helps to improve our understanding of how South 
Korea’s specific cultural values and norms have affected the ways in which 
conflict-resolution is articulated by each case study organisation. Framing 
explores whether and how some of the core features of conflict-resolution 
practices, such as inclusiveness, neutrality, and impartiality, have been 
elaborated by each case study organisation. The summary of each 
organisation’s issue-framing on peace, conflict, and conflict-resolution, and 
some perspective on the core features of conflict-resolution, are visualised in 
Table 7.  
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Table 7: Comparison: Conflict Resolution and Issue Framing 
 School Peace WMP-CR Centre Peace Activist Network 
Types of Conflict § Interpersonal / 
School violence 
 
§ Social conflicts / 
Interpersonal conflicts / 
School violence / 
Organisational conflicts 
§ Social conflict / Inter-
Korean conflict / Structural 
violence / International 
relations in northeast Asia 
Framing – 
Conflict 
§ School violence as a 
violent manifestation 
of interpersonal 
conflict 
§ Stems from 
intolerance and 
insensitivity to 
difference  
§ Ignorance of others’ 
human rights 
§ Exists everywhere  
§ Can be a source of 
positive social change 
§ Erupts as a result of lack 
of skills in dealing with 
differences in a 
constructive manner 
§ Created as a result of 
militarisation and security 
paradigms  
§ State-centred orientation 
to resolve differences  
§ Coercive approach to 
Inter-Korean dynamics 
and northeast Asian 
security  
§ Emphasis on conformity 
and denial of differences 
and diversity  
Framing – 
Peace 
§ Values that can be 
taught  
§ One’s mind-set  
§ Basis for school 
violence prevention 
strategies 
§ Foundational value to 
promote the culture of 
peace 
§ Paradigm based upon 
tolerance, inclusiveness, 
diversity, consensus and 
right to disobedience 
(freedom of expression) 
§ Cultural and structural 
conditions which 
eliminates systematic and 
cultural obstacles to 
perpetuating violence  
Framing –  
Conflict 
Resolution  
§ Techniques to 
address inter-
personal 
communications  
§ Good parenting 
methods 
§ Tools to enhance 
young students’ 
democratic decision 
making and peaceful 
communication 
§ Preparatory tool for 
civic engagement in 
specific community 
issues 
§ Various techniques to 
resolve conflict-laden 
social situations in a 
peaceful manner  
§ Process of resolving 
conflict through 
individuals’ active 
involvement  
§ Basic techniques for 
promoting a culture of 
peace 
§ Strategy to transform the 
structural violence  
§ New security paradigm to 
change the existing 
security policy – emphasis 
on prevention and 
cooperation  
§ Peace education to 
promote a culture of peace 
§ Peace movement to 
promote the peace 
paradigm 
Inclusiveness § Open to all local 
residents, but high 
representation of 
women with children 
§ Open to all citizens, but 
high representation of 
women (likely 
educated, politically 
engaged and 
progressive feminists) 
§ Open to all civil society 
activists (mostly 
progressive civil society 
practitioners and 
researchers) 
Neutrality / 
Impartiality  
§ Progressive political 
views, thus limited 
neutrality as a 
conflict resolution 
third-party 
§ Mostly yes; but the 
organisation’s position 
on certain public 
conflicts can be 
influenced by its 
progressive political 
affiliation, thus their 
neutrality can be 
limited on certain 
§ Progressive political 
views, thus limited 
neutrality as a conflict 
resolution third-party 
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public conflicts. 
However, staff 
members and 
volunteers of the 
WMP-CR Centre are 
aware of the issue and 
make an effort to stay 
impartial and neutral. 
 
Types of conflict and conflict issue-framing. Each organisation 
emphasises different aspects of conflict as requiring a certain type of 
intervention and focuses on types of conflict more relevant to their respective 
constituents.  
By arguing that school violence is a violent manifestation of 
interpersonal conflict among students, School Peace focuses on interpersonal 
dimensions that affect conflict dynamics and outcomes. Specifically, School 
Peace 291roblematizes intolerance and insensitivity towards difference as the 
core issue perpetuating school violence, as such attitudes are indirectly 
nurtured by South Korean society’s demand for conformity, uniformity, and 
harmony. Furthermore, by emphasising the connection between conflict and the 
lack of democratic values, School Peace contends that school violence is 
widely manifested because of a lack of respect for others’ individuality and their 
rights to difference. In so doing, School Peace attempts to combine both 
interpersonal and systemic analysis of conflict. 
The WMP-CR Centre emphasises the inevitability of conflict in one’s life 
and makes an effort to alter the general perception of conflict, which is that 
conflict is a highly undesirable phenomena manifested because of personality 
deficiencies. Contending that addressing conflict requires certain sets of 
communication skills and values, the WMP-CR Centre focuses on 
strengthening individuals’ capacity for conflict-resolution. Despite its emphasis 
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on the inter-personal aspects of conflict, the WMP-CR Centre is rooted in the 
South Korean civil society tradition of advocating systemic change. Conflict, 
therefore—even at the individual level—and its negative dynamics carried out 
by individuals are outcomes of social, political, and economic structures that 
privilege certain values and attitudes fostering negative patterns for dealing with 
conflict.  
Finally, the PAN addresses a wide range of conflicts, including social 
conflict, inter-Korean conflict, and international relations—mostly those dealing 
with North-East Asian relations. Rooted in the social movement tradition, these 
activists place a great deal of emphasis on the structural and cultural 
dimensions that sustain negative conflict patterns in society. Peace activists are 
distinguished from other types of civil society activists in South Korea because 
of the assumption that conflict and violence are perpetuated in the country 
owing to militaristic cultural norms nurtured throughout South Korea’s 
contemporary political history. With such a perspective in mind, transforming 
militaristic paradigms and cultural norms into more peaceful ones are seen as 
equally important as improving socio-economic conditions in order to alter the 
negative conflict patterns embedded in all levels of society.  
It is rather difficult to generalise regarding issue-framing of conflict 
across these three case study organisations. However, there is one notable 
observation that deserves attention. While the WMP-CR Centre and PAN 
implicitly and explicitly acknowledge the positive functions of conflict in society 
as a potential source of social change, School Peace does not about the 
inevitability of conflict as it assumes that interpersonal conflict at schools is 
often manifested in violent forms. These organisations’ constituents can explain 
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such differences. Both the WMP-CR Centre and PAN reached out to their 
respective constituents, who have become increasingly party to certain social 
conflicts. As reviewed in the previous chapter, civil society practitioners have 
become involved in a wide range of social and public conflicts as part of their 
advocacy activities. In many cases, they have generated awareness by 
vocalising problems or employing confrontational strategies. In reaching out to 
such constituents, both organisations needed to articulate the dual function of 
conflict in order not to de-legitimize their core constituents’ conflict patterns. On 
the other hand, School Peace sought support from parents who are concerned 
about their children being a victim of school violence; therefore, they presented 
conflict as being synonymous with violence. As a result, the positive function of 
conflict was not directly presented to School Peace’s main constituents. Rather, 
its positive function was framed within the “embracing difference” and “tolerance 
of diversity” discourses.  
 Peace-framing. In the peace and conflict-resolution literature, peace is 
understood as comprising two categories: negative peace and positive peace 
(Galtung, 1969). Negative peace indicates the absence of violence and 
indicates a society in which the state does not engage in violent, coercive 
confrontation with either other domestic armed groups with certain political 
aspirations or foreign militaries. Positive peace goes beyond the absence of 
violence and is a presence of social justice. It is attained when structural and 
cultural elements that perpetuate violence are transformed through various 
means, such as equal opportunity, fair distribution of power and resources, 
equal protection and impartial enforcement of the law. Within such frameworks, 
all three organisations work towards creating socio-political conditions and 
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installing certain cultural values that foster positive peace. At the school and 
community level, School Peace believes that a peaceful school culture can be 
attained through educational efforts and school curriculum/management 
reforms. Peaceful attitudes need to be nurtured through peace and conflict-
resolution education. At the same time, the organisation advocates the creation 
of a system that fosters and rewards students’ constructive conflict-
management patterns. Similarly, the WMP-CR Centre uses conflict-resolution 
methodologies to lay the foundational ground for spreading the culture of peace, 
a key element to preparing for a reunified Korea. Deeply influenced by positive 
peace perspectives, the PAN aims to enhance the capacity and influence of 
peace activism within South Korea to emphasise the importance of positive 
peace and work towards the elimination of cultural and structural conditions that 
perpetuate violence.  
Conflict-resolution framing. The term “conflict-resolution” is rather 
ambiguous and highly contested. There are two approaches to conflict-
resolution terminology: a narrow, short-term, social psychological, internal 
approach focusing on conflict parties; and a comprehensive, long-term, 
sociological, systemic approach including the cause of violence. From the 
former perspective, conflict-resolution is defined as an effort to change 
adversarial relationships among parties in disagreement into constructive 
partnerships (Mitchell, 2005). This narrow definition of conflict=resolution 
explains how the lack of interaction between parties in conflict and inadequate 
communication skills greatly contributes to the exacerbation of destructive 
conflict patterns and focuses on various techniques to assist parties in conflict 
as they seek better to manage their conflicts.  
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However, the broad definition considers conflict-resolution to be “all 
process-oriented activities aiming to address the underlying cause of direct, 
cultural, and structural violence” (Reimann, 2004, p.10). Riemann defines 
“structural violence as the social, political and economic structure of a conflict 
situation when unequal power, domination and dependency are perpetuated, 
while cultural violence refers to the social and cultural legitimisation of direct 
and structural violence” (pp.10-11). Critical of the narrow approach to conflict-
resolution because of its indifference to structural and cultural elements that 
perpetuate violence, scholars such as Fast (2002, pp.531-532) argue that such 
conflict-resolution mechanisms “may strengthen the structures that oppress 
individuals, thereby retarding, decreasing, or even negating the possibilities for 
systematic change”. In order for conflict-resolution to become a tool for social 
change, system-oriented conflict resolution scholars such as Galtung (1969) 
and Lederach (2000) emphasise the need to address a wide range of structural 
and cultural aspects that sustain violence in society by working with diverse 
actors at all levels of society.  
There are two notable observations regarding conflict-resolution framing. 
Similar to peace-framing, the case study organisations present conflict-
resolution methodologies and principles as strategies and activities that 
contribute to addressing the underlying cause of direct, cultural and structural 
violence, partially owing to the lack of opportunity for them to intervene in 
specific conflict settings. In the last two years, the WMP-CR Centre has 
intervened in a number of cases involving school violence, as an alternative to 
the existing juvenile punitive mechanism. A few practitioners interviewed in 
2007, including CR2 (2007), CR9 (2007), CR12 (2007), and CR13 (2007), 
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shared personal anecdotes about their positive experiences resolving group 
conflict using the techniques they had learned. Except for such examples, these 
organisations’ conflict-resolution activities are justified, as their outcomes are 
expected to strengthen the cultural foundation for positive conflict-management 
and democratic decision-making.  
All of the case study organisations use conflict-resolution as a means of 
attaining their broad organisational goals. For example, with respect to School 
Peace, conflict-resolution is presented as a democratic decision-making and 
constructive communication strategy, helpful for preventing violence in the 
community and schools. The WMP-CR Centre offers conflict-resolution training 
to individuals. They argue that an enhanced capacity for conflict-resolution at 
the societal level can contribute to preventing social conflicts that can emerge 
during the reunification process. The PAN frames conflict-resolution as a useful 
tool for engaging with a wide range of constituents, as it makes peace 
discourse more accessible.  
Conflict-resolution features: inclusiveness, impartiality and 
neutrality. Fast (2002) argues that inclusiveness, impartiality and neutrality are 
central features that distinguish conflict-resolution organisations from other civil 
society organisations addressing the structural elements of conflict. Such 
perspectives are highly relevant for understanding organisations that employ 
third-party intervention conflict-resolution methods and include the following 
activities as conflict resolution work: negotiation; mediation and alternative 
dispute-resolution mechanisms; interactive conflict-resolution approaches, 
including public dialogues, problem-solving workshops and human relations 
workshops; and transformation and reconciliation work, including victim-
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offender reconciliation. Conflict-resolution training is categorised as a conflict-
resolution activity when it brings together parties that are in conflict. There is 
criticism of Fast’s attempt to create a boundary between conflict-resolution 
practice and other types of activities influencing the conflict-perpetuating 
structure, as opponents claim it imposes academic perspectives on actual 
practice, yet this effort is useful, as it provides a framework for comparing 
different activities undertaken under the conflict-resolution banner.  
When applying Fast’s core characteristics of conflict-resolution, two 
organisations—School Peace and the WMP-CR Centre—are qualified to 
engage in conflict-resolution work, with some limitations. School Peace does 
not provide conflict-resolution services to students or school officials. Rather, it 
provides students with an opportunity to interact with everyone and reflect upon 
conflict and school violence in a relatively safe space. Unlike some specialised 
extracurricular activities that recruit a few selected students for participation, 
their conflict-resolution and peace education programmes are offered to public 
school classrooms without selective processes. As a result, School Peace’s 
education programmes are offered in a setting where both victims and 
perpetrators of school violence are present. In this context, School Peace’s 
conflict-resolution training is an opportunity to bring students in opposing 
situations (violence-enduring/violence-perpetuating) together to reflect upon 
conflict-resolution issues. Regarding the WMP-CR Centre, its conflict-resolution 
practice is most visible in relation to its victim-offender reconciliation and 
mediation programme. For this programme, the WMP-CR Centre brings parties 
who are in conflict together to engage in dialogue aimed at mending their 
relationships and enhancing each other’s position. As pioneers in this area, 
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practitioners from the WMP-CR Centre are perceived as specialists with a pool 
of experts capable of facilitating and mediating difficult conversations. 
Furthermore, since the victim-offender mediation programme targets youth, the 
WMP-CR Centre’s political affiliation with pro-peace and centre-left political 
perspectives does not necessarily undermine its neutrality. However, its regular 
training programmes on conflict-resolution can be considered a general 
capacity-building tool for democratic decision-making or civil-society-building, 
rather than a conflict-resolution practice, as a majority of its training participants 
share similar political views and are not engaged in conflict-settings. However, 
in a broader sense, School Peace and the WMP-CR Centre are advocacy 
groups inspired by South Korea’s civil society activism, sympathetic to centre-
left ideals, and their main constituents are those who appreciate civil society’s 
liberal and centre-left-leaning position. Certainly, however, working closely with 
one end of the political spectrum limits these organisations’ outreach capacity 
and negatively affects their impartial and neutral images. 
This dissertation contends that the PAN cannot be considered as 
engaging in conflict-resolution practice because of its strong position on peace-
related issues and its limited constituency basis. Like the two other 
organisations, the PAN’s main constituents are drawn from one end of the 
political spectrum. The PAN has also employed rather radical peace discourses 
to challenge the status quo and militaristic paradigm that sustains structural and 
cultural violence in South Korea. The master frames of the PAN—elimination of 
militarism and replacing a security-centred peace paradigm with peace 
discourse—resonate well with a particular audience; that is, young, politically 
active individuals and civil society activists. However, one-sided constituents 
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and radical positions are considered as having a negative effect on peace 
activism’s neutral and impartial image. Specifically, a one-sided perspective 
may discourage activists’ empathetic attitudes towards the other side, in this 
case, conservative constituents. Furthermore, peace activism can be so locked 
into radical peace discourse that it is unable to reach out to those who do not 
embrace radical political views and may provoke counter-movements, thereby 
denying the value of peace activism. Such a situation can create political 
conflict between groups that no longer actively engage one another in dialogue 
(Miceli, 2005). While all of the activists interviewed during the field research 
indicated their willingness to engage with non-usual constituents, it seems that 
such aspirations are inhibited by the fact that civil society activists represent 
certain interests contradictory to the moderate or centre-right conservative 
populations.  
Democratic norms, values, and skills 
The democratic quality of a civil society is closely related to its ability to 
monitor and support existing democracy, its ability to generate public 
discourses and its ability to foster democratic skills and habits beneficial to 
democratic consolidation. The democratic skills and habits obtained through 
civil society engagement in turn contribute to strengthening the other two 
functions that civil society performs in the democratic consolidation process. 
This dissertation contemplates what values, skills, and attitudes are considered 
to play a positive role in strengthening civil society’s public-discourse-
generating capacity, and turns to participatory democratic theorists (cf. Chapter 
2).  
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A number of scholars, such as Barber (1984), Walzer (1974) and 
Kymlicka (2001), call such values, skills, and attitudes “civility”: tolerance, non-
discrimination and public reasonableness. They refer to “a set of practices that 
involves the exercise of self-constraint and a concern for others”. Civility 
promotes “reciprocal empathy and mutual respect” and “tempers tensions that 
arise out of different impressions of the good” (White, 2006, p. 446). 
Participatory democracy proponents, such as Kymlicka (2002), Dryzek (1994), 
and Galston (1991), put a great deal of emphasis on the following values, skills 
and attitudes, as these are particularly helpful in creating a public space based 
upon democratic norms and civility: the ability to tolerate different views and 
respect others’ opinions; promoting and accepting non-violent ways of problem-
solving; and a willingness to engage in dialogue with those who hold different 
positions.  
Kymlicka (2002) argued that effective and meaningful civic engagement 
generates a wide range of public discourse in civil society that cannot be 
facilitated without virtuous, engaged citizens who work towards an enlightened 
understanding of public affairs or common political issues. Civility underpinning 
the aforementioned democratic values, skills and attitudes “serves as a basic 
test of civic competence, as it encourages citizens to exercise self-constraint; to 
express a concern for others; and to maintain a commitment to civil discourse 
that is grounded in rational dialogue” (White, 2006, p. 456). 
This section explores whether participants found their engagement with 
the case study organisations beneficial to fostering the values, attitudes and 
skills helpful for enhancing civil society’s public-discourse-generating capacity, 
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and, if so, how their reflections are linked to the aforementioned democratic 
values and skills. Such findings are summarised in Table 8. 
Table 8: Comparison: Democratic Quality 
 
 School Peace WMP-CR Centre Peace Activist 
Network 
Democracy: 
Participation 
Enhancing 
§ Mobilises grassroots 
population and 
creates space for 
public discourse on 
community issues 
§ Broadens their 
support base through 
education and 
volunteering 
opportunities 
§ Makes peace 
discourse more 
accessible to 
grassroots 
population 
§ Initiates and scales 
up conflict resolution 
discourse in the 
country 
§ Increased reflection 
on how to 
strengthen their 
outreach capacity 
to connect to 
ordinary citizens 
§ Initiating and 
promoting 
discussion about 
how to further 
democratize 
internal civil society 
structures 
Democracy:  
Tolerance and 
Respect for 
Difference 
§ Acknowledging the 
importance of 
differences 
§ Increased capacity 
for conflict 
resolution, 
particularly 
tolerance and the 
willingness to listen 
to others 
§ Opportunity to 
strengthen skills 
and attitudes such 
as tolerance 
Democracy:  
Nonviolence, 
Peaceful Resolution 
of Conflict, Collective 
Problem-Solving 
§ Help to improve 
communication skills 
beneficial for 
resolving conflict in a 
constructive manner 
§ Promoting 
cooperative problem-
solving 
§ Promoting skills for 
enduring differences 
without resorting to 
anger and emotional 
reactions 
§ Enhancing civil 
society practitioners’ 
capacity for conflict 
resolution 
§ Capacity building to 
enhance he peace 
agenda – 
promoting peace 
education, 
nonviolence 
principles and 
conflict resolution 
skills 
Democracy: Ability to 
Work with 
Individuals/Groups 
with Differing 
Position 
§ Exposed to an 
opportunity to 
engage with a wide 
range of constituents 
including those who 
hold different 
positions 
§ Reaching out to 
various school 
officials and teachers 
§ Emphasis on 
common desires – 
reducing school 
violence 
§ Less effective in 
reaching out to 
conservative 
residents 
§ Less effective in 
promoting conflict 
resolution values to 
male constituents 
§ Increased 
awareness of the 
need to connect to 
diverse populations 
§ Limited outreach 
capacity to 
conservative 
constituents 
§ Accumulated 
expertise in 
intervening school 
violence / 
Interpersonal 
conflict among 
young people  
§ Successful 
individual-basis 
examples of 
reaching out to 
different 
constituents 
§ Tend to exclude 
conservative 
constituents from 
peace discourse  
§ Lack of visible shift 
in confrontational 
advocacy patterns 
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Tolerance and respect for difference. As one of the central values for 
fostering a stable and effective democratic system, political tolerance is 
understood as “The willingness to extend procedural liberties, such as free 
speech and association to unpopular or disliked individuals or groups” in liberal 
democratic discourse (Finkel, 2000, p. 2). Participatory proponents, such as 
Dryzek (1994), define attitudes manifested in citizens willing to listen and seek 
to understand what others say and respond respectfully to the views of others. 
Galston (1991, p. 227) refers to tolerance as one’s willingness to give serious 
attention “to a range of views, which will include ideas the listener is bound to 
find strange and even obnoxious” (cf. Chapter 2). In new democracies where 
the notion of political tolerance was non-existent or suppressed by authoritarian 
regimes, as Finkel (2000) summarises, one can observe generally low levels of 
tolerance and support for minority rights. Compared to established democracies’ 
limited willingness to extend civil liberties to unpopular groups, a lack of 
tolerance for difference and minority views poses a threat to new democracies’ 
long-term viability (Finkel, 2000).  
 As recent statistics on rising social conflict indicate, South Koreans are 
increasingly criticised for their inability to discuss public affairs openly in a 
constructive and civilised manner (The Korea Herald, 2007). The lack of ability 
to practise tolerance during citizens’ participation in civic discourse exacerbates 
contentious social issues and often escalates into negative confrontation (Kim 
et al., 2005). In a joint study on the socio-political contexts in which South 
Korean civil society organisations operate, Joo et al. (2006) identified that 
mistrust and intolerance are widespread and the levels of intolerance and 
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impatience towards minority and differences are the highest in the world. 
Scholars such as Ha (2003) attribute the high levels of intolerance to the 
historical and political experiences that have suppressed the diversity of 
ideologies and culture. The lack of tolerance and emphasis on conformity are 
also reflected in South Korea; until the early 2000s, South Korean civil society 
organisations put a great emphasis on common attitudes and actions, thereby 
unintentionally discouraging the emergence of diverse opinions and ideas. 
Furthermore, compared to other political and socio-economic reform issues—
transparency, corporate accountability, environmental justice, civil rights, 
gender equality—promoting tolerance in society was not considered a priority 
concern for civil society organisations (Joo et al., 2006). 
 When asked what benefits they have experienced by participating in the 
case study organisations and their conflict-resolution activities, an 
overwhelming majority of interviewees indicated that they had learned the 
importance of listening to others who hold different opinions and acknowledging 
others’ positions, even when they do not agree with them. Some of the specific 
examples to which School Peace’s participants referred testify that such 
changes were drawn from their own daily lives and interaction with family 
members. Some of the interviewees went on to say that training experiences 
have helped them to listen empathetically to their children’s perspectives, in 
contrast with their previous attitude that assumed that they, as parents, knew 
what their children were thinking and needed (cf. SP1 (2007), SP2 (2007), and 
SP3 (2007) in Chapter 5). The participants with the WMP-CR Centre and PAN 
shared their positive reflection on enhanced capacity for tolerance by using the 
examples in professional settings, rather than using anecdotes about changes 
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that took place in their private lives (cf. CR 2 (2007), CR3 (2007), and CR 13 
(2007) in Chapter 5).  
As explained in the previous chapter, a number of the interviewees the 
author met during the field research have engaged in the democratisation 
struggle or other forms of civil society activism, which clearly distinguishes good 
and progressive versus wrong and conservative. Specifically, owing to its long 
tradition of struggle against the state, South Korean civil society activism was 
entrapped in the dualistic master-frames that categorise the values promoted by 
civil society organisations as progressive, idealistic, morally superior and liberal. 
However, values opposed by civil society groups were presented as ultra-
conservative, anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic, and morally corrupt. In such 
contexts, interviewees shared that their exposure to conflict-resolution practices 
and methodologies forced them to reflect on whether their own behaviours have 
contributed to the escalation of conflict (cf. CR 6 (2007), CR8 (2007), SP5 
(2007), and PAN3 (2007) in Chapter 5). Furthermore, a number of the 
interviewees emphasised that they appreciated conflict-resolution because of 
their increased capacity to listen to others and reflect empathetically on others’ 
positions, despite the fact that they vehemently opposed their viewpoints in a 
political sense. In the context of interview findings, it is observed that conflict-
resolution methodologies have helped increase levels of tolerance towards 
minorities and difference.  
Ability to work with individuals with positions different from their 
own. Tolerance is a value individuals can internalise through educational efforts. 
The ability to work with individuals who hold positions different from one’s own 
is a specific form of action that practises the value of tolerance. Conflict-
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resolution methodologies can be, to a certain extent, considered as contributing 
to enhancing one’s level of tolerance of differences. However, it appears this 
value has not yet been systematically translated into action. Out of over 50 
interviewees, fewer than ten individuals responded that they were able to 
engage with others during a rather contentious situation and positively reflect 
their ability to handle such situations49. Fewer than five individuals illustrated a 
specific example in which they used conflict-resolution skills and values in an 
attempt to solve social and public conflicts, either as a third-party facilitator or 
as a direct party to the conflict (cf. CR 2 (2007), CR 13 (2007) in Chapter 5). 
The limit in translating the values and skills into specific action can be explained 
by the fact that civil society organisations have increasingly become party to 
conflicts and are considered by conservatives, who would likely oppose civil 
activism, to favour certain positions. It can be argued that such a lack of trust in 
civil society’s ability to be neutral and impartial to certain values limits civil 
society organisations’ opportunities to engage with opposing sides. 
Non-violent and peaceful problem-solving. Shonholtz (2003, p. 402) 
elaborates on why democracy is considered a system for facilitating different 
opinions and conflicting values in a non-violent and constructive manner, by 
emphasising democracy’s inherent goal “to create democratic processes, 
policies, structures, mechanisms, skilled personnel, and enforcement 
procedures” when managing contentious social issues, while maintaining peace 
and order. Democracy as a system of conflict-management explains, to a 
certain extent, how the field of conflict-resolution has emerged in advanced 
                                                
49 These individuals include CR2, CR9, CR10, CR11, CR12, CR13, PAN6, PAN7, and PAN8. Their ability 
to engage in difficult conversations with those who hold differing positions cannot be solely explained by 
their exposure to conflict-resolution and peace activism. Their professional positions require them to 
engage with more diverse constituents than other activists interviewed in 2007.  
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democratic societies. Conflict-resolution avoids the use of violence as a means 
of social change; when applied to national settings, “it privileges more pacific 
methods of negotiation, dialogue, prevention or peace-building” that promote 
incremental social change (Fast, p. 207, 2002). The term “civil” in the context of 
civil society in democracy implicitly assumes that non-violence and collaborative 
problem-solving are critical elements for distinguishing civil society’s benefits, 
such as democracy, from other forms of civil associations that potentially 
threaten the democratic political order, such as civic gatherings mobilised 
around ethnic chauvinism, extreme nationalism or religious fundamentalism. As 
elaborated by Barber (1984, p. 223), civility based upon non-violence and 
collaborative problem-solving based upon public reasonableness helps “citizens 
deal with conflicts of public life, and works as a social lubricant to ease the 
demands”. 
As explained by Joo et al. (2006), non-violence in civil society became 
more prominent in the late 1990s and 2000s. However, in the context of social 
and public conflict between civil society and the state, or civil society and large 
corporations, violent demonstrations have occasionally been employed in order 
to voice civil society’s vehement opposition, even in the early 2000s. Reflecting 
civil society’s increasing acceptance of non-violence as an organising principle 
to articulate one’s views, more recently civil society organisations have begun 
to engage in activities to promote the value of non-violence and the constructive 
management of contentious social issues. The three case study organisations 
reviewed in this dissertation serve as notable examples of such efforts, as their 
activities emphasise the importance of non-violence and collaborative problem-
solving. Yet, as acknowledged by a number of interviewees from the WMP-CR 
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Centre and the PAN, the influence of these case study organisations is rather 
limited and remains a minority voice within civil society (cf. CR2 (2007) in 
Chapter 5). Specifically, civil society practitioners experience difficulty in 
promoting peace and conflict-resolution methodologies to other civil society 
actors, owing to the complexity of core concepts and a rather limited effect on 
social structure. 
Increasing participation. One theme that emerged repeatedly from 
interviews is that conflict-resolution methodology provides an alternative 
outreach method for civil society practitioners to engage with ordinary citizens; 
this claim frequently appeared during the interviews with those who participated 
in the WMP-CR Centre and the PAN. At the same time, School Peace 
interviewees, who tend to be volunteers and non-professional civil society 
practitioners, also indicated that conflict-resolution training and its relevance to 
their daily lives gave them courage and a willingness to participate in activities 
organised by civil society groups. Such enthusiasm over conflict-resolution as a 
method for helping civil society activism to focus on macro and systemic social 
issues and grassroots politics can be related to the fact that civil society 
organisations have long been faced with limited participation of ordinary and 
grassroots population. For example, Joo et al. (2006) reported that the growth 
of citizen participation does not contribute to the structural development of civil 
society, as their participation is limited to one-off activities, and has not led to 
sustainable participation in civil society spaces. Although interviewees indicate 
that they see great potential for expanding citizen participation through conflict-
resolution, there is very limited evidence as to whether such participation can 
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have a significant effect, owing to the lack of specific data profiling the type of 
citizens participating in conflict-resolution activities.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the findings of three case study organisations 
through four different analytical frameworks: organisational overviews; interview 
reflections; conflict-resolution issue-framing; and enhancing democratic quality. 
Such analysis helps us gain insight into these case study organisations and 
allows reflection on their role in enhancing conflict-resolution capacity, while 
nurturing the democratic functions of civil society. The next chapter will 
summarise the ideas of this dissertation and reflect critically upon some of its 
limitations. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
 
Evolution of democracy is not possible if we are not 
prepared to hear the other side. (Mahatma Ghandi) 
 
No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a 
democracy. Rather, both are processes that 
continue to evolve over a lifetime. (Kofi Annan) 
 
These quotes are illustrative of the two main arguments of this 
dissertation. The author embarked on this research project based on 
contemporary views that democracy requires citizens who are willing to 
participate in civic discourses non-violently, who respect diverse views, and 
who engage in dialogue with others for problem solving (cf. Chapter 2). The 
above quotes allude to the process of obtaining citizen virtues and deepening 
democracy as a journey of both an individual citizen and a society that 
embraces democratic ideals. South Korea, the focus of this dissertation, is still 
new to democracy. It celebrated the 20th anniversary of the democratic 
transition only in 2007. The 1987 transition was its third attempt at 
democratisation since a modern governance system was incorporated in the 
late 19th century. The previous democratisation attempts were unsuccessful, 
and authoritarian rule prevailed. In this context, this dissertation showed that the 
country continues to experiment with democracy, and so does its civil society, in 
which citizen action is primarily organised. The author highlighted the critical 
role civil society and citizens in South Korea play in the country’s democratic 
experiments because the civil society advocates for citizens’ interests, supports 
the state’s democratic reforms, and monitors the government for its 
accountability. In 2003, the civil society in South Korea became the most 
trusted institution in the country (cf. Chapter 1, Lee, 2008).  
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The country no longer restricts basic rights, nor do have citizens to fear 
for their lives because they are willing to share their ideas in public. Yet, South 
Korea is a new democracy and its government, civil society, and citizens were 
not fully equipped to manage conflictual social dynamics or emerging public 
policy-related disputes in a constructive manner. This dissertation argues that 
peace and conflict resolution is South Korea’s civil society’s innovative 
response to this emerging challenge, and that peace and conflict resolution 
activities in the civil society space contribute to enhancing its capacity to nurture 
democratic citizenship, which is a key ingredient for a vibrant civil society, and 
participatory democracy.  
This dissertation first reviewed the emerging challenge related to 
constructive management of social conflicts, pubic disputes, and other 
conflictual dynamics, and then investigated ways in which the South Korean 
civil society responded to conflictual social issues throughout history. Through 
the historical analysis, the evolution of civil society’s roles and characteristics at 
different junctions of the democratisation process are explored, and ways in 
which it engaged with the state in pursuit of democratic advancement are 
investigated. The historical overview helped to specifically identify how the 
authoritarian legacy and South Korea’s relation to North Korea reinforced 
conflictual dynamics between civil society and the state. Furthermore, civil 
society’s self-identification in relation to social conflicts in the country is 
examined. Based on the empirical data assembled through fieldwork, ways in 
which civil society activists and participants engaged in PCR activism were 
examined, and their perspectives on the added benefits and limits of these 
activities outlined. Finally, this dissertation investigated whether—and to what 
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extent—peace and conflict resolution activities were beneficial to embedding 
democratic norms, skills, and values into civil society. 
While a liberal democratic vision overarches South Korea’s democratic 
transition and consolidation process (cf. Chapter 4), the KDJ and RMH 
administrations emphasised the importance of citizen participation in their policy 
directives. Specifically, the RMH administration, which held the power at the 
time of the field research, placed the promotion of citizen participation at the 
core of its democracy-deepening policies and introduced various supportive 
policies. This dissertation suggested that participatory democracy was a 
complementary vision to the liberal one, as it offered mechanisms for citizen 
empowerment. As highlighted in Chapter 2, this dissertation agreed with 
Baber’s vision on participatory democracy; specifically his view that through the 
genuine empowerment of citizens, participatory democracy strengthens a 
society’s capacity to address conflicts (Barber, 1984; cf. Chapter 2). Barber’s 
vision strengthened liberal democrats’ vision that democracy was a system that 
constructively managed differences and diverse viewpoints. While a majority of 
liberal democratic scholarly efforts focused on macro-level institutional 
measures to fulfil the vision, participatory democracy gauged democratic 
citizenship and micro-level measures affecting their abilities.  
In engaging with theoretical discourse on democracy, this dissertation 
turned its attention to civil society, which emerged as one of the most examined 
concepts since the late 1980s. Especially its dramatic role in triggering 
democratic transitions in various parts of the world, including South Korea, 
continued to play a relevant role in shaping processes of democratic deepening 
and consolidation in these countries (Diamond, 1994). For South Korea it was 
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virtually impossible to imagine the country’s democratic vision without including 
the civil society.  
This dissertation interpreted the post-transition civil society in South 
Korea through the lenses of the liberal and the public sphere (cf. Chapter 2), as 
these frameworks better reflected the roles and activities civil society played 
since the 1987 transition. Through the historical analysis in Chapter 4, the 
author demonstrated how mainstream civil society activities transitioned from 
oppositional struggles for emancipation to discourse generation on critical 
reform issues for public debates. Built upon the civil society and 
democratisation literature by Diamond (1994), Edwards (2004), and Finkel 
(2003), three main areas where civil society played an important role in the 
post-democratic, transitional process were identified: a) monitoring, advocating, 
and supporting the state’s reform process, b) raising citizens’ awareness of key 
reform agendas and democratic processes and c) mobilising relevant actions 
and nurturing people’s democratic capacity. 
This dissertation paid particular attention to the third function of civil 
society–mobilizing relevant action and nurturing people’s democratic 
capacity/citizenship because Korean scholars including Kim (2000) examined 
extensively the relevance of the first two functions to the democratisation 
process in South Korea. As outlined in Chapter 2, this dissertation concurred 
with participatory democratic theorists such as Barber (1984), Drysek (1990), 
and Kymlicka (2002) that democratic citizenship was critical to ensure the 
quality of the democratic participation of citizens. These theorists made explicit 
references to certain virtues of democratic citizenship to operationalize the 
participatory vision of democracy in practice. These virtues included tolerance, 
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open-mindedness towards differences, embracing diversity, empathetically 
listening to opposite sides, a willingness to solve problems in dialogue, and 
participation to advance public interests with a commitment to nonviolence.  
With the aforementioned theoretical backgrounds in mind, this 
dissertation faced the following questions:  
• How were such virtues obtained in new democracies such as 
South Korea?  
• Who was engaged in such discourses in South Korea?  
• What mechanisms and activities were utilised by South Korean 
actors to promote these democratic citizenship qualities?  
The PCR lens led to the examination of three South Korean civil society 
organisations that brought PCR practices into the country. The three 
investigated case study organisations were a representation of the different 
forms of civil society groups that exist in South Korea. At the same time, they 
represented the same vision—alternative forms of civil society activisms that go 
beyond street protests and petition signing and collaborative management of 
conflictual social issues. Their stories were told in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, and 
it was examined how they were intertwined with the country’s political history. 
This dissertation was a journey in search of understanding the linkage between 
PCR, civil society activism, and democratic citizenship in South Korea and it 
attempts to honour its PCR pioneers. This chapter aims to summarise what this 
dissertation explored and found.  
Summary of Conclusions  
This chapter summarises and affirms the related arguments that have 
been presented in previous chapters. Arguing that PCR activities are beneficial 
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to strengthening civil society’s the nurturing capacity for democracy, the 
dissertation reviewed the country’s political history and civil society’s changing 
response to social conflicts, and analysed empirical data assembled through 
observation, interviews, and documentation during the field research.  
The dissertation mapped existing efforts in the areas of peace and 
conflict resolution by civil society, and concluded that the field is still in a 
developmental phase in South Korea. The mapping exercise and subsequent 
case studies highlighted that the field differs from those observed in advanced 
democracies. Specifically, it has not yet fully integrated core features of conflict 
resolution—advocating neutrality, inclusiveness, and impartiality not only 
through their rhetoric, but also through their actions (Fast, 2002; cf. Chapter 3). 
With a majority of their policies oriented centre-left, civil society organisations 
studied here had limited success with reaching a wide range of constituents 
including conservatives and mainstreaming a PCR agenda within South Korea’s 
civil society. In addition, with the societal pressure that success had to be 
demonstrated, civil society organisations often hesitated to take on specific 
cases that could practically utilise conflict resolution techniques and peace 
education in the community (PAN6, Personal interview, 2 May 2007 in Chapter 
5). This limited the possibility of expanding PCR activities into the broader 
society and prohibited a greater effect on the macro political processes. 
Nonetheless, rather than putting great emphasis on comparing South 
Korean PCR to the ones in North American, the dissertation examined the 
emergence of peace and conflict resolution in South Korea’s civil society within 
the framework of democratic deepening and consolidation process. Throughout 
the dissertation, the author contemplated this field’s potential, relevance, and 
 315 
315 
 
promises to the country’s on-going democratic deepening processes. The 
following three findings were highlighted in the last three chapters of this 
dissertation; the historical overview, the description of three case studies, and 
the analysis and comparison of these case studies, and are summarised below.  
1. PCR activism in South Korea emerged as a result of civil society activists’ 
efforts to transform the negative pattern of problem solving that 
intensified social conflicts in post-transitional South Korea. Conflictual 
ways of handling differences are embedded in the South Korea’s civil 
society because of its antagonistic encounters with authoritarian regimes 
throughout its modern history. 
2. Civil society practitioners initiated the PCR movement in order to 
increase citizen participation and make civil society activism more 
accessible to South Koreans. The PCR movement offers a range of 
practical solutions that appeal to the ideals of participatory democracy. 
However, there is limited evidence on whether PCR has made specific 
contributions to expanding citizen participation in civil society.  
3. Exposure to the PCR movement sensitizes civil society activists in South 
Korea towards the values of tolerance and constructive problem solving. 
However, there is limited evidence on whether these values have been 
systematically integrated into activists’ action.  
Detailed Reflections on Conclusions 
In Search of an Alternative Framework for Problem-Solving Pattern of 
Civil Society: PCR activism in South Korea emerged as a result of civil society 
activists’ efforts to transform the negative pattern of problem solving that 
intensified social conflicts in post-transitional South Korea. Conflictual ways of 
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handling differences are embedded in the South Korea’s civil society because 
of its antagonistic encounters with authoritarian regimes throughout its modern 
history.  
 As presented in Chapter 4, how the civil society in South Korea handles 
social conflicts is closely linked to country’s political history. Until 1987, civil 
society had existed as a space for mobilising oppositional forces to challenge 
the status quo, and antagonism had long defined the state-society relationship. 
Throughout the country’s modern history, authoritarian leaders repeatedly 
denied setting up democratic measures for citizens to raise their concerns and 
grievances legitimately. Civil society was suppressed, and authorities denied 
their oversight function and failed to openly mobilise South Koreans, especially 
for matters and causes that were controversial and might be perceived as anti-
governmental. Civil society opposition had been portrayed by the authoritarian 
regimes as a dangerous attempt to overthrow the government and the capitalist 
system in South Korea. To challenge authoritarianism and to demand 
democratic rights, civil society had very little choice but to resort to 
confrontational engagement with the state, even at the expense of being 
accused of interrupting social harmony—one of the most important Confucius 
virtues, which are highly relevant for South Koreans.  
During historical periods such as the colonial era from 1910 to 1945, or 
Chun’s military regime from 1980 to 1987, civil society opposition and anti-state 
confrontation were viewed necessary by a broad range of South Koreans (cf. 
Chapter 4). On the other hand, the oppositional civil society and its antagonistic 
engagement with the government from 1945 to 1979 were highly contested and 
polarised the opinions of South Koreans’ (cf. Chapter 4). The complex 
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interaction of anti-communism ideology, the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the 
South-North tensions throughout the Cold War, and Park’s successful economic 
development strategies that resulted in an annual 8.5% GDP growth, spilt the 
population in two in regard to the role of civil society and their strategies 
towards engaging the state. Specifically, authoritarian leaders claimed that the 
civil society and its progressive ideals were responsible for the two failed 
attempts at democratisation, arguing that civil society brought chaos (Kim, 
2000). Kim (2002) further elaborates (cf. Chapter 4) that authoritarian leaders 
also successfully linked civil society and the diverse interests expressed by civil 
society actors to attempts by North Korea to invade South Korea. 
This dissertation reviewed the evolution of South Korean civil society and 
the manner in which it has interacted with the country’s socio-political history (cf. 
Chapter 4). In doing so, it investigated the pattern of civil society’s responses to 
social conflicts, and the ways in which society has changed since the 
democratic transition. The dissertation noted that the two previous failed 
attempts reinforced the arguments of authoritarian leaders that open contests 
from the society sphere, diverse interests advocated by civil society groups, and 
civil society activism were dangerous to the country’s well-being, and were 
sources of social conflicts. In addition, the two failed democratisation attempts 
and the subsequent repression through the state restricted the autonomy and 
independence of the civil society and its members, and in turn legitimised the 
antagonistic engagement of civil society with the state or other actors who were 
loyal to the regime and the status quo, such as conservative social groups, 
state-controlled media, and conglomerates. 
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The military dictatorships and their repressive measures gave civil 
society actors few options for confrontation or anti-government resistance. In 
South Korea, oppositional movements sparked through civil society were not 
groups engaging in guerrilla warfare or covert violent conflicts with the state. 
Their tactics were mostly protests, campaigns, and other types of nonviolent 
strategies. However, throughout history, oppositional politicians, pro-democracy 
movements, and progressive civil society figures were portrayed to be part of a 
wing of violent opposition against the state because the presence of North 
Korea legitimised labelling these groups as violent (Kim, 2000). As the state-
society conflict intensified in the 1980s, street protests often ended with violent 
clashes; however, most of the offensive measures were taken by the military 
police, while a limited number of protestors resorted to throwing gasoline bombs 
(Kim, 2000). This dissertation found that due to South Korea’s historical legacy, 
its civil society had internalised antagonistic measures into its core survival 
strategies, and raised legitimate concerns in more aggressive and 
confrontational manners than what was traditionally accepted under the term 
civil society activities. In activist’s minds, these measures were a necessary 
means to attain justice and freedom. 
As elaborated by Kim (2000), the 1987 transition provided progressive 
South Korean civil society actors with an opportunity to expand and redefine 
roles and characteristics of civil society, based on the changing political 
contexts. However, their engagement patterns with the state and other 
economic and political elites remained conflictual and antagonistic for the first 
ten years post-transition (cf. Chapter 4). To promote public interests and 
equality and to restore the wrongdoings of the past regimes, activists have 
 319 
319 
 
utilised civil society as a space to mobilise against previously suppressive 
voices and to promote progressive causes such as transitional justice measures, 
workers’ rights, a conciliatory approach to North Korea, women’s rights, and 
highly gender-biased family laws, corruption of politicians, development over 
rights for the poor, conglomerates’ close association with the state power. To 
publicise these progressive ideals, civil society actors continued to utilise strong 
advocacy campaigns, street protests, and strikes. Civil society activists rarely 
viewed civil society organisations’ lack of attention to other democratic needs of 
the society as a problem because they argued that more urgent tasks had to be 
addressed before thinking about other issues (Moon, 2002; cf. Chapter 4). 
Civil society's long battles with economic and political elites contributed 
to the rapid development of democratic institutions and measures that 
accelerated the democratic consolidation process. With the election of KDJ in 
1998, more progressive measures to institutionally legitimize civil society were 
introduced and its influence on publicizing critical issues were strengthened (cf. 
Chapter 4). In the early 2000s, the civil society was at the centre of media 
attention with numerous successful campaigns; major dam development 
projects were blocked for conserving the environment and peoples’ livelihoods; 
corrupt politicians were blacklisted from being elected; the conservative parties’ 
attempt to impeach RMH was stopped; and many anti-American protests 
against the as perceived influence U.S. military power has on South Korean 
politics were organised. Civil society became South Korea’s most influential 
institution in 2003 (Kim, 2009).  
Simultaneously, the rising influence of the progressive civil triggered 
increased activity of conservative social groups whose goals were to confront 
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progressive activists and to restore the country’s conservative values. In dealing 
with these conservative groups, progressive civil society activists took more 
confrontational and antagonistic measures, denying them their association with 
the term ‘civil society’, or discounting their presence and views (Joo et al., 2006). 
In addition, in the early 2000s, numerous public policy disputes involving local 
development projects were reported in the media. Both KDJ and RMH were 
sympathetic to progressive civil society actors, and influential state officials in 
these administrations were considered progressive and civil-society-friendly. 
Despite the attempts to arrive at mutually agreeable resolutions, the disputes 
between the state, civil society, and community members ended with 
dissatisfactory outcomes for the involved parties, and civil society began to be 
perceived as a conflictual organisation (Park, 2004; Park 2006).  
In this context, this dissertation noted that PCR activism emerged as an 
alternative framework for self-reflection and action for the country’s civil society 
actors. As stated by CR2 (Personal interview, 26 January 2007), “civil society 
began to realize that the previous conflictual patterns were deeply influential to 
how civil society activists resolved differences… we felt that alternatives need to 
be explored to transform this.” As summarized in Chapter 5 and 6, many other 
interviewees echoed her views. For example, PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 May 
2007) shared that “we internalized violence, antagonism, and confrontation, and 
neglected many other values that we claim to promote.” These actors integrated 
peace and conflict resolution as a framework, which challenged the negative 
pattern of how civil society handled differences. They further embraced peace 
and conflict resolution ideals because they offered more than just a tool for self-
critiquing (cf. PAN and WMP-CR Centre). These activists including CR2 
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(Personal interview, 26 January 2007) appreciated peace and conflict resolution 
because of its practical value for empowering activists and active civil society 
practitioners to constructively engage in social conflicts.  
Activists the author met highlighted that the increased spread of PCR 
and its rising popularity among civil society activists were reflective of PCR’s 
practicality, and its process-oriented values. A statement by CR2 (Personal 
interview, 26 January 2007) elaborated how peace and conflict resolution 
emerged in civil society:  
 
In the late 1990s, we began to be keenly aware that we have 
internalized too much violence and confrontation, and forgot to 
engage with others in a humanistic way. We were lost in great 
discourse, and neglected to pay attention to processes, which 
guide change and progress. I was drawn to peace and conflict 
resolution because of its offer to emphasise the process, and 
raise my consciousness around these negative patterns that I 
absorbed. 
 
This dissertation showed that PCR in South Korea was a self-reflective 
effort to transform violent patterns of problem solving and reflected during the 
encounters with volunteers with the School Peace. These activists tended to be 
less politicised than practitioners associated with the WMP-CR Centre and the 
PAN, yet they asserted that negative patterns of problem solving affected them 
and their community despite their political awareness and active community 
engagement. SP5 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007) elaborated on her 
interaction with youth on peace and conflict resolution, “peace education and 
conflict resolution training tries to showcase constructive problem solving 
examples to our children who are already deeply exposed to the negative 
conflict management patterns of Korean society.”  
Peace and Conflict Resolution for Citizen Participation: Civil society 
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practitioners initiated the PCR movement in order to increase citizen 
participation and make civil society activism more accessible to South Koreans. 
The PCR movement offers a range of practical solutions that appeal to the 
ideals of participatory democracy. However, there is limited evidence on 
whether PCR has made specific contributions to expanding citizen participation 
in civil society.  
This dissertation noted that in the mid-2000s, citizen participation in civil 
society began to decrease (Joo et al., 2006). Especially, the low level of 
participation in progressive advocacy activities became more visible with civil 
society research advancing more in South Korea (Joo et al., 2006). For 
example, civil society membership declined by nearly 15% from 1996 to 2006, 
and while the percentage of civil society membership was with 77% still rather 
high, the membership of most South Koreans was linked to cultural, social, and 
friendship-based groups (Lee, 2008). It is especially notable that only 30% of 
those who indicated their membership with one or more civil society groups 
were affiliated with interest-based advocacy and progressive civil society 
groups (Lee, 2008). In addition to the low level of participation, institutional trust 
in civil society has declined in recent years. In 2006, the same survey that 
previously ranked civil society as the most trusted institution in the country 
revealed a dramatic change. Kim (2009) explained that the civil society in 2006 
ranked as the fifth trustworthy institution because of its highly politicized 
activities, too much emphasis on progressive, macro-political ideals, and 
citizens increasingly perceiving civil society as a source of social conflict.  
The decline of public citizen participation and institutional trust in civil 
society are not unique to South Korea. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the notion of 
 323 
323 
 
participatory democracy emerged in response to advanced democracies’ 
continued decline of civic engagement in democratic processes (Barber, 1984). 
Putnam’s social capital theory was inspired by his research comparing Italian 
and American civic engagement patterns and the overall well-being of their 
respective societies (Putnam, 1993). Howard (2003) examined the low 
participation of citizens in civil societies in former communist countries in his 
triangulation study, and argued that these countries’ totalitarian legacy is 
strongly linked to the decline of civic participation. Further, scholars such as 
Carothers (1999) argued that the lack of genuine citizen participation in civil 
society organisations in developing countries was closely linked to the rapid 
professionalization of civil society, which tended to attract particular types of 
elites to such space.  
In South Korea, researchers sympathetic to progressive causes tended 
to dominate civil society discourses (cf. Chapter 1; Chapter 4). Further, the 
decline of civic participation was a relatively new phenomenon in the country. 
As a result, comparably few studies were conducted, and discussion of the 
subjects was limited to editorials and commentaries in newspapers (Joo et al., 
2006). Within progressive civil society circles, activists began to identify these 
patterns and ways to revive citizen action in civil society. In this dissertation, 
civil society practitioners’ self-reflections on the decline of civic participation are 
evident in their motivations to engage in PRC activities and their assessment of 
PRC’s positive contributions (cf. Chapter 5).  
One of the most frequently cited reasons for the decline of civic 
participation by the interviewees was the emphasis on great political discourses 
that were far removed from the day-to-day concerns of citizens that were not 
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professional civil society practitioners or life-long activists. All the volunteers 
interviewed for School Peace (cf. Chapter 5) indicated that prior to their joining 
School Peace, although they were politically conscious, they had not been 
engaged in civil society activism since their college days because of their daily 
obligations, including child rearing. Specifically, SP2 (Personal interview, 25 
April 2007) elaborated her perception towards civil society activism when 
explaining how surprised she was when she felt urged to volunteer with School 
Peace. She said, “I never imagined myself volunteering for a neighbourhood 
civil society organization before … because I thought activism is for somebody 
else.” Similarly, a number of interviewees featured in WMP-CR shared their 
reflections on civil society activism and its focus on big political issues. CR1 
(Personal interview, 24 May 2007) stated, “after a number of engagements in 
the movement, I burnt out, and could not continue. I wanted to stay away from 
activism, and engage in my daily life.” The rationale of Peace Activists’ Network 
is also closely linked to the lack of sustained civic participation. After a 
movement opposing the government’s decision to deploy troops in Iraq 
emerged, activists recounted that they began to reflect on how ordinary citizens’ 
interest in peace activism had quickly diminished. One of those self-reflections 
was shared in their meeting minutes from 2004; civil society saw anti-war 
protests in the context of Korea-U.S. relations and complex international politics, 
rather than something more personal to South Koreans (Peace Activists Retreat 
Minutes, 2004 in Chapter 5).  
In addition to civil society’s intense focus on great political discourses, 
the interviewed civil society activists including PAN1 (Personal interview, 29 
January 2007), PAN6 (Personal interview, 2 May 2007), and CR9 (Personal 
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interview, 30 May 2007) pointed a lack of diversity within civil society out, and 
remarked that the absence of a holistic approach to activism contributed to the 
decline of civic participation. A majority of veteran civil society practitioners that 
met for the Peace Activists’ Networks acknowledged that South Korean 
activism intellectualized various issues, and relied upon political knowledge for 
people’s empowerment. PAN1 said:  
We have a number of knowledge forums and seminars. These 
forums and seminars intellectually analyse all sorts of problems 
inhibiting peaceful inter-Korean relations. However, compared to 
the knowledge realm, peace activism in South Korea neglects 
process, values, and technical aspects of peace. (Personal 
interview, 29 January 2007) 
  
Young practitioners including PAN9 (Personal interview, 17 April 2007) 
and CR11 (Personal interview, 21 May 2007) were particularly critical of the 
lack of diversity within civil society activism and the implicit and explicit pressure 
to conform to the movement tradition. They assessed that lack of attention to 
fostering diversity and embracing a holistic approach turned young people away 
from activism. Interviewees shared self-reflective comments and explained that 
the issues causing the decline of civic participation in civil society were 
problematic because citizen participation was viewed as critical in sustaining a 
vibrant civil society and creating a participatory democratic space. Certainly, the 
stance of progressive civil society on macro-political issues or its own lack of 
creativity in approaching and reaching out to citizens could not solely explain 
the lack of sustained citizen participation. As Joo et al. (2006) and Kim (2009) 
elaborated, more complex circumstances affected citizen participation; de-
politicisation of young people, the association of progressive civil society with 
RMH, whose administration had a low approval rate during his final years in 
office, and conservative media’s attacks on influential progressive groups in the 
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mid-2000s are some of the discussed reasons.  
Yet, this dissertation only briefly touches upon the discussed decline of 
civic participation. Rather, this dissertation paid attention to various 
interviewees who repeatedly emphasised their enthusiastic assessment of the 
PCR movement as an instrument to enhancing citizen participation in South 
Korea (cf. Chapter 5). All three case studies stressed that activists and 
participants viewed peace and conflict resolution alike as tools to advance the 
quality of civic engagement, diversify existing civil society movements, and 
renewing civic participation in civil society (cf. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
Through informality, volunteerism, and a community-centred approach, School 
Peace successfully mobilised community members, specifically female 
suburban residents who tended to be less politically active than their male 
counterparts (Moon, 2002). As SP3 stated:  
Although the issue of conflict resolution and peace education is 
new and sounds difficult, it was rather easy for me to get involved in 
the organisation as all those who participate in the training share 
common challenges and found this issue useful to address our own 
problems. (Personal interview, 30 April 2007 in Chapter 5)  
 
Furthermore, School Peace’s example illustrated that framing peace 
education and conflict resolution as an empowering opportunity to address 
various interpersonal conflicts was effective in reaching out to ordinary citizens.  
The interviewees met for the WMP-CR Centre to assess the importance 
of conflict resolution programmes in bringing more people back or welcoming 
them into civil society activism in a democratic era. Interviewees thought that 
PCR activities offered by the WMP-CR Centre allowed ordinary citizens, who 
may have been away from activism, to reclaim their political consciousness and 
remain relevant for social discourses. CR1 explains her motivation to return to 
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her engagement with civil society:  
As I continue my participation in the training programme, I realised 
that I could remain highly active and relevant to social issues 
without putting myself into exhaustion and extreme dedication. I 
was happy that I could reclaim this space without sacrificing other 
important aspects in my life (Personal interview, 24 May 2007 in 
Chapter 5).  
 
The author identified that the WMP-CR Centre responded to their 
participants’ need for engaging in activism without being trapped into macro-
dynamics by framing peace and conflict resolution activities as small daily 
practical tools that could address the underlying causes of structural, systematic, 
and cultural violence that reinforced conflictual dynamics in society (cf. Chapter 
6). Such framing appealed to centre-left or centre constituents who were 
sympathetic to causes, but less willing to engage in activism with the full 
intensity demonstrated by professional or life-long activists.  
The interviews the author conducted for the PAN also revealed that 
activists welcomed the new wave of peace activism that emerged out of 
continued network and capacity building. This approach was attractive because 
of its potential to reach out to the young adult population. Especially peace 
activists frequently interacting with young adults highlighted that peace activism 
and its process-centred and holistic approach enabled young people to 
encounter activism in a more easily accessible way (cf. Chapter 5). Furthermore, 
activists stated that the traditional activism model, which centred on street 
protests and policy discussions, was less effective in engaging young people 
than experiential programmes such as travelling to particular cites for historical 
reflection on social justice, or engaging in dialogue with people from different 
countries to address common challenges such as environmental degradation or 
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gender.  
The interviewees of the three case studies expressed their appreciation 
for the PCR activities their respective organisations had implemented for their 
participatory potential. The present dissertation argued that the aforementioned 
sentiments, especially the ones highlighted by School Peace interviewees, were 
reflective of Folger and Bush’s (1994) and McCoy and Scully’s (2002) claims 
that empowerment increased through PCR activities including deliberative 
dialogue and transformative mediation allowed citizens to engage more in 
issues affecting their lives. The reflections from the interviewees also echoed 
Shonholtz’s (1997) argument that PCR could serve as a vehicle to prepare 
effective civic participation in new democracies.  
Interviewees’ appreciation for PCR activism as a way to enhance civic 
participation, reminded this author of Gidron et al.’s (2002) notion of multiple 
purpose hybrid organisations. Through a case study of PCR organisations in 
four protracted conflict areas, Gidron et al. (2002) argued that these 
organisations utilised PCR techniques to advance the causes their respective 
organisations advocated. Similar to these four localities’ PCR organisations, the 
author noted that South Korean civil society organisations studied in this 
dissertation incorporated PCR methodologies and ideals in order to promote 
their advocacy goals.  
Nonetheless, the participatory potential of peace and conflict resolution 
has limits in terms of skewed success along gender and political ideological 
lines. Echoing Khor’s (1999) view on the impact of what on gender in reinforcing 
women’s participation in a culturally prescribed sphere for women, this 
dissertation agreed with PAN3’s assessment that PCR was considered a 
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female-dominated civil society space by South Korean civil society activists 
(PAN3, Personal interview, 16 April 2007). The WMP-CR Centre and School 
Peace showed a high representation of female citizens while the PAN, which 
drew activists from peace organisations advocating peaceful North-South 
relations, had a stronger male presence. In this context, while the PCR 
movement was effective in bringing ordinary citizens into the public sphere, it 
tended to be more successful with women and young people. As highlighted in 
Chapter 6, during the analysis of these organisations’ core constituents and 
perceived political affiliation, the organisations of the case study and their PCR 
activities were less successful in enhancing participation of citizens less 
sympathetic to centre-left ideals. All interviewees acknowledged the lack of 
perceived political neutrality, but this dissertation acknowledged that few offered 
any concrete solutions to address the challenge; this could be an area for future 
research.  
Sensitising Citizens towards Democratic Values and Norms: Exposure to 
the PCR movement sensitizes civil society activists in South Korea towards the 
values of tolerance and constructive problem solving. However, there is limited 
evidence on whether these values have been systematically integrated into 
activists’ action.  
The present dissertation put an emphasis on civility and civic virtues as 
critical elements of civil society because they serve “as a basic test of civic 
competence as they encourage citizens to exercise self-constrain, to express a 
concern for others, and to maintain a commitment to civic discourse that is 
grounded on rational dialogue” (White, 2006, p.456). To understand how civility 
and civic virtues are fostered, the author examined civil society’s role in 
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providing a space for citizens to develop skills and habits beneficial to 
democratic development. Reiterating the view of White (2006) on civility, this 
dissertation argued that democratic skills and habits citizens obtained through 
engagement in civil society contributed to strengthening the two other functions 
civil society performs in democratic consolidation processes: monitoring and 
supporting the government’s action and generating public discourses 
(Habermas, 1980; Calhaun, 1993; Finkel, 2003, Edwards, 2003). In identifying a 
set of democratic values, skills, and attitudes that can be beneficial to 
strengthening a civil society, this dissertation drew inspiration from the work of 
participatory democratic theorists such as Barber (1984), Walzer (1974), 
Kymlicka (2001), Dryzek (1994), and Galston (1991). Based upon their work, 
the dissertation examined  three democratic values, skills, and norms; 
tolerance and respect for diversity, commitment to non-violent problem solving, 
and willingness to engage in difficult conversations in the public sphere, as they 
are deemed beneficial to strengthening civil society.  
As Joo et al. (2006) argued, civil society’s capacity to promote tolerance, 
diversity, and non-violence had been limited in South Korea. Many activists and 
practitioners assumed that these were qualities produced through exposure of 
citizens to civil society activism, and secondary outputs of civic participation. 
Furthermore, major newspapers such as the Korea Herald (2007) published 
essays, arguing that South Korea generated social conflicts because Koreans 
were unable to tolerate different opinions when engaging in public discourses. 
Ha (2003, cf. Chapter 6) indicated that the root causes of high levels of 
intolerance in South Korea were linked to the country’s historical and political 
experiences that have suppressed the diversity of ideologies. The country’s 
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historical development reinforced the conflictual dynamics of resolving 
differences within civil society (cf. Chapter 4). Additionally, its cultural heritage 
valued conformity and social harmony over diverse opinions and individual 
autonomy (cf. Chapter 3).  
In this context, this dissertation demonstrated that PCR activism in South 
Korea represented the efforts of civil society to generate civic virtues and 
democratic citizens. Specifically, interviewees across the three case study 
organisations valued the increased level of tolerance towards differences 
because of their encounters with PCR activism. This dissertation furthermore 
noted that School Peace participants focused more on their increased tolerance 
based upon their personal experiences of interacting with family members and 
friends. SP2 (Personal interview, 25 April 2007 in Chapter 5) explained that 
training experiences had helped her to listen more empathetically to her 
children’s perspectives, as opposed to her previous attitude that assumed that 
she, as parent, knew what her children needed. The WMP-CR Centre and PAN 
interviewees illustrated their enhanced capacity for tolerance by using the 
examples from professional settings. Many of the interviewees from these two 
organisations have engaged in the democratisation struggle or other forms of 
civil society activism. Civil society’s long tradition to struggle against the strong 
state entrapped activists in dualistic master frames, one that categorised the 
values promoted by civil society organisations as progressive, ideal, morally 
superior, and liberal, and another in which civil society groups were presented 
as ultra-conservative, anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic, and morally corrupt (cf. 
Chapter 5). In such contexts, interviewees such as SP2 (Personal interview, 25 
April 2007 in Chapter 5) shared that their exposure to conflict resolution 
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practices and methodologies forced them to reflect on whether their own 
behaviours had contributed to the escalation of conflict. CR5 (Personal 
interview, 23 May 2007 in Chapter 5) highlighted that her exposure to conflict 
resolution training programmes increased her capacity to listen to others and 
empathise with positions of others, despite the fact they vehemently opposed 
their political viewpoints. Corresponding to interviewees’ self-assessment of 
their level of tolerance for different opinions, this dissertation observed that PCR 
activism triggered some changes in the perspectives of civil society 
practitioners on constructive problem solving. One example is CR6 (Personal 
interview, 24 May 2007 in Chapter 5), who highlighted that her exposure to 
PCR activism shifted her previously ambivalent view on constructive problem 
solving. Formerly, she treated problem solving as a search for a mutually 
agreeable solution—a linguistic euphemism for compromise or co-optation. 
CR6 noted her perspective changed as constructive problem solving enhanced 
her ability to engage with people from differing positions.  
 While this dissertation demonstrated that PCR activism contributes to 
sensitising civil society participants towards tolerance and problem-solving 
approaches, the author noted that democratic values, norms, and skills had not 
yet been systematically translated into activists’ action. An example was 
highlighted in Chapter 6; out of over 50 interviewees, fewer than ten responded 
that they were able to engage with others during a rather contentious situation 
and positively reflect their ability to handle such situations. Fewer than five 
individuals illustrated a specific example in which they used conflict resolution 
skills and values in an attempt to solve social and public conflicts, either as a 
third-party facilitator or as a party directly involved in the conflict. The limited 
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translation of the values and skills into specific actions can be explained by the 
fact that civil society organisations are considered to favour certain positions by 
conservative constituents of the centre –right and right, who would likely 
disapprove progressive civil society activism. It seems likely that such a lack of 
trust in the ability of civil society to be neutral and impartial to certain values, 
limits the opportunities of civil society organisations to engage with opposing 
sides. 
Further Reflections 
Despite the rather encouraging findings from the case studies, this 
dissertation does not condone fully conclusive statements such as, PCR 
activities advanced civil society’s democracy-nurturing capacity in South Korea. 
Rather, this thesis presented nuanced and exploratory arguments that illustrate 
the complexities surrounding the application of PCR in the context of the South 
Korean civil society. This is due to the scope, methodological choice, and 
purpose of this dissertation. It was intentionally designed to avoid coming up 
with a generalizable statement based upon a cause-effect analysis of 
quantitative information on PCR activities. The author deliberatively adopted 
case studies as methodology to capture the relationship between civil society 
and PCR activism in South Korea. As a result, this dissertation collected 
experiences of interviewees with the PCR activities each case study 
organisation offered, and aimed to understand how the field of PCR emerged in 
South Korea’s post-transitional space. Additionally, the detail-rich narratives of 
the interviewees allowed the analysis of how they assess the benefits and 
added value of PCR in fostering democratic citizenship. 
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While this author opted for the method of qualitative case studies to 
explore emergent practices in South Korea’s PCR activism, it is worth 
examining the quantifiable data and its value for advancing this topic. During 
the field research, the author noted an absence of quantifiable data on PCR 
activities in South Korea and through interviews identified that this was partially 
related to a lack of emphasis on monitoring and evaluation in the civil society 
sector. Given the increased demand in the donor community for evidence-
based practices, international NGOs with sustainable funding tend to have a 
rigorous framework for monitoring and evaluating their practices. For example, 
Search for Common Ground and International Alert, two of the most reputable 
international NGOs in the area of PCR, have staff members dedicated to 
measuring the effects of their activities on the ground. However, South Korean 
NGOs examined in this dissertation hardly receive a large sum of foreign 
funding, and are therefore rarely confronted with such rigorous requirements. 
The funding received from foreign organisations is limited to supporting activists’ 
travels, or to the development of tool kits and workshops (WMP-CR Centre in 
Chapter 5). The author learned that a majority of donors tend to be Korean 
philanthropic organisations, or governmental institutions whose policies on 
monitoring and evaluation of PCR activities are non-existent at the time of the 
field research.  
The absence of quantifiable data means researchers in the field cannot 
compare how the individual understanding and attitude toward democratic 
problem solving, tolerance, and willingness to engage in difficult conversations, 
have changed as a result of their exposure to PCR activities over time. In the 
future, if funding is available, the time is opportune, and the field further 
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expands, this dissertation’s exploratory findings could further benefit from 
additional research, designed as a longitudinal study, focusing on those who 
participate in PCR activities. A longitudinal study with more measurable 
indicators could strengthen some of the arguments presented in this 
dissertation. 
In order for the overall themes of this research to be relevant to a larger 
academic community, the author believes that it is necessary to conduct 
multiple case studies and cross-national analyses in this area. This research 
looks only at South Korean civil society practitioners and citizens. Despite its 
unique contribution of bringing a new area to the field, this significantly limits the 
potential to add relevant information to other contexts. As cited previously, two 
notable case studies conducted by Finkel (2005) and Gidron et al. (2003) could 
serve as examples of how such cross-national analysis could be conducted.  
In conclusion, the field of peace and conflict resolution is still in a 
developmental stage in South Korea; thus, it is extremely difficult to indicate 
what this field can contribute to South Korean democracy. However, those who 
participated in conflict resolution activities have confirmed their positive 
experiences and recounted the transformative effects of these activities had on 
their lives. In this context, it is hoped that PCR will come to its full potential in 
South Korea; altering the violent pattern of conflict that has caused enormous 
damage to human relationships, and that citizens can integrate democratic 
values and norms in their lives and utilise them to demand and exercise the 
fundamental rights that they obtained through their drawn-out struggle. 
Certainly, this dissertation is encouraged by the enthusiasm expressed by civil 
society participants, highlighting that PCR can offer citizens an instrument that 
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helps them to be active participants in building a peaceful society. This author 
hopes that more research by Korean and foreign scholars will emerge and 
determine whether this hope can turn into reality. 
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ANNEX 1: FIELD RESEARCH: SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS 
(DRAFTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006)  
 
Unofficial Translation from Korean to English by the Researcher 
 
Constructing Baseline for Research Subjects 
 
1) Gender, Age, Occupation  
2) How have you get involved in (xx) activities that (xx) organisation is providing? 
3) How have you learned about (xx) activities that (xx) organisation is providing? 
4) Before joining (xx) programs, how did you understand conflict resolution, 
dialogue, peace action, or peace education? 
5) Could you describe your experience with Korea’s democratisation process? 
6) How do you understand Korea’s democratisation process? What does 
democracy, participation, or democratisation of South Korean mean to you? 
7) What other civil society activities have you participated in (e.g. voluntary 
activities, campaigns, or anything related to community organisations, charity 
groups, or non-governmental organisations)? 
8) How did you handle conflicts taking place outside of home or friendship circle? 
9) How do you describe conflicts in social setting? 
 
Questions in relation to their experience with activities 
 
1) What programs have you participated? How often (or regularly) have you 
participated in their programs? 
2) What programs have you found more relevant (or useful) to fulfil your 
expectation or motivation to participate in (xx) organisation? 
3) How have your perception toward others (e.g. Japanese youth, North Korean 
defectors, migrant workers, or people sitting in different political spectrum) 
changed after participating in the program? 
4) Can you describe your experience with (xx) activities? 
5) What experiences do you find most useful or rewarding in terms of applying to 
other social situations? 
6) Do you find your involvement in (xx) programs helpful for you to participate in 
social or political process? 
7) After joining the program, have you noticed any changes in terms of your 
reaction when you confront ‘opposing’ sides? 
8) What challenges do you face when applying skills and knowledge gained 
through your participation in (….) organisations? Do you think such challenges 
are related to the specific context of Korean culture or society? 
9) What skills and knowledge do you find most useful in applying to Korean civil 
society? 
10) Could you share your views on the value of PCR activism in advancing 
participatory democracy and sustainable development of Korea’s civil society? 
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ANNEX 2: SAMPLE COMMUNICATION APPROACHING INTERVIEW 
PARTICIPANTS 
(DRAFTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006) 
 
Unofficial Translation from Korean to English by the Researcher 
 
Dear (         ), 
 
How do you do? This is Da Woon Chung who has visited your office / spoken to you 
via phone about my PhD dissertation on PCR activism in (South) Korea’s civil society. 
 
[or when I obtained the contact detail from someone, the following sentence was used] 
 
How do you do? This is Da Woon Chung who is currently registered in the University of 
Bradford to do a PhD on PCR activism in South Korea’s civil society. I have obtained 
your contact information through [….], and he/she highly spoke of your work and 
strongly recommended that I should meet you to seek your views on this issue. 
 
My PhD dissertation aims to highlight South Korean civil society organisations focusing 
on PCR activism, and the critical resources that will be used for my research will be 
interview data obtained from having a structured conversation with experts/ 
practitioners / participants such as yours. I am sorry to interrupt you during your busy 
schedule, but I very much hope that I could visit your office or meet with you at your 
convenient place to seek your views for 40-50 minutes. Specifically, I am interested in 
learning about your experience on PCR activism and how such experience are being 
integrated into your daily life as well as work. 
 
For your reference, I have briefly summarised sample questions that can be used 
during our conversation. My sole purpose is to learn your perspectives in a comfortable 
and relaxed environment. It is really essential to see you and have our interviews 
recorded to create a solid research paper. I am in Seoul to do a series of interviews 
with numerous experts, practitioners, activists, and participants, and am very flexible 
and stand ready to accommodate your convenient time. Of course, the conversation 
we have will strictly remain confidential. I would greatly appreciate that I could learn 
about South Korea’s PCR activism by listening to your experience and views. 
 
I very much look forward to hearing from you soon, and thank you in advance for 
positively considering my request. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
Dawoon Chung 
 
Enclosure: Sample Interview Questions 
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ANNEX 3: PROFILES OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS  
 
Date and Location  Alias  Gender Age Democratisation  
May 24, 2007 at a youth center, Seoul  CR1 F 40s Yes 
Jan 26, 2007 & June 19, 2007  
at CR2’s office in Seoul 
CR2 F 40s Yes 
May 21, 2007 at CR3’s office in Seoul CR3 F 30s N/A 
April 10, 2007 at CR4’s office in Seoul CR4 F 20s Yes 
May 23, 2007 at CR5’s office in Seoul CR5  F 20s N/A 
May 24, 2007 at a pub in Seoul  CR6  F 40s Yes 
May 30, 2007 at CR7’s office in Seoul CR7 M 30s N/A 
May 28, 2007 at CR8’s office in Seoul CR8 M 30s Yes 
May 30, 2007 at a café in Seoul CR9 F 40S Yes 
Jan 26, 2007 & June 20, 2007  
in CR10’s office in Seoul 
CR10 M 30s N/A 
May 21, 2007 at CR11’s office in Seoul CR11  M 30s N/A 
May 21, 2007 at CR12’s office in Seoul CR12 F 20s N/A 
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Temple in Yeojoo CR13 M 30s Yes 
April 23, 2007 at a SP1’s office in Seoul SP1 F 40s Yes 
April 25, 2007 at a SP2’s office in Gwacheon SP2 F 30s N/A 
April 30, 2007 at a Nation Zoo in Gwacheon SP3 F 40s Yes 
April 23, 2007 at a SP4’s office in Seoul SP4 M 30s N/A 
April 25, 2007 at a SP5’s office in Gwacheon SP5 F 40s Yes 
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon SP6 F 40s Yes 
April 30, 2007 at a National Zoo in Gwacheon SP7 F 40s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN1’s office in Seoul PAN1 M 50s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a pub in Seoul  PAN2 F 20s N/A 
April 16, 2007 at a PAN3’s office in Incheon  PAN3 M 40s Yes 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN4’s office in Seoul PAN4 M 30s N/A 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN5’s office in Seoul PAN5 M 30s N/A 
May 2, 2007 at a PAN6’s office in Seoul PAN6 M 50s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN7’s office in Seoul PAN7 M 50s Yes 
May 11, 2007 at a café in Seoul PAN8 F 40s Yes 
April 17, 2007 at a PAN9’s office in Seoul PAN9 M 30s N/A 
June 14, 2007 at a Buddhist Tempe in Yeojoo PAN10 F 40s Yes 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN11’s office in Seoul PAN11 M 20s N/A 
April 30, 2007  
on the subway from Ansan to Seoul 
PAN12 F 40s Yes 
Jan 29, 2007 at a PAN13’s office in Seoul PAN13 F 20s N/A 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN14’s office in Seoul PAN14 M 40s Yes 
May 10, 2007 at a PAN15’s office in Seoul PAN15 M 50s Yes 
May 26, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO1 F 30s N/A 
Jan 30, 2007 
At CSO2’s office, moved to her car, and  
continued interviews at a restaurant in Seoul  
CSO2 F 60s Yes 
June 15, 2007 at a Buddhist temple in Yeojoo CSO3 F 50s Yes 
May 28, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO4 F 30s N/A 
June 1, 2007 at a CSO5’s office in Seoul CSO5 F 50s Yes 
June 1, 2007 at a CSO6’s office in Seoul CSO6 M 40s Yes 
May 25, 2007 at a CSO7’s office in Seoul CSO7 M 40s Yes 
May 26, 2007 at a CSO8’s office in Seoul CSO8 M 30s Yes 
June 4, 2007 at a CSO9’s office in Seoul CSO9 M 40s Yes 
June 1, 2007 at a café in Seoul CSO10 F 20s N/A 
April 18, 2007 at CSO11’s office  CSO11 F 20s N/A 
April 26, 2007 at CSO12’s office CSO12 M 40s Yes 
April 18, 2007 at CSO13’s office CSO13 F 50s Yes 
May 14, 2007 at a school cafeteria in Seoul  CSO14 F 40s Yes 
April 26, 2007 at a CSO15’s office CSO15 F 40s Yes 
April 3, 2007 at a pub in Seoul CSO16 F 30s N/A 
April 6, 2007 at a café in Seoul CSO17 F 20s N/A 
April 4, 2007 at CSO18’s office in Seoul CSO18 M 20s N/A 
April 5, 2007 at CSO19’s office in Seoul CSO19 M 30s N/A 
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ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTATION USED FOR CHAPTER 5 & CHAPTER 6 
(All documents were produced in Koreans except for the GPPAC-Korea Committee Report 
whose English version is available. The author wishes to acknowledge that their titles were 
translated into English by the author) 
 
School Peace  
(http://cafe.daum.net/schoolpeace) 
 
Department, K. A. E. (2008). Plan to Reduce School Violence in Anyang and Gwacheon Area. 
Anyang: Kyungki Anayng Education Department. 
 
Gwacheon News. (3 May 2007). School Peace's Youth Rights.  
 
Kim, M.-y. (30 August, 2006). School Violence? Please ask homemakers - Cup of Tea with 
Activists: Lee Hwa-Yung, School Peace. Ohmynews. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohmynews.com/nws-web/view/at-pg.aspx?cntn_cd=a000356400 
 
Lee, S., & Kim, Y. (29 January 2002). Request to Establish School Violence Prevention 
Legislation. Kyungin News. Retrieved from 
http://www.kyeongin.com/news/articleview.htlm/idxno=125769 
 
School Peace: Members Newsletter Inaugural Edition: February 2003.   
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 2: March 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 3: April 2003.  
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 4: May 2003.  
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 5: June 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 6: July 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 7: August 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 8: September 2003.  
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 9: October 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 10: November 2003. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 11: December 2003 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 12: January 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 13: February 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 14: March 2004. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 15: April 2004.  
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 16: May-June 2004.  
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 17: July 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 18: August 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 19: September 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 20: October 2004 
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School Peace Members Newsletter 21: November 2004 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 24: March-April 2005. 
 
School Peace Members Newsletter 25: May 2005 
 
School Peace: Members' Newsletter 26: February 2006. 
 
School Peace Annual Plan - 2006 
 
Women Making Peace – CR Centre  
(http://www.peacecr.org/) 
 
Chung, K. (1999). Reflection Essay: Geneva to Iwaguni. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Feffer, J. (1999). Meeting Women Making Peace. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Kim, D.-S. (2000). Peace Narrative: Reflection on Experiences of Participating in Conflict 
Resolution and Tolerance Building Workshop WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Kim, J.-s., & Park, S.-S. (2000 Autumn). Women Peace Academic: Autumn - Peaceful 
Resolution of Conflict. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data. 
 
Lee, S.-y. (2001). Workshop Experience: Peaceful and Tolerance Life Styles. WMP. 
Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Park, S.-S. (2001). Learning Conflicts in the Midst of Conflict. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Park, S.-S. (2001). New Civic Virtue: Facilitation and Conflict Resolution for Coexistence and 
Peace. WMP. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Park, S.-S. (2001). Seed for Peace Culture: Female Teachers' Workshop on Peaceful 
Resolution of Conflicts in Public School Systems in South Korea. WMP. Unpublished 
Raw Data.  
 
Park, S.-S. (2002). Cultural Approach: Application of Conflict Resolution to the South Korean 
Context. Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
Park, S.-S. (2002). Understanding peaceful resolution of conflict. UNESCO Korean Commission. 
Unpublished Raw Data.  
 
WMP-CR. (2000). Discussion Papers on Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Building Workshops. 
 
WMP-CR. (April 2006). Discussion on School Violence: Conflict Resolution and Peace 
Education as Preventative Measures. 
 
 
Peace Activist Network 
(http://www.cp.or.kr/) 
 
2006 Peace Activist Retreat Planning Commission Brochure.  
 
2006 Peace Activist Retreat Report: Opportunities and Challenges for Peace Activism in South 
Korea (30 November 2006 – 2 December 2006) 
 
Brochure from the Peace Activist Retreat Planning Committee. 2006.  
 
GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 16 February 2004.  
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GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 26 February 2004.  
 
GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 10 March 2004.  
 
GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 25 March 2004  
 
GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 19 August 2004 
 
GPPAC Korea Preparation Committee Meeting Minutes: 27 August 2004 
 
GPPAC-KOREA. (2005). Activity Report on GPPAC-KOREA. 
 
Minutes: Peace Activist Retreat: 19 April 2003.  
 
Peace Activist Retreat Activity Plan for 2007.  
 
Park, S.-y. (2009). Korean Society: Peace Movement. Unpublished Raw Data. 
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